

2021



# STATE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

# REPORT

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The State of South African Cities Report (SoCR) is the product of five years of knowledge generation and engagement by the South African Cities Network (SACN) and the broader fraternity of urban development practitioners, scholars and analysts. The efforts of the following are acknowledged and sincerely appreciated.

## SoCR team

Sithole Mbanga (SACN CEO), Monique Damons (Project Manager), Danga Mughogho, Rebecca Gatang'i

## SECTION 1. Insights into City Performance and Trends

**Contributors:** Monique Damons, Geci Karuri-Sebina, Danga Mughogho

**Data:** Open Cities Lab, Monique Damons

## SECTION 2. Collaboration and Partnership: Working towards transformed, inclusive and sustainable cities

### CONTRIBUTORS:

**Chapter 1:** Marius Pieterse, Danga Mughogho

**Chapter 2:** Jodi Allemeier, Kgomotso Tolamo

**Chapter 3:** Darlington Mushongera, Sipehelele Ngobese, Kate Tissington, Tariq Toffa, Nicolette Pingo, Tihologelo Mokgere

**Chapter 4:** Mark Swilling, Nontsikelelo Mngqibisa, Sumetee Pahwa Gajjar, Shahid Solomon, Liteboho Makhele

**Chapter 5:** Geoffrey Bickford, Kayla Brown, Sipehelelisiwe Ntombela, Nicolette Pingo, Gcinekile Luthuli, Beryl Mphakathi, Alana Potter, Yasmin Coovadia, Anel Du Plessis

## SECTION 3. Collaboration and Partnership: City perspectives and voices

**CONTRIBUTORS:** Monique Damons, Kristina Davidson, Sylvia Croese

**RESEARCHERS:** Development Works Changemakers (Johannesburg, Tshwane, City of Ekurhuleni); Urban Futures Consulting (eThekweni, Msunduzi); the Workplace Agency (Nelson Mandela Bay, Buffalo City); Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State (Mangaung); Development Works Changemakers and the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership (Cape Town).

### MUNICIPAL CHAMPIONS:

- Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality: Operations Manager: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality and team
- City of Ekurhuleni: Department of Strategy and Corporate Planning and the Department of Human Settlements.
- City of Johannesburg: Department of Human Settlements Resources, Monitoring, Capital & Infrastructure Maintenance Unit and Regional Health, Region A Unit.
- City of Tshwane: Group Head: City Strategy and team, the Divisional Head: Operations Support and team, and the COSUP team at the University of Pretoria's Department of Family Medicine.
- eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality: Senior Manager: Research and Policy Advocacy
- Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality: General Manager: Intergovernmental, International Relations and Funding, Office of the City Manager
- Msunduzi Local Municipality: IDP Manager and Senior Manager: Office of the City Manager
- Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality: Assistant Director: Policy and Research and colleagues, Office of the Chief Operating Officer

SACN would further like to thank Tanya Zack Development Planners, UrbanWorks and the City of Ekurhuleni for successfully undertaking the pilot study.

## SECTION 4. Beyond 2021: A local government outlook

**Contributors:** Tammy Lieberman, Sithole Mbanga, Nosipho Hlatshwayo, Rebecca Gatang'i, Kopano Ntsoane

## Technical reviewer

Geci Karuri-Sebina

The SACN would further like to thank the following for their input and participation in the production of the SoCR:

Ajiv Maharaj, Amira Osman, Andrew Boraine, Anthea Stephens, Ashraf Adam, Daniel Irurah, David Everatt, Eldrid Uithaler, Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha, Ivan Turok, Jan Erasmus, Jessica Blumberg, Johann Mettler, Karen Harrison, Kate Joseph, Lethu Masango, Marie Huchzermeyer, Mercy Brown-Luthango, Mirjam van Donk, Modjadji Malahlela, Monika Ginzler, Nhlanihla Mncwango, Nontando Ngamlana, PARI (Public Affairs Research Institute), Philip Harrison, Rehana Mosajee, Samantha Naidu, Sandiswa Tshaka, Seana Nkhahle, Sean O' Donoghue, Shirley Robinson, Sibongile Mazibuko, Soobs Moonsammy, Stefan van Niekerk, Stefanie Chetty, Thiresen Govender, Thsonono Buyeye, Tsholofelo Koopedi, Vuyiswa Mutshekwan, Xola Pakati, Yolisa Kani, Zayd Ebrahim.

## Production team

**DEVELOPMENTAL EDITOR:**  
Kristina Davidson (Write to the Point)

**PROOFREADER:**  
Fiona Wallace (Proof Excellence)

**DESIGN AND LAYOUT:**  
InkDesign, Cape Town

**PHOTO CREDITS:** see page 288

## Suggested citation:

SACN. 2022. State of South African Cities Report 2021. Johannesburg: SACN.

ISBN No. 978-0-620-98277-1



© 2022 by South African Cities Network. The State of South African Cities Report is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – Share-Alike 4.0 International License.

To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/>.

# CONTENTS

|                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| The Cities Covered in the SoCR        | 2  |
| Forewords                             | 3  |
| History of the State of Cities Report | 6  |
| Overview of the SoCR 2021             | 12 |
| The Story of the SoCR 2021            | 15 |

## INSIGHTS INTO CITY PERFORMANCE AND TRENDS

16

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Measuring City Performance and Trends        | 17 |
| About SCODA                                  | 19 |
| The SoCR Indicators in the Context of SCODA  | 20 |
| Overview of the Dashboards                   | 21 |
| Roadmap to the Dashboards                    | 23 |
| Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality       | 24 |
| City of Cape Town                            | 28 |
| City of Ekurhuleni                           | 32 |
| eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality          | 36 |
| City of Johannesburg                         | 40 |
| Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality           | 44 |
| Msunduzi Local Municipality                  | 48 |
| Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality | 52 |
| City of Tshwane                              | 56 |

## COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIP: WORKING TOWARDS TRANSFORMED, INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE CITIES

60

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| CHAPTER 1. Governing South African Cities  | 66  |
| CHAPTER 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion                    | 98  |
| CHAPTER 3. Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing   | 123 |
| CHAPTER 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition | 142 |
| CHAPTER 5. Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game                   | 172 |
| Conclusion   | 205 |

## COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIP: CITY PERSPECTIVES AND VOICES

207

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Introduction                                 | 208 |
| Summary of the Case Studies                  | 209 |
| The Research Project                         | 211 |
| Lessons and Insights                         | 213 |
| Conclusion                                   | 252 |
| City of Johannesburg                         | 216 |
| City of Tshwane                              | 220 |
| City of Ekurhuleni                           | 224 |
| eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality          | 228 |
| City of Cape Town                            | 232 |
| Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality | 236 |
| Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality       | 240 |
| Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality           | 244 |
| Msunduzi Local Municipality                  | 248 |
| Conclusion                                   | 252 |

## BEYOND 2021: A LOCAL GOVERNMENT OUTLOOK


253

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Introduction                                      | 254 |
| Where Have We Come From?                          | 255 |
| The Challenges and Issues Facing Local Government | 259 |
| Where Do We Go To From Here?                      | 268 |
| The Last Word                                     | 270 |
| List of Figures                                   | 271 |
| List of Tables                                    | 272 |
| References  | 273 |
| Acronyms and Abbreviations                        | 283 |

For ease of reading, the following shortened city names are also used in this report.

Buffalo City (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality)  
 Cape Town (City of Cape Town)  
 Ekurhuleni (City of Ekurhuleni)  
 Johannesburg (City of Johannesburg)  
 Tshwane (City of Tshwane)  
 eThekweni (eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality)  
 Mangaung (Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality)  
 Msunduzi (Msunduzi Local Municipality)  
 Nelson Mandela Bay (Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality)

# THE CITIES COVERED IN THE SoCR



BUFFALO CITY



CAPE TOWN



EKURHULENI



ETHEKEINI



JOHANNESBURG



MANGAUNG



MSUNDUZI



NELSON  
MANDELA BAY



TSHWANE

# FOREWORD

---

I am honoured to present the fifth edition of the State of Cities Report (SoCR). The South African Cities Network (SACN) prepares and publishes regular editions of the SoCR for South Africa. With their thorough research and grounding in city practice, these reports provide practical analysis and commentary on the trends in urban performance and the dynamics that shape cities in South Africa.

This report, which covers nine South African cities (Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Ekurhuleni, City of Joburg, City of Tshwane, eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality, Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, Msunduzi Local Municipality, and Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality), is borne out of a close collaborative relationship among the country's urban actors across all spheres of life. This fifth edition is being released at a time of great disruption and uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also timely, as the country has just ushered in new administrations following the local government elections held in November 2021, and will serve as an agenda-setter for the next five years.

Predicated on South Africa's urban development policy, the Integrated Urban Development Framework, the theme for this report is "effective cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach" and the importance of cooperation, collaboration and partnership between urban actors. The publication sheds light on the unfolding governance paradigm in South Africa. It posits that spatially transforming our cities to achieve access and inclusion, economic development, and job creation depends on a capacitated state, politics that work, cooperation across all spheres of government, and mutual understanding and ethical behaviour among all urban actors.

Part of the period covered by this report unfolded in the context of emergency governance (i.e., recurring incidents of xenophobia, COVID-19 and riots). These events brought to the fore the role of local government during emergencies and provided lessons from the past term of local government for implementing effective emergency governance initiatives.

The report emphasises the developing narrative that good urban governance is governance that allows space for participatory planning and decision-making, to ensure that all-of-society views and priorities are central to the way cities are run.

I hope that the research, engagements, and learnings coming out of this report will assist cities to adequately implement their respective city strategies and realise our collective vision of high-performing cities that are well-governed, productive, inclusive, resilient and sustainable.



**CLLR. XOLA PAKATI**

Chairperson of the SACN Council  
and Executive Mayor of the Buffalo  
City Metropolitan Municipality



**WITH THEIR THOROUGH  
RESEARCH AND GROUNDING  
IN CITY PRACTICE, THESE  
REPORTS PROVIDE PRACTICAL  
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY  
ON THE TRENDS IN URBAN  
PERFORMANCE AND THE  
DYNAMICS THAT SHAPE  
CITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA.**

---



**YOLISA KANI**

Chairperson of the SACN Board

# FOREWORD

Over 67% of South Africa's total population resides in cities. Considering that just over 56% of the world population now lives in cities, one begins to appreciate the rate at which urbanisation is taking place in South Africa.

With that number set to grow exponentially over the coming years, those leading our cities (and all of society) need to be at the forefront of driving impactful social change and promoting high-performing cities that are well-governed, productive, inclusive, resilient and sustainable.

In examining the characteristics of high-performing cities, a critical feature that stands out is governance. At its core, governance relates to how decisions that impact the lives of citizens are made. To achieve the spatial transformation agenda of the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), cities must anchor their programmes and initiatives in good governance. Good governance is about much more than city leaders making decisions – it is about how those decision-making processes are premised on long-term visioning, are collaborative, and are adequately resourced to help achieve the desired outcomes for city residents.

This fifth edition of the State of Cities Report goes beyond articulating good governance at a conceptual level and explores the phenomenon of cooperative governance. The cooperative governance theme is motivated by the reality that it is becoming increasingly urgent for South African cities to work well across all spheres of government and with other urban actors, to develop effective collaborations and partnerships for an inclusive, innovative and sustainable future for city residents.

This report, produced in close cooperation with South Africa's major cities and partners, is intended to progress the country's urban agenda in achieving the IUDF's strategic goals of access, growth, governance and spatial transformation. Through research, learning, and innovation, we can improve urban management and deliver a positive urban experience for all citizens. With this publication, the South African Cities Network continues its long-held tradition of encouraging the exchange of information, expertise and best practice on urban development and city management.

I sincerely hope that this report helps cities and other urban actors to reflect on the state of South African cities, to analyse the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead, and to develop impactful strategies that transform the lives of all urban residents.



**THIS FIFTH EDITION OF THE STATE OF CITIES REPORT GOES BEYOND ARTICULATING GOOD GOVERNANCE AT A CONCEPTUAL LEVEL AND EXPLORES THE PHENOMENON OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE.**

# FOREWORD

---

Local government was the final brick laid in establishing South Africa's democracy, a dispensation that comprises three spheres of government. Negotiations about the form, type, role and shape of municipalities were completed only after the Constitution had been finalised and adopted in 1996. The consequent 1998 White Paper on Local Government became an essential tool in crafting a vision for the local sphere.

The White Paper was an unwavering call to action at the local level, for municipalities to deliver basic services (water, electricity, human settlements) in an inclusive way, while contributing to economic growth, and protecting and preserving the country's ecological inheritance. The expectation was – and remains – that municipalities are accountable to and work with communities, households, businesses, citizens and civil society.

Almost a generation since that ambitious agenda was set down on paper, discontentment with municipalities continues to grow, despite interventions from various quarters, including other spheres of government. Local government's intended beneficiaries are disengaged and disillusioned. The consensus is that the local government system is not responsive to the growing needs of its constituents and is becoming increasingly unviable.

For South Africa to attain the vision of developmental local government, so well-articulated in the 1998 White Paper, something must change. This fifth iteration of the State of Cities Report highlights how city governments are expected to deliver under difficult circumstances while operating in a mode of emergency governance. They are affected by successes and failures in other spheres of government and influenced by global phenomena, such as climate change, increasing urbanisation, economic downturns and corruption. The COVID-19 health emergency has added to the levels of complexity facing cities.

Yet, at the same time, the challenges facing cities offer an opportunity for improved collaboration and cooperation, and for finding a different way of doing things. Such an opportunity requires everyone to coalesce around a common progressive agenda that prioritises inclusive economic growth, a closer relationship between nature and humanity, and accountable governance, where no one is left behind. I hope that the insights contained in this report will encourage a broad-based dialogue and influence the political agenda within local government.

I am privileged to have worked alongside a team of dedicated city practitioners, researchers, policymakers and activists who believe in the importance of cities and municipalities for delivering change and development to citizens. I believe that this report helps to raise the voices of the people. We must leverage government's robust policy frameworks to build and sustain cooperation, collaboration and partnership within our cities, for the improved wellbeing of all.



**SITHOLE MBANGA**

Chief Executive Officer



**I BELIEVE THAT THIS  
REPORT HELPS TO  
RAISE THE VOICES OF  
THE PEOPLE.**



# HISTORY OF THE STATE OF CITIES REPORT

---

Shortly after its formation, the South African Cities Network (SACN) produced the first State of South African Cities Report (SoCR). The report's production was informed in part by one of the SACN's founding funders, the Cities Alliance, "a global partnership fighting urban poverty and supporting cities to deliver sustainable development" that operates a multi-donor fund.<sup>1</sup> Cities Alliance had recognised that many cities and countries continued to manage urban issues with very limited evidence about major urban trends, changes and dynamics. Yet without such intelligence, it would be impossible to understand the success or failure of city strategies and interventions, or to compare cities for purposes of benchmarking or shared learning. Therefore, Cities Alliance began offering support to countries wishing to develop state of cities reports. South Africa was at the front of the line, and its SoCRs became the earliest success story.

SoCRs produced in South Africa set a very high standard of data presentation and analysis, and they have spurred a number of other countries to follow suit. Ideally, the Cities Alliance would like to see these reports produced in as many countries as possible and at regular intervals, to allow for progress (or the lack thereof) to be regularly reviewed. These reports are also an excellent vehicle for improving accountability for the use of public resources and assessing the positive and negative effects of different policy options. (Cities Alliance, 2009: 29)

Subsequently, other countries began producing SoCRs, with Mozambique, Brazil, Syria, and Latin America and the Caribbean all initiating their reports in 2009 with Cities Alliance's support, and the trend has continued. The SACN has often been invited to support the SoCR learning and journeys of other countries, including making presentations and, at one stage, developing a free SoCR toolkit, which was used by countries across Africa, Latin America and the Middle East in preparing similar reports. Despite this, in 2015, a review event of SoCRs held at the Africities 7 Summit in Johannesburg found that only two other African nations had managed to fully produce SoCRs: Ethiopia and Tanzania.<sup>2</sup> The reasons for countries not producing reports were largely to do with the very issues that SoCRs seek to engage, i.e., lack of data, capacity and political championship for understanding urban issues better.

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.citiesalliance.org/who-we-are/about-cities-alliance/overview>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.uclg.org/en/media/events/7th-edition-africities-summit>





## THE IMPORTANCE OF SoCRs

---

The central concern of SoCRs is to produce solid and up-to-date information that helps inform and support the work of urban actors across different sectors of society, as well as research into how to make South African cities functional. They contribute essential urban intelligence, build local skills and capacity, and raise the profile of the urban agenda in the national development discourse by helping to inform strategic urban policy, planning and decision-making processes.

Through this role, SoCRs have become an important enabler for sustained urban knowledge generation at the SACN and beyond, and are an important and influential compendium of South Africa's best urban data, knowledge and ideas. As every SoCR involves numerous data sources, researchers, institutions and references, the SoCR process has contributed to the ongoing building of urban intelligence and knowledge bases, while also enabling urban research skills development.


Externally, SoCRs have been widely recognised for their role in informing policy and practice and have even directly guided SoCR practice internationally. As illustrated above, the SoCR is recognised by Cities Alliance, UN-Habitat and other key institutions involved in steering, informing and raising the profile of the urban agenda in Africa and globally.

Locally, the SoCRs have been a crucial South African urban reference point since inception. Through strategic, analytical and other scholarly work, their value is in continually generating, sourcing, aggregating, processing and presenting urban knowledge in a unique way. The SoCRs have sustained the longitudinal narrative of South Africa's unfolding urban development journey in a way that no other record does. The involvement of the metropolitan municipalities and national partners in the development of the reports lends not only credibility but also analytical insight and impact potential to the work because it is thus positioned more closely to policy design, planning, and decision-making.

The 'State of' franchise is at the core of SACN's methodology, meaning that the SoCR is more than just a publication. It is one of several 'State of' knowledge products, which synthesise knowledge emanating from multi-year action research undertaken through the SACN. Examples include the State of City Finances, State of Urban Safety, State of Energy and State of Expanded Public Works Reports. The SoCR is elevated above the different publications due to its length and breadth. It takes the longest view (five years), which is the equivalent of a local government political term (see Figure 1), and is not sectorally delimited, making it the one report that comments holistically on the urban outcomes of a range of interventions and factors.

As far as possible, the SoCR production and release is aligned with South Africa's local government trajectory, and more specifically local government terms of office. with the intent of informing the work of incoming administrations.


**FIGURE 1:** Timeline (1994–2020)



The SoCR is the SACN's flagship output that presents a five-year perspective on the performance and analysis of the conditions of South Africa's largest cities. This is aligned with SACN's role of monitoring and evaluation, "taking stock of the performance, best practices and binding constraints of governance in large cities today" (SACN, 2012), and "as a form of assessment of member cities and the evolution of urban South Africa" (SACN, 2016).


  
**THE SoCRs PROVIDE  
HINDSIGHT, INSIGHT AND  
FORESIGHT ABOUT SOUTH  
AFRICA'S CITIES.**

South Africa's SoCR journey has been one of evolutionary learning – the two decades of producing SoCRs represent an iterative process of experimentation, learning and adjustments along the way.




## 2004 SoCR I

The inaugural SoCR introduced a thematic framework for interrogating cities, covering productivity, inclusivity, sustainability and good governance. This was used to reflect upon how South Africa's nine largest cities had performed in the post-apartheid years. It made the definitive point that cities are important and could drive social change, echoing Cities Alliance's view that "[i]nstead of debating the contribution of cities to development, more energy needs to be spent on unblocking it" and that the potential positive impacts of urbanisation could be leveraged through mobilising proactive local and national policy and development (Cities Alliance, 2004: 4). The first SoCR received positive acclaim and became a key urban reference work in the South African public policy system across government and academia. In addition to its pioneering data analysis and interpretations, the SoCR began to create a knowledge, planning and action agenda for South African cities.



## SoCR II 2006




The SoCR II was treated as an update to the first SoCR but had a wider scope and interpretation of urban trends and dynamics. It considered how city development strategies had facilitated economic growth and the extent to which cities had succeeded in providing access to services, amenities and opportunities for all residents. Importantly, the SoCR II concluded that the apartheid legacy of cities remained largely untransformed.

It identified 10 key challenges for South African cities to address over the following decade:

- i Thinking in new ways about urban space economy
- ii Managing population dynamics
- iii Economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth
- iv Enhancing urban transport
- v Overcoming the “apartheid city”
- vi Delivering basic services
- vii Promoting productivity and inclusivity
- viii Building an urban citizen
- ix Taking sustainability seriously
- x Streamlining urban governance

## SoCR III 2011




Under the theme of “Towards resilient cities”, the SoCR III continued to track and advocate for “the urban”. Its central question was whether or not developmental metropolitan government was having the desired effect of improving socioeconomic and environmental conditions in urban South Africa.

Although unable to answer this question affirmatively, the SoCR III did identify key differentiated intervention and support required for cities to drive resilient growth and development, with the main levers being:

- i Integrated spatial development
- ii Sustainability and climate resilience
- iii Rural-urban interdependence
- iv Reforming the local government financing model
- v Building stable and improved capabilities across government

## 2016 SoCR IV

The theme of the SoCR IV was “South African cities as effective drivers of local and national development”. The report was deliberately centred around the SACN’s Strategic Plan for 2011–2015, which had guided knowledge tracking and generation around selected themes derived from the SoCR III (SACN, 2012). This approach signalled the next evolution in SoCR, which was to serialise the report into a five-year barometer of the urban system. As such, the report reviewed city performances over an administrative term in relation to focal issues, sought to understand the reasons and variations of such performance, and concluded by framing some priorities for the agenda of the incumbent local government administrations.



The SoCR IV highlighted as key areas for consideration the need for:

- i Urgent spatial and economic transformation of cities
- ii Adequate organisational resourcing (finances and skilled people) for this transformation
- iii More capable, innovative and accountable institutions
- iv Appropriate governance arrangements and ecosystems
- v Reconfigured power relations to support an all-of-society approach

## 2021 SoCR V

The 2021 edition of the SoCR continues the journey, applying a governance lens to diagnose progress made towards achieving productive, inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed cities.



### REFERENCES

- Cities Alliance. 2004. 2004 Annual Report. Brussels, Belgium: Cities Alliance.
- Cities Alliance. 2009. 2009 Annual Report: Building Cities and Citizenship. Brussels, Belgium: Cities Alliance.
- SACN. 2004. State of the Cities Report 2004. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2006. State of the Cities Report 2006. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2011. State of the Cities Report 2011. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2012. SACN Strategic Plan 2011-2015. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2016. SACN Strategic Plan 2016-2021 and 10-Year Strategic Framework. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2021. SACN Strategic Business Plan 2021-2026. Johannesburg: SACN.



# OVERVIEW OF THE SOCR 2021

---

As with previous State of Cities Reports, the SoCR 2021:

- Reflects on the state of South African urban performance (2016–2021).
- Analyses how South African cities have addressed challenges, utilised opportunities, and effected change during this period.
- Communicates essential messages about what will be required from all urban stakeholders, particularly incoming city administrations, in the immediate future and beyond.

The SoCR 2021 comprises four sections.

## **SECTION 1** Insights into City Performance and Trends

This section provides evidence, analysis and insight into the performance and trends of nine South African cities: Buffalo City, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekweni, Johannesburg, Mangaung, Msunduzi, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane. It begins by explaining the importance of measuring city performance and the South African Cities Network (SACN's) involvement in the urban data space. It then briefly compares each city's performance and provides a roadmap for the individual dashboards or city data profiles that follow.

South African cities are performing by continuing to deliver services to their growing populations and by contributing to the national economy. However, they have made limited progress towards achieving the desired developmental outcome of becoming productive, inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed cities. This is nothing new. For over two decades, the SACN and others have reflected, analysed and advised on the city challenges that underpin these shortcomings. The same urban challenges and how to address them have been chronicled in numerous research reports, including previous SoCRs. Yet the local government system has been unable to respond meaningfully. This raises several inter-related questions:

- Why is South Africa not making progress towards the transformed future, as described in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 and the the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), and aligned to international policy instruments, such as the sustainable development goals (SDGs)?
- What in the system has prevented the realisation of these transformation intentions?
- What are the reasons for this and what needs to change?

In response to these questions, this SoCR focuses on governance issues, with the intention of understanding better what bedevils the local government system. However, interrogating the range of governance arrangements within the local government system is beyond the scope of one SoCR. Therefore, this SoCR concentrates on cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach, taking its lead from the SoCR 2016, which recommends the following:<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> SACN. 2016. State of Cities Report 2016. Johannesburg: SACN, page 304.

The activation of all role-players will be necessary to address these constraints. Government cannot address the extent and nature of the urban challenge by itself. Increased responsibility needs to be given to other role-players, since spatial transformation requires coordination and the active intervention of government, the private sector, knowledge institutions and civil society. Generic actions and conditions that need to be realised by all parties include building trust, ensuring consistency in communication, developing the ability to compromise and fostering cooperative space for mutual engagement as well as the realisation of goals on time, to budget and to the expectations of all role-players.

The discourse around cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach is not new and remains relevant. Cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches underpin the NDP, IUDF and international instruments, such as the SDGs, and are central concerns that the District Development Model (DDM) is trying to address.

However, despite policy support and commitment, these practices are not widespread and not always successful – their use has been haphazard, with isolated instances of (good) practice, rather than broad application. Cooperative governance and all-of-society practices are increasingly important for South African cities, especially in a climate of dwindling state resources but growing public demands at the local level (health, economy and social security), and when developmental outcomes are the mandate of (or dependent upon) other urban actors.

The SoCR acknowledges that cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach intersect with other aspects of governance, including the political-administrative interface, the capability of the state, and issues related to values and principles (Figure 1).

**FIGURE 2:** SoCR V theme



SoCR V specifically contributes to understanding:

- How (well) cities have addressed challenges and developed opportunities to effect change through cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach, with a focus on what they have (or have not) done, and how and why they have (or have not) done it.
- The successes and the failures and related lessons, insights, recommendations and solutions.
- The nature, power and politics of different urban institutions, systems, processes and stakeholders.

This understanding is specifically communicated through Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the SoCR.

## SECTION 2 Collaboration and Partnership: Working Towards Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Cities

This section provides perspectives on how cities have used a cooperative governance and all-of-society approach towards becoming more economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed. It reflects on the progress made towards these objectives, but its main intention is to provide insights, lessons and recommendations on using whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches to achieve these objectives. These approaches are connected to other governance concerns, including the capability of the state, the political-administrative interface, and values and principles.

## SECTION 3 Collaboration and Partnership: City Perspectives and Voices

This section presents nine case studies of city projects, which showcase how cities have used cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches, and offers governance insights and lessons about implementing these approaches. More specifically, some case studies illustrate how whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches can lead to positive change, while others highlight the systemic and project-level barriers that hinder the implementation of such approaches, as well as responses and recommendations to overcome them.

## SECTION 4 Beyond 2021: A Local Government Outlook

This section's core intention is to define a reform agenda for local government and to provide recommendations for beyond 2021. It starts by tracing the journey of democratic local government and giving an overview of the vision and thinking that informed the role and powers of local government. It then unpacks some of the complex challenges that have affected the performance of local government and examines some of the underlying assumptions and principles that have informed local government policy and practices. In line with the theme of the SoCR, this section argues that reforms are needed for better cooperative governance and all-of-society practices, and are connected to other important governance reforms.



### RESEARCH SOURCES

Section 1 of the SoCR is based on data drawn from the **South African Open Data Almanac (SCODA)**, while Sections 2, 3 and 4 are based on primary and secondary research inputs received from a wide range of urban practitioners, both internal and external to SACN and across different sectors of society – this broad spectrum of inputs is reflected in the **acknowledgements section**. Uniquely, Section 3 was produced in conjunction with the municipalities, whose insights directly informed the research outputs.



# THE STORY OF THE SOCR 2021

---

## Cities are delivering but face challenges

Despite an expected growing population (and number of households), South Africa's metros have maintained relatively high levels of service delivery, in terms of basic services (water and sanitation, electricity, waste removal) and ICT infrastructure. They have also managed to increase their contribution to the national economy, while operating in a climate of poor economic growth. Nevertheless, metros face challenges related to informality, public transport and associated infrastructure, as well as declining operational expenditure on maintenance.

## Development progress is limited and outcomes are mixed

Cities have made limited progress towards becoming economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed. They have struggled to translate their accomplishments into positive developmental outcomes and to create a better life for all their citizens. Outcomes have at best been mixed. The positives: Adequate access to food and literacy rates. The negatives: Unemployment, poverty and inequality, and more people affected by environmental problems.

## Cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches are key

To stand any chance of meeting their long-term development goals, cities need to adopt whole-of-government and all-of-society practices. Local government has had mixed results in working with all spheres of government and sectors of society (including civil society and the private sector). However, despite the challenging municipal environment, there are examples of successful practices. What is urgently needed is to remove the barriers and to facilitate broader project-level and systemic uptake of these practices.

## Related governance concerns need to be addressed

Governance concerns are interlinked and complex. A useful starting point for addressing interconnected concerns is to focus on implementing cooperative governance and all-of-society practices, which in turn benefit from the resolution of other concerns. Concerns include a differentiated approach to problem-solving; the voice and role of local government; devolving power, functions, responsibilities and resources to the local level; and the architecture and design of the local government system.

# 1

## INSIGHTS Into City Performance and Trends

- 17 Measuring City Performance and Trends
- 19 About SCODA
- 20 The SoCR Indicators in the Context of SCODA
- 21 Overview of the Dashboards
- 23 Roadmap to the Dashboards
- 24 Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
- 28 City of Cape Town
- 32 City of Ekurhuleni
- 36 eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality
- 40 City of Johannesburg
- 44 Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
- 48 Msunduzi Local Municipality
- 52 Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality
- 56 City of Tshwane





## MEASURING CITY PERFORMANCE AND TRENDS

Today, half of the world population lives in cities (a number which is projected to rise to 68% by 2050) and generates four-fifths of the global gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>1,2</sup> South Africa is no exception in experiencing rapid urbanisation: in 2020, over two-thirds (67%) of its population were living in urban areas,<sup>3</sup> and by 2050, South Africa's population is projected to grow by an additional 19–24 million people, most of whom will be living in cities and towns.

As the world's engines, cities are crucial for global development. Their performance in delivering basic services and positive development outcomes is inextricably linked to the wellbeing of not only their citizens but also regions, countries and the world. Given this tremendous responsibility placed on cities, understanding their performance and associated trends through data that supports key urban indicators is crucial. Urban indicators are measures that help cities make more informed decisions, prepare better policies and plans, and measure and report on results against set goals.<sup>4,5</sup> They also enable the performance of cities to be compared and evaluated against sector standards.

However, many parts of the world face challenges in data deficiencies and inadequate urban intelligence, which hamper planning and governance.<sup>6</sup> In response, several urban-focused data approaches have emerged, ranging from city data platforms, vendors and consortiums to big data initiatives, smart city solutions, and other alternative approaches. In South Africa, the South African Cities Network (SACN) has always been concerned about the need for up-to-date information on cities, to help inform and support urban governance.

In the first State of Cities Report (SoCR), the SACN introduced the idea of a data almanac, as a living resource of city data that would mitigate the challenges of inadequate data and limited analytical skills.<sup>7</sup> From 2004, the SACN began compiling such an almanac around five sets of indicators that corresponded to the SoCR themes: urban population, productive city, inclusive city, sustainable city and well-governed city indicators. Nevertheless, despite efforts by the SACN and others, municipal intelligence has remained weak. The Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) notes the inadequate data and analytical capacity within municipalities in relation to land administration and local economic development, and the need for building capacity to manage and analyse data “that is central to planning and policy implementation”.<sup>8</sup>



The aim of this section is to provide evidence, analysis and insight into the development performance of and trends in nine South African cities:

BUFFALO CITY,  
CAPE TOWN,  
EKURHULENI,  
ETHEKWINI,  
JOHANNESBURG,  
MANGAUNG,  
MSUNDUZI,  
NELSON MANDELA BAY  
AND TSHWANE.

Individual city profiles or dashboards are presented after an explanation of the importance of measuring city performance and trends, some background to the SACN's involvement in the urban data space, a comparison of the city data and a roadmap to the dashboards.

1 <https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html>

2 <https://ideas.ted.com/why-cities-rule-the-world/>

3 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=ZA>

4 <https://morphocode.com/urban-performance-measures/>

5 <https://www.intechopen.com/chapters/49102>

6 <https://www.citiesalliance.org/resources/publications/project-case-studies/%E2%80%9Cstate-cities%E2%80%9D-reports-help-transform-south-africa%E2%80%99s>

7 <https://www.sacities.net/state-of-cities-reports-2004/>

8 <https://iudf.co.za>



## PUBLIC SECTOR

Actors in South Africa's urban data space include:

- **National Treasury:** Local government database (MuniMoney); the City Support Programme (CSP's city data innovation initiatives linked to MFMA Circular No 88).<sup>12</sup>
- **South African Local Government Association (SALGA):** Municipal Barometer
- **Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA):** South Africa National Data Portal.
- **Statistics South Africa (Stats SA):** Nesstar data repository and sustainable development goals (SDGs) datasets.


## PRIVATE SECTOR

Actors include data vendors, smart city corporate consultancies and initiatives, while non-governmental actors include the Civic Tech Innovation Network (CTIN) and academic initiatives.

12 [http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Circulars/Documents/Second%20Addendum%20to%20Circular%2088/01.%20MFMA%20Circular%20No.%2088%20-%20Addendum%202%20-%2017%20December%202020%20\(final\).pdf](http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Circulars/Documents/Second%20Addendum%20to%20Circular%2088/01.%20MFMA%20Circular%20No.%2088%20-%20Addendum%202%20-%2017%20December%202020%20(final).pdf)

In 2016, the SACN launched the South African Cities Open Data Almanac (SCODA), an evolution of its 2004 SACN Almanac predecessor. SCODA's vision is to create an online living resource and database for cities, pursuing "a city-centric approach to addressing the planning, management, monitoring and reporting needs of cities – and to realise more efficient and effective data systems and processes".<sup>9</sup> Since 2016, the SACN has established a Data Strategy and a Common Data Framework for Cities (CDFC) (including a Codebook of Common City Indicators<sup>10</sup>), hosted data storytelling workshops with cities, and continued to develop the platform (adding new datasets and features and improving user engagement and capacity-building).

**FIGURE 1:** Common Data Framework for Cities



Source: SACN (2017)<sup>11</sup>

SACN occupies a unique position within the urban data space and has the agility to work across the ecosystem with universities, civic organisations, international partners and government spheres. As an intermediary working directly with South Africa's largest cities and the South African Council for City Data (SACCD), the SACN has both convening capacity and insight into city functioning. It appreciates that, while cities are mandated to report to the SACCD, each city will experience its own unique urban planning and management data needs and challenges.

9 <https://www.sacities.net/the-state-of-south-african-cities-report-2016/> page 385

10 The Codebook is a live listing of common city statistics and indicators, with definitions and methodologies for data collection, information on which cities are reporting on which indicators, and where respective data can be sourced.

11 <https://eolstoragewe.blob.core.windows.net/wm-566841-cmsimages/July2017CommonDataFrameworkforcities.pdf>



## ABOUT SCODA

---

SCODA is a city-centric data portal that provides current and comparable information about South African cities, to help inform evidence-based decision-making and reporting. An online central repository platform of open data, SCODA has three functions: data management, data analysis and data insight. It is mainly a data catalogue, but the intention is to evolve SCODA into a fully interactive data portal, able to be ISO<sup>13</sup>-certified as a city system for data and indicators. Ultimately, the aim is for SCODA to feed directly into cities' reporting requirements, thereby contributing to embedding data management principles and breaking down siloes across cities.

### Partners

SCODA is the product of work undertaken by SACN, its member cities and partners, which have included National Treasury, SALGA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and CTIN. The SACN's strategic partner, Open Cities Lab (formerly Open Data Durban), facilitated the design and development of SCODA, which informed the development of Durban Edge, eThekweni's open data portal.

### Data and indicators

The city-level data and indicators have evolved over time and represent the consolidation and review of various sources, including:

- Indicators from the 2006, 2011 and 2016 SoCR reports and almanacs.
- Reviews of existing sector-specific reporting requirements (e.g., State of Environment (SoE) indicators, NDP indicators and SDG indicators).
- Analysis of data and indicators required for local government reporting (SACN review and CSP Circular 88 data rationalisation processes).
- Data included in SoCR 2016.
- Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR's) Spatial Temporal Evidence for Planning in South Africa (StepSA) initiative.<sup>14</sup>
- Global City Indicator Facility (GCIF) indicators.<sup>15</sup>
- The World Council for City Data (WCCD), ISO 37120 Standard on City Indicators.<sup>16</sup>

In developing the portal and data catalogue, the SACN engaged with users through the SACCD, data storytelling workshops and focus groups. SCODA is a tool that all-of-society can use to understand and engage with city data and insights. Its components include:<sup>17</sup>

- An enhanced demographic model and interactive framework, which is supported by data streams.
- An improved data-handling framework that allows individuals to work with datasets directly.
- Training for city officials, to facilitate their use of the new framework.

---

<sup>13</sup> International Organization for Standardization <https://www.iso.org/>

<sup>14</sup> <http://stepsa.org>

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.cityindicators.org/>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.dataforcities.org/>

<sup>17</sup> [https://civictech.africa/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ODD\\_JICA\\_SACN\\_SCODA\\_FinalReport\\_19May2017.pdf](https://civictech.africa/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ODD_JICA_SACN_SCODA_FinalReport_19May2017.pdf)



## THE SoCR INDICATORS IN THE CONTEXT OF SCODA

---

SCODA provides important intelligence building blocks for the SoCR analysis, as well as being a key output of the SoCR project. This interconnectedness is evident in the three mechanisms through which SCODA data is collected:

- Data provided by the authors of research reports produced or commissioned by the various SACN thematic programmes towards the SoCR.
- The Codebook.
- Programme-specific data projects that source or specify additional data and indicators.

The SCODA platform is built around the original 2004 SoCR themes: productive cities, inclusive cities, sustainable cities, well-governed cities, and city development strategies that include demographic change. There are also additional focused sub-themes associated with the SACN's programmes, such as the biannual State of City Finances, which has a strong and sustained presence on the platform.





## OVERVIEW OF THE DASHBOARDS<sup>18</sup>

# 1

**FIGURE 2:** Population growth (2011–2019)

| BCM  | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN   | NMB  | TSH   |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| 5.9% | 20.0% | 22.4% | 13.0% | 29.4% | 14.9% | 4.8% | 24.9% |

**FIGURE 3:** Increase/decrease in households living in informal dwellings (2015–2018)

| BCM   | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN   | NMB   | TSH   |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ↓0.9% | ↑0.9% | ↓2.4% | ↓3.1% | ↓1.1% | ↓0.4% | ↓0.2% | ↓3.2% |

**FIGURE 4:** Change in percentage of city population with adequate access to food (2015–2018)

| BCM   | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN   | NMB    | TSH   |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|
| ↓1.5% | ↑4.2% | ↑2.6% | ↓4.0% | ↑3.0% | ↑2.4% | ↑14.5% | ↑2.9% |

**FIGURE 5:** Increase/decrease in unemployment rate (2016–2020)

| BCM   | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN   | NMB   | TSH   |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ↑0.9% | ↓0.2% | ↓0.5% | ↑1.9% | ↑4.1% | ↑1.9% | ↑4.1% | ↑3.4% |

**FIGURE 6:** Change in access to basic services between 2015 and 2018

|                       | BCM   | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN    | NMB    | TSH   |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| Electricity           | ↓0.3% | ↓0.1% | ↑5.5% | ↑0.9% | ↑1.7% | ↑0.3%  | ↑0.3%  | ↑2.0% |
| Sanitation            | ↑4.2% | ↑0.6% | ↑2.5% | ↓0.1% | ↓0.3% | ↓1.7%  | ↑2.4%  | ↑1.8% |
| Water supply          | ↓3.3% | ↓0.1% | ↑1.3% | ↑5.4% | ↓0.1% | ↓10.7% | ↓0.4%  | ↓0.9% |
| Weekly refuse removal | ↓3.0% | ↑0.5% | ↑0.6% | ↓0.3% | ↓2.0% | ↓13.0% | ↑30.4% | ↑0.5% |

**FIGURE 7:** Households experiencing environmental problems (2019)

|     | AIR POLLUTION | WATER POLLUTION | WATER REMOVAL & LITTERING | LAND DEGRADATION |
|-----|---------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| BCM | 35.2%         | 24.6%           | 48.4%                     | 52.3%            |
| CPT | 7.5%          | 7.7%            | 24.1%                     | 10.5%            |
| EKU | 22.4%         | 11.7%           | 22.1%                     | 16.5%            |
| ETH | 19.3%         | 18.9%           | 46.8%                     | 21.2%            |
| JHB | 21.6%         | 24.7%           | 46.8%                     | 23.5%            |
| MAN | 30.7%         | 24.9%           | 68.2%                     | 52.9%            |
| NMB | 15.2%         | 5.9%            | 42.0%                     | 2.7%             |
| TSH | 15.5%         | 14.5%           | 31.1%                     | 27.3%            |

**FIGURE 8:** Increase/decrease in households spending ≥10% of income on public transport (2015–2018)

| BCM   | CPT   | EKU   | ETH   | JHB   | MAN    | NMB   | TSH   |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| ↑8.0% | ↑3.3% | ↑2.8% | ↓6.3% | ↑4.2% | ↓10.7% | ↑3.4% | ↓1.7% |

<sup>18</sup> Msunduzi is not included in this overview due to the lack of comparable data.

All the SoCR city data dashboards are structured in the same way. They present a thematic storyline of city performance and trends, using selected data from SCODA, supported by data from the national Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA)<sup>19</sup> and Msunduzi Municipality. The indicators presented are a snapshot of selected trends or facts that are used to 'indicate' the state or condition of something and, where data is available for more than one year, the indicators show how conditions change over time.

The dashboards are by no means a comprehensive assessment of the issues represented. However, they do provide the ability to benchmark cities, displaying comparative data and indicators in an easy-to-view format, using uniform data sources. As a result, some newer or additional data for some cities has not been used, so that comparability could be retained. In some cases (e.g., life expectancy), provincial averages are used as proxies.

19 <https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/index.php/documents/>



# ROADMAP TO THE DASHBOARDS




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS

How are cities growing and changing?



## ECONOMY

Is our economy growing and do people have economic access?



## SOCIAL FABRIC

Are we transforming our cities into places that are creating a better life for all?







## SUSTAINABILITY

Are we using resources responsibly?




## CITY FINANCE

How financially secure are our cities?

### SUSTAINABILITY

Main source of energy/fuel for population




Households and recycling



Households and environmental problems



### SERVICE DELIVERY




### CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT



### CITY FINANCE

For more FINANCE DATA go to SCIBA


Municipal revenue



Audit outcomes




Operating expenditure



Capital expenditure



### TRANSPORT



## SERVICE DELIVERY

Do urban residents have access to reliable basic services?



## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

How are we engaging in governance?



## TRANSPORT


Are we responding to infrastructure needs and investing in building infrastructure for the future?




# BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

---

Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality lies between the Nahoon River and the Buffalo River, covering an area of 2750 km<sup>2</sup> and with a population density (in 2019) of 290 people per km<sup>2</sup>. It includes the town of East London, which is home to South Africa's only river port.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC

### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Buffalo City

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018



### Households and recycling

93.4%

OF HOUSEHOLDS DO NOT SEPARATE THEIR WASTE



4.3% sorted for or by waste pickers



2.3% collected or dropped off at recycling depot



### Households and environmental problems



35.2%

Air pollution

24.6%

Water pollution



2019



48.4%


Waste removal & littering

52.3%

Land degradation



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



6.7%

Fixed-landline telephone



94.9%

Mobile telephone



69.4%

Internet connections

80 831 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



419 044

VOTER TURNOUT



56.1%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



421 247

VOTER TURNOUT



65.5%

For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R6 144-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R43.0 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R132.5 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R12.4 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R6 846-million** ▶ 105% of budget spent



### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R1 760-million** ▶ 100% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure

2009 ▶ 2015 ▶ 2020  
6.0% ▶ 3.0% ▶ 2.0%



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 1.0%               | 1.3%         | 25.7%                 | 20.3%                          | 2.9%  | 33.3%   | 11.3% |
| 2018 | 0.4%               | 2.7%         | 26.0%                 | 26.5%                          | 1.7%  | 31.1%   | 11.3% |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.



of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (80.3% in 2015)







# CITY OF CAPE TOWN

---

The City of Cape Town includes South Africa's second largest city (Cape Town) – South Africa's legislative capital and the capital of the Western Cape Province. It covers an area of 2445 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 1835 people per km<sup>2</sup>.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC


### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Cape Town

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018




### Households and recycling



### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



315 246 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 977 690

VOTER TURNOUT



64.3%

### National elections


2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



2 008 243

VOTER TURNOUT



69.8%



For more **FINANCE DATA**, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R40 474-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

No data



Irregular expenditure

**R950.4 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R19.8 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R36 164-million** ▶ 91% of budget spent



### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R5 382-million** ▶ 64% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure

2009 ▶ 2015 ▶ 2020  
**5.4%**    **9.0%**    **8.0%**



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 0.8%               | 7.9%         | 37.5%                 | 13.9%                          | 9.9%  | 22.4%   | 7.2%  |
| 2018 | 1.3%               | 8.1%         | 38.2%                 | 17.2%                          | 4.9%  | 21.8%   | 8.1%  |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.



of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (76.9% in 2015)






# CITY OF EKURHULENI

---

The City of Ekurhuleni is one of three metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng Province and home to Africa's biggest international airport, OR Tambo. It covers an area of 1975 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 1968 people per km<sup>2</sup>.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC

### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Ekurhuleni

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018




### Households and recycling



### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



226 118 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 587 116

VOTER TURNOUT



58.0%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 631 056

VOTER TURNOUT



73.6%

For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R35 106-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

No data



Irregular expenditure

**R413.0 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

No data

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R38 020-million** ▶ 108% of budget spent



### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R5 983-million** ▶ 87% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure

2009 ▶ 2015 ▶ 2020

9.1%

3.0%

5.0%



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work



Bicycle/motorcycle



Bus (public)



Car (private/company)



Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie)



Train



Walking



Other

2015

1.5%

2.5%

32.5%

21.3%

6.5%

24.3%

11.0%

2018

1.2%

2.1%

33.2%

24.3%

3.5%

25.6%

9.9%

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.



of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (74.8% in 2015)







# ETHEKWINI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

---

The eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality is South Africa's third largest metropolitan municipality. It is the economic powerhouse of the KwaZulu-Natal Province and home to Africa's busiest seaport. It covers an area of 2555 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 1521 people per km<sup>2</sup>.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC

### Life expectancy



### Healthcare




### Levels of poverty

1 066 555 People living on less than R547 per month in 2018

2015–2019 inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.62

88.3% of the population had adequate access to food in 2018 (92.3% in 2015)

### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for eThekweni

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018




### Households and recycling




1.4% sorted for or by waste pickers

3.2% collected or dropped off at recycling depot

### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



191 033 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 919 724

VOTER TURNOUT



59.8%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 961 406

VOTER TURNOUT



71.1%



For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R34 787-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

No data



Irregular expenditure

**R2 341.4 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R4.1 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R35 094-million** ▶ 100% of budget spent



### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R5 373-million** ▶ 76% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure

2009 ▶ 2015 ▶ 2020  
**11.7%**    **7.0%**    **7.0%**



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 0%                 | 4.5%         | 24.4%                 | 26.8%                          | 3.0%  | 34.1%   | 6.8%  |
| 2018 | 0.2%               | 2.9%         | 26.5%                 | 25.7%                          | 2.9%  | 32.5%   | 9.0%  |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.




of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (78.5% in 2015)






# CITY OF JOHANNESBURG

The City of Johannesburg houses South Africa's chief financial and industrial metropolis. It covers an area of 1644 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density of 3488 people per km<sup>2</sup>, making it South Africa's most densely populated metropolitan municipality.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC


### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Johannesburg

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



# SUSTAINABILITY

## Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018



## Households and recycling



18.0% sorted for or by waste pickers




5.4% collected or dropped off at recycling depot



## Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



## ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



11 520 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



2 239 966

VOTER TURNOUT



57.2%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



2 291 299

VOTER TURNOUT



70.8%

For more **FINANCE DATA**, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R52 269-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R480.6 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R816.2 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R117.0 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R48 438-million** ▶ 95% of budget spent



### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R7 651-million** ▶ 98% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure

2009 ▶ 2.3%    2015 ▶ 3.0%    2020 ▶ 6.0%



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 0.6%               | 3.6%         | 28.5%                 | 29.0%                          | 2.7%  | 26.3%   | 8.8%  |
| 2018 | 0.6%               | 3.4%         | 28.4%                 | 29.2%                          | 2.0%  | 27.3%   | 8.8%  |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.



of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (73.8% in 2015)







# MANGAUNG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

---

Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality includes three urban centres: Bloemfontein (South Africa's judicial capital), Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. It covers an area of 9886 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 86 people per km<sup>2</sup>.



## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS



## SOCIAL FABRIC


### Life expectancy

2016–2020



### Healthcare

2018




### Levels of poverty



### Education

2018




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Mangaung

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018




### Households and recycling




**15.7%** sorted for or by waste pickers

**1.5%** collected or dropped off at recycling depot

### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



32 105 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



425 211

VOTER TURNOUT



57.8%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



425 263

VOTER TURNOUT



65.4%



For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R6 818-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R1 364.0 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R842.5 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R9.5 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R7 859-million** ▶ 125% of budget spent




### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R822-million** ▶ 73% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least **8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 1.0%               | 8.5%         | 27.1%                 | 20.4%                          | 0%    | 39.7%   | 3.0%  |
| 2018 | 1.7%               | 8.2%         | 27.5%                 | 19.3%                          | 0.4%  | 40.0%   | 2.6%  |

IN 2018

3.5% of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.

68.8% of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (79.5% in 2015)







# MSUNDUZI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

---

Msunduzi Municipality includes the capital city of KwaZulu-Natal Province, Pietermaritzburg. It covers an area of 751 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 927 km<sup>2</sup>.



## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS



## ECONOMY

### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment



## SOCIAL FABRIC

### Life expectancy

2016–2020

63.6%

YEARS



57.1%

YEARS



### Levels of poverty


2015–2019 inequality (Gini coefficient)

0.62



### Education

2018




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Msunduzi




## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018



## SERVICE DELIVERY



## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



340 998

VOTER TURNOUT



67.3%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



350 112

VOTER TURNOUT



74.3%



# CITY FINANCE


For more  
**FINANCE**  
DATA,  
go to SCODA

## Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R5 229-million**

### REVENUE BY SOURCE



## Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R170.0 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R215.0 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R4.50 MILLION**

## Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R5 675-million** ▶ 115% of budget spent




## Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R613-million** ▶ 107% of budget spent

## Maintenance as % of operating expenditure



# TRANSPORT

## Mode of transport to education or work

2015



Car (private/company)  
**25.0%**



Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie)  
**27.0%**



Non motorised  
**48.0%**

IN 2018




of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.






# NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality is the gateway to the Eastern Cape Province. It is located on the shores of Algoa Bay, midway between Cape Town and Durban and 1058 km from Johannesburg. It covers 1956 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population density (in 2019) of 617 people per km<sup>2</sup>.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC


### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Nelson Mandela Bay

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018



### Households and recycling




10.0% sorted for or by waste pickers




2.0% collected or dropped off at recycling depot



### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



63 706 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



609 217

VOTER TURNOUT



64.0%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



607 134

VOTER TURNOUT



66.5%



For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R10 097-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R446.4 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R 2876.7 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R103.4 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R10 171-million** ▶ 100% of budget spent




### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R1 667-million** ▶ 96% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least **8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 0.4%               | 6.4%         | 28.0%                 | 19.7%                          | 0.5%  | 37.4%   | 7.3%  |
| 2018 | 1.6%               | 4.4%         | 30.5%                 | 19.7%                          | 0.2%  | 34.9%   | 8.5%  |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.




of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (71.2% in 2015)






# CITY OF TSHWANE

The City of Tshwane is the largest (in land area) metropolitan municipality in Gauteng Province and includes South Africa's executive capital, Pretoria. It covers 6298 km<sup>2</sup> and stretches almost 121 km from east to west and 108 km from north to south. It has a population density (in 2019) of 579 people per km<sup>2</sup>.




## PEOPLE AND HOUSEHOLDS




## SOCIAL FABRIC

### Life expectancy




### Healthcare



### Levels of poverty



### Education




Go to SCODA to access SAFETY DATA for Tshwane

## ECONOMY


### Contribution to the national economy (GVA)



### Employment




### Main source of income for households



## SUSTAINABILITY

### Main source of energy/fuel for population

2018



### Households and recycling




7.4% sorted for or by waste pickers

4.8% collected or dropped off at recycling depot

### Households and environmental problems



## SERVICE DELIVERY



### ICT connections per 100 000 people in 2018



52 926 domestic consumer units received free basic services in 2019

## CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

### Local government elections

2016

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 512 524

VOTER TURNOUT



59.3%

### National elections

2019

NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS



1 557 224

VOTER TURNOUT



72.7%

For more FINANCE DATA, go to SCODA


## CITY FINANCE

### Municipal revenue

2018/19

TOTAL REVENUE ▶ **R33 173-million**

#### REVENUE BY SOURCE



### Audit outcomes

2018/19



Unauthorised expenditure

**R446.4 MILLION**



Irregular expenditure

**R2 876.7 MILLION**




Fruitless & wasteful expenditures

**R103.4 MILLION**

### Operating expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R32 395-million** ▶ 100% of budget spent




### Capital expenditure

2018/19

TOTAL EXPENDITURE ▶ **R3 302-million** ▶ 82% of budget spent

### Maintenance as % of operating expenditure



National Treasury recommends cities should spend at least

**8.0%**

## TRANSPORT

### Mode of transport to education or work

|      | Bicycle/motorcycle | Bus (public) | Car (private/company) | Taxi (minibus, sedan & bakkie) | Train | Walking | Other |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|
| 2015 | 1.0%               | 6.5%         | 36.3%                 | 19.5%                          | 3.9%  | 24.6%   | 7.9%  |
| 2018 | 0.9%               | 4.6%         | 34.7%                 | 21.5%                          | 3.0%  | 23.9%   | 11.2% |

IN 2018



of commuters have a travel time to work of more than 60 minutes.



of households spent more than 10% of their income on public transport (81.4% in 2015)



# 2

## COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIP: Working Towards Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Cities

66

**CHAPTER 1**  
Governing South African Cities

98

**CHAPTER 2**  
Productive Cities: Governance  
and Economic Inclusion

123

**CHAPTER 3**  
Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation  
for Inclusion and Wellbeing

142

**CHAPTER 4**  
Sustainable Cities: Cooperative  
Governance of the Just Urban Transition

172

**CHAPTER 5.**  
Spatially Trapped: Transforming  
the Rules of the Game

205

Conclusion





## INTRODUCTION

Section 2 of the State of Cities Report (SoCR) 2021 provides perspectives on the journey of cities towards the objectives of becoming more economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed. It reflects briefly on progress made, but its main intention is to provide insights, lessons and recommendations regarding using whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches to achieve these objectives. Such approaches are connected to other governance concerns, including the capability of the state, the political-administrative interface, and values and principles.

The chapters in this section show collectively that South African cities have made limited progress in achieving key development outcomes and, to stand any chance of meeting their long-term goals, cities must adopt whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches. A useful starting point for addressing the interlinked and complex governance concerns is to focus on implementing and embedding these practices. The chapters illustrate that, despite examples of good practice, these practices can be improved and need to be broadened to uptake at both project and systemic levels – similar findings are contained in **SECTION 3**.

**This section consists of five chapters.**

This chapter provides the conceptual, historical, legislative and policy context for the SoCR. Its departure point is mission-orientated governance, which refers to governance for creating economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed cities. An explanation of the concepts of government and governance, within international and national contexts, is followed by an examination of the role of local government in South Africa's constitutional and legal framework, and the challenges and developments for metropolitan municipalities since 2000. After providing some reflections on a post-COVID-19 South Africa and recommendations for achieving effective urban governance, the chapter introduces the subsequent chapters.

The chapter charts a trajectory of city governance, highlighting the fact that key governance improvements are needed if South African cities are to meet their development objectives in the way envisaged. Notwithstanding its noble intent, the Constitution's apportioning of functional authority and responsibility for various features of urban governance (and how it has been reflected in legislation) has failed to produce the kind of developmental and rights-based urban

## CHAPTER

# 1

## GOVERNING SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

autonomy that is required to achieve the ideals espoused by the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), Sustainable Development Goal 11 (SDG 11) and the New Urban Agenda (NUA). However, to assume that urban autonomy has failed in South Africa would be a mistake. On the contrary, the chapter shows that urban autonomy was never fully enabled in the first place.

Moreover, devolving power, functions and responsibilities will fail to produce results if not mirrored by the devolution of resources. Local government's funding base needs to be broadened, and resources for strategic projects and community assistance must not be subsumed by operating costs. Cities should also be encouraged to make the most of the funding sources that they do have, and to acknowledge that a range of external resources can be leveraged through the more explicit pursuit of all-of-society partnerships. The chapter shows that dynamic urban autonomy is not achieved through delegation, funding and intergovernmental arrangements alone. Rather, achieving the IUDF's vision will require doing things differently and relooking at urban governance structures – a sense of urgency and considerable political will are needed for a new approach to urban governance.

---

## CHAPTER

# 2

### PRODUCTIVE CITIES: Governance and Economic Inclusion

This chapter reflects on governance as a vehicle for inclusive economic growth in South African cities, and examines the interplay between governance, productivity and inclusion, emphasising the urgency of the latter. It has two main objectives: to highlight the importance of improving the collective understanding of city economies and to show that cities have levers available to address economic constraints. It profiles the structure and composition of the nine cities, as well as the different cooperative structures around levers that cities can use to achieve inclusive economic growth, providing practical examples of where and how these levers can be used. These examples also illustrate the challenges associated with an all-of-society approach and the inclusion of the economically vulnerable, which goes beyond providing services and low-level jobs to supporting business ownership and investment. The chapter concludes with lessons from the cities and recommendations for future efforts aimed at economic growth, redress and governance.

The chapter highlights the facts that cities are key drivers of productivity within the South African economy, but that economic gains are unevenly distributed and many people are precluded from participating and benefiting meaningfully. South African cities have historically experienced 'jobless growth', where economic growth (i.e., growth in production) has not always resulted in significant gains in permanent employment opportunities nor reduced inequality. Furthermore, limiting reporting on the economy to the gross domestic product (GDP) may be convenient but tells an incomplete story, especially when most citizens are poor, disadvantaged and excluded from benefiting in improved GDP. The most vulnerable remain susceptible to precarious income generation and skills development opportunities, which ultimately limit avenues for entry



into the formal economy and its benefits. This has led to increasing poverty, spatial and socioeconomic inequality, unemployment, overcrowding, pressure on infrastructure and municipal resources, and social tension.

South Africa's economy is characterised by increasing informality, barriers to entry, monocentric urban economies, constrained economic activity in previously disadvantaged areas, a spatial mismatch between areas of economic opportunity and households, as well as misalignment between the available labour force and industry demands. The shock of the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the economy's fragility. Better economic data and analytics capabilities would enable a more holistic story to be articulated, thereby enabling economic actors to work collaboratively towards positive interventions and providing all-of-society with the tools to hold cities to account. Economic actors need to come together to improve a city's economy and foster economic inclusion. This requires recognising the importance of an all-of-society approach to deepening governance through both enabling the participation of local elites and poor and marginalised residents and holding powerful actors to account.

This chapter explains why inclusivity and wellbeing are crucial for cities, and how greater inclusion leads to a better quality of life and wellbeing of city dwellers. South African cities have not made much progress towards creating inclusive places that all people (including the marginalised) can own and shape without fear of intimidation. However, pockets of excellence demonstrate that transversal cooperation among government spheres and all-of-society approaches contribute to making cities more inclusive. The chapter highlights the elements necessary to achieve real engagement for inclusion and wellbeing, and offers some recommendations for cities.

The chapter shows that, decades after the end of apartheid, most urban dwellers remain socially, spatially and economically excluded. The COVID-19 crisis has deepened inequality and disproportionately affected the marginalised and vulnerable. The lack of progress in making and managing more inclusive spaces and places can be attributed to local governance systems that are constrained in terms of devolution, transversal management and intergovernmental relations. In addition, inadequate participation processes result in conflict with communities and stakeholders. Given the multidimensional nature of inclusion and wellbeing, to change the status quo will require adopting a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach, and devolving mandates and funding for crucial inclusion functions to the local level.

## CHAPTER

# 3

### **INCLUSIVE CITIES: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing**

The multi-stakeholder urban environment in South Africa is challenging. This means that attaining social inclusion (in particular equal rights and the participation of all) requires meaningful cooperation among government spheres, public agencies and other sectors of society. Cities have pockets of excellence that demonstrate how city officials are shifting their practice towards partnership and co-development in order to make cities safer, involve the youth in urban processes, improve living conditions in informal settlements, and create better public places. However, these practices tend to be at the level of loosely formed coalitions of the willing. The challenge is to upscale and institutionalise these practices, by making systems, processes and practices of public institutions more people-centred and inclusive, and upskilling city practitioners to be able to work with complexity, both within their own institutions, across spheres of government and with communities.

## CHAPTER

# 4

### SUSTAINABLE CITIES: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition

This chapter examines how South African cities have addressed sustainability challenges and harnessed opportunities to further the just urban transition through cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach. It looks at knowledge-sharing networks (for energy, water and waste); intermediaries in Cape Town, Gauteng and the Eastern Cape; and multi-stakeholder partnerships that illustrate partnering strategies implemented in Ekurhuleni, eThekweni and Cape Town. The chapter shares lessons from the practical experience of cities, touching on the power and political dynamics of different urban institutions, systems and processes, and stakeholders involved in just urban transition initiatives. This then feeds into specific recommendations.

The chapter describes the national policy frameworks and city-level strategies, which show a growing commitment to achieving a just urban transition. However, the practical challenges of shifting the institutional and cooperative governance arrangements that constrain sustainability transitions in cities have not been fully grasped. The chapter uses practical examples of how to formulate a shared value proposition across sectors of society when the focus of government is regulation, the aim of business is profit and civil society demands change. Achieving a shared value proposition requires specific interventions to harness partnerships that are best facilitated by networks, intermediaries and knowledge brokers, have high degrees of autonomy and can establish the ground rules for partnering in practice.

South African cities face a triple challenge: they have to respond to profound environmental challenges (specifically climate change, resource depletion and ecosystem vulnerability); address deepening socioeconomic inequalities exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic; and establish new modes of cooperative governance able to navigate effectively the complexities of urban development in the information age. For cities to drive just transitions will depend on partnerships and learning from experimentation, and require cooperative governance, which comes alive when a balance is achieved between the top-down authorising environment and the bottom-up mobilising environment. Such a balance creates conditions for innovation and resource mobilisation across both state and non-state actors.

## CHAPTER

## 5

**SPATIALLY TRAPPED:  
Transforming the  
Rules of the Game**

This chapter's departure point is that spatial transformation depends on the governance capacity of the municipal institution. It interrogates the link between slow spatial transformation in cities and institutional governance capabilities, and analyses how internal municipal environments enable or hinder the attainment of equitable spatial outcomes. The chapter argues that structural forces (the 'rules of the game') in municipalities shape the behaviours of practitioners, which in turn hinder practices that support the attainment of spatial transformation goals. Through the lens of cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach, the chapter explores the complexities of devolution, transversal management, the political-administrative interface, and participation by and conflict between communities and stakeholders. It provides 'rays of hope' and offers some insights into the areas where new 'rules' are required.

The chapter is primarily based on the research and reflections of municipal practitioners through the work done by SACN's Built Environment Integration Task Team (BEITT), which involved extensive qualitative interviews and the inclusion of several case studies that demonstrate the complexities and challenges of spatial transformation work. The rules of the game are both formal (legislation) and informal (institutional norms and power dynamics), and have contributed to the current state of play, in particular with regard to challenges in intergovernmental cooperation, partnering with communities and long-term, meaningful community engagement.

Despite these challenges, cities have good practices that showcase transversal management and intergovernmental collaboration; human-centred practice; and long-term, meaningful, targeted community involvement. The journey of the BEITT highlights the passion and human capability that exist within the system, and has provided a space for reflection and learning, reminding practitioners of the wide gap between city intentions and actual practices. To attain greater spatial inclusion/transformation in South African cities will require shifting and transforming the rules of the game. They include the municipal performance management system, which does not encourage cooperative governance, and the existing interpretation of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), which currently disincentivises creative solutions. Based on municipal practitioner experience, this chapter offers some leading perspectives of what matters most for South Africa in the efforts to exit the capability trap and make progress in driving spatial transformation.

# Governing South African Cities

|   |  |    |
|---|--|----|
|    | Introduction   | 67 |
|    | Unpacking 'Good' Urban Governance                        | 69 |
|    | Governing South African Cities in the Constitutional Era | 75 |
|  | The Realities of Governing Cities: 2000–2016             | 81 |
|  | Urban Governance: 2016–2021                              | 87 |
|  | Lessons from the Last Five Years                         | 90 |
|  | Conclusion   | 94 |
|  | Recommendations  | 95 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <b>BOX 1:</b> Collaborations between government and non-state stakeholders | 85 |
| <b>BOX 2:</b> The IUDF policy levers                                       | 88 |
| <b>BOX 3:</b> Emergency governance and local government                    | 93 |



## INTRODUCTION

---



The ways in which cities are governed locally matter globally, both economically, politically and socially. Over the last century, the increased movement of people to cities and their participation in markets have profoundly challenged the conventional conceptions of nation states and government. Transnational flows of people, goods, money and services are ostensibly undeterred by national boundaries and domestic exercise of state power. Yet they are simultaneously driven from and concentrated in the world's cities, which remain physically, politically and legally embedded in nation states (Curtis, 2016; Porras, 2009; Sassen, 2012). Governing cities and towns in a variety of local contexts is complex and challenging and has to respond to globalisation and its many associated crises, including climate change, inequality, political instability, terrorism, migration, social polarisation and pandemics (Barber, 2013; Du Plessis, 2017; Schragger, 2016).

Global sustainable development and prosperity depend on the sustainability of the world's cities, and that sustainability depends, among other things, on how cities are governed. The United Nations' New Urban Agenda (NUA) embodies an ambitious commitment to steer the force of urbanisation towards sustainable development. It speaks of the need for an "urban paradigm shift" that requires all levels of government to "readdress the way we plan, finance, develop, govern and manage cities and human settlements, recognizing sustainable urban and territorial development as essential to the achievement of sustainable development and prosperity for all" (UN-Habitat, 2017: para 15).

The 2021 State of Cities Report (SoCR) applies a governance lens to assess the limited progress made towards productive, inclusive and sustainable cities. One of the policy levers in South Africa's urban policy, the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), is "effective urban governance", which envisages "cities and towns that have the necessary institutional, fiscal and planning capabilities to manage multiple urban stakeholders and intergovernmental relations, in order to build inclusive, resilient and liveable urban spaces" (COGTA, 2016: 10).

The South African Cities Network (SACN) understands governance to mean both governing, through bureaucratic systems and processes, and managing competing public and private interests and stakeholders, through political processes. This idea of governance towards particular ends (e.g., productivity, inclusion and sustainability) is known as mission-oriented governance or the just urban transition in the case of sustainability.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the term, two key components are cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach.

This chapter introduces the concepts of government and governance, within the context of international and national policy and standards. It then examines the role of local government in South Africa's constitutional and legal framework and the challenges and developments for metropolitan municipalities (metros) since 2000. The chapter ends with reflections on a post-COVID-19 South Africa and recommendations for achieving effective urban governance.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition





## UNPACKING 'GOOD' URBAN GOVERNANCE

Cities have been the backdrop for a conceptual shift away from 'government', which is understood as the top-down regulation of societal actors through the command and control of the central state, to the far broader notion of 'governance'. Governance refers to multi-scalar, relational, flexible and open-ended processes of regulation, decision-making, implementation and administration, as well as the joint application of resources and expertise, through dialogue, negotiation and compromise by a range of actors from across the public and private spheres (Curtis, 2016; Du Plessis, 2010; Newman & Verpraet, 1999; Picciotto, 2011; Pierre, 1999; Porras, 2009). Governance involves a plurality of actors acting in tandem to pursue locally defined, continually negotiated and contested, common goals (Du Plessis, 2010; Lobel, 2004; Pierre, 1999). It is:

- Cooperative: depending on cooperation and dialogue among the different actors (Du Plessis, 2010; Lobel, 2004).
- Networked: occurring primarily through the relationships and interactions between these actors (Curtis, 2016; Newman & Verpraet, 1999; Picciotto, 2011).
- Participatory: allowing for and depending on all of the actors to contribute to devising solutions (Lobel, 2004; Millstein, 2010; Porras, 2009).

Compared to conventional notions of government, governance emphasises the following:

- The central state governs with actors from all-of-society, including other spheres and organs of state, as well as a wide range of non-state actors, such as civil society organisations, knowledge institutions, businesses, labour unions, residents' associations and individual members of society.
- The normative and practical dimensions of governance emerge primarily from the relationships and interactions between the various actors involved, rather than from some overarching structure of authority.
- Governance processes are not always linear, unidirectional and hierarchical, and solutions are often negotiated (rather than imposed) and implemented through the joint efforts and cooperation of all involved.

### Urban governance: Challenges and opportunities

All around the world, the shift from government to governance has required thinking about new platforms, mechanisms, institutions, instruments, lines of accountability, and processes for governing cities and towns, at different scales. It has also come with a complex set of challenges and opportunities. Networked and cooperative governance is necessarily far more fragmented than conventional, top-down notions of regulation (Pierre, 1999). It requires a plurality of governance coalitions, which may shift over time, and governance instruments that regulate different aspects of life in different spatial configurations, such as national laws, local bylaws, city or region-wide development plans, local zoning regulations, neighbourhood or street-based public-private partnership (PPP) agreements, investment agreements or private contracts (Lobel, 2004; Picciotto, 2011; Pierre, 1999). As a result, cities and towns often consist of an unstable 'patchwork' of governance arrangements. Different sectors (e.g., transport, security, essential

service provision or housing) in different parts of the city (e.g., inner cities, upmarket business districts, specific suburbs, streets, neighbourhoods, industrial areas, development precincts or office parks) are governed by different (and shifting) coalitions of private and public interests, and according to different mixes of legal/regulatory regimes and instruments (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Bulkeley et al., 2018; Murray, 2011; Pieterse, 2017).

This constantly shifting ‘patchwork’ of governance arrangements is unwieldy and complex, especially when superimposed onto challenges of transversal management within government institutions (SACN, 2016). It may lead to the following outcomes:

- Exacerbated inequality, segregation and the privatisation of public space (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Lemanski, 2007; Madlalate, 2017).
- Less democratic influence, control, openness and accountability, as actors other than elected governments have control over different aspects of city life (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Millstein, 2010; Murray, 2011; Pierre, 1999). This may frustrate urban residents (especially the urban poor), as “growing democratic opportunities offer limited to no influence over the multiple forms of governance and diverse sets of authorities who decide how they must live” (Anciano & Piper, 2019: 4).
- Watered-down commitments to social or spatial justice and meeting the socioeconomic needs of residents, when governance arrangements are fragmented and corporate interests dominate specific sectors or areas. ‘Good’ urban governance may be associated with neo-liberal, market-friendly practices focused on achieving urban competitiveness, middle-class liveability and corporate profit, thereby potentially sidelining more social-democratic or welfarist efforts (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Curtis, 2016; Houghton, 2011; Lemanski, 2007; Porras, 2009).

More optimistically, the all-of-society approach inherent in contemporary governance arrangements allows for the leveraging of far broader skills and resources than are typically available to most governments (Lobel, 2004; Picciotto, 2011). It also leads to the deepening of democracy, offering more radical possibilities than in conventional structures for individuals and communities to participate in governance, and enabling both the local elites and the poor, marginalised and formally disenfranchised residents to participate in collective decision-making processes and to hold powerful actors accountable (Kola & Jordan 2019; Millstein, 2010; SACN, 2016).

## Urban governance: Towards what ends?

A progressive all-of-society approach to urban governance requires broad consensus among governing actors on the substantive outcomes that governance efforts should strive to achieve (Pierre, 1999). The backbone for such consensus is provided by ‘developmental governance’ and ‘rights-based governance’, joined together by the value and normative standard of sustainable development (Du Plessis, 2017), as reflected in international and national commitments.

Central to the notion of sustainable development are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which present a “plan of action for people, planet and prosperity” aimed at “eradicating poverty in all its dimensions” and intending to “heal and secure our planet” (UN, 2015a). In line with an inclusive, all-of-society approach to governance, the SDGs are committed to



“strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people” (ibid: 2). Of particular importance for urban governance, SDG 11 articulates a commitment to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”. SDG 11.1–11.3 include undertakings to:

ensure access for all to adequate, safe, and affordable housing and basic services; [...] provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all; [and] enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management.

In many respects, this commitment to inclusivity, safety, resilience and sustainability dovetails with the longstanding goals of the international human rights movement, which is geared towards achieving “the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want” by creating conditions in which all civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, can be enjoyed (UN 1966: common preamble).

SDG 11 acknowledges that the form and functioning of cities and towns contribute to unsustainable and unjust forms of development, and it requires cities and towns to redirect their form and functioning towards safer, more inclusive, more resilient and more sustainable ways of being (Du Plessis, 2017). In South Africa, this connects with the need to overcome the severe spatial and socioeconomic cleavages bequeathed by apartheid that continue to frustrate the achievement of SDG 11’s ideals in urban and rural areas (ibid; SACN, 2016). Accordingly, the IUDF, which is the South African government’s “policy position to guide the future growth and management of urban areas”, explicitly aligns its aims and objectives to SDG 11 and undertakes to make urban settlements “more functionally integrated, balanced and vibrant” as well as more compact, connected, coordinated, productive and liveable (COGTA, 2016: 7).

Like SDG 11 and the international instruments concerned with its implementation, such as the NUA and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (UN, 2015b), the IUDF requires that urban governance efforts actively steer the form and functioning of cities and towns towards safety, inclusivity, resilience and sustainability, in interaction with each other and with rural and peri-urban areas (COGTA, 2016; Porras, 2009; Valencia et al., 2019). Such mission-orientated governance is achieved through a rights-based approach to urban governance that leverages partnerships from (and for) all-of-society (Mazzucato et al., 2021; UCLG, 2018). This is perhaps best encapsulated by the NUA’s commitment to “leave no one behind”. Indeed, the shared vision articulated by the NUA is of “cities and human settlements where all persons are able to enjoy equal rights and opportunities, as well as their fundamental freedoms” (UN-Habitat, 2017: para 12). The NUA urges all levels of states and all urban stakeholders to mainstream human rights in their urban governance practices, especially the right to adequate housing (UCLG, 2018; Valencia et al., 2019).

Human rights are crucial tools for an effective all-of-society approach to developmental local governance (Grigolo, 2017; UCLG, 2018), alongside the need to create, strengthen, revitalise and enable “multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources” across the conventional private/public state/non-state

divides (UN, 2015a: SDG 17 – see also UCLG, 2018; Valencia et al., 2019). Rights, which are constitutionally entrenched and/or legally enforceable, are important instruments for governance from below, as they give citizens a way to hold both state and private actors accountable and to insist that governance efforts remain true to their substantive ends (Chueca, 2016; Millstein, 2010).

The SDG 11 commitments resonate with the African Union Commission's Agenda 2063 – the African We Want (AUC, 2015), which envisages “a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development” (aspiration 1); expresses a commitment to developing “a universal culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law” (para 27); and explicitly determines that “all the citizens of Africa will be actively involved in decision making in all aspects of development, including social, economic, political and environmental” (para 48).

## Devolution and urban autonomy

Urban governance has global, regional, national and local dimensions that converge in the physical localities of cities. Therefore, local government has an important coordinating role in urban governance processes, especially in systems (such as in South Africa) where local government structures are elected by and are the closest democratic link to local urban communities.

The reconfiguration of state power, as a result of globalisation, has often involved decentralising state power from national level to regional or local governments (Brenner, 2004; Schragger, 2016). Decentralisation and power-sharing among different levels of government take many forms around the world and vary considerably between different states.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, most decentralisation models involve a degree of transfer or ‘devolution’ of powers to local governments. These include functions and responsibilities associated with essential service delivery, local economic development, the regulation of urban form and function, and everyday urban administration (Fombad, 2018; Pieterse, 2020a; Turok, 2013).

Urban local governance occupies central stage in the shift from government to governance because local government typically receives power devolved from national government and then power is transferred and diffused ‘outwards’ to stakeholders other than the state (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Brenner, 2004; Lobel, 2004; Newman & Verpraet, 1999). Moreover, local government is the branch of state ‘closest to the people’ and so often the point where individual and community concerns encounter the governance matrix (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Du Plessis, 2010), which is why it tends to be the space ‘formally’ designated for community participation.

Competent, effective and accountable local governance is essential for the localisation of SDG 11, and local government has an important role to play “in strengthening the interface among all relevant stakeholders, offering opportunities for dialogue [...] with particular attention to contributions from all segments of society” (UCLG, 2018; UN-Habitat, 2017: para 42). Therefore, the devolution of state power to local government appears fundamental for an all-of-society approach to urban

---

<sup>2</sup> See Fombad (2018) for a comprehensive discussion of an African context

governance. Shifting power away from centralised, top-down government to the local level brings the following advantages (Turok, 2013: 170):

- Stronger “horizontal relationships” become possible, as do improved “policy coordination across different sectoral functions of government”, and better alignment of policy “with the activities of external organizations in civil society”.
- Bringing policy-making closer to local communities gives citizens more influence and leads to public services that are more relevant and responsive to “conditions on the ground”.
- City economies are strengthened, as local authorities have “greater discretion to address their distinctive needs and opportunities” and to develop “infrastructure, skills and partnerships with private investors” relevant to their local needs.

Local government is the most suitable venue for formulating, coordinating and steering local priorities for all-of-society governance processes and is best placed to counter the potential fragmentation of urban governance efforts and to steer developmental and rights-based urban governance (Barber, 2013; Du Plessis, 2010; Lobel, 2004; Picciotto, 2011; Porras, 2009; Schragger, 2016). To fulfil effectively this steering role, local governments must be appropriately empowered, capacitated and resourced. This means that sufficient decision-making, priority-setting and strategic planning authority must be devolved to local governments, alongside the necessary powers and responsibilities, and sufficient human and financial resources, to enable effective implementation of plans and policies (Porras, 2009; Schragger, 2016; UCLG, 2018; UN, 2015b; UN-Habitat, 2017; Valencia et al., 2019).

Devolution also needs to be accompanied by intergovernmental relations structures and accountability mechanisms, which circumscribe the powers of local governments, hold them accountable for the ways in which they exercise these powers, and maintain a degree of alignment between their governance efforts and those of other governance actors in the broader society (Grigolo 2017; Schragger 2016; Valencia et al 2019; UN-Habitat, 2017).

Cities are governed by both legally bestowed state power and the relational interactions between the state and non-state actors and communities. Therefore, local government needs to be able to define, pursue and steer a conglomeration of urban actors to achieve common developmental ends and exercise control over “the kind of places their cities are or become” (Pieterse, 2019a: 121). Devolution does not adequately capture the source, extent and dynamics of the powers, functions and responsibilities associated with local government’s steering role. Instead, ‘urban autonomy’ is increasingly used to refer to the extent of local government’s legal and related ‘power over’ urban shape, form and functioning, and the extent to which it exercises and can mobilise other actors with the ‘power to’ shape urban space (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Newman & Verpraet, 1999).

Urban autonomy is relational, contextual and ever-shifting, continuously reshaped by the intricacies of devolution and intergovernmental relations, and the changing relationships among the different actors that govern urban space in the city (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Bulkeley et al., 2018; Pieterse, 2019a). Furthermore, it depends on the human and financial resources at the disposal of governance coalitions, alongside other factors such as local and national party politics, economic forces, the nature of private sector interests and activities, the strength, focus and level of organisation of civil society, and culture and identity politics prevailing in the community (Bulkeley et al., 2018; DeFilippis, 1999; Oomen & Van den Berg, 2014; Pieterse, 2019a; Porras, 2009).

## So, what is 'good' (urban) governance?

Urban autonomy can be steered towards both progressive and less progressive ends (DeFilippis, 1999; Frug, 1999; Lemanski, 2007; Pieterse, 2019c). It is arguably a crucial prerequisite for good urban governance and needs to be anchored in the pursuit of progressive societal goals, such as achieving the SDGs and protecting and realising human rights (Bulkeley et al., 2018; Du Plessis, 2010; Grigolo, 2017). Cities are not islands, and their autonomous governance must contribute to the pursuit of social justice and sustainable development for all-of-society. Moreover, urban governance conglomerations, as steered by local government, need to be held accountable for the effective pursuit of these societal goals. Such accountability lies both outside, where national or regional governments or the courts hold local governments accountable, and inside, built into internal mechanics, such as community participation processes in local government affairs (Barber, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2018; Pieterse, 2020a).

'Good' urban governance is accordingly both shaped and enabled by an appropriate package of devolved legal powers, functions, responsibilities and (human and financial) resources, which are applied towards locally defined common goals anchored in sustainable development and human rights. It involves bringing on board a broad range of other governance stakeholders and steering their efforts, while being guided by the meaningful participation of residents. It respects the important interests in local government affairs of national and regional governments, other cities and rural areas, and cooperates with them through reciprocal structures geared towards the achievement of broader societal goals (Valencia et al., 2019). It exercises its powers and performs its functions openly, transparently, competently and effectively (Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016).





## GOVERNING SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA

# 2

Under apartheid, a racially segregated and highly unequal system of local government involved urban municipalities functioning as subservient bureaucratic substructures of the central state and serving only the interests of white urban residents (Palmer et al., 2017; Steytler & De Visser, 2008). This system was completely transformed into rights-based, developmental and participatory autonomous local governance, through South Africa's interim (1993) and final (1996) Constitutions alongside the Department of Constitutional Development's comprehensive White Paper on Local Government (1998), and was implemented through a range of transitional legislative and policy instruments.

### A strong and progressive developmental framework

South Africa has a strong and progressive constitutional, legislative and policy framework for developmental and rights-based urban governance, involving all-of-society.

#### 1996 Constitution

South Africa's Constitution constitutes three distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government (national, provincial and local) that operate according to the principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. The three spheres are envisaged as autonomous but co-dependent, meaning that they must "co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith", including by "coordinating their actions and legislation with one another", in order to "provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole". They must "respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres" and "exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere" (Sections 40 and 41).

Chapter 7 of the Constitution is devoted to local government, establishing municipalities across the country ("wall to wall"). These municipalities have "legislative and executive authority" and significant space for autonomous governance, as each municipality has "the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community". This autonomy is exercised within the parameters of national and provincial legislation, but national and provincial governments "may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions".<sup>3</sup>

The Constitution's concept of urban governance (and therefore of urban autonomy) is explicitly developmental, participatory and rights-based, which aligns with the global pursuit of sustainable development and with an all-of-society approach to governance.

<sup>3</sup> Sections 151(1), 151(2), 151(3) and 151(4)

**Developmental and participatory** (Section 151): Municipalities must, within their financial and administrative capacity, strive

- a. to provide democratic and accountable local government for local communities;
- b. to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
- c. to promote social and economic development;
- d. to promote a safe and healthy environment; and
- e. to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.

**Rights-based** (Chapter 2): All spheres of government and all organs of state must “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights (Section 7). These rights are legally enforceable against both state and non-state actors (Section 8) and include the following rights: access to adequate housing (Section 26); access to food, water and health care services (Section 27); and an environment that is not detrimental to health or wellbeing (Section 24). All of these rights involve aspects of urban shape, form and functioning and are thus affected by urban governance (Du Plessis, 2010; Pieterse, 2017).

The Constitution provides for the establishment of different categories of municipalities (Section 151), including ‘Category A’ municipalities, which are the focus of this chapter. The Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) defines a Category A municipality (more popularly referred to as a metropolitan municipality or metro) as:

a conurbation featuring areas of high population density; an intense movement of people, goods and services; extensive development; and multiple business districts and industrial areas [which is also] a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy; a single area for which integrated development planning is desirable; and having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units.

South African municipalities typically exercise a mix of devolved and delegated powers (De Visser, 2005; Pieterse, 2014; Steytler & De Visser, 2008). Metros exercise on their own the powers and functions conferred upon local government by the Constitution, whereas Category B (local) and Category C (district) municipalities operate in secondary towns and cities and in rural areas, and exercise these powers jointly.

Local government derives its powers from Section 156(1) of the Constitution, which determines that municipalities have “executive authority in respect of, and [...] the right to administer” both “local government matters” listed in either Schedules 4B or 5B<sup>4</sup> of the Constitution, and other matters assigned to them by legislation. Municipalities have the power to make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of these matters (Section 156(2)) and are assigned the administration of functional areas listed in Schedules 4A and 5A of the Constitution where “the matter would most effectively be administered locally and the municipality has the capacity to administer it” (Section 156(4)).

---

4 Functional areas listed in Schedule 4B are “air pollution; building regulations; childcare facilities; electricity and gas reticulation; firefighting services; local tourism; municipal airports; municipal planning; municipal health services; municipal public transport; municipal public works [...]; pontoons, ferries, jetties and harbours [...]; storm water management systems in built-up areas; trading regulations; water and sanitation services [...]”. Schedule 5B lists “beaches and amusement facilities; billboards and the display of advertisements in public places; cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; cleansing; control of public nuisances; control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public; facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals; fencing and fences; licensing of dogs; licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public; local amenities; local sport facilities; markets; municipal abattoirs; municipal parks and recreation; municipal roads; noise pollution; pounds; public places; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; street trading; street lighting; traffic and parking”.

The division of functional authority in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution is often criticised for being vague, overlapping, random and haphazard, while the legislative delegation of some functional areas (e.g., housing and transport) that are crucial to urban governance has been slow and incomplete. This has been blamed for diluting, even stunting, urban autonomy in South Africa (Christmas & De Visser, 2009; De Lille & Kesson, 2017; De Visser, 2009; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2019a; Turok, 2013). Nevertheless, when their delegated and devolved responsibilities are viewed together, South African municipalities clearly exercise considerable authority over a great many aspects of urban form and everyday urban functioning (Pieterse, 2019a; SACN, 2016; Turok, 2013), although this authority is often shared with the national and provincial spheres of government and always exercised subject to their oversight (Section 155(7)). How authority is allocated adds complexity to the pursuit of developmental objectives and invites intergovernmental tensions and conflict. Cities exercise different degrees of autonomy and authority over different aspects of interrelated functional areas, subject to different co-governance or oversight arrangements.

In addition to exercising oversight, the national and provincial spheres of government may intervene in municipal affairs when municipalities fail to fulfil their executive obligations. Depending on the context, such interventions may be far-reaching. For instance, provinces may be empowered to issue directives to municipalities, take over certain municipal functions (such as the provision of essential services) and, under extreme circumstances, even dissolve a municipal council (Section 139). These powers may be a potential dampener on urban autonomy (De Visser & November, 2017; Pieterse, 2019a) but are tempered by procedural constraints (Section 139(2)-(6)) and by national and provincial governments' constitutional obligation to "support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions" (Section 154(1)).

The Constitution establishes an independent resource base and a measure of financial autonomy for local government. Municipalities are entitled to receive an "equitable share" of nationally raised revenue and project-specific grants from national or provincial government (Section 228(1)). Although the equitable share should be spent on service provision in poorer communities, in principle municipalities may spend it how they see fit, provided that the expenditure can be related to their developmental mandate (Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2020). Municipalities may further raise their own additional revenue, by imposing service charges, property rates and other surcharges, taxes, levies and duties; and raising loans for capital and bridging current expenditure (Sections 229 and 230A).

## 1998 White Paper on Local Government

The White Paper paved the way for translating into reality the constitutional vision of developmental, participatory, rights-based and autonomous local governance. To overcome the legacy of racial segregation of all features of South African life, the White Paper contains an extensive vision of developmental local government, comprising four interrelated aspects:

- Maximising social development and economic growth.
- Aligning public (including all government spheres) and private investment.
- Democratising development.
- Building social capital through leadership and empowering marginalised groups.

Developmental government rests at the local level, and municipalities need “to develop their own strategies for meeting local needs and promoting the social and economic development of communities in their areas of jurisdiction” (South Africa, 1998: 11). The White Paper makes extensive recommendations on how to structure cooperative intergovernmental relations and the institutional, political and administrative systems of municipalities. These recommendations are reflected in the legislative architecture of municipal government in South Africa. Three legislative instruments form the backbone of this architecture: the Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998), the Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (No. 56 of 2003).

## The Municipal Structures Act

This Act provides the form for urban autonomy and governance in South African cities. It establishes and clarifies some of the powers and functions of different categories of municipalities, provides for the composition and operation of municipal councils and their executive leadership, and enjoins municipalities to focus on achieving developmental objectives set out in Section 152 of the Constitution.

- **Executive authority:** In metros, this authority can be delegated either to a committee elected by the council or to an elected executive mayor supported by an executive committee of their choosing (Sections 8: 42–60). The executive leadership is tasked with identifying, reviewing and prioritising local needs, and then recommending to the metropolitan council how these needs can be met, and how best to implement the strategies, programmes and services, including doing this through partnership with other local government stakeholders (Sections 44(2) and 56(2)).
- **Community participation in municipal affairs:** This can be structured at municipal ward or substructure level, or a combination of both (Sections 8: 61–78). Participatory structures may exercise some delegated authority and may, through their leadership, make recommendations to the metropolitan council on any matter affecting their areas (Sections 64 and 74).
- **Metropolitan councils:** Although in practice the bulk of their powers are delegated to the executive leadership or participatory substructures, metropolitan councils maintain overarching strategic and decision-making authority. They hold their executive leadership accountable and have the power to remove the leadership from office by way of a resolution (Sections 53 and 58). Both the council and the executive leadership may create and task committees to perform any particular municipal function (Sections 79–80).
- **Annual review:** Municipalities are required to review annually their performance against their developmental objectives, community needs, organisational and delivery mechanisms, and participatory processes through which these are met (Section 19).



The Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act together are intended to enable autonomous, developmental, participatory and rights-based local governance. As such, they not only reflect the intentions of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government but also accord closely with the subsequent global aspirations contained in the SDGs and the NUA.



## The Municipal Systems Act

This Act details the powers and functions assigned to local government, elaborates the many ways in which municipalities exercise their executive and legislative authority, and prescribes processes for exercising legislative authority. It reflects an all-of-society approach to municipal governance, stating that a municipality comprises its political structures, its administration and *its community*.

- **Community:** This is defined widely and includes residents, ratepayers, civil and non-governmental organisations, the private sector, labour organisations, and basically anyone or body who makes “use of services or facilities provided by the municipality”, including “the poor and other disadvantaged”.
- **Municipal autonomy:** Municipal councils have the right to govern on their own initiative, to exercise their executive and legislative authority without interference, and to finance their operations through levying service fees, rates and surcharges (Section 4(1)).
- **Municipal governance:** Municipalities are directed to achieve developmental goals, involve and consult with communities, meet community needs, deliver financially and environmentally sustainable services, and realise the socioeconomic rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Section 4(2)). Municipal governance is further explicitly subjected to the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (Section 4(3)).
- **Participatory governance:** Municipalities are required to “develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance” (Section 16). Communities should be encouraged, enabled and capacitated to participate in integrated development planning, strategic service delivery planning, performance management and budgeting, through ward and/or sub-council structures, as well as other mechanisms (e.g., petitions, public meetings). These participation provisions have been described as among the most comprehensive and progressive of their kind in the world (Foster, 2019; Kola & Jordan, 2019).
- **Integrated Development Plan (IDP):** At the start of its term, every municipal council must adopt an IDP as a “single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the municipality” (Section 25(1)). The IDP must reflect the council’s developmental vision, priorities, objectives and strategies, and must include its spatial development framework, operational plans, disaster management plans, financial plans, and key performance indicators (Section 26). It is designated as “the principal strategic planning instrument” in every municipality, and binds municipalities in the exercise of their executive authority (Section 35). An elaborate and participatory drafting and adoption process is also prescribed (Sections 28–31).



Although ambitious and cumbersome, the IDP process is credited with forcing local government to come to terms with its developmental role, and has played an important role in aligning city visions with global objectives, such as those embodied by the SDGs and the NUA.

## The Municipal Finance Management Act

The MFMA supplements the Systems and Structures Acts but betrays a somewhat more restrictive leaning. It prescribes detailed processes for municipal budgeting, accounting, financial management, supply chain management, the formation of PPPs and financial auditing and reporting. While certainly robust and conducive to good financial governance, these provisions have been criticised for being overly prescriptive, cumbersome and micromanaging, for complicating beneficial forms of networked governance in partnership with the private sector, and for stifling municipal innovation and autonomy (De Visser, 2009; Fuo, 2019; SACN, 2016; Steytler, 2008; Turok, 2013).



Overall, South Africa's suite of municipal legislation, which also includes the Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998) and the Municipal Property Rates Act (No. 6 of 2004), embodies a progressive commitment to enabling autonomous, innovative, developmental and rights-based urban governance, which dovetails well with the global 'urban paradigm shift'.

The MFMA betrays a top-down and somewhat punitive vision of intergovernmental relations (Pieterse, 2019a; Steytler, 2008), as its provisions on cooperative government include:

- The possible stopping of funds and equitable share allocations to municipalities.
- The close monitoring and capping of municipal service charges, taxes and tariffs.
- Often mandatory provincial interventions in municipal affairs that require stringent financial recovery plans to be imposed on malfunctioning municipalities, which risk having their councils disbanded or their functions taken over by provinces in case of non-compliance.

Yet these provisions were arguably inspired by national government's growing frustration at increasing failures of municipal governance at the time of the Act's drafting. Moreover, they remain the only effective legislative elaboration of the constitutional provisions governing provincial monitoring, support and interventions in municipal affairs (De Visser & November, 2017; Ledger & Rampedi, 2019) and, in recent years, have proven direly necessary in dealing with wide-scale municipal collapse.

## Sector-specific legislation

In addition to the municipal legislation, an array of sector-specific legislation regulates various aspects of urban form and functioning, and of essential service delivery in cities and towns. These laws include the Housing Act (No. 107 of 1997), the Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997), the National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998), the Disaster Management Act (No. 57 of 2002), the Social Housing Act (No. 16 of 2008), the National Energy Act (No. 34 of 2008), the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) (No. 16 of 2013) and the Infrastructure Development Act (No. 23 of 2014). They grant significant powers and impose significant responsibilities on local government, while giving effect to the constitutional provisions requiring national government to regulate the exercise of municipal authority, to delegate the administration of a range of functional areas to municipalities, and to oversee the manner in which municipalities perform their functions.



## THE REALITIES OF GOVERNING CITIES: 2000–2016

---

While the constitutional, legislative and policy framework for urban governance is strong and progressive, the actual task of governing South African cities and towns has, perhaps unsurprisingly, not been a ‘walk in the park’.

After a transition phase, local government structures began operating in their current form following the municipal elections in late 2000. The period 2000–2016, which spans three local government election cycles, consists of two roughly equal phases: slow but steady ‘implementation and growth’ (until the 2008 global financial crisis); then socioeconomic and political decline and increasing governance collapse following Jacob Zuma’s ascent to the national presidency (Palmer et al., 2017). During both phases, the metros generally outperformed their local and district counterparts, as a result of existing resilient bureaucratic systems and structures, comparatively more advanced infrastructure and economies, and a greater pool of human, technological and financial resources (De Visser, 2019; Palmer et al., 2017). They also did not have to contend with the debilitating inefficiencies that have come to be associated with the ‘dual’ layer of district and local municipalities (De Visser, 2005; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2021).

Despite some pressure points, metros are “well governed in terms of structures and processes” and have generally sound and solid bureaucratic structures, financial and audit controls and service delivery systems (SACN, 2016: 203). They have made strides in extending essential service delivery across their disparate geographies, and their IDPs reflect both a distinctly local developmental vision and a realistic roadmap, and are increasingly grounded in extensive community consultation (Du Plessis, 2017; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2019b; SACN, 2016; Van der Berg, 2019).

However, their performance has been disappointing in terms of spatially transforming cities. Their population distribution and built environment continue to display acute racial divisions, while service delivery has remained inequitable across this fractured urban geography (COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). Moreover, especially post-2008, metropolitan governance politics have become more fraught; cracks have appeared in service delivery systems; and an increasingly hostile rift has developed between metropolitan governments, their communities and their stakeholders (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). Dwindling trust in local government increasingly manifests in destructive protests by residents (Atkinson, 2007; Booysen, 2009; Pieterse, 2018), and the metros have found themselves increasingly hauled before court by local residents’ and civil society organisations (Du Plessis, 2018; Pieterse, 2018).

While much of this state of affairs can be ascribed to deep socioeconomic and political cleavages in the broader South African society, fault lines in the formal structuring of urban autonomy and urban governance systems also played a part. These have become apparent especially from the interaction between legislated structures, systems and processes, and the messy realities of urban politics and city human and financial resources.

## Value, overlapping, haphazard allocation of functions

The vague, overlapping and haphazard manner in which Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution allocate functional competence and responsibilities among the three government spheres has hampered effective devolution and complicated both intergovernmental relations and intersectoral alignment of governance efforts.

The Constitution's scattered allocation of legislative, executive and administrative authority over closely related planning and development functionalities has caused significant intergovernmental tensions. There has been a string of high-profile legal disputes over planning and development decisions, with cities resisting provincial bodies taking planning and development decisions that subvert municipal IDPs. In all these disputes, the Constitutional Court came down on the side of the cities, declaring the relevant provincial actions unconstitutional for unduly usurping municipalities' executive authority.<sup>5</sup> These judgments, which have been lauded for enhancing and cementing urban autonomy (Pieterse, 2019a; Turok, 2013; Van Wyk, 2012), spurred Parliament to adopt the SPLUMA, which now governs intergovernmental cooperation in relation to development planning.

Outside of planning, despite their intent to be progressive and to empower urban autonomy, the various sector-specific laws display "little consistency and explicit inter-linkages" in allocating powers and responsibilities to municipalities (Du Plessis, 2017: 254). Moreover, they all conceptualise the role of local government somewhat differently, on a spectrum between autonomy and subservience, and many of them have different monitoring, support and financial arrangements (Du Plessis, 2017). Different departments within municipalities operate with a different mix of autonomy, powers, functions and resources, and function under different intergovernmental relations and accountability arrangements, which has resulted in silos and complicated intersectoral alignment, coordination and cooperation within municipalities (Cameron, 2014; De Lille & Kesson, 2017; Du Plessis, 2017; Pieterse, 2019a; Steytler & De Visser, 2008; Turok, 2013). It has further contributed to unfunded mandates (where responsibility is devolved but unaccompanied by fiscal devolution) and to breakdowns in accountability (SACN, 2016).

For municipalities, the maze of poorly aligned laws and regulations governing different aspects of their operations in different sectors, and different compliance standards and reporting requirements, are overbearing and overwhelming (ibid). Moreover, devolution has been delayed or incomplete in some sectors, specifically housing and transport, which both lie at the core of sustainable urban development and spatial transformation (De Visser, 2005; 2009; COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2014; SACN, 2016).

## Complex, ineffective intergovernmental structures

The intergovernmental coordination and planning structures created in terms of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (No. 13 of 2005) are complex, ineffective and out of step with urban autonomy, embodying a somewhat hierarchical and top-down conception of cooperative government (Cameron, 2014; COGTA, 2016; De Visser, 2009; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). What is missing is "a fluent

---

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed discussion of the judgments, see Pieterse (2019a)

intergovernmental dialogue on urban planning and development” (COGTA, 2016: 99). Intergovernmental structures have tended to focus on coordination rather than on establishing effective mechanisms for joint planning, and embedding these within the structures of local government (COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017). Furthermore, national and provincial efforts at regulating, monitoring and overseeing municipal performance have been poorly aligned and have tended to veer between overbearing micromanagement and disconnected aloofness (COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017; Steytler, 2008; Turok, 2014). In particular, provincial interventions in malfunctioning municipalities have been unpredictable, inconsistent and mostly ineffective, and have not capacitated municipalities to take control of their own recovery (De Visser & November, 2017; Ledger & Rampedi, 2019; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2021).

## Politicising of the executive-administrative interface

The absence of a legislated separation of powers between legislative and executive functions at local level works against executive accountability in municipalities, especially in municipalities governed by an executive mayor system (De Visser, 2009; Pieterse, 2020b). In these municipalities, power is over-concentrated in the office of the executive mayor, as almost all meaningful decision-making power is delegated to this office, mayoral committees serve at the executive mayor’s behest, and the administrative leadership answers in the first instance to the executive leadership (Cameron, 2005; De Visser, 2009; Pieterse, 2021; SACN, 2016). Most meaningful strategic governance decisions are taken by the mayor and mayoral committees behind closed doors, with councils relegated to a rubberstamping function, as mayoral committees are not viewed as committees of council and so do not have to be open to the public (Atkinson, 2007; Cameron, 2005; De Visser, 2009; Pieterse, 2021). The mayor chooses mayoral committee members from the majority party caucus in council (a practice which has withstood constitutional attack — see Pieterse, 2020b). This has resulted in political party agendas and factionalism exercising undue influence over executive decision-making in most urban municipalities (De Visser, 2010; Pieterse, 2020b; Thornhill, 2008a; Woodridge, 2007). The legislative/executive conflation has further blurred lines and caused tensions between the offices of mayor and speaker, and played a part in politicising the executive-administration interface (De Visser, 2010; Thornhill, 2008a; 2008b; Woodridge, 2007).

The politicising of the executive-administrative interface is a problem around the world, but is especially acute in South Africa, where through the years major political parties in control of urban councils have insisted on political loyalty from senior administrators (Cameron, 2003; Palmer et al., 2017). This has, predictably, resulted in high turnover and vacancy levels in senior administrative positions; allowed for significant executive interference in municipal administration and party-political interference in urban autonomy; and has left many administrations vulnerable to nepotism, infighting and corruption (De Visser, 2010; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2020b; Thornhill, 2008b; Woodridge, 2007).

Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. For example, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane have had some success in countering these accountability shortcomings of the legislature/executive conflation by establishing committees of council under Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, and tasking these with exercising oversight over the executive and administration (Kraai et al., 2017; Napier, 2018). However, many other cities have opted to create committees answerable only to the executive leadership under Section 80 of the Municipal Structures Act, thereby exacerbating the problems (De Visser, 2010; Kraai et al., 2017; Thornhill, 2008b).

## Lack of trust and communication between communities and government

Despite having one of the most elaborate and progressive frameworks for participatory governance in the world, South African municipalities have struggled to adopt an all-of-society approach to urban governance. All large cities have established participation structures and processes, which consume much of local government's energy, time and resources. However, these have not resulted in meaningful community participation and much less in partnership or co-governance (Foster, 2019; Kola & Jordan, 2019). Instead, post-2000 urban governance is characterised by rapidly deteriorating levels of trust between communities and government (Kola & Jordan, 2019; SACN, 2016). Ward committees, in particular, are widely regarded as having failed. They have become politicised or captured by narrow interests, and have little influence in municipal decision-making — as a result, communities view them as toothless and pointless (Barichiev et al., 2005; Foster, 2019; Kola & Jordan, 2019; Piper & Deacon, 2009). Similarly, communities experience the elaborate and time-consuming IDP processes as hyper-technical, tedious talk-shops, where community input is seldom meaningfully taken on board (Foster, 2019; Gervais-Lambony, 2015; Kola & Jordan, 2019; Pieterse, 2018). As a result, active citizens are often not aligned with or leveraged by governance efforts and not uncommonly pit themselves against the aims of local government (Atkinson, 2007; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017).

There is a “lack of innovative, co-produced solutions to service delivery dissatisfaction” (COGTA, 2016: 94). Service delivery planning tends to take place with minimal community input, while service delivery processes are plagued by communication breakdowns between municipalities and residents. Dissatisfied communities have given up on constructive engagement as a way of solving service delivery disputes and resort, in the first instance, to protest and/or litigation to vent their frustrations with local governance (Atkinson, 2007; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; Booysen, 2009; Pieterse, 2018).

Between 2000 and 2016, urban residents (assisted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) won a string of legal cases based on their socioeconomic rights in the Constitution. Most cases concerned local government's developmental duties compared to city practices in delivering services, or right-to-housing challenges against evictions and relocations from informal settlements or illegally occupied inner-city buildings. Almost without fail, inadequate communication between the cities and their residents lay at the crux of these disputes. Not uncommonly, the Constitutional Court would declare the city practices unconstitutional for unreasonably failing to engage with their residents, or for failing to treat residents with dignity and respect in the course of interactions.<sup>6</sup> While sympathetic to the challenges faced by urban local governments and not averse to recognising responsibilities of residents, the Constitutional Court was uncompromising in insisting that urban governance processes must respect and observe constitutional rights, and must endeavour to enhance participatory democracy (Pieterse, 2018; Ray, 2016; Wilson, 2011).

## Lack of partnership with non-government stakeholders

Local government's relationship with non-state urban stakeholders is characterised by poor communication and a mutual lack of trust. In most cities, the business sector, knowledge sector and civil society engage with local government as service consumers or organised pressure/lobby groups,

---

<sup>6</sup> For discussion of these judgments, see Du Plessis (2018), Pieterse (2017: chapters 2-3), Pieterse (2018), Ray (2016)

not as stakeholders or partners. Most metropolitan local governments lack internal institutional platforms for stakeholder collaboration, which thus tends to be regulated predominantly through 'external', arms-length mechanisms such as contracts or memoranda of understanding.

South African cities have surprisingly low levels of private sector participation in service delivery (COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). This may be due to lingering distrust of the business sector and ideological opposition to privatisation among South Africa's political leadership (Palmer et al., 2017). Moreover, between the Municipal Systems Act and the MFMA, the formation and governance of PPPs for service delivery in South African cities are arguably overregulated and tangled in bureaucracy to the point of actively discouraging and smothering meaningful partnerships (Palmer et al., 2017; Steytler, 2008).

## BOX 1

### COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS

Exceptions to the generally low levels of collaboration with stakeholders do exist.

- The Cape Town Partnership and the Durban Growth Coalition in eThekweni have spearheaded major infrastructure and property developments.
- City improvement districts (CIDs), created through PPPs, have contributed to inner-city regeneration in both Johannesburg and Cape Town but have also struggled to accommodate the public sector's development aims with the private sector's profit motives, and have been criticised for advancing business and middle-class interests at the expense of poor inner-city communities (Houghton, 2011; Lemanski, 2007; Mirafteb, 2007; Murray, 2011; Pieterse, 2017; SACN, 2016).
- The Western Cape Economic Development Partnership (EDP), which is a non-profit organisation funded by national, provincial and local government that facilitates all-of-society partnerships aimed at economic development and implementation of the IUDF, functions both as a launching pad for PPPs, a capacity-enhancing partner for municipalities in the province and an intergovernmental relations and coordination forum (SACN, 2016).
- The Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO), which is a knowledge partnership between two Johannesburg-based universities, the Gauteng provincial government and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), generates research and data relevant to urban governance challenges in the Gauteng city region.
- eThekweni's Municipal Institute of Learning (MILE) collaboration presents a shining example of leveraging a knowledge production partnership between local universities and local government to improve urban governance for sustainability and resilience (SACN, 2016: 293–294).

Since 1994, civil society has become fragmented, lost capacity, and played an uneven and suboptimal role as an urban governance stakeholder (Palmer et al., 2017). It has become dominated by political society, with (especially) the African National Congress (ANC) using a range of grassroots strategies to co-opt and monopolise the agendas of civil society organisations, while discrediting and marginalising those social movements that have arisen in opposition to the party's policies (Piper, 2015; Sinwell, 2015). Since the late 1990s, the relationship between local governments and the few NGOs interested in rights-based governance have become adversarial and unconstructive. Legal cases brought by NGOs on behalf of poor urban residents may have served to clarify local government's constitutional responsibilities, protect the interests of poor urban inhabitants and advance the general state of South African socioeconomic rights jurisprudence, but at the same time they have often unduly stretched local government capacity, undermined strategic planning and diverted local government resources (Pieterse, 2017).

## Skills deficit and unsustainable financial model

Since 2000, one of the most common refrains in assessments of local government performance is that of acute shortages of skills, financial and human resources and governance capacity. While this has been less the case in the metros than in local and district municipalities, all metros have struggled to attract and retain qualified staff, especially planners, financial managers, project managers and engineers (Atkinson, 2007; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). This shortage has interacted with the politicisation of municipalities' administrative/political interface, as partly enabled by the structure of authority in municipal councils. Political loyalty, rather than skills or qualifications, has tended to determine senior administrative appointments, including those in the metros (Cameron, 2014; Pieterse, 2021; Thornhill, 2008a; Woodridge, 2007). Apart from the debilitating impact on the capacity to govern, a predictable side effect has been that political turmoil or factionalism seriously disrupts municipal governance (Cameron, 2014; De Visser, 2009; Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2021). For instance, in the City of Cape Town, administrative leadership was replaced and governance systems were (sometimes radically) restructured, each of the three times the city experienced a change in party-political leadership (Cameron, 2014; Olver, 2019).

Metros have all established municipal performance management systems in terms of the Municipal Systems Act, but this has not translated into effective individual performance and consequence management for staff, while the endless resources expended on building municipal capacity also seems to have had little effect (Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2021; SACN, 2016).

Overall, the lack of skills and capacity has undermined urban autonomy, not only by limiting the extent to which municipalities can pursue developmental objectives, but also by leading national and provincial governments to distrust cities' abilities, to micromanage their operations and to intervene in their affairs (Pieterse, 2020a; Steytler, 2008; Turok, 2014). Local government's lack of implementation capability is further cited as a major reason for national and provincial government's reluctance to fully devolve functional capacity and responsibility for core urban functions, such as housing and transport, to cities (Palmer et al., 2017; Turok, 2014).

In terms of financial resources, the Constitution's fiscal provisions have been lauded for bolstering urban autonomy by securing for cities an independent resource base (Palmer et al., 2017; Pieterse, 2019a). Although metros receive equitable share grants and some conditional grants from national and provincial governments, they have largely funded themselves from service charges and property rates, while Johannesburg, Cape Town and eThekweni have raised substantial loans for capital expenditure (De Lille & Kesson, 2017; De Visser, 2005; SACN, 2016). In general, metros have steadily improved their audit outcomes, especially since the MFMA came into operation, while atrocious financial management has near completely crippled a great many local and district municipalities (SACN, 2016).

However, serious concerns have been raised about the sustainability of a financial model dependent on rates and service charges, especially in times of constrained supply, environmental pressures to reduce consumption, and increased supply costs (Cameron, 2014; Pieterse, 2020a; Savage, 2007). Moreover, tough financial times since 2008 have both reduced consumer demand and increased bad debt, while debt-collection systems in all cities have severely underperformed (COGTA, 2016; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2016). By 2016, it was apparent that there needed to be a relook at cities' financial architecture — there was a clear need for greater grant support for large capital projects and infrastructure maintenance, and a need to diversify revenue sources (COGTA, 2016; SACN, 2016).





## URBAN GOVERNANCE: 2016–2021

# 2

After three terms of elected local government, cities had not achieved their developmental objectives nor realised the socioeconomic rights contained in the Constitution. Therefore, in 2016, the IUDF was introduced as South Africa’s national policy beacon for the way forward (COGTA, 2016). The IUDF is aligned with the SDGs and South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) and envisages the “spatial transformation” of South African cities and towns, through “steering urban growth towards a sustainable growth model of compact, coordinated and connected cities and towns” (ibid: 7).

The failure to overcome spatial apartheid in cities is partly due to the failure of autonomous urban governance, and so one of the IUDF’s strategic goals is to “enhance the capacity of the state and its citizens to work together to achieve spatial and social integration” (ibid: 8). “Effective urban governance” is one of the IUDF’s nine central “policy levers” and envisages “cities and towns that have the necessary institutional, fiscal and planning capabilities to manage multiple urban stakeholders and intergovernmental relations, in order to build inclusive, resilient and liveable urban spaces” (ibid: 10). The IUDF’s priorities are based on the hurdles identified, which include weak intergovernmental relations, incomplete devolution, skills shortages, weak oversight and defective community engagement platforms. In general, the IUDF is well aligned to the substantive goals of urban governance embodied by SDG 11. Implementing its policy levers would enable both the achievement of developmental local government and the progressive realisation of the socioeconomic rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Du Plessis, 2017; Pieterse, 2019a; Van der Berg, 2017). However, from 2016, several factors resulted in all spheres of government ‘taking their eyes off the ball’ with regards to the implementation of the IUDF.



## BOX 2 THE IUDF POLICY LEVERS

1. **Integrated urban planning and management** require improved intergovernmental relations and transversal management capabilities within local government. Related policy priorities include aligning spatial, sectoral and strategic plans at different levels; improving municipal capacity for long-term strategic planning; aligning land use and human settlement planning with transport planning; and improving the functioning of intergovernmental relations structures.
2. **Integrated transport and mobility** require addressing the incomplete devolution of transport functions and aligning roles and responsibilities among the different spheres of government. At city level, priorities include strengthening and integrating public transport modes, pursuing transport-oriented development, and endeavouring to make cities pedestrian and cycling friendly.
3. **Integrated and sustainable human settlements** depend on the consistent and effective devolution of built environment and human settlement functions. Cities should steer the various national human settlement priorities (such as upgrading informal settlements, regenerating inner cities, promoting densification and inclusionary housing, and redeveloping townships) at local level and co-opt the private sector effectively.
4. **Integrated urban infrastructure** requires overcoming the fragmentation in infrastructure governance, the lack of coherent local planning and delivery, and insufficient funding. Cities require increased planning and capital investment capacity, strengthened intergovernmental relations and improved coordination and consolidation of funding for infrastructure projects and maintenance.
5. **Efficient land governance and management** require addressing tenure insecurity and land-use planning and management processes. Cities need improved intergovernmental relations especially around the availability of state-owned land for urban development, streamlined land-use management instruments, and a range of forms of flexible land tenure.
6. **Inclusive economic development** requires strengthening the economic role and planning capacity of municipalities, and creating enabling environments for innovation and the informal sector. Cities need to improve and leverage partnerships with other economic stakeholders, and support community-based enterprises and the informal sector.
7. **Empowered active communities** require addressing the lack of skills and experience, and developing innovative, co-produced solutions. Cities need to invigorate existing public participation structures, improve communications with residents and constructively involve community organisations, so as to strengthen participatory governance and increase trust and cooperation between communities and city governments.
8. **Effective urban governance** requires overcoming weak intergovernmental relations, fragmentation of governance, incomplete devolution, skills shortages, weak oversight and support mechanisms, and defective community engagement platforms. Related policy priorities include strengthening policy coherence, and inter-municipal and intra-municipal coordination; and improving city leadership, transparency, accountability and communication.
9. **Sustainable finances** require increasing own revenues and a review of the intergovernmental fiscal relations framework. Cities need to be incentivised to provide integrated infrastructure, improve relationships with the private sector and other state entities, and explore alternative capital financing instruments.

*Source: COGTA (2016: 42–109)*

## Coalition governments and party factionalism

The outcome of the local government elections in August of 2016 sent shockwaves through South African politics. Previously, all the metropolitan councils in the country were under the fairly comfortable rule of the ANC, except for the City of Cape Town which, after initially flip-flopping between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), had been governed by the DA with a steady majority for several years. Then, in 2016, a fall in voter turnout combined with a rise in opposition support saw the ANC dip below 50% in four further metros. The ANC formed a coalition government with smaller parties in Ekurhuleni but lost control of Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg to coalitions led by the DA and propped up by conditional support from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

A new era of volatile and unstable coalition government dawned for South African cities. At the same time, both the ANC and DA were experiencing serious internal ructions, and over the next five years both parties experienced a change in national leadership and a struggle with severe factionalism. The combination of internal political instability and the pressures of cross-party coalition governance took its toll on political leadership in the major cities. While at first seeming steady, the initial coalitions in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay all collapsed and were reconstituted in different ways. These three cities, as did eThekweni and Cape Town, changed mayors before the end of the electoral cycle, sometimes more than once.

## Social, political, natural and economic forces

During Jacob Zuma's presidency, the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into state capture, corruption and fraud in the Public Sector<sup>7</sup> was established, from which evidence of large-scale corruption and subversion of governance structures emerged almost daily, further driving factionalism and instability within the ANC. Not entirely unrelated, one after another international credit rating agencies lowered their rating of South Africa's sovereign debt to 'junk' status, with the final downgrade coming in early 2020. Tenacious droughts in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape drove both Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town to the brink of full-scale water crises, while a combination of governance failure and aging infrastructure pushed the national electricity grid and rail network to the edge of collapse.

At the same time, years of large-scale governance failure in smaller municipalities came to a dramatic head, with the collapse of sewerage and water delivery systems, impounding of municipal assets by creditors and threats of the discontinuation of bulk water and electricity supplies due to non-payment (Ledger & Rampedi, 2019; Pieterse, 2021). Cracks even started to appear in the larger cities, with Msunduzi, Mangaung and Tshwane all subjected to provincial interventions during this period. Hostile community protests increased and intensified, and were joined by violent and disruptive nationwide student protests that first erupted in 2015 and would continue, with varying intensity, throughout the next five years.

Urban governance became increasingly litigious terrain. Socioeconomic rights-based litigation against cities continued and was joined by cases brought against malfunctioning municipalities by community groups seeking to stave off discontinuation of bulk services,<sup>8</sup> force provincial governments to intervene decisively in municipal affairs,<sup>9</sup> and allow for civic 'takeover' of municipal functions.<sup>10</sup> High-profile political battles for leadership in Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay ended up in court,<sup>11</sup> while the Constitutional Court found the provincial decision to dissolve Tshwane's Municipal Council to be unlawful and unwarranted.<sup>12</sup>

Then in March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit South Africa, exacting a heavy toll on the lives and livelihoods of all South Africans, and doing serious and ongoing damage to the health system, the national economy and social cohesion. Its impact on urban governance was as severe, and is still being felt.

7 <https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-judicial-commission-inquiry-state-capture-corruption>

8 See *Cape Gate v Eskom Holdings*, 2019 (4) SA 14 (GJ) available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2018/599.html>; *Eskom Holdings v Resilient Properties*, [2021] 1 All SA 668 (SCA) available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2020/185.html>

9 See *Unemployed Peoples Movement v Premier of the Eastern Cape*, [2020] ZAECGHC 1 available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAECGHC/2020/1.html>

10 See *Kgetlengrivier Concerned Residents and Others v Kgetlengrivier Local Municipality and Others* [2020] ZANWHC 95 available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZANWHC/2020/95.html>

11 See *Democratic Alliance v MEC for Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape* [2018] 4 All SA 356 (ECP) available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAECPEHC/2018/49.html>; *De Lille v Democratic Alliance* [2018] 3 All SA 488 (WCC) available at <https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAWCHC/2018/22.html>

12 <https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/judgement/413-premier-gauteng-and-others-v-democratic-alliance-and-others-african-national-congress-v-democratic-alliance-and-others-cct82-20-cct91-20>



## LESSONS FROM THE LAST FIVE YEARS

---

Over the last five stormy years, many factors have contributed to no sphere of government paying due attention to the implementation of the IUDF. The absence of a separation of powers between legislative and executive functions at local government level, combined with the configuration of decision-making powers located in executive mayor systems, severely strains executive accountability in South African cities. These structural weaknesses have interacted with party politics and the lack of a legally regulated line between political parties and the state, to produce a situation where political party leadership takes urban governance decisions outside of municipal councils (Pieterse, 2020b). Apart from undermining accountability, this subverts participatory democracy and sabotages urban autonomy, by diverting governance decisions to unaccountable structures outside of democratically elected urban governance bodies and by altering the balance of power in interactions with non-state urban stakeholders (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Pieterse, 2020b). Moreover, as evidenced by the events in Cape Town, when mayors and city leadership rightly assert themselves against unconstitutional interference in urban governance by political party leadership, resulting standoffs can have destabilising effects.<sup>13</sup>

### Party politics can seriously destabilise urban governance

The legislative architecture of municipal governance in South Africa was devised at a time when one-party dominance, and associated top-down intergovernmental relations, appeared both natural and inevitable. This is no longer the case and, as the experience across sub-Saharan Africa shows, vertically divided political authority (where different spheres of government are under the control of different political parties) can be detrimental to intergovernmental relations and derail urban governance. For instance, national or regional governments may attempt to subvert urban autonomy by recentralising powers, making overzealous use of intervention powers or starving local government of resources; while local governments may sabotage development projects initiated by their political adversaries in national or previous local governments (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2013; Cameron, 2014; Pieterse, 2020b; Resnick, 2014).

South Africa's elaborate constitutional framework for cooperative governance has arguably prevented the worse effects from materialising here (Cameron, 2014; Pieterse, 2019c), but it has certainly not been plain sailing. Changes in political control and coalitions have had a negative impact on cities:

- Relations between cities run by a DA coalition and the national (ANC) government have been tense from the very beginning (De Visser, 2019; Pieterse, 2019c) and became virtually unworkable once coalitions crumbled due to internal pressures.
- Collapsing coalitions virtually paralysed governance in Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane. Nelson Mandela Municipality experienced differently configured coalition governments, while Tshwane was unable to form a government after two successive mayoral resignations — and the subsequent dissolution of the metropolitan council by the Gauteng provincial government was decried as an overblown, politically motivated attempt to subvert urban autonomy, and declared unlawful by the Constitutional Court.

---

<sup>13</sup> See also events in Johannesburg detailed by Masango (2019)

- DA-run coalitions effectively purged metros of their administrative leadership (which was perceived to be loyal to the ANC) and halted or deprioritised implementation of several ANC-initiated development projects (Masango, 2019; Pieterse, 2019c). The most high-profile victim was Johannesburg's 'Corridors of Freedom' transport-oriented development initiative, which was lauded as perhaps the most significant local government attempt yet at overcoming spatial apartheid (SACN, 2016). The initiative was left to languish, as resources were diverted from the rollout of the rapid bus transit system, and strategically located properties earmarked for housing development along the corridor were sold off (Harber, 2019).

Internal party politics and factionalism proved to be as debilitating, contributing to the collapse of coalitions in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, and to mayoral turnover in both Cape Town and eThekweni. In Cape Town, a high-profile standoff between Mayor Patricia De Lille and the leadership of the DA had a ripple effect within the council and the administration, and seriously hampered the City's response to a serious drought-induced water shortage (Olver, 2019; Pieterse, 2020b).

## The local government financial model is not sustainable

The significantly deteriorating national economic outlook over the last five years and the impact of COVID-19 on the economy exposed the fault lines inherent in South Africa's local government funding framework. Cities are reeling under financial pressure, as detailed in the latest State of City Finances report (SACN, 2020). National government's austerity measures have led to a reduction in grant income, while the national credit rating downgrades have made city borrowing more burdensome and expensive. Service debt has mounted as more households fail to afford their water and energy bills, national electricity provision troubles are causing lower consumption, and the economic contraction exacerbated by COVID-19 is forecast to lead to a reduction in commercial rates and service income. Meanwhile, bulk purchase costs for both water and electricity have increased far above inflation, while unfunded mandates have increased, especially in the wake of the pandemic with its attendant increased pressures on water provision and the need to sanitise public facilities (ibid). Most metros have decreased capital and maintenance expenditure and have deteriorating debt collection. Moreover, all cities except for Ekurhuleni have been directing income from the equitable share grants towards meeting other expenses, instead of basic service provision, as was the original intention (ibid).

Meanwhile, although previously much better than in district and local municipalities, financial management in metros may be deteriorating, due in part to the pressures detailed above and in part to political instability. Qualified audits for metropolitan municipalities are becoming more common, and all metros have displayed a rise in fruitless and wasteful expenditure over recent years (ibid). Whereas provincial intervention in large cities was previously a rare occurrence, two of the SACN's member cities are currently under administration due to a crisis in their financial affairs.

Previous concerns about the sustainability of a financial model that depends on rates and service charges are presenting as an urgent crisis. Cities need to broaden their funding base and to improve their financial systems (especially in relation to debt collection), but a more fundamental relook at the municipal funding framework has now become urgent (ibid).

## Is the District Development Model the answer?

Long before 2016, the ad hoc, top-down and siloed nature of intergovernmental relations in South Africa was regarded as a hindrance to urban autonomy and effective all-of-society governance — and political authority divided among spheres has not improved the situation. Interventions by national and provincial governments often occur too late, damage urban autonomy and have a poor track record in putting municipalities on a sustainable recovery path (Ledger & Rampedi, 2019; Pieterse, 2021). Over the last few years, the collapse of urban governance in many secondary cities attests to serious shortcomings in intergovernmental monitoring, support and intervention. These shortcomings are increasingly drawing judicial attention and scorn, with both the Eastern Cape High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal having recently lambasted the national and provincial spheres for their hands-off approach to municipalities in crisis.<sup>14</sup> What is needed is a less hierarchical, more proactive, cooperative and de-politicised approach to intergovernmental relations and planning.

The introduction of the District Development Model (DDM), which is driven by the national presidency and is currently being piloted and refined, seems like a welcome and timely intervention. The DDM is an intergovernmental relations platform that envisages close coordination between planning processes of all spheres of government. The intention is that all three government spheres, with other government stakeholders, jointly devise and adopt development plans for each of the district and metropolitan municipal areas in the country. These district development plans would advance the aims of the NDP and the IUDF and focus on managing urbanisation, driving local economic development, coordinating spatial planning and land use management, and institutionalising long-term planning. The plans are intended to cut across functional silos and address governance challenges, including financial management, infrastructure delivery and maintenance, and community participation.

However, although the DDM has correctly diagnosed the need to reform intergovernmental relations platforms and is couched in language of cooperation, agreement and support (rather than top-down management), the concept contains undertones of centralisation, which are cause for concern. In particular, the DDM appears to assume that all spheres (whatever the political party in control) will agree ideologically and politically on the developmental priorities. It also does not appear to be primarily concerned with enabling and enhancing urban autonomy, as it assumes that municipalities will cooperate with national policy preferences. Indeed, it is not always clear how the DDM articulates with the IUDF's policy levers or with the participatory IDP process under the Municipal Systems Act.

The DDM pilot coincided largely with the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw many aspects of 'ordinary' governance processes and intergovernmental relations suspended by the invocation of the Disaster Management Act of 2002 (the DMA). The DMA requires all three government spheres to establish disaster management structures and platforms that involve a whole range of societal stakeholders (organised labour, higher education institutions, business and the private health care sector), but its coordination of national disasters is strongly hierarchical and executive-driven. Perhaps unsurprisingly, little constructive urban autonomy has been on display in the course of the national response to COVID-19, with municipalities for the most part meekly towing the national line and acting simply as implementing agents for national executive decisions (Kruger et al., 2021). The ease with which the government spheres appeared to fall into a strongly hierarchical line under the DMA does not bode well for urban autonomy under the DDM.

---

<sup>14</sup> See *Unemployed Peoples Movement v Premier of the Eastern Cape*, [2020] ZAECHC 1 (available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAECHC/2020/1.html>) para 60; *Eskom Holdings v Resilient Properties*, [2021] 1 All SA 668 (SCA) (available at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2020/185.html>) paras 93-97

More positively, COVID-19 revealed the lack of functional platforms for broader stakeholder engagement and resulted in the establishment of various constructive dialogical forums involving civil society, the private sector and the knowledge sector, both inside and outside of the official purview of the DMA. These offer examples of constructive forums needed for all-of-society governance, which the IUDF and DDM call for without offering concrete suggestions for their facilitation.

### **BOX 3 EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

During emergencies, local government plays a central governance role because the strongest coordination and relations are needed at local level. Emergency governance is about relational, flexible and open-ended processes of regulation, decision-making, implementation and administration by a range of actors from various sectors during times of crisis/emergency. Since 2016, several emergencies have taken place, including state corruption, financial crises, xenophobic attacks, water crises and more recently the COVID-19 pandemic. These emergencies have added to the pressures already facing cities, which are financially strained due to the national economic decline and to political tensions in coalition governments. For cities, this 'business unusual' has meant they must chart new waters while fulfilling their constitutional mandates

#### **Emergency governance lessons from 2016–2021**

Good urban governance may be hindered when legislation emphasises national command and control without devolving adequate power to the local level.

- Some legislation and processes may slow down the response to emergencies due to the fear of breaching 'good' financial management practices. (This should not take away from the importance of managing city coffers responsibly.)
- Legislation and policy may refer to cooperative intergovernmental relations and interrelated yet independent government spheres, but during emergencies hierarchical power play comes to the fore and is amplified by political leadership differences among the various spheres.
- Cities have not embraced urban governance as a whole-of-government approach to development, which limits their ability to implement localised solutions given the lack of financial and other resources that can be leveraged through partnerships.
- Cities need to be able to employ strategic foresight, deploy strategic resources efficiently, build relationships with all-of-society and innovate to respond effectively to crises and emergencies.
- Once emergencies have passed, cities need to reflect on what worked and what did not work, to learn from innovative ways of governance that emerged from the crisis, and to build accountability structures that go beyond legislated structures towards an all-of-society approach.

These lessons are crucial because South Africa is likely to experience further disasters/emergencies in the future, and its financial fortunes are not going to turn around anytime soon. Therefore, cities need to identify their developmental partners and leverage financial and knowledge resources, which should be at the centre of localised governance.

#### **Enablers of emergency governance**

The period 2016–2021 highlighted what is needed for effective emergency governance:

- Empowered, capacitated and resourced local government that is able to set the policy agenda at local level, define priorities, implement its own plans, and allocate its own resources.
- The devolution of powers and responsibilities, to allow cities to respond at speed.
- A strong network of government, researchers, business and non-government and civil society organisations, that is able to play a brokering role in steering all efforts towards achieving local objectives and priorities.

Good emergency governance is the ability of cities to coordinate resources, within and outside government institutions, to deal with the current emergency within a clearly defined localised policy framework.

*Source: Gumede W, Everatt D, Karuri-Sebina G, Moleketi T and Willis A. 2020. Integrated, all-of-society, democratic emergency governance. Discussion paper prepared for the State of Cities Project..*



## CONCLUSION

Urban governance in South Africa appears to have ‘hit rock bottom’ and, since the SoCR 2016, little progress has been made towards achieving the IUDF’s vision. Nevertheless, many invaluable lessons have been learned over the last five years. As the country gradually emerges from COVID-19, there is both an urgent need and considerable political will for a new approach to urban governance (SEE BOX 3). This moment of opportunity needs to be seized. The time has come not only to do things differently but also to relook at the structures of urban governance in South Africa. Notwithstanding its noble intent, the Constitution (and subsequent legislation) has apportioned functional authority and responsibility for urban governance in a way that has failed to produce the kind of developmental and rights-based urban autonomy required to achieve the ideals espoused by the IUDF, SDG 11 and the NUA. This does not mean that urban autonomy has failed in South Africa but rather that urban autonomy has never been fully enabled.

Delegation, funding and intergovernmental arrangements alone will not achieve dynamic urban autonomy. There is a pressing need to relook at governance structures within metropolitan municipalities, in particular the executive mayor system, which was devised precisely to enhance urban autonomy (Cameron, 2014; Pieterse, 2020b). However, the system was introduced within a local government structure that does not separate legislative and executive powers and fails to police a line between political parties and state structures. The result has been the side-lining of official deliberative and participatory structures and the outsourcing of urban governance to unaccountable political-party structures, which have undermined urban autonomy.

Local governments also need simultaneously to leverage resources through whole-of-government and all-of-society practices. The chapters in this section provide specific insights into the cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches required to achieve spatially transformed, inclusive, productive and sustainable cities.

- **Chapter 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion** highlights the need to improve the collective understanding of city economies and the levers that cities can use to achieve inclusive economic growth. It profiles the economic structures and composition of the nine cities, and the different cooperative structures around levers that cities can use to achieve inclusive economic growth, providing practical examples of where and how these levers can be used.
- **Chapter 3. Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing** explains why inclusivity and wellbeing are crucial for cities, and how greater inclusion leads to a better quality of life for city dwellers. Despite not making much progress in creating inclusive places for all citizens, including the marginalised, cities contain pockets of excellence that demonstrate how transversal cooperation among government spheres and all-of-society approaches contribute to making cities more inclusive.
- **Chapter 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition** examines how South African cities have addressed sustainability challenges and harnessed opportunities to further the just urban transition through cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach. It looks at knowledge-sharing networks, intermediaries and multi-stakeholder partnerships, and shares lessons from the practical experience of cities, which touch on the power and political dynamics of different urban institutions, systems, processes and stakeholders involved in just urban transition initiatives.
- **Chapter 5. Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game** interrogates the link between slow spatial transformation in cities and institutional governance capabilities, and how internal municipal environments enable or hinder the attainment of equitable spatial outcomes. It identifies forces or ‘rules of the game’ that shape the behaviours of practitioners, which in turn hinder practices that support the attainment of spatial transformation. The chapter draws heavily on the learnings from the organisational and institutional focus areas of the Built Environment Integration Task Team (BEITT), to provide insights into why the state has made little progress in implementing policies.





## RECOMMENDATIONS

# 2

### Fully enable urban autonomy

To implement the IUDF requires a more robust and consistent pursuit of devolution, which means resisting the tendency to recentralise power as a cure for municipal malfunction. Urban functions, such as housing and transport, should be devolved urgently and the legislative frameworks across sectors reviewed, to ensure that cities are both appropriately and consistently capacitated to coordinate urban governance processes.

### Empower local government

Over the last decade, provincial interventions have shown that the top-down imposition of outside priorities cannot effectively arrest or reverse urban governance collapse. Therefore, intergovernmental platforms should empower *local government* to tackle its own problems and coordinate developmental efforts. Such platforms must function as effective connection points for national, regional and local interests, and for interaction and collaboration between these state structures and stakeholders from all-of-society. Moreover, the devolution of power, functions and responsibilities must be accompanied by the devolution of resources; local government's funding base needs to be broadened; and resources for strategic projects and community assistance must not be subsumed by operating costs. Cities should be encouraged to make the most of their funding sources, while acknowledging that a range of external resources can be leveraged through more explicit pursuit of all-of-society partnerships.

### Improve cross-sectoral alignment

To enable intersectoral dialogue and collaboration will require improved consistency in delegation across sectors and the alignment of monitoring and support frameworks between devolved functionalities. Functional silos in all three government spheres are an impediment to good urban governance and hinder the achievement of cross-cutting objectives, such as spatial transformation. In addition to improving the cross-sectoral alignment of powers, functions and accountability structures, cross-sectional institutional platforms are needed to tackle cross-cutting issues. The challenge will be to operationalise these intergovernmental structures, given the current top-down sensibilities of municipal structures, as illustrated by the disruptive consequences of attempts to establish a cross-cutting strategic planning unit in the office of Cape Town's executive mayor. However, much can be accomplished with mere political will, as demonstrated by the various engagement platforms that were established at various levels in response to COVID-19. The DDM has the potential to provide the kind of intergovernmental and intersectoral relations framework that has been missing in South Africa. Intergovernmental platforms within cities could function as effective connection points for national, regional and local interests, and the DDM's intergovernmental cooperation model could meet the need for more consistent and vigilant urban oversight and support structures.

## Relook at governance structures within metros

Local government's legislative and executive powers and functions need to be separated clearly. Options include requiring municipal councils to establish executive and administrative oversight committees (as is currently allowed, but not mandated, by Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act); requiring more active council involvement in strategic decision-making; and more explicit filtering of the concerns of ward and regional representatives into decision-making processes. The municipal leadership needs to be insulated from political party discipline by enhanced security of tenure; for example, retaining municipal council membership notwithstanding loss of political party membership, or placing limits on 'caucus-whipping'. There are also simple changes in current practice within the prevailing legal architecture that could enhance open and accountable urban governance.

## Depoliticise and professionalise the administration

Urban governance needs to be pragmatic rather than political, and administrative loyalty should lie in the first instance to cities, rather than to political parties. The amendment of the Municipal Systems Act, to lay down minimum qualification requirements for municipalities' administrative leadership and to prohibit them from also occupying leadership positions within political parties, is to be welcomed. Further possible interventions include enhancing contractual security of tenure for administrative leadership and redirecting some of their accountability towards councils rather than towards executive leadership, which could be done within the prevailing legal framework.

## Improve how cities interact with their stakeholders

Partnerships and coalitions with the local business community and civil society, experts, universities and community leaders have long been articulated but will remain an aspiration unless enabled by institutionalised and democratically legitimate forums for dialogue and collaboration. At the same time, local government must be placed solidly at the helm of horizontal interactions with urban stakeholders, to avoid further fragmentation and ceding of urban autonomy to unaccountable private sector actors. Communities should also be given a seat at the table in stakeholder dialogues, lest their interests be sidelined.

## Embrace meaningful community participation

The current community participation and associated bottom-up accountability structures are not working and need to be reinvigorated, reformed and supplemented. Cities cannot continue with timid and superficial attempts to establish and maintain meaningful and constructive relationships with the private sector and civil society, and with technical, uncommitted 'tick-box' approaches to community engagement. This may be due in part to skills and capacity shortages, but also to a culture of municipal subservience that was inherited from the previous political dispensation, and a general lack of appreciation for the opportunities inherent in progressive urban autonomy. Community

relations with local government will remain at best arms-length and at worst outrightly hostile, so long as government structures are perceived as external to communities, and integrated development planning is a 'cut-and-paste' exercise. Meaningful urban autonomy must be substantively moored in a progressive local consensus and agreed pursuit of common goals. Technological advances since the adoption of the Municipal Systems Act have opened up many possibilities for extensive and constructive community participation, from social audits to participatory budgeting and bottom-up formulation of policy initiatives. These need to be embraced and extended if meaningful urban autonomy and all-of-society urban governance are ever going to be more than slogans.

## Take responsibility for developmental local government

South African cities need to view rights-based and developmental responsibilities as opportunities for enhanced autonomy rather than burdens of governance.<sup>15</sup> Cities need to be more assertive and take responsibility for their developmental role. They must insist on autonomy and for adequate support in its exercise, but also accept the responsibilities inherent in developmental governance and the accountability for the way in which autonomy is wielded. This will require city governments to view themselves not as functionaries of 'upper-level governments' but as representatives of the communities to whom they are accountable.



<sup>15</sup> Cities in other parts of the world are increasingly rallying around human rights or sustainable development in articulating this common good so as to strategically enhance their autonomy by strengthening their democratic legitimacy and the strength of their partnerships, (see Chueca, 2016; Oomen, 2016; Oomen & van der Berg, 2014; Grigolo, 2017).

# Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion

---

|   |   |     |
|---|---|-----|
|    | Introduction                                  | 99  |
|    | Current State of City Economies               | 104 |
|   | Economic Levers for Inclusive Economic Growth | 108 |
|  | Stacking the Levers: City Case Studies        | 114 |
|  | Conclusion                                    | 121 |
|  | Recommendations                               | 121 |



## INTRODUCTION

---



People created cities around infrastructure that connected them to markets or raw materials. Cities grew through being able to connect to more markets, and to attract and accommodate people with diverse capabilities. This enabled cities to increase and diversify production (via industrialisation) and services (starting with public services such as courts, and eventually expanding into the knowledge economy), and to introduce new forms of connectivity (such as air transport and fibre). Having a diversity of people and products available in proximity generates spaces of creativity and innovation, and results in the “urban dividend” (SACN, 2016).

Production happens not only *in* the city, but also *of* the city. As cities grow, their food systems and housing, transport, security, cleaning, health and energy needs grow – and the networks required to supply these needs become economies of production in and of themselves. ‘Productivity’ relies on complementary inputs, some of which are movable (such as raw materials, machinery and, to a certain extent, labour), while others cannot be moved easily from place to place (such as infrastructure, rules and specialised know-how). It is the existence of these complementary inputs that enable or constrain productivity and contribute to a city’s relative productivity, especially spatial pockets of productivity.

South Africa starts from a base of extreme inequality and has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world due to a history of colonisation and apartheid, followed by a combination of state underperformance and inequities in the gains of development since 1994 (Fourie, 2021). As a result, despite improvements in service delivery, cities are characterised by parts of their economies that perform well (but are under constant stress and threat of crisis) and parts that are under-developed, informal and even ‘survivalist’, and pushed to the outskirts.


Many people remained excluded from the economies and formal services of their cities, leading to increasing poverty, unemployment, overcrowding, pressure on infrastructure and municipal resources, and social tension. Within cities, disparities exist between rich and poor and between suburbs, with the consequence that “if all voices are not represented [...] minorities can sway policies to the detriment of those excluded” (ibid: 118). This does not align with imagery of a vibrant, productive city that attracts talent to its hub of connectivity to increase innovation and production. Cities are struggling within a broader context of slow economic growth, and baseline economic, social and spatial asymmetries, which have been worsened by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Warnings that the poorest and most vulnerable are hit the hardest in times of crisis have proven true, deepening the ‘inclusion’ challenge moving forward.

This chapter has two main objectives. Firstly, it aims to highlight the importance of improving the collective understanding of city economies, which is essential for informing inclusionary economic development and growth, and to contribute to this understanding by providing key insights into the current state of urban economies (largely from an inclusionary perspective). Secondly, it attempts to show what economic levers are available to cities to address economic constraints, especially related to informal and township trade and direct employment, and to illustrate the need for multiple actors to collaborate through cooperative structures around these levers. In concluding, the chapter offers some related lessons and recommendations.

## Governance and inclusive economic development

Governments that are “accountable to their citizens are more stable, which in turn means they are more likely to attract investment and generate long term economic growth” (FCDO, 2006: 19). Therefore, the way in which a government interacts with its citizens either enables or disables its economic endeavours. South Africa’s legislation and policy recognises the importance of partnerships for economic and social development, which is a key objective of local government (Figure 1). From the White Paper on Local Government in 1998, to the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012 and the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) in 2016 (COGTA, 2016), local government is recognised as being closest to the communities and the most participatory sphere of government. The NDP notes that “participation is critical for democratising governance processes and ensuring local government remains responsive to its citizens” (NPC, 2012: 437), while the IUDF states that the functioning of local government ought to have a governance focus involving all-of-society.

**FIGURE 1:** Local government is designed to function as a partnership



*Source: Adapted from EDP (unpublished).*

South Africa’s economic policy has shifted from the “growth and redistribution” discourse of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR<sup>1</sup>) policy in 1996, to “inclusive development” and “inclusive growth”, as reflected in the NDP and the IUDF Lever 6. This was a consequence of periods of “jobless growth”, where economic growth (i.e., growth in production) did not result in a significant reduction in unemployment. The District Development Model (DDM) reiterates the need for a pivot to inclusive growth, in its coupling of social and economic development and promoting the (re)development of an economic structure that ensures all people are included, and inequality is reduced. Cooperative governance is seen as a critical enabler of inclusive economic growth in the NDP, IUDF and DDM. For example, the DDM prioritises economic development and puts forward a practical intergovernmental relations mechanism for “one district plans”, supported by cross-referenced budgetary allocations (Cawe, 2021) anchoring its success on the ability of multiple actors to engage collaboratively in pursuit of a common objective.

1 <https://www.gov.za/documents/growth-employment-and-redistribution-macroeconomic-strategy-south-africa-gear>

## Productive cities and inequality

Productive cities are cities in which “the local economy [is able to] provide the majority of residents with the opportunities to make a reasonable living” (SACN, 2018: 14). In this regard, a crucial part of inclusion is having “the opportunity to participate in and enjoy the benefits of economic growth”.<sup>2</sup> This is far more than redistribution (i.e., growth that is taxed and then shared). Inclusion is about direct participation in increasing productivity (Hausmann, 2015) – essentially, it is about playing an active role in the production process or owning the production process. In an inclusive economy, prosperity is broadly shared, opportunities are available for all people, and people are able to realise positive outcomes in education, employment, health and overall wellbeing especially “those facing the greatest barriers to independently advancing their well-being”.<sup>3</sup>

Increased productivity without inclusion leads to inequality replicating within and between people, firms and places (Figure 2). For example, engaging with the city or navigating the many city processes is easier for organised or professionalised community and business groups than for individuals or small businesses. These processes, relating to incentives, development and permit applications, or licensing regimes, can be complex and time-consuming. The result is unsustainable levels of inequality, redistributive burdens, and inefficient spatial forms.

**FIGURE 2:** How inequality replicates, despite increases in productivity



Source: Author’s own, inspired by Hausmann (2015) and Bradlow (2021)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/inclusive-cities>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/five-characteristics-inclusive-economy-getting-beyond-equity-growth-dichotomy/>

To address inequalities in the distribution of the benefits of productivity, cities need to ensure that people are connected to skills, production inputs, networks and rights that make them productive. If the mechanisms of inequality are not addressed, the benefits of productivity may reinforce patterns of social inequality, leaving just the policy options for re-distribution (essentially, compensation for structural exclusion) and responses to the societal impacts of inequity.


South African cities are characterised by deeply entrenched structural and spatial inequality, which makes achieving both growth and inclusion very urgent and requires better governance. Local governments are able to shape how their respective economies develop through participatory engagements when developing strategies and plans (e.g., integrated development plans).

## Collaborating to understand city economies

The creation of more inclusive city economies requires developing contextual and evidence-based interventions. However, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of city economies and their current state.

Cities (including economic actors) need robust data to be able to “successfully target spatial economic development interventions and infrastructure investments”, but there is scant spatialised and sector-specific economic data at a city level (SACN, 2016: 91). Improving economic intelligence at a metro level remains a challenge, especially for understanding certain parts of the economy, such as the informal sector. City economic analysis units need to understand economic actors and their interactions and influence at a city level (Figure 3).

**FIGURE 3:** Economic actors in cities





Collaboration is required across government spheres and between the public and private sectors because the data and information held by these actors are distributed across different national, provincial and private entities. Collaborating, to share data, deepen analytical capabilities and arrive at sharper diagnoses, has been a slow process but is occurring. For example:

- The City Support Programme (CSP), which was almost a decade in the making and emerged from the Economies of Regions Learning Network, works with the South African Revenue Service (SARS), metros and academics to better understand spatialised economic anonymised tax data.
- The South African Cities Network (SACN) research programmes and the South African Open Data Almanac (SCODA) provides access to several metro-level indicators.
- Metro-led innovations include the Durban EDGE Open Data Portal, which is eThekweni Municipality's platform providing cutting-edge economic intelligence and insight.
- Topic-specific research collaborations between established research organisations<sup>4</sup> and capacity-building and knowledge networks, such as the CSP, SACN and eThekweni's Municipal Institute of Learning (MILE), often draw on new data sources, such as satellite imagery, mobile phone data and civic data.
- Partnerships, with established civic organisations and researchers<sup>5</sup> and countless grassroots community organisations, for community-led data collection aim to understand better the informal economy, the township economy, and the urban land market (including backyard rentals and informal land markets and 'micro-developers').

Such collaboration is crucial to creating an urban economic data ecosystem that is transparent, accessible and encourages improved data analytics capability. When the economy of cities is better understood, economic actors are better capacitated to make meaningful contributions. For example, National Treasury's CSP provides city spatialised economic data, which enables the economic activities (business start-up, growth and closure, turnover and employment) to be understood at sub-place and sectoral levels. As a result, economic actors are able to understand what is happening at a sub-place level. For example, in areas such as Devland (between Soweto and Diepsloot), Babelegi (in Tshwane), Jacobs (in eThekweni) and Wadeville (in Ekurhuleni), crime, corruption, red tape and reliability of services were reported as constraints for businesses.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, interventions that relate to creating an enabling environment for SMME development need to focus on strategies that address crime and corruption.

4 For example, the Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)

5 For example, Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (SLF), Centre for Affordable Housing Finance (CAHF), Isandla Institute, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrade (VPUU), International Budget Partnership South Africa (IBPSA)

6 In Devland, 37% of the respondents considered crime incidence (robberies, violent crime and employee theft) as very high, while 59% reported corruption working with the city as a key constraint.



## CURRENT STATE OF CITY ECONOMIES

---

Cities are drivers of inclusive economic growth, and so understanding the current state of their economies provides clarity about the focus areas for interventions and clues to which steps could be taken to advance inclusive economic growth. This chapter provides an overview of the state of the economy in cities, in particular Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekweni, Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane.

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected supply, demand and productivity across the world, and cost the global economy an estimated 4.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 alone.<sup>7</sup> Between 2016 and 2020, South Africa's GDP grew by an average of 0.8% per year, or 0.6% if 2020 with the impact of COVID-19 is excluded. It is estimated that South Africa's GDP lost about 5% as a result of COVID-19, with the most severe employment losses felt among lower income workers in service sectors and women employed in various sectors, including care work and informal work (Spaull et al., 2021). In July 2021, the unrest in two of the country's major economic regions, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) compounded the impact of COVID-19 (and existing unstable public transport and energy supplies) and caused damage to key economic infrastructure and supply chains, and to about 50 000 informal enterprises.<sup>8</sup>

### Economic activity

Cities are key drivers of productivity within the South African economy. Nine cities contribute almost two-thirds of South Africa's GDP and over half of national employment (SACN, 2016). The country's powerhouse is the Gauteng region whose three metros (Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni) account for a third (30.4%) of national gross value added (GVA), while Cape Town (9.7%) and eThekweni (8.8%) continue to be significant urban economic drivers. Buffalo City, Mangaung, Msunduzi and Nelson Mandela Bay play a more important role in their regional spaces and each contributes between 1.3% and 2.9% of South Africa's output.

The performance of the national economy affects city economies, as a low-growth environment makes it difficult for cities to attract investment or to be prescriptive about directing the market to achieve specific inclusion or spatial outcomes. The assumption here is that additional growth cannot be generated by working from the bottom-up and building capabilities, know-how and infrastructure to address constraints to productivity among the low-skilled labour force.<sup>9</sup>

---

7 <https://www.statista.com/topics/6139/covid-19-impact-on-the-global-economy/>

8 Williams G. 'Counting the cost of chaos', *Finweek*, 20 August 2021. <https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/finweek-english-edition/20210820/282218013866397>

9 Levy B. 'South Africa's way forward: abandon old ideas, embrace bold experimentation', *The Conversation*, 4 August 2021. <https://theconversation.com/south-africas-way-forward-abandon-old-ideas-embrace-bold-experimentation-165539>

Economic growth, as measured by GVA, varies across cities. Between 2016 and 2020, all experienced ‘sluggish’ growth not dissimilar from that of the national economy.<sup>10</sup>

- Msunduzi averaged the highest growth, at an annual average of 1.1%.
- Cape Town, Joburg, Ekurhuleni and Mangaung all averaged an annual growth of 0.8%.
- In 2019, two metros, Nelson Mandela Bay and eThekweni, were already experiencing negative growth (pre-COVID-19) at -0.3% and -0.9% respectively.

## Economic structure

Between 2007 and 2015, all cities have experienced a structural change in their local economies. Each city has a distinct industrial mix and is affected differently by sectoral or national changes, but some common trends emerge.

- Deindustrialisation, with a large contraction in blue-collar jobs, will have a devastating effect on cities, “such as Nelson Mandela Bay, Ekurhuleni and eThekweni, that have traditionally relied upon their manufacturing jobs” (Visagie & Turok, 2020: 19). Challenges will be reskilling blue-collared workers and regaining lost managerial, shopfloor and team know-how.
- A growing tertiary sector, which includes finance and business services (especially in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Tshwane) and low value-adding services, such as private security, cleaning and labour broking, are driving growth in the sector (Visagie & Turok, 2020).
- There was a decline in the percentage of export-oriented firms between 2013 and 2017, which may be related to relative growth in other sectors, or market failures due to lack of access to enough information or connectivity to global markets (CSP, 2021).
- Cities that are part of a functional economic region continue to benefit from the spillover effects of agglomeration and inter-firm interactions across neighbouring municipal boundaries. Gauteng and KZN benefit from strong agglomeration advantages (Amusa et al., 2019).

The distinctive features (pre-COVID-19) of the largest six cities are provided on page 106 and drawn from various sources (Visagie & Turok, 2020; Amusa et al., 2019; Figueroa et al., 2018).



<sup>10</sup> IHS Global Insight. 2020. *Gross Value Add by municipality*. Accessed via SCODA

## City profiles

### CITY OF CAPE TOWN

**IN BRIEF:** Diversified economy with reliance on tourism and relatively low agglomeration advantages



Tourism (local and international), commercial agriculture and related agri-processing



Services, i.e., middle-level professional services (e.g., accounting, legal), low-value services (e.g., private security, labour brokering) and, to a lesser extent, the IT industry



Decline in manufacturing industry, with firms closing and entire sectors being lost. Between 2013 and 2017, the city saw a decline in the number of small businesses but a growth in large firms.

### CITY OF EKURHULENI

**IN BRIEF:** Struggling economy



Airport logistics and services



Airport and related logistics, engineering-related services, as well as professional business services



Decline in manufacturing (minerals and electronics) and retail

### eTHEKWINI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

**IN BRIEF:** Economy based around transport



Seaport and transport corridor to landlocked Gauteng



Road and rail transportation, low-skilled services (private security)



Decline or stagnation in manufacturing sector, most trade-related sectors and the construction industry

### CITY OF JOHANNESBURG

**IN BRIEF:** Economy skewed towards finance and selected business services



South Africa's financial and business centre



Finance and middle-level professional services, as well as low-value services such as private security



Decline in retail, entertainment, and tourism industries. Despite significant focus on township development, the city has seen a decline in the number of firms in places such as Soweto and Diepsloot, including export-focused businesses in Soweto Industrial

### NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

**IN BRIEF:** Economy based around declining industries



South Africa's automobile manufacturing hub



Cleaning services and general business services



Decline in manufacturing industries, including automotive sector

### CITY OF TSHWANE

**IN BRIEF:** Fairly recession-proof economy



South Africa's political centre



Retail, construction, utilities, postal services and hotels/restaurants



Decline in retail, entertainment and tourism industries because of low demand

## Employment and unemployment

People move to cities to find work, and so, unsurprisingly, the largest workforces are found in the major cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and eThekweni. Between 2015 and 2020, growth in employment was slow across all cities, but no city recorded a net loss in jobs. Indeed, during this period, net jobs increased by 7.9% in Cape Town (114 640 new jobs) and 7.2% in eThekweni (80 264 new jobs). However, between Q1 2020 and Q2 2021, over half a million (691 000) jobs were lost across the cities, excluding Msunduzi (Stats SA, 2021), with most losses in Gauteng (225 000 in Johannesburg, 123 000 in Ekurhuleni and 105 000 in Tshwane), Cape Town (111 000) and eThekweni (71 000 – before the unrest of July 2021).

Since 2015, the expanded unemployment rate<sup>11</sup> has increased in all cities (Table 1), but especially since 2020, due to the impact of COVID-19 on the economy. Mangaung was the only city to show a decline in unemployment between 2020 and 2021.

**TABLE 1:** Unemployment rate (2015–2021)

| CITY               | 2015  | 2020  | 2021 (Q1) |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Buffalo City       | 30.1% | 32.0% | 33.2%     |
| Cape Town          | 24.7% | 25.1% | 29.6%     |
| Ekurhuleni         | 35.3% | 37.6% | 40.3%     |
| eThekweni          | 28.5% | 30.8% | 34.9%     |
| Johannesburg       | 29.7% | 35.1% | 41.8%     |
| Mangaung           | 35.6% | 39.5% | 38.2%     |
| Nelson Mandela Bay | 33.1% | 36.5% | 39.3%     |
| Tshwane            | 33.0% | 35.1% | 40.3%     |

Source: Stats SA



### GENDER WAGE GAPS

All metros, except for Mangaung, show gender wage gaps. In the metros, full-time employed women earn on average 78% of the mean income of full-time employed men. More analysis is needed, but this gap may be because of different opportunities, and/or differences in salaries for equal work.

Female-headed households are also more likely to be larger and have no access to the internet and computers. Focusing on the earning potential of women may become an important socioeconomic intervention strategy for city development and intergenerational economic mobility.

<sup>11</sup> Expanded unemployment rate includes people who have stopped looking for work



## ECONOMIC LEVERS FOR INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

A city's ambition for inclusive economic growth may have various dimensions. Cities offer different types of interventions in their economic strategies and locate the 'function' of economic development differently within their institutions. This reveals the level of maturity in their thinking about how to achieve the 'outcome' of inclusive economic development. Generally, many cities have shifted their focus from local economic development (LED) projects to enabling economic growth through improving the business environment – including informal and township economies – and addressing unemployment.

Cities have levers at their disposal that could catalyse inclusive economic growth. These include levers that address constraints relating to the following:

- Information and brokering relationships (collaborating with agencies, provincial authorities and national counterparts, relying heavily on strong interpersonal relationships and clear distinctions of roles).
- Internal geography (land-use planning and land-use rights, and to some extent transport).
- Infrastructure and city services (with some dependencies on other spheres of government and state-owned enterprises).

These levers are generally within the ambit and control of local government and can be leveraged to realise inclusive economic growth aspirations. The following are brief examples of such levers.



Special economic zones (SEZs) are tools used by the South African government for driving industrial and economic development. Cluster industries from a particular sector locate themselves in these geographically designated areas to reap the benefits of scale and co-location. SEZs are governed by the SEZ Act (No.16 of 2014) and are supported by a range of incentives aimed at attracting foreign and local investment. (<https://atlantissez.com/community/faq>)

### Information and brokering relationships

Collaborations (as well as information and data sharing) across various economic actors remain critical to inclusive economic growth. Relations across the various government spheres, the private sector and the rest of society have significant impact on the business environment. The success of initiatives such as public employment programmes (PEPs) highlight what is possible when various actors collaborate towards a common vision. PEPs are generally designed and financed by national government and implemented by local government in projects undertaken in collaboration with the private sector or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). PEPs have a temporary lifespan, and so a conducive business environment creates opportunities to absorb individuals who have participated in PEPs.

## Improving the business environment

Improving the business environment includes incentivising specific locations, investing in infrastructure and services, and supporting businesses, both formal and informal. Examples include the following.

- Strategic infrastructure development to support economic growth in the city, which is emphasised in the COVID-19 recovery plans of Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, eThekweni and Cape Town.
- ‘Catalytic’ projects that are place-based and often in partnership with the private sector or other spheres of government, sometimes leveraging national incentives such as urban development zones (UDZs) or special economic zones (SEZs).
- Incentives in the form of rates and/or consumption rebates for developers (or their tenants) who align with specific spatial or economic objectives, or who need support to retain or stabilise those objectives during crises – eThekweni’s incentive policy is particularly sophisticated in its dynamism and breadth, although the impact of rates rebates on attracting investment is contested and may conflict with short-term municipal finance objectives (eThekweni Municipality, 2020).
- Area-based management, urban management, special ratings areas or similar initiatives, which are approaches adopted by Cape Town, eThekweni, Nelson Mandela Bay and to some extent Johannesburg.
- Informal economic activity support, with a particular focus on facilitating informal trade’s contributions to local jobs and productivity capacity (addressed in more detail below).
- A focus on township economic development, which is sometimes linked to supporting informal economic activity and sometimes treated as distinct (addressed in more detail below).

## Public employment programmes

Cities focus on unemployment particularly among the youth, skills development either in specific sectors (technical or digital) or for entrepreneurs, and PEPs, such as the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). The EPWP uses public sector spending and procurement as a lever for direct inclusion in the economy. It is a low-wage opportunity that is both a “social protection measure” (Takunda, 2016: 1) and a means of generating income, developing skills and creating public value through, for example, maintaining public spaces (SACN, 2021).

Cities that have been the most successful in implementing the EPWP have “managed not only to institutionalise the programme into their existing municipal structures, processes and systems, but also to gain widespread buy-in” (ibid: 11). The importance of EPWP is elevated in cities that have a formalised structure in place, a dedicated EPWP champion and direct reporting to the city leadership. In contrast, cities that have not embedded the EPWP within structures and do not have dedicated structures to support this transversal programme, have struggled to scale up the programme in terms of numbers of people employed, directorates involved and programmes created.

Although the EPWP provides people with short-term income, more can be done to develop skills. A potential pathway for cities is ‘micro-tasking’, which refers to digital tasks that are broken down into subcomponents to be teachable (Ellis, 2021). For instance, cities could use EPWP workers to collect data for service delivery standards in informal settlements, validate building heights or structure counts, or monitor the environment and waste and traffic management. Such skills would appeal to young people and be transferable to growth sectors of the economy, such as call centres, marketing companies and data science fields.

## Internal geography

Local government's core activities include determining and enforcing land-use planning and articulating land-use rights. Leveraging both can redress the structure of the economy and deliberately include economic activities that have been previously excluded or inadequately included.

In South Africa, cities are characterised by spatial segregation, where households with little to no income live furthest away from existing economic infrastructure. This is in part the result of an apartheid planning policy and forced removals, and in part due to land markets and post-apartheid housing policies that put low-income housing on the cheapest land. The consequence is that workers have high transport costs in relation to their wages and travel long distances: “[A]n eight-hour shift becomes an 11-hour shift for which net pay is only six hours [which] implies an effective tax rate of 45% on low-income, formal-sector workers”.<sup>12</sup> This drives many people to prefer something closer to home, but the options are limited due to the varieties of available markets, skill sets and infrastructure (Charman et al., 2020).

Cities have an opportunity to interact with their respective internal geographies in a way that enables the township economy to thrive and improves the integration of the informal trade into formal value chains and subsequent markets.

## Township economic development

In recent years, a plethora of projects has emerged aimed at developing township economies and building capacities. Gauteng has developed the Gauteng Township Economic Development Bill and is promoting township-linked, multi-tier SEZs (GPG, 2021). New formal entities (a fund in the Bill) and the SEZ model bring dedicated resourcing and capacity, but also add to an already vast network of agencies and institutions in the province. Strong governance, transparency and accountability will be needed to ensure they do not become vehicles for rent seeking.<sup>13</sup> The EDP and HSRC (2019) identified 37 organisations working on township development in the Western Cape and Cape Town, covering areas such as urban management and placemaking; enterprise support and business development; skills development and education; policy development, advocacy and research; and intergovernmental capacity-building and coordination.

Despite all this attention, township environments display few signals of change. Micro-developers are emerging in areas where there is title deed transfer and/or enablement by positive upzoning (such as City of Cape Town's as-of-right third dwelling policy), but even this trend is not without issues of regularisation and potential displacement (Scheba & Turok, 2020). A key issue is poor regulation and policy environments, with township development being hampered by the oscillation “between laissez-faire neglect and enforcement of punitive regulations, which creates uncertainty and opportunities for abuse” (ibid: 1).

Projects on the ground in cities remain limited, while those in informal trading areas and precincts tend to be planned from the top down, without proper engagement with locals, resulting in underuse and neglect (EDP & HSRC, 2019). For example, Nelson Mandela Bay identified Njoli Square, as a potential mixed-use precinct to be developed through a public-private partnership. However, 10 years after the project started, with the relocation of 72 families, the site remains vacant waiting for co-investment.

<sup>12</sup> Hausmann, R. 2013. The Logic of the Informal Economy. Project Syndicate. Available online: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-logic-of-the-informal-economy-by-ricardo-hausmann?barrier=accesspay>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/-engineering-and-the-built-environment/research-entities/cubes/documents/Comments%20on%20the%20Gauteng%20Townships%20Economy%20Bill%20031120%20.pdf>



The institutional hype around township development has not yet led to significant resources being directed towards townships themselves, and all the research, thinking and talking have had little impact on the ground.

## Informal trade

“The informal sector is mostly a consequence of the fact that people are largely disconnected from modern production networks.”<sup>14</sup> Informal sector work is determined by both limited market opportunities and barriers in pathways to formality. Informal sector workers are engaged in retail and trade (40%), manufacturing (16.1%), construction (15.4%), transport (10.9%), finance (8.9%) and community and social services (8%) (Stats SA, 2019). Of the nine cities, Buffalo City has the highest percentage (22%) of people employed in non-agricultural informal work, followed closely by Johannesburg (21%), while Tshwane (10%) and Cape Town (12%) have a relatively small informal sector.

Informal or street traders are a specific type of informal business that is location-specific and relies on access to foot traffic. Cities can support the informal sector by including informal traders in decision-making processes, providing infrastructure, assisting with diversity of products and services, creating suitable trading spaces, and providing training, services and skills development (SALGA & SERI, 2018). The most common (and least effective) intervention by local government is to support informal traders through training (LGSETA, 2020).

Despite recognising the importance of the informal sector, cities sometimes view “informal traders as an annoyance” and “a way of evading taxes and regulations” and cannot ignore complaints from formal businesses and ratepayers (Pillay & Govender, 2020: 40). City economic departments or sub-councils are often called upon to mediate in conflict between neighbouring formal businesses and street traders who are blamed for poor urban management because they do not have access to good infrastructure (ibid). Yet access to infrastructure and services not only contributes to the growth of informal enterprises but also “helps keep streets attractive, hygienic, safe and clean for all users of the street, not just traders” (Matjomane & Koma, 2020: 63). In Mitchells Plain, Cape Town, after extensive deliberations with the informal traders, the municipality allocated trading spaces that were locationally competitive, resulting in less congestion and more pedestrian traffic (Pillay & Govender, 2020).

Cities can enable bottom-up initiatives, as in the case of the African Traders Organisation (ATO) at ‘The Piles’ market near Park Station in Johannesburg (Matjomane & Koma, 2020). Traders came together to find a solution to their infrastructure, cleaning and security needs, including patrolling services. Initially the patrols caused some conflict with the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) and the South African Police Service (SAPS) who felt that the ATO was “stepping on their mandate”, but after much negotiation, the three parties agreed on a collaborative patrolling system (ibid: 70). The presence of patrols has resulted in fewer petty crimes and an improved image of the street market.

The research shows the benefits of engaging meaningfully with informal traders before decisions are taken, but the ‘clean-up’ operations seen in several metros suggest that street trading is still viewed through a law enforcement, not an economic development, lens.

<sup>14</sup> Hausmann, R. 2013. The Logic of the Informal Economy. Project Syndicate. Available online: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-logic-of-the-informal-economy-by-ricardo-hausmann?barrier=accesspay>

## Infrastructure and city services

A city's property markets are influenced not only by land use planning and land use rights, but also by improved infrastructure and consistent supply of quality services. The highest valued asset that many poor households might own on their lifetime is their formal housing. Households are able to increase their incomes by leveraging this asset, through mechanisms such as backyard rentals or possibly setting up a home-based enterprise. As noted below, household incomes have largely stagnated, and so cities should consider ways to support households in leveraging housing to generate income, especially in the face of low employment rates and barriers to entry in formal markets.

### Housing and affordability

Eight of the nine cities (excluding Msunduzi) are home to over half (57%) of South Africa's total formal residential property market. Between 2008 and 2019, the number of high-end properties in these cities grew faster than the number of entry or affordable properties, which are properties valued at below R600,000. These properties made up 74% of the residential market in 2008 but just 55% in 2019, whereas during the same period, *luxury* properties valued at over R1.2-million increased by more than 100% (CAHF & CSP, 2020). The decline in availability of affordable housing since 2014 poses a serious challenge to lower-income households in cities (ibid).

In 2018, informal housing accounted for about 20% of all housing in four of the nine cities<sup>15</sup> **SEE CITY DASHBOARDS**. Although few comparators are available for the informal housing market across the nine cities, a study of the backyard rental sector in eight neighbourhoods across Cape Town found that rentals average between R440 and R1,590 per month (Isandla Institute, 2021). The rental cost was influenced by location (e.g., close to transport links) and social factors, such as the relationship between the landlord and tenant, as well as affordability. Both tenants and landlords spend most of their income on rent/bond costs, food and transport, followed by electricity, medicine and clothing (ibid).

In South African cities, "household incomes are stagnating for all but the wealthiest", while "cities continue to experience above-inflation increases in some of their key cost drivers, notably salaries and bulk purchases" (SACN, 2020: 55). Despite efforts by most cities to manage the costs of services, municipal services are unaffordable for many, especially poorer households (SACN, 2020).

As mentioned earlier, a productive city is one in which most people earn a *reasonable* income. A *reasonable* income implies that it is sufficient to cover the costs of living in the city, which include costs related to municipal services, housing, transport, food, and personal services. In 2019, salaries, wages and commission were the main source of income for 64.2% of households living in metropolitan areas (Stats SA, 2019). The real median incomes for those earning a salary vary across metros: in 2017, the average monthly income was just over R11,000 for Johannesburg and below R6,000 for Buffalo City (CSP, 2021).

---

<sup>15</sup> Buffalo City (23.3%), Johannesburg (21.7%), Ekurhuleni (19.9%) and Cape Town (19.3%). In the remaining five cities, informal housing made up between 6.1% (Nelson Mandela Bay) and 16.8% (Tshwane) of housing.

## 'Stacking' the levers: Governance and economic levers

Cities need to work with many different role players, across government spheres, the private sector and civil society, at various spatial and institutional scales. The IUDF views local government as governance that involves all of society in achieving economic and social development. A coordinated approach is needed to use the levers to enable inclusive economic growth. 'Stacking' the levers refers to multiple actors coming together in cooperative structures to collaborate around economic levers. It recognises that interventions are needed well beyond the above reform processes and that efforts to collaborate on the economy are established at different levels, as illustrated in Table 2.

**TABLE 2:** Economic development cooperative structures

| TYPE   | FUNCTION  | EXAMPLES  |
|--|---|---|
| Place-based  | To manage the spatial organisation of a specific area in an efficient manner through planning, developing and managing land and assets of an area for specific outcomes   | Subcouncil and urban management projects; area forums and committees; special ratings areas, such as city improvement districts; SEZs (see Atlantis); area-based partnership, special purpose vehicles (SPVs) or agencies; community land trusts; district holding companies and joint ventures (see Bridge City) |
| Labour market support  | To support job seekers with improving their access to work, through match-making functions and workforce development programmes   | Partnerships with social providers, jobs funds and EPWP   |
| Business associations  | To represent businesses in policy-making processes and support business-to-business networking, sometimes assisting to mobilise resources from the private sector   | These can be organised around a community, a city, national level, demographics or issues.  |
| Sector SPVs, trade and promotion agencies  | To drive innovation and investment within specific targeted sectors, coordinate research and investment promotion, and develop human resource programmes for those sectors  | Craft and Design Institute, Invest Durban, Trade & Investment KZN, Gauteng Growth and Development Agency (GGDA), Eastern Cape Development Corporation, Wesgro, GreenCape, Cape Innovation and Technology Initiative and Blue IQ Infrastructure Gauteng  |
| Integrated planning and intermediaries   | To facilitate, broker and innovate, by bringing together diverse role players and providing dedicated capacity for governing these relationships by building the capacity to plan, implement and monitor integrated initiatives | GGDA, Mandela Bay Development Agency (MBDA) and Western Cape EDP  |
| Education and technical transfer   | To connect role players in the education sector with business, to align workforce development with sector uptake pipelines and to connect research and development initiatives with the business sector to take to market       | Several in each province, for example: Cape Higher Education Consortium (CHEC) and university-based technology transfer offices   |
| Building state capability, research and learning and driving policy and legislature reform | To coordinate technical capacity building, drive knowledge production and learning, and identify areas for policy and legislature reform  | SACN, SALGA, GCRO, CSP, United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UKFCDO), CSIR, MILE, Growing Gauteng Together 2030 (GGT2030), KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Planning Commission (KZNPPC) and public sector economists' forum  |
| Global networks  | To influence global urban agendas and bring resources for local cities in line with local city strategies   | C40 Climate Leadership Group (C40), Future Cities and various twinning agreements & mayors' platforms   |



In light of the reflections on economic levers and examples of the different economic development cooperative structures in place across the cities, the following two case studies demonstrate how role players come together (with varying degrees of success) to apply their regulatory mandates, fiscal powers and incentives, assets and relationships to a targeted spatial area.

### Bridge City – eThekwini

The Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu (INK) area consists of formal residential townships and informal settlements and is “the second largest agglomeration of poor neighbourhoods in South Africa” with high unemployment, poverty and crime, and inadequate physical infrastructure. In 2001, the area was identified as a critical urban development node and presidential lead project.<sup>16</sup>

Bridge City is a multi-billion rand, mixed-use development located 17 kilometres from the Durban city centre. It is a new town centre that connects the communities of Phoenix with INK and the broader city by providing access to public transport and opportunities for work, travel, shopping and business.<sup>17</sup> The development extends over 60 hectares and includes a R100-million underground train terminus (part of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa’s (PRASA’s) modernisation programme) from which passengers emerge into the Bridge City Shopping Centre (68 000m<sup>2</sup>).

The precinct includes connections to the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality’s GoDurban! Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) C3 corridor route (stations complete although buses not yet operational) and various other developments, such as a regional health facility (the Dr Pixley ka Isaka Seme Memorial Hospital), a magistrates’ court and areas zoned for commercial offices. It further includes a 13-hectare business and light industrial estate, which is being marketed to private developers.

The development is a public-private partnership between Tongaat-Hulett and the municipality via the Effingham Development Joint Venture (EDJV). It represents a significant collaboration between multiple government role players (PRASA, the provincial government and the municipality) to leverage land assets, planning powers, infrastructure budgets, transport services and leadership and vision. At its core, it represents aligned financial interests, through the land-value capture mandate of PRASA, the rates-generation potential of the development as well as shareholding value of the joint venture between the municipality and Tongaat-Hulett.

The economic actors include:

- eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality: land, land packaging and zoning; infrastructure/bulk services; GoDurban! stations
- KZN Province: land and infrastructure (development of a provincial hospital)
- PRASA: land and infrastructure (existing station)
- Private sector: capabilities for development, marketing and tenancing

---

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.durban.gov.za/City\\_Government/Administration/Area\\_Based\\_Management/INK/Pages/INK\\_Introduction.aspx](http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/Administration/Area_Based_Management/INK/Pages/INK_Introduction.aspx)

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.bridgocity.co.za/>

**FIGURE 4:** Layout of Bridge City



Source: [www.bridgecity.co.za](http://www.bridgecity.co.za)

## Community involvement

In the early planning stages of Bridge City, there was a lack of any real engagement with communities, and no clear structures were created to ensure consistent and representative participation. Some community members were not aware of the development, while others indicated some engagement took place during the planning phase, and a few said that engagements occurred only after the planning phase.

The relatively low level of organisation within the communities meant that the EDJV had difficulty identifying INK stakeholder representatives when the implementation phase began. Therefore, a steering committee was established, to inform and monitor the construction of the precinct. This committee brought together representatives from local government (councillors), business, religious organisations, civic associations, minibus taxi associations, contractors, investors, as well as community members and organisations. However, these representatives were largely silent, and questions were also raised around whether the community members involved were representing the community's interests or their own interests. The high turnover in representatives also resulted in the steering committee being unable to convene as required.

## Advantages and disadvantages for the community

The development benefits the INK community in the following ways:

- Easy access to goods and services at the shopping centre, as residents no longer have to travel long distances at their own expense and in their own time.
- Jobs for community members. In the early stages of the development, 90% of people working at the shopping centre were locals, predominantly the youth (Nomathemba, 2012).
- Transport, health and civic infrastructure, as well as planned gap and social housing.

However, although local residents benefit as consumers and employers, the precinct provides limited further economic opportunities and has had a negative impact on local informal traders. In 2012, most of the low-level, unspecialised positions at the shopping centre were occupied by people from the INK communities, whereas most of the managerial and supervisory positions, and centre tenants, business owners or investors were from outside the local community (Table 3). The development also led to informal traders being displaced from the original PRASA station, without being offered any alternative accommodation within the new town centre. Informal traders in the INK community also suffered, and many went out of business.

**TABLE 3:** Community involvement in the Bridge City Shopping Centre (2012)

| CATEGORY           | INK COMMUNITY | OTHER COMMUNITY |
|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Owners             | 10%           | 90%             |
| Renters            | 30%           | 70%             |
| Senior supervisors | 60%           | 40%             |
| Workers            | 90%           | 10%             |

*Source: Adapted from Nomathemba (2012)*

INK community members do not appear interested in investing in the Bridge City project, which may be due to affordability and skills issues (ibid). In response, the EDJV is developing more inclusive financial models, but no capacity development processes are in place to improve local business development and mitigate investment constraints. There is also a need to work with tenants to ensure that skills are developed internally and that local residents are hired.

Over the long term, the INK community will not benefit from Bridge City unless measures are taken to ensure real engagement and partnership with local communities, and greater economic inclusion. The risk is that the new town centre will simply become a rates-collection island for the municipality, instead of contributing to the economic upliftment of local communities. The widespread unrest and looting in July 2021, which caused about R1-billion in damages to Bridge City,<sup>18</sup> raises questions about the extent to which the development has contributed to social cohesion and economic development in the community, and whether the lack of cohesion contributed to the unrest and related damages, suggesting that real community engagement will be central to the development's future sustainability.

<sup>18</sup> Dlamini, X. "Doors to looted Durban mall expected to reopen after 8 months – centre manager", *Highway Mail*, 20 July 2021. <https://highway-mail.co.za/445250/doors-to-looted-durban-mall-expected-to-reopen-after-8-months-centre-manager/>

## Atlantis Special Economic Zone – Cape Town

Atlantis is a town 54 kilometres from the centre of Cape Town established by the apartheid government in the 1970s as an industrial site at the city's edge for evicted coloured communities. The town received various apartheid-era government incentives, including relocation tax credits, low-cost loans for land and buildings, company tax incentives and worker housing (Stafford, 2005). At its peak in 1985, Atlantis was home to 119 manufacturing enterprises contributing 8 859 manufacturing jobs, which were well below expectations (ibid). When incentives ceased in the mid- to late-1980s, factories moved out of the town, and unemployment, poverty and crime skyrocketed.

The Atlantis SEZ (ASEZ) is located in the town's industrial area and aims to boost manufacturing, create jobs and reduce poverty. It is dedicated to green technology manufacturing and services, and welcomes businesses involved in wind power, solar power, insulation, biofuels, electric vehicles, materials recycling and green building materials. To date, the ASEZ has attracted about R700-million in private investments and created approximately 312 new jobs. The biggest investor, Gestamp Renewable Industries, employs 295 staff of whom 80–85% are Atlantis residents. The ultimate goal is to create 3000 direct jobs by 2030 and attract investment of about R4.4-billion.

The ASEZ is a collaboration between government (the City of Cape Town, the Western Cape Government, and the national Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC)); GreenCape, a non-profit special purpose vehicle supporting the development of a regional green economy; and Wesgro, the tourism, trade and investment promotion agency for Cape Town and the Western Cape.

The economic actors include:

- City of Cape Town: land, planning powers, infrastructure budgets and energy supply guarantee
- Western Cape Government: infrastructure budgets
- Department of Trade and Industry: SEZ designation and related incentives
- GreenCape: market intelligence and domain knowledge
- Wesgro: investment facilitation and promotion
- Private sector: additional incentives available to specific firms and forward linkages to independent power production and similar green economy programmes

### Community involvement

The communities of Atlantis and nearby Mamre and Witsand are key collaborators and partners in the ASEZ. In October 2017, the DTIC held extensive public consultations and received overwhelming support to establish the SEZ, which was launched in December 2018. In 2019, the ASEZ community stakeholder network was formed as a conduit between local community members and the ASEZ, with the mandates to hold the ASEZ accountable and to ensure that the Atlantis community benefits from economic and skills development opportunities, including jobs. The network comprises representatives from Atlantis, Mamre and Witsand across different sectors: business, education, labour unions, the informal economy, faith-based organisations, civic organisations and marginalised and vulnerable social groups (women and people with disabilities, cultural and traditional groups).

## Advantages and disadvantages for the community

Communities benefit in various ways:

- Jobs in businesses located within the ASEZ. In addition, the ASEZ project office recruited three women interns from Atlantis who successfully transitioned into permanent appointments.
- Opportunities for local SMMEs to supply businesses within the ASEZ.
- Youth skills development, to ensure that local skills are able to meet the needs of industries located in the ASEZ. This includes training, mentoring, exposure, and participation in the annual Renewable Energy Challenge and career expo. In addition, since 2016, a high-school tutoring programme has supported more than 300 learners to gain access to tertiary opportunities.
- Skills development and training programmes for adults. These include training in solar photovoltaic (PV) systems for people from Atlantis and surrounds, digital literacy, teacher support and a dedicated supplier development programme for local small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs).
- Improved infrastructure, including the upgrade of the power supply, fibre connectivity and MyCiTi transport links.

The ASEZ community stakeholder network is an innovative ‘soft’ governance mechanism that fosters shared rationales and the consensus needed for the emergence of a different development pathway (Grant et al., 2019: 6). However, the assumption that inclusive processes will result in inclusive growth may not be enough to “lift the poor out of poverty with local community consultation” and build the “broader trust and support for the green transition among the disconnected poor” (ibid: 8). The links between production (industries) and consumption (workers/people in townships and informal settlements) need to be better understood, and “specific transition policies for workers and the population of Atlantis” put in place (ibid).

## Lessons from cities

The case studies above highlight the interplay between governance, productivity and inclusion, and provide learnings that might result in continued improvement in the quality of and impact on similar projects. Lessons include the impact of power on collaborations and how mutual interest and accountability reinforce the governance process. The case studies reiterate the importance of economic data, emphasising that economic intelligence can demystify local economies as a whole, especially those parts of the economy that are perceived to be at the fringes, such as the informal economy. Lastly, the case studies confirm that inclusion takes time.

## The risk of power imbalances

Varying sets of rules within different spheres of government can be used to develop inclusive economies in cities; for instance, through “giving rights and policing the negative”,<sup>19</sup> or a “silence is consent” approach (National Treasury, 2019). This latter approach is limiting, as being able to pursue economic activity legally is perhaps not a binding constraint for the survivalist trader

---

<sup>19</sup> Adams, Ashraf, CEO: Nelson Mandela Development Agency (NMDA). 04 August 2021, Virtual interview



but is important for traders who want to grow their business through investing in improved infrastructure (Charman et al., 2020). However, due to South Africa's history, these rule-based dynamics are not seen through an economic-constraint lens only, but are also experienced as a power dynamic, an expression of state power over the township-based business, which can also serve to further advantage the shopping mall developer or retailer (ibid).

Developments are not about the physical construction only but also about representation and inclusion. Bridge City is an example of a 'township mega project' that is tantalising given the urgent need for development, but also carries the classic risks of mega projects within a context of extreme power imbalances. Dominant, vertically integrated retailers (supermarkets) or large firms are likely to represent leakage from township economies; and, although bringing development closer to INK partially addresses the spatial issues, the risk is that Bridge City creates an 'island within a sea'. Therefore, ways in which Bridge City could improve integration need to be found, such as by developing local production capacity through enterprise and supplier development programmes led by large retailers or firms occupying Bridge City.

### **The importance of mutual interest and accountability**

The Bridge City case study demonstrates a model in which PRASA's modernisation and land-value capture interests and eThekweni's transit-oriented development approach were able to be aligned. Both role players were able to benefit and actually implement a successful development around a train station (other redevelopments at PRASA stations in Durban include the retail and commercial development at Isipingo).

Business facilitation should preferably be targeted at specific places, sectors and development/investment processes, where there is also mutual accountability, such as Bridge City or the Cape Town Energy Forum. Business engagement needs to include transparency, direct engagements with firms, and commitments that create public value, not just increased profit (Hausmann, 2015).

### **Lack of spatial economic intelligence**

Collaboration, in order to share data and analytical capacity, is important. After years of investment in relationships, some collaboration is taking place. Research such as the CSP spatialised economic data, especially when read with analyses from other programmes, is starting to produce diagnostic frames that have not been seen before. This type of deep-dive research, providing enterprise-level insights into the formal and informal economies, enables cities to understand which strategies are working, which parts of the economy are under strain, what the root causes are and, ultimately, who might be disproportionately affected.

### **Inclusion takes time and cannot be top-down**

When role players come together, they often achieve meaningful implementation, but it may take a long time. Both the Atlantis SEZ and Bridge City case studies were in conceptualisation for a decade, and it will be years before full uptake of the land is achieved. Furthermore, while both examples are to be lauded for their efforts to 'bring development to workers', they both represent large, formal infill developments. It is harder to find projects where economic actors

leverage their respective roles to (re)develop spaces in decline or underdeveloped areas with complex sets of existing users and interests, although recommendations on where to start in these contexts do exist.<sup>20</sup> Both projects are relatively passive, leaving the actual mechanisms of inclusion to the market, based on the match between the capability of the work seeker and the work provider, rather than investing in ensuring that labour is sought from local communities.

A common weakness is the inability to engage and enrol communities directly in township development, which is due to institutional capabilities, a lack of clear responsibility and measurement linked to participation, as well as a belief that consultation “can disrupt plans, undermine assumptions and create new demands for service delivery” (Turok & Charman, 2021: 2). The complexities of the township environment defy the top-down planning process, which requires an orderliness and long-term planning ability. What is needed is an approach that can quickly assess current realities and implement specific interventions in specific locations (Turok & Charman, 2021).

### Dual approach to the informal sector

Most cities take a dual approach to working with informality, regulating informality out of the “formal, developed areas” through enforcing bylaws, and adopting a “silence is consent” approach to townships, with the application of some bylaws (Charman et al., 2020). City governments have multiple touch points with individual informal businesses: through permitting offices, law enforcement (for bylaw infringements), health and safety (training programmes and enforcement), licensing processes (in the early childhood development, food, or transport sectors), social development (for participation in various training programmes and community events) and economic development (for research projects, trader summits, training programmes, permitting, etc.). Despite this, the informal sector often lacks a single formal institutional mechanism for inclusion and, as a result, may feel unfairly targeted, displaced or excluded from development processes (ibid). To ensure direct inclusion of this more vulnerable group, concepts of power and voice in planning and implementing large projects need to be considered more carefully.

Given the multiplicity of cooperative structures in the LED landscape, the context for non-professionalised civil society actors or unorganised informal sector actors to gain representation and participation appears complex and difficult to navigate. One option may be through what the EDP termed ‘partnering readiness’, which is a process that equips individual groups to organise themselves and to create a voice and the capacity to be represented formally in the processes; for example, establishing an area-based informal or small business forum prior to the arrival of a new development, with adequate training on inclusion mechanisms distinct from more destructive forms of gatekeeping.

---

<sup>20</sup> For example, the work by Charman et al. (2021)



## CONCLUSION

---

Governing for productive cities in contemporary South Africa means governing in a context of ‘continual shock’ (as evidenced by the unrest of July 2021). There is a need to control against corruption and to create a regulatory environment to serve and mediate the competing interests of a dual economy through mechanisms of inclusion and transmission of gains. However, in this context, pre-determined, compliance-driven, implementation-ready projects are likely to come at the cost of comprehensive collaboration. The result may be projects that successfully implement and achieve clean audits, but do not achieve the maximum impacts in terms of inclusive outcomes and acceptance by communities.

Inclusive economic growth is urgent. Instances of economic growth in cities have not always resulted in significant gains in permanent employment opportunities or meaningful improvements in equality. Furthermore, it may be convenient to limit reporting on the economy to the GDP only, but this tells an incomplete story, especially in the case of South African cities where most citizens are poor, disadvantaged and excluded from participating in and benefiting from improvements in the GDP. Increasing access to economic data and improving the capacity for analytics production may enable a more holistic story to be articulated, thereby enabling economic actors to work collaboratively towards positive interventions and providing all-of-society with the tools to hold cities to account.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

---

### Governance: Economic actors in the city

Good relationships and trust among the range of actors that are engaged in economic decision-making are essential, especially in times of crisis. Cities should incorporate emergency allocations in municipal budgets and prepare for the eventuality of introducing fiscal and tax stimulus measures to ensure business continuity and social security during crises; for example, financial incentives and commitments to companies to prevent layoffs, or the ability to redirect budgets to respond to other impacts of crises. One risk of working cooperatively is blurred accountability (Kamara, 2021); for instance, the Gauteng Township Economic Development Bill was criticised for not offering clear obligations for different role players. As economic development actors are learning new ways of working cooperatively and of driving inclusive productivity, there is a need for increased monitoring, evaluation and learning to adapt and improve on both theory and practice (ibid). This is no easy feat. However, intermediaries such as the Western Cape EDP have developed tools to support collaboration in these spaces.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> <https://wcedp.co.za/partnering-framework/>

## Productivity: Evidence-based approaches to productivity

Cities that invest in good financial and economic data systems and capabilities will be better equipped to model and understand potential scenarios for the short- and long-term impacts of crises, shocks or disruptions to their economy, residents and businesses. Data, evidence, research and learning have become sites of collaboration for metros and other intergovernmental actors. The work produced from data-sharing cooperation between National Treasury, SARS, cities and specialist deep-dive survey projects, especially when read together with analysis from other programmes in similar fields, could produce diagnostic frames that have not been seen before. This type of enterprise-level insight into both formal and informal economies could be very helpful for understanding which strategies are (or are not) working, which parts of the economy are under strain, what the root causes are and, ultimately, who might be disproportionately affected.







## Economic inclusion: Using economic levers as pathways

Clearer pathways for inclusion are needed where “local aggregators and marketing structures” are used to create a competitive platform for local entrepreneurs (Cawe, 2021). Levers that could be combined here include land-use planning (for example, focusing on the ‘finer grain’, by emphasising smaller businesses), and potential technology angles, such as creating a currency based on state grants redeemable only at certain local/small-scale retailers (ibid). Innovative cities could go further by allowing this currency to be traded for city-related services. Representation is more than merely participating in planning and project processes through formal and informal structures (Criado-Perez, 2019) and ensures direct representation through the diversity of teams working on projects and involved in decision-making. Furthermore, representation in data is important to minimise gaps in policy-making, or biased decision-making and planning (ibid). Emergent practices in South African cities are compiling a more complete picture of local economies, including the representation of township, informal and women actors in economic data. These practices could potentially ensure that policies and plans are more context-appropriate and targeted.

Access to finance is a barrier to entrepreneurship in townships. The large banks consider township-based entrepreneurs to be high risk and do not offer competitive products to this market, whereas the cost of finance from smaller lenders can be prohibitive. Cities could facilitate access to alternative funding streams (such as those suggested in the Gauteng Township Economies Bill), or work to convince traditional lenders that their risk ratings are incorrect, as Brixton residents did regarding home loans (Haferburg & Huchzermeyer, 2017).

For township development to occur, decision-makers within city governments need to be far more committed to driving policy and regulatory changes, and to redirecting infrastructure and other resources at programmatic and not just project levels.

# Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing

|   |                                   |     |
|---|-----------------------------------|-----|
|    | Introduction                      | 124 |
|    | Progress Towards Inclusive Cities | 127 |
|    | Pockets of Excellence             | 129 |
|  | Making Cities More Inclusive      | 137 |
|  | Conclusion                        | 140 |
|  | Recommendations                   | 140 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <b>BOX 1: The right to the city</b>  | 125 |
| <b>BOX 2: Working to make cities safer: The Urban Safety Reference Group</b> | 130 |
| <b>BOX 3: Scaling up informal settlement upgrading</b>                       | 132 |
| <b>BOX 4: Qalakabusha Interventions in Albert Park</b>                       | 133 |
| <b>BOX 5: Stakeholders involved in Congella Park initiative</b>              | 134 |



## INTRODUCTION

---

With more than half of the world's population now living in cities, urbanisation is a driving force of global development. When managed correctly, urbanisation creates opportunities for a better life, providing a pathway out of poverty and acting as an engine of economic growth. However, although urbanisation is driving global economic development, it is also accompanied by rising levels of inequality and exclusion within cities, which can hamper and obstruct development progress, especially in Africa.<sup>1</sup> Across the world, there is a shared vision that cities need to be inclusive and work to improve the wellbeing of citizens, so that all can reap the benefits of urbanisation. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 calls for “inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” cities,<sup>2</sup> while the World Bank places inclusion at the centre of its twin goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.

In post-apartheid South Africa, inclusion is an important concept rooted in the need for transformation and redress. The country's Constitution is fundamentally redistributive, emancipatory and transformative, underpinned by the unlocking of rights and dignity. It lays “the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people”, stating boldly that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it”.<sup>3</sup> It tacitly recognises that how local government delivers its functions (e.g., human settlements, basic services, economic development) is based on dignity, belonging and affirming humanity and quality of life. For example, the right to adequate housing incorporates deeper elements of wellbeing, such as enjoying physical and mental health, and living in a safe place in peace and dignity.<sup>4</sup> South Africa's Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) reaffirms these intentions, speaking about harnessing urban dynamism for inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development, and includes the goal of “Inclusion and access: To ensure people have access to social and economic services, opportunities and choices” (COGTA, 2016: 8).

Inclusivity and wellbeing in cities are crucial because within the next decade over 70% of South Africa's population will be living in urban areas. Inclusive development will happen in cities, which in practice means achieving spatial justice and a right to the city for all citizens, through the provision of basic services and infrastructure (e.g., housing, water and sanitation, electricity), sustainable urban management, employment and the necessary infrastructure to enhance and access economic opportunities, and participation and equal rights for all (SACN, 2016).<sup>5</sup> However, in 2018 over a quarter (26%) of South Africa's urban population lived in “slums”,<sup>6</sup> and South African cities continue to be characterised by deep inequality, “class-based segregation” and “huge concentrations of poverty” (COGTA, 2016: 22).

---

1 <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/inclusive-cities>

2 <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal11>

3 Preamble of South Africa's Constitution (1996) <https://www.gov.za/constitution>

4 Nene-Khalema E., Verbal inputs at the ISOCARP International Symposium on Inclusive Cities, 28 – 30 June 2021

5 <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment/overview#1>

6 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=ZA>

South African cities have not made significant inroads into creating places and managing spaces that all people (particularly the marginalised) can identify with strongly – places and spaces that they can own and shape economically and socially, frequent freely and feel welcome in without fear of intimidation. This chapter attempts to describe some pockets of excellence that demonstrate how a more conducive and capable governance environment would shape the outcomes of cooperative governance. The emphasis is on devolving mandates and funding for crucial inclusion functions to the local level and how an all-of-society approach could help to make inputs/investments more sustainable and cities more inclusive. The case studies showing pockets of excellence demonstrate the effectiveness of partnerships in navigating devolved functions without the requisite resourcing. They suggest capability for positive impacts on inclusion and wellbeing rests not on the state doing it alone, but on its ability to partner effectively. In conclusion, the chapter offers some related lessons and recommendations.

### BOX 1 THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

The New Urban Agenda (NUA) represents a paradigm shift in thinking about urban development. Adopted in 2016, the NUA “is intended to guide national and local policies on the growth and development of cities and human settlements” (DHS, 2018). At the heart of the NUA is the right to the city, which is defined as (UN-Habitat, 2017: 26):

the right of all inhabitants present and future, to occupy, use and produce just, inclusive and sustainable cities, defined as a common good essential to the quality of life. The right to the city further implies responsibilities on governments and people to claim, defend, and promote this right.

## Inclusion and wellbeing

Greater inclusion means improved quality of life or wellbeing of city dwellers. Quality of life encompasses a broad range of aspects, from culture and value systems to life goals and expectations, health and social relations (WHO, 1997). Inclusion can also be linked to the concept of care, which implies that citizens need a government that cares about their welfare. This concept draws attention to the object and mandate of local government in terms of people’s rights to dignity, quality of life and economic inclusion.

Wellbeing is part of human development, which also includes various concerns about people’s lives and their freedoms (Sen, 2000). It is multidimensional and requires effective cooperative governance, as various responsibilities are shared across different spheres of government. For example, housing is predominantly a national responsibility with some devolution to local government, while water and sanitation service delivery is a local function. Wellbeing also requires that individual and collective preferences are taken into account, as ignoring these leads to eroded dissatisfaction and trust in government and life in general, manifesting as a high incidence of service delivery protests.<sup>7</sup>

Inherent in bringing substance to democratic citizenship is the level of care by cities and an investment in all-of-society approaches. Spatial and social inclusion give way to “equity, justice, democratic governance, participation, social capital and quality of life”.<sup>8</sup> If the dignity, justice, care and the quality of life of citizens matters, then so too does inclusion in space and involvement in civic and economic affairs.

<sup>7</sup> In 2016/17, many community protests stemmed from lack of basic service delivery, corruption, unemployment and housing allocation (Right2Protest, 2017)

<sup>8</sup> Pretorius O. Verbal inputs at the ISOCARP International Symposium on Inclusive Cities, 28–30 June 2021

## Cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach

Building inclusive cities requires the whole of government and all of society. Cooperative governance is rooted in the Constitution and enhances the capacity of the state and its citizens to work together to achieve spatial, economic and social integration (COGTA, 2016). The importance of inclusionary, participatory practices in effective placed-based responses to urban challenges is highlighted in two of the IUDF's policy levers: 7. Empowered Active Communities and 8. Effective Urban Governance. Achieving these practices will require improving systems and institutional competency, and empowering citizens with knowledge of government structures and processes. Government needs to change how it communicates and engages with its citizens in order to demystify local government and improve participatory, co-creative governance. Better use of technology and digital platforms are some of the ways in which government can enable active democratic citizenship and empower communities to shape and contribute to developing spaces that will transform their quality of life. (ibid).

Municipalities may shoulder the greatest responsibility to govern because they are implementers of public policy, but they are supported by national and provincial governments (Coetzee, 2010). They are legally obliged to encourage participatory governance in development planning, which is defined as being committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives (Basdeo, 2012). However, barring some instances of dynamic engagement, municipalities have not facilitated extensive, effective, meaningful and authentic engagements with citizens and communities. The lack of deep meaningful engagement and partnerships with communities to shape development is also echoed in Chapter 3: Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game. Although development and service delivery are central to how many services are provided (i.e., in terms of outputs), actual outcomes are barely considered or quantifiable at the city level. As a result of this disconnect between large-scale public investment and wellbeing outcomes, city programmes have perpetuated exclusion, resulting in more people becoming dissatisfied with government and services (GCRO, 2021).

Co-creation through cooperation and partnership, particularly with the marginalised, is fundamental to the emancipatory, transformative and redistributive underpinnings of policy, programmes and governance.

Multiple experiences show that partnerships between local governments and organised community and citizens organisations based on high-quality, community-collected data produce development solutions that are more sustainable and affordable to the poorest – thereby creating more inclusive cities.<sup>9</sup>

Stakeholders need to change their mindset to one that understands the importance of working in partnership in order to address the multiple dimensions of poverty and improve quality of life in cities.

---

9 <https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/news/spotlight/why-we-need-inclusive-partnerships-new-urban-agenda>





## PROGRESS TOWARDS INCLUSIVE CITIES

# 2

South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.63.<sup>10</sup> Income inequality is high and increasing: 10% of the population earn about 55–60% of all income and own 90–95% of all assets, while the poorest 50% earn about 10% of all income and own no measurable wealth at all.<sup>11</sup> Although non-monetary wellbeing has improved, for example through access to piped water, electricity and formal housing, and comprehensive social protection programmes are in place, the grants and pensions may reduce poverty but have minimal impact on wealth inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 2010; World Bank, 2018).

In South Africa, the face of poverty, inequality and exclusion is increasingly urban, despite metros reporting service levels of over 90% for water and electricity. Cities remain constrained in their ability to operationalise their functions in a developmental and transversal way, despite legislation requiring them “to put in place a range of strategic interventions, secure investment, encourage growth and deal with issues of social exclusion and poverty” (Nel & Binns, 2003).

Decades after the end of apartheid, many urban dwellers remain socially, spatially and economically excluded. The COVID-19 crisis has deepened inequality and mostly affected the marginalised, particularly black people, women, the youth and the ‘forgotten agents’: the people (e.g., security guards, homeless persons, informal workers) who enable cities to function smoothly but have limited choices for where they live and how they navigate cities (SACN–SACPLAN, 2019: 9). The reality of South African cities is that it is mostly the marginalised who “lead precarious lives on the margins”, and those “born black, female, queer or disabled” find themselves at “the bottom of South Africa’s barrel of inequity, with hardly any opportunity to jump the class hierarchy”.<sup>12</sup>

### Marginalised and vulnerable groups

Marginalised and vulnerable groups, including the youth, women and LBGTQI+ persons bear the brunt of poverty, inequality and exclusion, exacerbated by COVID-19, and experience limited participation in urban processes. Furthermore, city plans and programmes do not address the extent of exclusion facing these “othered” bodies (Seepie & Goba, forthcoming).

Almost two-fifths of South Africa’s urban population is aged 15–35 years, and youth unemployment stands at 46.3% (Stats SA, 2021). They are disproportionately affected by multiple and intersecting exclusions and are most affected by violence and crime both as victims and perpetrators, with young men making up the majority of victims and perpetrators of crime.<sup>13</sup> Gender-based violence incidents have risen in their frequency and/or visibility over the years.

<sup>10</sup> <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country>

<sup>11</sup> <http://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-to-fix-its-dangerously-wide-wealth-gap-66355>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.newframe.com/historys-economic-imbalance-persists-in-sa/>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/youth-violence#YouthviolenceinSouthAfrica>

Young people, individually or in organised/semi-organised structures, are actively involved in finding innovative solutions to problems in their communities and have a rich history of exercising their voice in discussions about education, climate change and politics. However, their participation in decision-making processes is limited, and they have few avenues through which to proffer ideas and to enable them to shape their own futures (SACN, forthcoming).

In South Africa, over two-fifths (41.8%) of households are female-headed (Stats SA, 2020). These households are “more likely to experience complete household non-employment” and have a higher incidence of poverty than male-headed households (Nwosu & Ndinda, 2018: 13). In many cases, women are responsible for multiple households and remit their earnings to other provinces. Women are also disproportionately affected by spatial inequality and inequitable economic participation, and shoulder more responsibility for unremunerated work, such as household tasks and care work, a situation exacerbated during COVID-19 (Deloitte, 2021). COVID-19 also amplified existing gender-based income inequalities.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, lack of safety and gender-based violence are more acutely felt in cities and towns, which are also where higher rates of crime occur (SACN, 2017; 2020a). Nine cities are home to about two-fifths of South Africa’s population but account for 48% of murders, 84% of aggravated robberies and 76% of car hijackings (SACN, 2017). Women, girls and the LGBTQI+ community are especially vulnerable in public spaces and often limit their movement due to fear of crime (SACN, 2020b).



<sup>14</sup> <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-16-women-headed-households-and-covid-19/>



## POCKETS OF EXCELLENCE

Despite these challenges, cities contain pockets of excellence that demonstrate how transversal cooperation among government spheres and all-of-society approaches contribute to making cities more inclusive. “The spatial, social and economic dimensions of urban inclusion are tightly intertwined, and tend to reinforce each other” – the result is either to marginalise and keep people in poverty, or to improve lives and lift people from exclusion.<sup>15</sup> These examples of pockets of excellence reflect the interconnectedness of social, spatial and economic inclusion, with a particular emphasis on social inclusion.<sup>16</sup>

The social aspect of inclusion is based on equal rights and the participation of all, including the most marginalised. Therefore, the examples reflect citizen engagement through involving the youth in urban processes, working to make cities safer, improving living conditions in informal settlements, and creating better public places.

### Empowering the youth: Metro Youth Strategies Project

The project’s aim was to amplify the voice of youth and capacitate the youth to be empowered urban citizens and actors. The project, which was implemented by the SACN in partnership with the national Department of Cooperative Governance, ran from 2017 to 2020 and had two components:

- In 2018 and 2020, the Young Planners and Designers Competition invited young urban scholars and professionals to share their perspectives on local governance and visions of the futures of their cities. The 2020 entrants considered how to lay the foundations for more inclusive cities in a world changed by the pandemic. Topics included: the apartheid-esque management of public spaces; the relegation of ‘forgotten agents’ (e.g., car guards, domestic workers) to the fringes of urban society; the need for modern, adaptable townships that support informal livelihood strategies through inclusive spatial design and technology; creative ways of enhancing civic participation; planning systems and institutional cultures that remain inherently elitist; and resource-intensive development that perpetuates gatekeeping around who benefits from living in cities.
- The Youth and City Space component engaged youth from non-planning backgrounds involved in community organising or youth structures, with the aim of demystifying urban institutions and processes. Participants learned about key processes, such as integrated development plans (IDPs) and how to navigate municipal spaces. They also undertook participatory action research to identify challenges, map community assets and partnerships, and devise solutions in an evidence-based way.

The project revealed that young people, both individually and in organised/semi-organised structures, are actively involved in innovation and finding solutions to problems in their communities. However, their experience is that intersecting hierarchies exclude them from playing a meaningful role in shaping their own communities and futures. Too often their ideas and contributions fall on deaf ears and, in many cases, they simply do not know which channels to follow to report or address problems.

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/inclusive-cities>

<sup>16</sup> For more on the spatial and economic aspects of inclusion, see [Spatial Transformation chapter] and [Productive Cities chapter] respectively.

A common view expressed was “[i]t hurts me to know that I know young people that could do something for the community at large but are not given the chance because they don’t have connections”.<sup>17</sup> This is in part because of the lack of awareness and visibility of youth empowerment initiatives in cities. It also speaks to the challenges that local government face in formalising partnerships and distributing resources to community actors for much-needed community initiatives. Furthermore, where city youth structures do exist, they are seen as generally event-based and ineffective in challenging the status quo of poor youth engagement and democratic participation, thus reinforcing the point made about the current state, depth and quality of community engagement. Even though local government is closest to communities (an anchor point), all indications suggest that this positioning requires further capacitation and resourcing.

## BOX 2

### WORKING TO MAKE CITIES SAFER: THE URBAN SAFETY REFERENCE GROUP

The SACN's Urban Safety Reference Group (USRG) brings together city practitioners and their national counterparts, to advocate collectively and grow consciousness about the transversal/multidisciplinary inputs needed to make cities safer, moving beyond policing or law enforcement. Addressing the problems of crime and violence, particularly as they affect a city's developmental capacity to transform space and lives, requires the input of most city functions, not just community/public safety units. Planning, transport, human settlements, public space, economic and community development functions, among others, all contribute to creating safe cities that can achieve their developmental agenda. Collaborative approaches are emerging, in spite of an institutional set-up that does not support the required cross-departmental collaboration,<sup>18</sup> the ongoing challenges of alignment between policy and practice, siloed implementation, and widespread state capacity challenges (SACN, 2019).

- eThekweni Municipality's Safer Cities unit<sup>19</sup> has made significant strides in educating other line departments about their role in transversal approaches to safety planning and governance, and advocating the streamlining and institutionalisation of safety as multidisciplinary and transversal. Through a programme endorsed by the African Forum for Urban Safety (AFUS), eThekweni implemented various offerings including an accredited masterclass, inviting all line departments in the city to increase their understanding and contribution. It has brought sector functions, such as human settlements, horticulture, architecture, and social development, to the table to learn how they can contribute to co-producing a safer city.
- The City of Joburg, through a programme of learning and exchange on the topic of public space with eThekweni Municipality, initiated the Park Activation Coordinators Training Programme, which capacitates and trains Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) participants in both cities to be park activators (facilitating sports programmes among other activities) and to conduct city safety audits (GIZ-VCP & VPUU NPC, 2020).

These interventions aimed at making cities safer have taken place in pockets, through the efforts of active champions and with the support of a community of practice that has over the years shifted their collective understanding of urban safety to one which is transversal and a developmental issue. They work across silos and partner within an institutional environment that recognises the value of transversality but is seemingly not yet able to iron out the barriers to integration. Metro police departments remain confined to traffic, with limited scope to do crime prevention, while municipal and police precinct boundaries remain misaligned. Such issues of demarcations have material impacts on violence and crime reduction.

There is a need for capacity, innovation, adaptation and resourcing for institutional uptake of learning. In addition, the institutional positioning of mandates needs to be considered in discussions about effective devolution. Despite the best practices generated through ad-hoc partnerships, to upscale these practices requires the department with whom the safety function sits having the institutional power to compel others to participate – this is not the case in most instances.

17 Interview with a young person (2019)

18 The design of individual and departmental performance indicators and budgets makes justifying the sharing of human and financial resources across functions difficult.

19 [http://www.durban.gov.za/City\\_Government/safer\\_cities/Pages/default.aspx](http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/safer_cities/Pages/default.aspx)

## Giving a voice to people living in informal settlements: Asivikelane

Space determines people's quality of life, wellbeing and life chances, especially in South Africa where an historically distorted spatial planning legacy impedes the creation of inclusive cities. Apartheid's socially engineered imbalance and spatial inequalities continue to this day and have been compounded by the influx of people seeking opportunities and the benefits of city life.

Government housing programmes have not addressed the persistent apartheid spatial segregation that defines the South African urban landscape. Millions of people live in poor housing conditions, often located on the periphery of cities in informal settlements, backyard shacks in townships, overcrowded family homes or dilapidated inner city buildings. These living circumstances are informal and lack access to decent basic services (water, sanitation, electricity, solid waste removal, storm water drainage, etc.). The human settlements sector is characterised by a lack of alignment among the three spheres of government, with the partial devolution of housing functions to the local level, and other role players such as the Housing Development Agency (HDA) and Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA). Despite the need for intergovernmental collaboration and coordination to deliver programmes, in particular the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP) and the Social Housing Programme, there is currently a lack of alignment between municipal and provincial housing plans. The growing backlog and slow pace of delivery have led to increased protests and litigation around human settlements.

The COVID-19 crisis highlighted the importance of partnering with civil society organisations and communities, which is something that the Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (2019: 90) recommended, stating that municipalities should be supported “to work in inclusive and democratic ways with social movements and organisations of the landless, homeless, backyard and shack dwellers”.

One such initiative is Asivikelane<sup>20</sup> (“Let's protect each other”), which was started in 2020 by the International Budget Partnership South Africa (IBPSA) in collaboration with a number of partners. Its aim is to amplify the voices of informal settlement residents in South Africa's major cities who faced severe basic service shortages during the COVID-19 crisis. The initiative has grown and currently has 15 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) as members,<sup>21</sup> working with Asivikelane across seven metros: Buffalo City, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekweni, Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane.

The campaign seeks to develop partnerships with metros for monitoring and improving service provision in informal settlements, in order to improve wellbeing outcomes for residents overall.<sup>22</sup> The model promotes inclusion and is used in many metros. It offers a way to bridge the gap between the municipality and residents around service provision in informal settlements. Evidence, data and monitoring of service provision are all crucial elements. Residents of informal settlements answer three questions about their access to water (taps), clean toilets and waste removal, and the results are published bi-weekly and shared with the relevant local government actors.

<sup>20</sup> <https://asivikelane.org/>

<sup>21</sup> The organisations involved include Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), Afesis-corplan Development Action Group (DAG), Planact, South African Shack Dwellers International Alliance (SASDIA), Social Justice Coalition (SJC) and 1:1 Agency of Engagement. Many of the organisations that are part of the initiative also push for incremental participatory and informal settlement upgrading as a key focus of metros.

<sup>22</sup> See <https://www.internationalbudget.org/covid-monitoring/>

## IN MAY 2021, RESPONSES WERE OBTAINED FROM:<sup>23</sup>

17 settlements and  
182 residents in

**BUFFALO CITY**

47 settlements and  
141 residents in

**CAPE TOWN**

28 settlements and  
160 residents in

**EKURHULENI**

44 settlements and  
167 residents in

**ETHEKWINI**

36 settlements and  
220 residents in

**JOHANNESBURG**

19 settlements and  
175 residents in

**NELSON MANDELA BAY**

5 settlements and  
31 residents in

**TSHWANE**

<sup>23</sup> See <https://asivikelane.org/summaries-for-municipalities-asivikelane-17/>

Over the past year, evidence collected by Asivikelane shows that broken taps and blocked or broken toilets are common in informal settlements, and metros are generally slow to repair these. As a result, residents are left with fewer working taps and toilets, or in some cases with none. Although most metros indicate that maintenance and repairs of basic services infrastructure is a 'priority', lessons from the initiative identified challenges around budgeting for maintenance.

### BOX 3 SCALING UP INFORMAL SETTLEMENT UPGRADING

Another initiative to emerge as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic was the push to rapidly scale-up of informal settlement upgrading. In 2020, a range of stakeholders participated in the development of a partnership framework agreement between civil society organisations (CSOs) and the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) around interventions in informal settlements.

The pandemic exposed "the severity of living conditions in informal settlements, which have always threatened the health, dignity and safety of people living there, [and...] present an imminent life and death situation". The following risk factors were identified: access to basic services, adequate shelter, economic activity, education and information sharing, and social safety nets.<sup>24</sup> The results demonstrate the need to work across sectors to urgently meet the needs of very vulnerable populations and to ensure that "economic levers are used collaboratively to create pathways for inclusion", as Chapter 2: Productive Cities discusses. This means rethinking the economy and opening opportunities especially for the informal sector. Although the partnership framework agreement is not yet implemented, its aim is to strengthen local partnership agreements between stakeholders around informal settlement upgrading in metros, at both a programmatic and project level. The process highlights the need for municipal departments, residents, community groups, national government and other entities to work together, as collaboration remains the key to successful improvement of the lives of people in informal settlements and integrating them into the broader fabric of cities.

<sup>24</sup> Partnership Framework Agreement between Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) around interventions in informal settlements in the context of COVID-19 (8 June 2020)

## Working together to create better public spaces and places

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated service delivery, economic and housing challenges, and highlighted the importance of public spaces for public health and safety, especially among marginalised communities. At the same time, the response to the pandemic has demonstrated the resilience and innovation that exist in the non-government sector, including communities. There is an urgent need to find solutions to the persistent inequalities and creative ways of developing and managing public spaces (SACN, 2020b). The key is community ownership and true participation, which means including communities and other stakeholders from the outset, i.e., at the design stage.

The Congella Park project in eThekweni (eThekweni PRC, n.d.) and the Gilfillan Park project<sup>25</sup> in Johannesburg are examples of successful inclusive public place-making, illustrating the importance of collaboration for regenerating inner cities, supporting livelihoods and improving community wellbeing.

### Congella Park

Like many cities in the world, Durban faces the broad social problem of homelessness. In February 2016, a census found that “close to 4000 people are living on the streets or in the formal shelters of Durban”, of which about half live in public spaces, including parks (Desmond et al., 2016: 2). The municipality has implemented various programmatic responses to address the challenge of homelessness, despite not having a specific homeless policy in place.

The case of Congella Park illustrates the power of a champion and the success of a ‘social management’ model for parks, which was informed by previous interventions in the city. The project indicates that whole-of-government and all-of-society partnering could lead to new social management models and a new social vision of public space.

Over the years, Congella Park had become an uninviting physical space that was no longer used by the local community. Once one of Durban’s most well-landscaped parks, the large 3.6-hectare park in the Congella industrial area located southwest of the Durban inner city faced challenges including rising crime and public safety concerns in the area, littering, illegal dumping, ‘vandalism’ (such as use of trees for firewood), drug abuse and homeless occupation of the park. To revitalise the park and improve accessibility and public use, the municipality adopted a strategy regarding homelessness similar to the one adopted in Albert Park.

#### BOX 4 QALAKABUSHA INTERVENTIONS IN ALBERT PARK

In 2013/14, eThekweni Municipality launched its Clean My City Programme, “in response to the social ills and service delivery problems identified in certain parts of the City”.<sup>26</sup> It is aligned to eThekweni’s vision of being Africa’s most caring and liveable city by 2030 and includes clean-up operations, bylaw enforcement and education aimed at changing people’s attitudes. Part of this programme is the Qalakabusha Intervention Programme, a pilot project involving many stakeholders, from NGOs to private sector and provincial and local government (Nzimande & Fabula, 2020). The aim was to make Albert Park safer, cleaner and more attractive, and included moving a large group of homeless men from the park to a more suitable area about 500 metres from the park (ibid). The Qalakabusha Programme was innovative because it sought to address both social problems (homelessness) and the sustainable management of the park.

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.kwpccreate.com/post/3617/gilfillanpark/>

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.durban.gov.za/Resource\\_Centre/Press\\_Releases/Pages/EThekweni-to-unveil-full-scale-City-wide-clean-up-campaign.aspx](http://www.durban.gov.za/Resource_Centre/Press_Releases/Pages/EThekweni-to-unveil-full-scale-City-wide-clean-up-campaign.aspx)

Since 2016, Jennifer Rampersad, a horticulturist with the eThekweni Parks, Recreation and Culture (PRC) department had been working on upgrading and improving Congella Park, including pruning trees and other vegetation.<sup>27</sup> By 2017, after numerous clean-ups, law enforcement patrolling and regular monitoring of the park, most of the homeless had left the park. Just 12 homeless people remained and refused to move. An extensive consultation process followed, between local government departments, civil society and faith-based organisations, the local business community, and the homeless residents of the park.

The Umbilo Business Forum (UBF), a voluntary membership and non-profit organisation of local businesses based in Sydney Road, where the park is located, had already donated tents for the homeless in the park in 2016, and backed and supported Rampersad's development of an urban park social model that could accommodate the needs of all stakeholders (Rampersad, n.d.). With a limited budget and limited staff, other organisations were approached for assistance where necessary. Social workers from non-profit organisations I-care and the Dennis Hurley Centre (who were also involved with the earlier project at Albert Park) looked after the general needs of the homeless, offered counselling services and acted as interpreters since some of the homeless did not speak English well. Durban Solid Waste (DSW) kept the area clean, while a nearby hospital tended to the sick, and local businesses provided trucks to assist with the clean-ups.

#### **BOX 5** STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN CONGELLA PARK INITIATIVE

- The homeless residents of the park
- Government departments: PRC, DSW, Metro Police and the Safer Cities Unit, the South African Police Services (SAPS), Health, Social Development, Home Affairs and Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
- Civil society and non-profit organisations: Kenneth Gardens Youth, Dennis Hurley Centre, I-care, Diakonia Council of Churches
- The UBF and other private sector role players, including park users

What emerged was an alternative, socially orientated management model, which appointed the remaining 12 homeless people as the park's resident caretakers and operators, after they had undergone training in maintaining and securing the park. The process has three phases:

- Phase 1 (completed): Education and awareness: This included helping homeless people with drug and health issues, facilitating access to shelters in the city centre and providing training in how to keep the park clean and tidy.
- Phase 2 (completed): Implementation: This included establishing and monitoring a food garden, a recycling station, and a pay toilet facility, as well as landscaping and additional flower beds. The homeless people participated in workshops that trained them in running a food garden, which now supplies restaurants in nearby Glenwood. Many of the homeless were already engaged in recycling and participated in a five-day workshop on managing and generating an income from recycling. A recycling station operated by the homeless residents was also established, working in close collaboration with municipal staff.
- Phase 3 (current): Management and sustainability: This involves local stakeholders through collaboration between PRC, local businesses (e.g., UBF), communities, churches and the selected interested local homeless people who are receiving park training work in close collaboration with municipal staff.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with J Rampersad, horticulturalist, Durban Botanic Gardens, eThekweni Municipality, 29 May 2021





Food garden produce supplied to local restaurants (eThekweni PRC)

The alternative model is an example of new thinking in public space management and underscores the importance of collaboration and partnering. The wellbeing benefits include:

- Addressing social ills, by managing homelessness in the park.
- Improving waste management, through regularising recycling, thereby addressing a source of extreme frustration for local businesses.
- Creating a place of peace and recreation that is enjoyed and frequented by local residents and users
- Providing livelihoods to the homeless, most of whom now have a bank card and are generating more income (R1,000/week, compared to about R350/week previously). The UBF manages their funds and offers supervision, and continues to pay wages for the management, permaculture and recycling programmes.

Congella Park also appears to have had a broader impact. During the COVID-19 Level 5 lockdown, eThekweni Municipality set up 11 temporary homeless shelters that housed about 2500 people. One year later, by March 2021, the municipality had reduced the number of temporary shelters to four, housing just under 560 people.<sup>28</sup> At least three of these have started their own gardens to grow vegetables for market. The municipality's Safer Cities Unit facilitated the programme, partnering with non-governmental, faith-based and civil society organisations, while private sector companies also provided agricultural expertise.

28 Harper P. 'A year into Covid, Durban's beachfront farmers are still tilling the soil.' Mail and Guardian, 27 March 2021 <https://mg.co.za/news/2021-03-27-a-year-into-covid-durbans-beachfront-farmers-are-still-tilling-the-soil/>

Gilfillan Park (commonly known as Jeppe Park) is a 11 000m<sup>2</sup> area located in the inner-city neighbourhood of Jeppestown, Johannesburg. The park consisted of basic, neglected lawned areas and a strip of paving around the perimeter, with mostly exotic trees providing shade. It was ill-equipped and did not have the basic facilities required for its large number of users. In 2017, the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), together with Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo (JCPZ), began the park's upgrade, which was completed in June 2018 at a cost of R15-million. The upgrade was one of the many projects identified in the "Inner City Eastern Gateway Urban Development Framework and Implementation Report", a city spatial policy prepared by Osmond Lange Architects & Planners for the City of Johannesburg and JDA (CoJ & JDP, 2016). The final brief supplied by the JDA was to transform the site into a functional park without restricting any of the multiple and positive on-site activities already taking place, as revealed during the community engagement process. The upgraded and re-designed park would serve residents in Jeppestown and the surrounding areas of City and Suburban and Troyeville.



Source: Gilfillan Park, Jeppestown, Johannesburg

In 2016, prior to implementation, JCPZ commissioned the Bjala Foundation, a Jeppestown-based social development enterprise, to conduct a local community consultation study (Bjala Foundation, 2016). Bjala employed several tools to determine and understand the community's norms and rules, likes/dislikes, needs and wishes, as well as basic spatial considerations. The study identified five main park user groups and activities, which were incorporated into the design and implementation phases, and included community feedback. The five main park user groups identified were: Streetlight Schools – Jeppe Park Primary, located three metres from the park; Shembe Church; Ingoma traditional dancing; The Soccer Guys; and different *imihlangano* (community meetings). Other important stakeholders identified were: people in transit (passing through the park on their way home), local residents, the Nationwide Primary School (located 40 metres from the park), the Bjala Early Childhood Development (ECD) centre (located three metres from the Park) and the Bjala Foundation itself.

Some of the activities identified included:

- Physical education classes for primary school learners.
- Supervised play for children from the neighbouring ECD centre.
- Community meetings.
- Health promotion (the Department of Health's circumcision van is positioned in the park on a regular basis).
- Information sharing and public notices, provided by the Jeppestown Building Information Forum, which is the custodian of a community noticeboard that contains information about building ownership and land use change (an initiative aimed at protecting housing rights), as well as general public notices.

The park was upgraded and re-designed in consultation with local residents through an extensive stakeholder engagement that enabled the community to give inputs into the final design. As a result, further objectives for the park emerged that went beyond the initial plan to develop a functional, multi-purpose public space amidst the dense streets, office blocks, apartments and schools surrounding the site. These included skills development and job creation during the construction phase of the project, with 30% of the contract value being awarded to small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) in the local ward. The contractor used five SMMEs and 39 local labourers for the construction work, which included employing and training small landscape and horticultural enterprises involved in work such as paving, brickwork, street furniture and planting.

The process created a sense of community ownership and anticipation, so much so that children were excitedly trying to access the play areas even before completion. Today, the park is used extensively and vandalism has decreased. The project showed the benefits of a collaborative approach, which was recognised when the design of Gilfillan Park received a commendation for excellence in urban design at the Institute for Landscape Architects for South Africa (ILASA) awards in 2019.



## MAKING CITIES MORE INCLUSIVE

The role of the state and city authorities in promoting inclusion is not merely technical or procedural but is underpinned by an explicit agenda of safeguarding human rights and dignity, rooted in the Constitution. Unfortunately, the reality is that public investment decisions “are largely made in disciplinary silos which often barely communicate with each other; and engineering concerns dominate over human and environmental ones – our cities are over-simplified technical ‘solutions’ to highly complex human processes”.<sup>29</sup> However, the pockets of excellence have demonstrated what is possible and highlighted elements that are necessary to achieve real engagement for inclusion and wellbeing.

### Community involvement makes the difference

Participation is people empowerment, a vehicle for social change and sustainable public investments. When participation is linked to access to the commons or public goods, it significantly enables the right to the city, uplifts and upskills, stimulates active citizenship, sustains service delivery, and contributes to positive community perceptions and public trust in institutions (SACN, 2021).

The case study on human settlements shows the importance of metros working in partnership with CSOs and communities to ensure informal settlements receive basic services and are upgraded incrementally. This involves developing multi-stakeholder, multi-sector local teams that can address issues impeding the wellbeing of some of the most vulnerable residents in the city. The Asivikelane initiative shows that such collaborations are possible, but implementation requires political will from metros.

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-07-16-the-smart-solution-is-to-fix-our-ailing-cities/>

Local ownership is the primary and essential benefit of extensive participation and cooperative governance. In Congella Park, the inclusion of homeless individuals, as the park’s caretakers, guardians and operators, addressed both welfare and community safety issues, while in Gilfillan Park, the all-of-society approach led to the identification of multiple existing usages, which had not been included in the original plan, and to the local community taking ownership of their park. The result was a decrease in vandalism and an increase in park usage. The Gilfillan Park consultation process further benefited from being undertaken by a local stakeholder, the Bjala Foundation, that was invested in the project and in community engagement.

## Integrators or champions play a crucial role

More integrators or champions are needed within local government. These are “people who can work beyond the confines of their line departments and develop good relationships with other sector departments within the municipality and other spheres of government” (SACN, 2015: 79). For instance, prior to its partnership with JCPZ/JDA, Bjala had only a few years earlier not wished to proceed with such a partnership for the Gilfillan Park upgrade because the city approach was believed to be too top-down.<sup>30</sup>

Champions can show what is possible beyond the conventional. In Congella Park, the champion drew from precedents but also developed innovative in-situ responses, while Gilfillan Park demonstrated that community-engagement champions within the city and among local stakeholders can play a key role in the ultimate success of the project.

The style of engagement that is adopted in any setting will depend on the capacities and resources of the practitioner leading the engagement process, as well as community dynamics, budgets and organisational culture in the municipality. Practitioners will find it more difficult to invest in relationships that could deliver true collaboration if they are fearful of community responses or punitive responses inside their institution. Therefore, the ability of practitioners to achieve true collaboration depends on their ability to acknowledge and manage their own feelings of fear, scarcity, resilience, courage and creativity, and on the support they receive within typically hierarchical state institutions (SACN, 2021).

## Working to attain inclusion has multiplier effects

Inputs made towards a certain goal can result in broader outputs and outcomes than originally intended. For example, conceiving, developing and managing parks in an ‘urban cluster’ enables certain resources to be shared in creating an urban environment. Safety can be improved in cooperation with local stakeholders, by identifying key targeted areas between parks (e.g., along sightlines) for upgrading through small-scale interventions, such as installing lighting and WiFi. In so doing, a safety network is created in the immediate environment of inner city parks. Capital (re)development should be undertaken in tandem with other strategies, to create complementary, integrated and responsive interventions, and to maximise the use of resources.

---

<sup>30</sup> Interview with N Pingo, Development Facilitation Manager, Johannesburg Development Agency, 30 May 2021

Both Gilfillan Park and Congella have extended the meaning of ‘inclusion’, to include addressing social needs and social development, in both process and management. The parks have become more than recreational and leisure places; they have become healthy public spaces that have improved community and societal wellbeing. The scope of what can be conceived and accomplished is likely to be widened through deepened local stakeholder engagement. Conceiving parks in a collaborative way is ultimately tied to public space and place-making defined in an African context, which emergent projects such as the Centre on African Spaces will be addressing.<sup>31</sup>

## Transversal management and intergovernmental relations are needed

The lack of alignment between functions, responsibilities and funded mandates has a detrimental impact on the wellbeing of individuals. As the Asivikelane initiative found, metros are generally slow to repair the broken taps and blocked toilets that are so common in informal settlements, resulting in residents being left with fewer working taps and toilets or, in some cases, with none. Responsibility for the maintenance of public infrastructure in informal settlements is usually vested in municipalities. However, issues of informal settlement upgrading, relocations (where unavoidable), allocation of land, funding for serviced sites and top structures, and programmes (such as Finance Linked Individual Subsidy Programme, FLISP, and social housing) are dispersed among provincial and national government as well as agencies. This creates a challenge in planning for longer-term improvements and formalisation within informal settlements. The need for transversal management and improved intergovernmental relations has been an important focus of the USRG, as the mainstreaming of planning, implementation and operations among a range of actors from different state and non-state organisations is crucial for improving safety in urban areas.



<sup>31</sup> <https://www.urbanet.info/towards-pan-african-spaces-of-public/>



## CONCLUSION

---

When managed correctly, urbanisation is a driving force of development but may also result in rising levels of inequality and exclusion. Inclusion is rooted in the need for transformation and spatial justice. The right to the city for all citizens and greater inclusion mean improved quality of life or wellbeing of citizens. South African cities remain spaces in which marginalised and vulnerable groups bear the brunt of poverty, inequality and exclusion, exacerbated by COVID-19. Nevertheless, pockets of excellence demonstrate how cities can become more inclusive through effective cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach. This includes engaging citizens in work to make cities safer, involving the youth in urban processes, improving living conditions in informal settlements and creating better public places. These examples show the importance of community ownership and participation, and the crucial role played by integrators or champions, as well as the multiplier effects of working towards inclusion.

The governance and operations of government must be emancipatory and redistributive in their essence, as underpinned by the Constitution. Local government's objective should not be merely procedural but must confront inequality and the spatial, economic and social drivers that constrain wellbeing. This will require addressing the design of urban and governance systems, not continuing with futile efforts that only skim the surface of power and politics. Existing systems have been designed for extraction, to benefit elites, and the relegation of the poor and historically marginalised to the fringes of South African cities. To give effect to rights and dignity will require shifting the foundations of urban institutions, systems, processes and stakeholders.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

---

The multidimensional nature of inclusion and wellbeing demands effective cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach. Although cities have pockets of excellence, the challenge is upscaling and institutionalising them in order to yield sustainable inclusion and wellbeing outcomes for city dwellers.

### Co-create with communities

The systems, processes and practices of public institutions must become people-centred and inclusive, so that all reap the benefits of living in cities. Co-creation through cooperation and partnership will have to become the order of the day, as opposed to rewarding individual achievement or siloed approaches. This is not easy but is essential to the sustainability of public investments and offers an opportunity for municipalities to connect with communities. These benefits will always outweigh the challenges.

Local stakeholders must be consulted and research done *prior* to the implementation of a project, in order to understand the needs of the surrounding area and communities. This will lead to sustainable and impactful programmes because they will be based on inputs from communities who understand their context better than anyone else. When community voices are not heard and projects do not reflect their needs, it reinforces historical exclusion and ‘un-belonging’. The result is often communities that do not value, vandalise or ignore projects, culminating in a worsening relationship with the municipality.

## Upskill city practitioners

Practitioners need to be equipped and skills transferred, to ensure continuity and the retention of institutional memory. Many practical tools and techniques exist (e.g., implementation and management models, and visioning tools) that officials could use to involve a cross-section of stakeholders, including partners, intermediaries, users and beneficiaries. Practitioners need to be capacitated to engage with complexity and work effectively horizontally and vertically within their own institutions and across spheres of government. They need to be able to facilitate effective community engagements and empower vulnerable groups, such as the youth, to amplify their voices and be part of decision-making processes. When practitioners find ways to share power, there is an opportunity to innovate and solve some of the most complex social problems through diverse inputs and shared effort and accountability. Practitioners should participate in learning and exchange platforms for professionals that breach the confines of their institutions and stakeholder groups. These platforms provide them with:

- An opportunity to share their experiences and practices, inform the practice of others and learn from others to improve their own practice.
- Spaces (perhaps not otherwise available) to engage with other professionals in developing solutions to problems and creating new ways of improving projects and practices.
- Psycho-social support.

## Institutionalise good practices

Good practices tend to be at the level of loosely formed coalitions of the willing, rather than institutionalised, which limits the ability to upscale them. Highly capacitated, knowledgeable and skilled practitioners show what is possible beyond the conventional, and demonstrate that the necessary tools, knowledge and materials are available. However, such efforts are neither replicable nor sustainable unless the systems and resources are in place to support them, and the lessons are learned and expanded upon systematically. What is needed is to encourage, facilitate and incentivise a collaborative culture through multiple and deliberate mechanisms. Such institutional activism provides continuity across projects to ensure that the various sector departments have a clear sense of their roles and input. This may require finding an institutional home for the project. Shifting institutional culture is hard and will require high-level political support in order to secure the capacities and finances necessary to drive the desired practices and outcomes.

# Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition

---

|   |  |     |
|---|--|-----|
|    | Introduction   | 143 |
|    | The Current State of Sustainability Transitions                      | 147 |
|   | Transversal Cooperative Initiatives                                  | 154 |
|  | Achieving Urban Resilience through<br>Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships | 160 |
|  | Lessons from the Cities  | 165 |
|  | Conclusion   | 167 |
|  | Recommendations  | 169 |





## INTRODUCTION

The preamble to the sustainable development goals (SDGs) refers to the world's commitment to a “transformed world”.<sup>1</sup> For the first time in modern history, the global community of nations represented in the United Nations has agreed on a set of goals that includes eradicating poverty (SDG 1) and reducing inequality (SDG 10) without destroying the planet's natural systems and resources (SDGs 6, 7, 13, 14 and 15). Furthermore, SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), read together with SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals), makes clear that these global goals must be realised in cities.

In a majorly urban world, what cities do will affect the extent and pace of the wider transition to sustainability. Cities and urban areas are crucial for ensuring global sustainability and resilience (Sitas et al., 2021), as they are places where urban challenges (food and water insecurity, and lack of basic services) collide with climate change impacts and disaster risks (Koop & van Leeuwen, 2017). “Cities are where the battle for sustainable development will be won or lost” (UN, 2013: 17). By 2050, two-thirds (66%) of the global population will live in urban spaces, up from 54% in 2015, resulting in massive increases in the demand for urban infrastructure.”<sup>2</sup>

The resource-use implications and environmental impacts of urbanisation parallel the severity of urban climate impacts (IRP, 2018). This is recognised in global agreements and policies, such as the New Urban Agenda (NUA) that gives guidance to countries, regions and cities on planning and managing sustainable urbanisation, while the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has called for urgent action in response to impending climate chaos (IPCC, 2018). An increase in global temperatures above 1.5°C will disrupt basic social and economic activities, with the worst consequences being for people and communities living in the global South. In southern Africa, temperatures are rising at about twice the global rate, which poses a significant risk to the region (Engelbrecht et al., 2019).

<sup>1</sup> <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html>



**CITIES ARE WHERE THE BATTLE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WILL BE WON OR LOST” (UN, 2013: 17). BY 2050, TWO-THIRDS (66%) OF THE GLOBAL POPULATION WILL LIVE IN URBAN SPACES, UP FROM 54% IN 2015, RESULTING IN MASSIVE INCREASES IN THE DEMAND FOR URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE.**

## THE NEW URBAN AGENDA (NUA)

Building on decades of global networking between cities and associated urban research outputs, the NUA presents the key social, environmental and economic building blocks for a just urban transition. It recognises the severe threats facing cities and human settlements from the loss of biodiversity and pressure on ecosystems, and represents a call for rethinking the urban agenda through (UN-Habitat, 2016):

- Promoting environmental sustainability and sustainable use of land and resources, by protecting, conserving and restoring ecosystems, water, natural habitats and biodiversity, and adopting lifestyles in harmony with nature.
- Addressing the energy and transport needs of the urban poor; and ensuring decent work and livelihood opportunities for all, with special attention to vulnerable social groups, such as women, youth, people with disabilities and those living in vulnerable situations.
- Recognising the contribution of the working poor in the informal economy, promoting the food security and nutritional needs of urban residents, ensuring accountability to the vulnerable groups; and considering the disproportionate impacts of policies on poor and vulnerable people.

The NUA emphasises partnerships and urges governments at all levels to strengthen and revitalise existing partnerships and to pursue new forms of direct collaboration with civil society and the private sector, thereby promoting both local and regional development.

In the face of climate change and environmental challenges, healthy and functioning urban ecosystems play a crucial role in ensuring the resilience of communities and landscapes (Keeler et al., 2019; McPhearson et al., 2015; Sitas et al., 2021). Therefore, a new strategy for 21st century urbanisation requires parallel actions around urban planning, sustainable design and resource efficiency that result in just urban transitions.

### Africa is the most vulnerable region

Africa is the most rapidly urbanising region of the world and faces immense urban challenges, including the growth of unmanaged informality, poverty and inequality, combined with fragmented governance capacities (Smit, 2018). The lack of service delivery is widely recognised as a critical urban challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the informal settlements that comprise over 60% of the total urban population — the highest percentage in the world (Zerbo et al., 2020). Ensuring effective and equitable service provision has proven to be an unending task, more so given the rapid urbanisation taking place (Moretto et al., 2018). This is often caused by governance structures that persist in trying to satisfy urgent and growing demands through regulating and maintaining conventional systems, without considering ways of working with informality and long-term sustainable solutions (Wolfram et al., 2019).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, a major cross-cutting challenge is climate change, which has the greatest negative impact on the most vulnerable segments of society (Serdeczny et al., 2017). Climate change overlays existing challenges, leading to municipal/local government officials having to deal with ever-increasing complexity and uncertainty in decision-making (Baker & Sovacool, 2017), and exacerbates the entrenched social inequalities that often act as major barriers to meaningful participation and collaboration (Gumucio et al., 2020).

South Africa is both highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and a major greenhouse-gas emitter. In transitioning to a low-emissions society, the three spheres of government will need to balance mitigation commitments with adaptation needs and ambitions for an inclusive economy (Petrie et al., 2018). This is recognised in South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) and the subsequent Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), which make the connection between eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and sustaining key ecosystems

and resources (COGTA, 2016). The IUDF is intended to address the unique conditions and challenges facing South Africa's cities and towns, by advocating effective management of urbanisation, and is underpinned by a growth model of compact, connected and coordinated urban areas driven by integrated infrastructure investments.

## Cities are crucial for global sustainability

Cities experience and continue to be exposed to climate impacts, such as extreme heat, droughts, flooding and coastal hazards (Hobbie & Grimm, 2020; Revi et al., 2014). They are also responsible for using most resources and generating most waste and emissions. If urban expansion continues through a 'business-as-usual' approach, material consumption will increase from 40 billion tonnes in 2010 to about 90 billion by 2050 (IRP, 2018). However, if cities change their approach to the design, construction and operation of urban infrastructures, they could halve resource consumption by 2050 and thus significantly increase urban resilience (ibid). Furthermore, cities could take actions to mitigate further global warming and to address the impacts of climate change on a systemic level (SUP, 2018). Such actions depend upon the ability of cities to take faster action and to innovate scalable solutions more easily than other spheres of government, potentially through greater proximity to the problems experienced by people (ibid). Local governments of the global South are in a unique position to contribute to the global sustainability agenda, by harnessing the creative capacities within cities appropriate to their respective developmental circumstances (Keeler et al., 2019; McPhearson et al., 2015; Nagendra et al., 2018; Ziervogel et al., 2021).

In South Africa, cities face the triple challenge that is common to most cities across the world, but in particular in the global South: they must respond to profound environmental challenges (in particular climate change, resource depletion and ecosystem vulnerability); address deepening socioeconomic inequalities exacerbated by the global pandemic; and establish new modes of cooperative governance appropriate for the complexities of urban development in the information age. In brief, cities need to make key transitions in order to be sustainable.

## A just urban transition

A just urban transition is, in essence, a process of transitioning over a period of time to inclusive, equitable, resilient and spatially integrated cities that are decarbonised, resource efficient and biodiverse. A just urban transition is not an *outcome*, but a *process* inspired by this vision of a sustainable city. Therefore, a successful just urban transition will depend on all spheres of government working within a wider all-of-society approach that includes non-state stakeholders from business, civil society, and academic and knowledge institutions.

In practice, an appropriate balance is needed between the top-down authorising environment, and the bottom-up mobilising environment. Without a balance, either the top-down authorising environment demobilises the wider society, leading to the delegitimation of local governance and oppositional, obstructive and counter-productive situations; or the bottom-up mobilising environment is too strong, leading to conflict and governance paralysis.

- While the authorising environment sets vision and provides leadership, it is of necessity about command-and-control (being regulatory and policy-driven), subject to budgetary and electoral governance cycles, rules-based and upwardly accountable, compliance-oriented and embedded within local, provincial and national regulations and rules.
- The mobilising environment has the potential to harness all-of-society energies, which are essential for learning, institutional agility and building partnerships with businesses, social movements, faith-based organisations and research institutions.

When a balance is achieved, cooperative governance comes alive, as government officials create conditions for innovation, while non-state actors mobilise the resources and capacities required for effective implementation rather than being merely oppositional. Effective partnering is what is needed to achieve a balance between a top-down authorising environment and a bottom-up mobilising environment. Indeed, partnering for the purpose of futuring, while learning from experimentation in practice, is what drives urban transitions forward across thousands of cities around the world (Swilling, 2020).

The adoption of the SDGs has resulted in the emergence of new forms of mission-oriented governance (Mazzucato et al., 2021). Mission-oriented governance means defining a shared all-of-society value proposition and then mobilising partnerships to make tangible progress towards attaining shared achievable goals. This type of governance is needed in an increasingly complex world facing a planetary emergency (Preiser et al., 2020), especially in cities of the global South that face the greatest challenges. These partnerships – referred to as multi-stakeholder initiatives, public-private partnerships or cross-sector collaborations – are changing the understanding of governance.

The chapter starts by examining the state of sustainability transitions in South Africa and South African Cities Network (SACN) member cities, in terms of policies, strategies and plans. It then looks at examples of transversal cooperative initiatives, in the form of knowledge-sharing networks and intermediaries that enable a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach, and multi-stakeholder partnerships (in Ekurhuleni, Cape Town and eThekweni) that illustrate the importance of developing shared value propositions for implementation through partnerships. Some lessons from the practical experiences of cities are then shared and fed into the recommendations provided in the conclusion.





## THE CURRENT STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS

---

# 2

In 2016, the five-yearly SACN flagship State of Cities Report (SoCR) pointed to the need for cities to embed sustainability in their development paradigms and to accelerate their sustainability transitions (SACN, 2016). Over the past five years, the SACN's Sustainable Cities programme has attempted to document the extent to which cities are, or are not, becoming more sustainable, using indicators to track progress and comparative analyses of sustainability practices. The SACN highlights the practical challenges encountered in embedding sustainability in cities and accelerating their transition (SACN, 2020a; 2020b). The sustainability indicators (water, waste, climate and air quality) reveal that each city is following a different pathway towards a just urban transition. Some cities emphasise restoring biodiversity, while others focus on improving waste management or procuring renewable energy to buffer residents against electricity load-shedding. This demonstrates the need to recognise that there can be no 'one-size-fits-all' cooperative governance for a just urban transition within an all-of-society framework.

Some cities have multiple championing departments and are able to drive solid sustainability transition pathways (SACN, 2020b):

- In Johannesburg, the Environmental and Infrastructure Services Department (EISD) drives overall sustainability in the city, focusing on service utilities and the environment (including climate change), while other departments champion different aspects of sustainability. For example, the Development Planning Department focuses strongly on inclusionary spatial planning through a sustainability lens, while the Smart City Unit engages with innovation to build towards a future, sustainable city.
- Ekurhuleni's sustainability work is driven by both the Environment and Strategic Planning Department and the Energy Department.
- eThekweni has multiple sites of sustainability practices, including (at minimum) Environmental Planning and Climate Protection, the Energy Office and the Planning Department.
- In Msunduzi, the Environmental Management Unit drives policy, but the City Enterprises Business Unit and Integrated Development Plan (IDP) Office accelerate practice by supporting implementation.

In the City of Tshwane, there is one dedicated City Sustainability Unit (CSU), which is located in the Executive Mayor's office and acts as the sustainability advisory and advocacy arm of the city. It has strategically linked its work with Tshwane Vision 2055, to address climate change issues and stimulate green economic growth. In addition, the CSU uses its location in the city to influence city projects that can make sustainability visible and tangible for officials, political leaders and citizens.

## Sustainability transitions call for system changes

During the past 15–20 years certain changes across all levels of the system have contributed to sustainability transitions in cities, albeit at a slow pace. These have been at the regime level (regulator/government) and at the local level, through socio-technological shifts (interactions between infrastructure and technology on the one hand, and quality of life and social wellbeing on the other) and through experimentation (on-the-ground pilots or innovations).

### Regime change

Over the past 20 years, the environmental and local government regulatory and policy space has changed dramatically, as a result of the adoption of the Constitution and its expression in key pieces of legislation that followed, such as the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) and various National Environmental Management Acts. These ascribed far greater social and economic powers, as well as environmental responsibilities, to local government (SACN, 2020b).

### Socio-technological shifts

The interaction between infrastructure and technology, on the one hand, and quality of life and social well-being, on the other, has contributed to the transition to sustainability in cities, as far greater emphasis is being placed on the demand side of water, energy and waste services to reduce costs and to improve the quality of life of people. For instance, the larger metros have implemented infrastructure developments (e.g., efficient water-pumping technologies), encouraged and regularised rain-water harvesting through local policy (e.g., water tanks on private properties), particularly in light of more frequent droughts. In recent years embedded solar photovoltaic (PV) energy supply has reached grid parity with the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom's) coal-based supply (Eberhard, 2015) and most cities have developed processes (technical, tariff, etc.) for installing embedded generation renewable energy plants within municipal electricity distribution grids. In the waste sector, 'separation of waste at source' programmes are taking root, easing the strain on over-stretched landfill sites and contributing to the green economy through recycling material, while also creating jobs and business opportunities in the waste sector. (SACN, 2020b).


### Experimentation

In recent years, cities have experimented with various projects: municipal rooftop PV installation; waste-to-energy projects; buses run on compressed natural gas; working with informal communities in waste collection and recycling; community food gardens and urban agriculture; biodiversity and community ecosystem-based adaptation projects; and green buildings (SACN, 2020b).

## The policies are in place

South African cities face serious resource, eco-system, climate change and socioeconomic challenges. In response to these challenges, a combination of national policy frameworks and city-level strategies have emerged (Figure 1 and Table 1). The result is a growing commitment to a just urban transition, with a diversity of strategies across different cities. However, unless cooperative governance becomes a vibrant and creative reality, just urban transitions and transformative adaptation will remain unlikely.

**FIGURE 1:** Timeline of national policies, frameworks and key climate-related incidents (2016–2021)



Source: Authors own

A matrix of policy frameworks clearly links cooperative governance and urban sustainability to a particular focus on the imperatives of a just transition. The country has several intersectoral policy frameworks and programmes, such as the IUDF and the Cities Support Programme (CSP), as well as national sectoral policy frameworks that cover energy, waste, water and sanitation. All these national policy frameworks and programmes emphasise the need to reconcile more sustainable resource use with poverty eradication and reduced unemployment and inequality. The transition to sustainable, resource-efficient, economically equitable and socially inclusive cities requires a shift from traditional, linear and siloed governance approaches to adaptive, participatory and integrated modes of governance. Although current city policies on the sustainable use of resources and tackling climate change are beginning to reflect this new approach, what it means in practice is less clear, given the siloed nature of governance. South Africa is renowned for its capacity to formulate and adopt sophisticated policy frameworks, but this has not translated into effective implementation (Mazzucato et al., 2021). Nevertheless, more collaborative approaches are starting to emerge emphasising the need for a shared value proposition and effective partnering.

South Africa has made important progress in developing its climate change policy and institutional architecture, and officials recognise that climate action is a local government mandate. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding the specific roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments (Petrie et al., 2018). The national government intends finalising its National Climate Change Bill in 2021, with the intention of taking the country through a low-carbon growth trajectory, where “no one is left behind”.<sup>3</sup> The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) provides a common vision of climate change adaptation and resilience for the country, and outlines priority areas for achieving this vision. It will be used as the basis for meeting South Africa’s obligations in terms of the adaptation commitments outlined in the Nationally Determined Contributions (DEA, 2019). The NCCAS is a 10-year plan that will be reviewed every five years, and is directed not only at national government departments but also at South African society as a whole, including the relevant sectoral institutions, provincial and local governments, the private sector, the research community and civil society (ibid).

Prior to the NCCAS, South Africa developed the Strategic Framework and Overarching Implementation Plan for Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) in South Africa (2016–2021), which promotes EbA as a central component of biodiversity and climate change programmes. EbA is about forging natural solutions to climate change (DEA & SANBI, 2016) and adopting nature-based solutions.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAP) 2015–2025 describe a path to ensure that the management of biodiversity assets and ecological infrastructure continues to support the country’s development. The NBSAP’s vision has at its core people and their access to the benefits of conserving, managing and using biodiversity, and highlights the development of a skilled workforce and effective knowledge foundations, such as indigenous knowledge and citizen science (DEA, 2015). Local government is mandated to mainstream biodiversity through municipal IDPs and spatial development frameworks (SDFs), taking bioregional plans and threatened ecosystems into account (SANBI, 2014).

---

3 <https://www.stateofthenation.gov.za/sona-2020-feb/addressing-climate-change>

4 Durban has adopted the concept of Community-based Adaptation or CbA (Roberts et al., 2012) that can be subsumed under the more embracing and systemic concept of transformative adaptation (C40 CFF, 2018).



## Cities have developed strategies and plans

Guided by national policies, cities have put in place policies and strategies that address different aspects of sustainability (Table 1).

**TABLE 1:** Strategies used by the nine cities

| MUNICIPALITIES     | EXISTING STRATEGIES   | PLANNING TOOLS   |
|--------------------|---|--|
| Buffalo City       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Mitigation Policy and Strategy (2008)</li> <li>• Integrated Waste Management Plan (Draft, 2021–2025)</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP 2017/18</li> <li>• SDBIP* 2017/18</li> <li>• BEPP** 2018/19</li> </ul>              |
| City of Cape Town  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated Coastal Management Policy of the City of Cape Town (2014)</li> <li>• Cape Town Bioregional Plan (2015)</li> <li>• Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) Strategic Framework (2016)</li> <li>• Environmental Strategy (2017)</li> <li>• Municipal Spatial Development Framework (2018)</li> <li>• Cape Town Resilience Strategy (2019)</li> <li>• Cape Town's Water Strategy (2019)</li> <li>• Inclusive Economic Growth Strategy (Draft, 2019)</li> <li>• City of Cape Town Climate Change Strategy (2021)</li> <li>• 3<sup>rd</sup> Generation Integrated Waste Management Plan (2019, aligned to 2017–2022 IDP)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP 2017–2022</li> <li>• BEPP 2018/19</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/19</li> </ul>               |
| Ekurhuleni         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water Services Development Plan (2015)</li> <li>• Ekurhuleni Climate Change Response Strategy (2017)</li> <li>• Draft Green City Action Plan (2021)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP 2017/18–2020/21</li> <li>• BEPP 2018/2019</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/19</li> </ul>       |
| eThekweni          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guideline for Designing Green Roof Habitats (2010)</li> <li>• Energy Efficiency Guideline (2010)</li> <li>• Water Conservation Guideline (2010)</li> <li>• Climate Change Strategy (2014)</li> <li>• Integrated Waste Management Plan (2016)</li> <li>• Durban Resilience Strategy (2017)</li> <li>• Durban Climate Action Plan (2019)</li> <li>• Durban State of Biodiversity Report (2019/2020)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BEPP 2017/18</li> <li>• IDP 2017/18–2021/22</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/2019</li> </ul>       |
| Johannesburg       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Climate Change Adaptation Plan (2009)</li> <li>• Integrated Waste Management Plan (2011)</li> <li>• Climate Change Strategic Framework (2015)</li> <li>• Climate Action Plan (2021)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BEPP 2017/18</li> <li>• IDP 2018/19 Review</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/19</li> </ul>          |
| Mangaung           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrated Waste Management Plan (2011)</li> <li>• Environmental Implementation and Management Plan (2015)</li> <li>• Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy for Mangaung (2017)</li> <li>• Water Conservation and Demand Management Strategy (2018)</li> <li>• Local Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2018)</li> <li>• Environmental Sustainability Strategy and Action Plan (2020)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP 2017–2022</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018–2019</li> <li>• BEPP 2018/19–2020/21</li> </ul>     |
| Msunduzi           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Strategy (2016)</li> <li>• Integrated Environmental Management Policy (2018)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft IDP 2017–2022</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/2019</li> <li>• No BEPP</li> </ul>            |
| Nelson Mandela Bay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water Master Plan (2005–2020)</li> <li>• Sustainable Community Planning Guide (2007)</li> <li>• Climate Change and Green Economy Action Plan (2015)</li> <li>• Integrated Waste Management Plan (2016–2020)</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDP 2016/17–2020/21</li> <li>• SDBIP 2017/18</li> <li>• BEPP 2018/19–2020/21</li> </ul> |
| Tshwane            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Green Economy Strategic Framework (2013)</li> <li>• Tshwane Vision 2055 (2013)</li> <li>• Climate Response Strategy (2017)</li> <li>• Sustainable Procurement Strategy (2017)</li> <li>• Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) (2017–2021)</li> <li>• Vulnerability Assessment (2018)</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BEPP 2017/18</li> <li>• IDP 2017–2021 Review</li> <li>• SDBIP 2018/2019</li> </ul>      |

\*Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan \*\*Built Environment Performance Plan

Source: Adapted from SACN (2020b)

Significantly, South African cities have created dedicated positions and new (or expanded) structures to handle their expanded environmental mandates, and some have moved from piloting projects to mainstreaming sustainability fully into several service-delivery line departments.<sup>5</sup>

**TABLE 2:** Structures or mechanisms to embed sustainability practices across the nine cities

| CITY         | LEAD/DRIVE DEPARTMENT   | INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION  | EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENT STRUCTURES*  |
|--------------|---|--|--|
| Buffalo City | Integrated Environmental and Sustainable Development Unit   | Challenge: no platform or coordinating committee   | Community Forum<br>Youth outreach  |
| Cape Town    | Sustainable Energy Markets Department: Energy and Climate Change Directorate;<br>Environmental Department: Spatial Planning and Environment Directorate                 | Various established transversal committees to address cross-sectoral work  | Global networks Engagements with academia in research projects<br>Engagements with private sector through energy, water and waste forum  |
| Ekurhuleni   | Environmental and Strategic Planning Department;<br>Electricity and Energy Department   | Resilience forum involving senior management from 14 different line departments  | IDP engagements<br>Mayoral task teams<br>Engaging academia and private sector through the Green Buildings assessment committee   |
| eThekweni    | Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department;<br>Energy Office;<br>Planning Department  | Practice of establishing transversal committees to address cross-sectoral work<br>Dashboard to flag challenges and coordinate solutions in development | Dashboard may extend to community engagement for problem solving<br>Linkages with community organisations and NGOs for incremental services upgrade and other environmental regeneration projects<br>National and provincial forums (e.g., KZN Climate Change Compact Forum)<br>Hub with neighbouring municipalities (**SALGA and ***COGTA)<br>Biodiversity Forum engaging traditional leadership in wildlife custodianship<br>Global networks (e.g., C40) |
| Johannesburg | Environmental and Infrastructure Services Department (includes the Climate Change Unit);<br>Development Planning (as a driver of sustainability through the urban form) | Climate Change Forum   | Global networks (e.g., C40)<br>Engaging academia (e.g., Urban Design Advisory Group)<br>City's Sustainability Forum (now collapsed)  |

<sup>5</sup> Comments made by city practitioners during the SACN-convened workshops that took place in 2020

| CITY               | LEAD/DRIVE DEPARTMENT  | INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION   | EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENT STRUCTURES*  |
|--------------------|--|---|--|
| Mangaung           | Environmental Management Department  |   | Research projects with academia<br>National government as implementation partner   |
| Msunduzi           | Environmental Management Unit (leads policy);<br>Sustainable Development and City Enterprises Business Unit and IDP office (important in leading projects) | Informal, but good relations  | Website<br>KZN Climate Change Compact Forum<br>Izimbizo with traditional leaders<br>Partnering with civil society and NGOs on projects     |
| Nelson Mandela Bay | Environmental Management   | Integrated BEPP task team recently set up with senior managers (sustainability as a guiding principle)                                | Award-winning Sustainable Community Planning Method document (not yet implemented)<br>No formal structure to engage communities<br>Website |
| Tshwane            | City Sustainability Unit, within the Office of the Executive Mayor   | Building Hub<br>'Green champions' in departments lapsed/did not work well<br>Staff members seconded to line department for six months | Global networks (e.g., C40)<br>World Resources Institute (WRI)<br>Research projects with academia  |

*\*This refers to internal city engagement. However, it is worth noting that cities engage with national government through an extensive set of forums, such as the Intergovernmental Forum, the IDP Representative Forum, the Mayoral Imbizo and the Green Forum. These spaces are considered useful, particularly for the smaller cities.*

*\*\*South African Local Government Association*

*\*\*\*National Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs*

*Source: Adapted from SACN, 2020b*

Several South Africa cities, including Johannesburg, Cape Town and eThekweni, have developed local biodiversity strategies and action plans (LBSAPs). The International Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI's) Local Action for Biodiversity (LAB) process draws attention to local government's role in biodiversity management, previously understood to be a national or provincial mandate, especially in the context of increasing urbanisation (ICLEI-CBC, 2016). An LBSAP is prepared through assimilating data and knowledge of the environment and ecology of the city and its surrounding region, and a range of policies and strategies that inform open space management, catchment and land management (ibid).


In cities where dedicated positions and new or expanded structures are in place, there has been a positive effect on the internal institutional shifts that are necessary for sustainability transitions. City officials recognise that achieving the goals of sustainable cities and finding solutions to complex problems means working increasingly with people, not just providing technocratic systems. This requires behaviour changes among city residents, which can be mediated by the ability of city officials to communicate complex, scientific, evidence-based ideas in tangible, relatable and practical ways.



## TRANSVERSAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES

The IUDF calls for a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach, which requires new forms of urban governance based on integration across sectors, coordination, collaboration and partnering (COGTA, 2016). A shared value proposition needs to be developed but cannot be imposed by city governments and does not simply emerge out of nowhere. City government's role is *not* to be the exclusive formulator of shared all-of-society value propositions and setter of goals, but to develop plans in collaboration with other public, private and civil actors and to facilitate innovative approaches to service delivery. These innovative approaches occur in that cooperative space where government, the private sector, knowledge institutions and civil society role players meet – the “quadruple helix” (SACN, 2016: 287), which creates an enabling environment for the necessary systemic changes to happen so that the productivity, inclusivity and sustainability of cities is improved (Figure 2). However, “this requires a commitment from all role-players to collaborate, as well as strong intergovernmental coordination among the various role-players that influence city form and space” (ibid).

**FIGURE 2:** Quadruple helix



Source: SACN (2016: 288)

To bring together the different actors, which each have their own aims and objectives, requires the involvement of cooperative governance enablers in the form of city networks, intermediaries and knowledge brokers. These enablers help facilitate the formation of shared all-of-society value propositions and accelerate the partnerships needed to drive just urban transitions. Some cities have started to address the need for “governance of governance” or “collibration” (Swilling, 2020), through knowledge-sharing and learning networks, and creating new ways of partnering using intermediaries. These networks and intermediaries demonstrate various all-of-society configurations.

## Knowledge-sharing and learning networks

The SACN co-convenes, with SALGA and other partners, reference groups on energy, water, waste and climate change.

### The Urban Energy Network

Convened by Sustainable Energy Africa (SEA), SALGA and the SACN, this reference group is a knowledge-sharing platform for urban energy matters that has been meeting regularly for almost two decades. The Urban Energy Network (UEN) also receives input, support and funding from other institutions, such as government departments, not-for-profit organisations (NPOs), international development agencies and academic institutions. Some of the network's achievements include:

- Facilitating discussions between cities about achieving net zero carbon buildings by 2030. Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekweni and Tshwane are members of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and signed the Net Zero Carbon Buildings Declaration in 2018 alongside other global cities that are taking the lead in tackling emissions from buildings (C40 CFF, 2018).
- Assisting municipalities to explore options for procuring electricity from independent power producers (IPPs). This is in response to the impact of rising electricity prices on municipal revenue from electricity sales (which is used to subsidise other municipal services) and to the need to reinforce municipal energy security. IPPs present a market opportunity for utility-scale projects and the embedded generation sector.


### The Water Resilient Cities

The Water Resilient Cities series of learning events is a city-focused collaboration with SALGA and the SACN, supported by the GIZ's<sup>6</sup> Natural Resources Stewardship Programme (NATuReS), USAID WASH-FIN<sup>7</sup> and the World Bank's Water Resources Group 2030. It is a peer-learning platform for managers responsible for water services and water management in SACN participating cities and some intermediary cities. The aim is to bring together key stakeholders in the water sector, including policy and decision-makers, technical experts, practitioners, civil society and communities.

6 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)

7 United States Agency for International Development: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Finance


**FIGURE 3:** All-of-society indicator for the UEN



**FIGURE 4:** All-of-society indicator for the Water Resilient Cities



**FIGURE 5:** All-of-society indicator for the City Waster Managers' Forum



| LEGEND |                  |    |               |
|--------|------------------|----|---------------|
| PS     | private sector   | A  | academia      |
| LG     | local government | CS | civil society |

Since 2018, the partners have been running learning events aimed at sharing knowledge, as city water managers are confronted by complex challenges and have to make trade-offs in financing service provision or infrastructure maintenance, within the context of a growing funding gap for capital expenditure and declining municipal revenue streams. Without cooperative governance, the water sector could well fall apart, as water resources are a national competency and most Water Boards are non-functional. The weak cooperation was evident in 2018, during the lead-up to the ‘Day Zero’ crisis in Cape Town, when the national, provincial and local government spheres each had their own ‘save water’ campaigns, with different campaign slogans and logos. However, the looming crisis forced improved cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach (as described later in the chapter).

### City Waste Managers' Forum

Convened by the SACN and SALGA, the City Waste Managers' Forum comprises managers responsible for waste management in SACN participating cities and intermediary cities. What is evident in the solid waste management sector is that practice continues to lag behind policy intent. To date, waste reduction, reuse and recycling efforts have not been able to significantly reduce the amount of waste going to landfill. Efforts to separate waste at source and increase material recovery are proving to be costly relative to the value of the material recovered. Although the remaining capacity of landfills in cities is declining, the processes to secure new regional sites remain complex, contested and long.

Despite the many challenges facing cities, an integral part of the city waste management value chain – informal pickers – is often overlooked in urban sustainability conversations. Remarkably little is known about informal pickers and their role in the broader waste management system, and yet “informal waste pickers recycle 90% of the recyclables collected from households in South Africa” which may be saving municipalities “up to R750 million in landfill space every year”.<sup>8</sup>

### Intermediaries enabling partnering

Intermediaries, which may be public agencies or specialist units with high degrees of autonomy, facilitate partnering in practice. They provide the ground rules, create forums for dialogue and build expertise in stakeholder management, including shaping expectations and aligning interests. Intermediaries seek to rebalance the top-down

<sup>8</sup> Nowicki L. Reconsidering South Africa's approach to waste pickers, *GroundUp*, 22 February 2019. <https://www.groundup.org.za/article/reconsidering-south-africas-approach-waste-pickers/>

authorising environment and the bottom-up mobilising environment in order to maintain social cohesion, which may include managing disputes between different government spheres and sectors. They strengthen processes by keeping informal channels open to ensure continuous flows of information; subsidise the costs of engagement (meetings, research, facilitation); and accept ultimate responsibility for any governance and process failures (Swilling, 2020).

In South Africa, intermediaries have emerged that may be partially external to city and provincial governance yet play similar roles to those of the knowledge-sharing and learning networks. The three intermediary organisations described below offer examples of partnership arrangements.

### Economic Development Partnership: Partnering for resilience

Established in 2012, the Economic Development Partnership (EDP)<sup>9</sup> is a collaborative intermediary organisation whose mandate is to improve the performance of the Cape Town and Western Cape regional economic development system, by creating and sustaining partnerships among stakeholders from different sectors. It is an NPO that supports collaborative problem-solving for the benefit of all sectors of society, including provincial and local governments, civil society, business, and national government departments and entities. It is funded mainly by the Western Cape Government (WCG) and the City of Cape Town. In terms of the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership Act of 2013,<sup>10</sup> the WCG provides funding in accordance with appropriations authorised by an annual budget, rather than programme or project funding on a contractual basis.

The EDP employs full-time expert facilitators who do the painstaking and time-consuming work of building meaningful partnerships inspired by a shared value proposition. The first step is to secure the public-public partnerships required to tackle a problem (the vertical whole-of-government relationships), as top-level sign-off is needed to mandate the relevant officials to participate.

<sup>9</sup> <https://wcedp.co.za>

<sup>10</sup> [https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/treasury/Documents/acts/2013/western\\_cape\\_membership\\_of\\_the\\_western\\_cape\\_economic\\_development\\_partnership\\_act\\_of\\_2013.pdf](https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/treasury/Documents/acts/2013/western_cape_membership_of_the_western_cape_economic_development_partnership_act_of_2013.pdf)



## INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS

The translation of urban plans into action requires collaboration with a range of local and international partners. Johannesburg, Tshwane, Cape Town, eThekweni and, recently, Ekurhuleni are part of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and have developed or are developing Climate Action Plans (CAPs) with local stakeholders. Since 2015, Cape Town and eThekweni have participated in trans-disciplinary collaborative research projects, as first tier cities within the FRACTAL (Future Resilience for African Cities and Land) project.<sup>11</sup> This project brings together diverse stakeholders for in-depth engagement processes, such as learning labs and city dialogues, to co-produce and co-explore knowledge. Feedback loops between climate sensitivity and decision-making at urban, national and regional scales were explored through multi-scale investigations. This resulted in a better understanding of southern Africa's climate, and drivers and impacts were established and co-produced as Climate Risk Narratives (Jack et al., 2020). The FRACTAL project highlights the need for a better understanding of water, energy, food and climate issues in southern African cities, in order to build urban resilience.

In addition to being a C40 city, Cape Town has been part of the 100 Resilient Cities network since 2016. This network comprises 100 cities from across the world (10 of which are in Africa) that are committed to building urban resilience around the social, economic and physical challenges of the 21st century. The 100 Resilient Cities Programme is an example of an initiative that focuses on building resilience across scales and capitalising on research-action networks and civil society organisations.<sup>12</sup>



<sup>11</sup> <http://www.fractal.org.za/partners/>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/100-resilient-cities/>

**FIGURE 6:** All-of-society indicator for the EDP



**FIGURE 7:** All-of-society indicator for the GRCO



The next step is to invite non-state actors into the partnership (the horizontal all-of-society relationships), and then, through careful facilitation, to create a safe-to-fail space for information sharing, joint planning and experimentation. As discussed later in this chapter, the EDP facilitated the partnering that resulted in Cape Town avoiding Day Zero in 2018.

### Gauteng City-Region Observatory: Knowledge partnerships for urban futures

Established in 2008, the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO)<sup>13</sup> is a unique partnership between the University of Johannesburg, the University of Witwatersrand and the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG), with SALGA in Gauteng represented on the Board. It is a research agency that generates insights into and understanding of the Gauteng City-Region (GCR), to be used by government agencies and civil society to inform governance and development across the city-region. It is funded by the GPG and receives in-kind support from the two universities. Although constituted primarily as a university-based research centre, the GCRO seeks to build a shared value proposition for the GCR and has begun to include the challenge of a just urban transition.

The GCRO's research focuses on what is needed for the GCR to have a full sustainability transition, including the political-economic, resource and infrastructure choices. It has looked at administrative configurations using ethnographic methods, and at how governance configurations either facilitate or hinder government performance and coherence in a complex city-region. The GCRO has also built global knowledge partnerships with other research agencies, including the Knowledge Partnerships for Urban Futures project, the BRICS+ Urban Lab network<sup>14</sup> and collaborates with University College London, the University of Melbourne and UN-Habitat<sup>15</sup>.

### Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council: Infrastructure governance

Established in 1995, the Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC)<sup>16</sup> is a multi-stakeholder council that advises the provincial government on integrated development strategy and planning. Its aim is to support the building of strategic and technical capacity in provincial and local government. Stakeholders include provincial and local government, organised business, organised labour, civil society and higher education.

ECSECC established the stand-alone Infrastructure Governance Programme in order to improve the integration of infrastructure planning across sectors and spheres of government in the province. This is in line

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.gcro.ac.za/>

<sup>14</sup> Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan, Thailand have attended as observers)

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Human Settlements Programme

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.ecsecc.org/>



with Lever 4 of the IUDE, which makes the case for transitioning from traditional infrastructure provision to integrated, resource-efficient infrastructure systems (COGTA, 2016). Such integrated systems provide for both universal access and more inclusive economic growth, and support the development of efficient, equitable and resilient cities. The programme’s main focus is facilitating the coordination and planning of all relevant strategic infrastructure plans (SIPs) in the province, ensuring that the economic benefits of SIPs are optimised, and developing a 10-year SIP for the province.

The three organisations described above combine research and facilitation work in collaboration with their provincial and local government partners, which also contribute funding. Their primary focus is on facilitating the building of shared value propositions at the whole-of-government and all-of-society levels. They provide the much-needed trusted external capacity for facilitating partnering. Although their focus is not exclusively on the just urban transition, this is what they are doing in practice, as they wrestle with the challenges in their respective regions.

The value of these transversal cooperative initiatives, whether through knowledge-sharing and learning networks or through intermediaries enabling partnering, has been significant in conditioning cities for cooperative governance, collaboration and leveraging of partnerships with all-of-society. For instance, through knowledge sharing in the UEN, several cities have developed and started implementing energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies and plans, with financial and capacity support from national government through energy efficiency grant programmes (SEA, 2020). Through learning networks, Cape Town, eThekweni, Johannesburg and Tshwane have developed Paris Agreement-compliant CAPs assisted by C40 Cities, while Ekurhuleni is currently developing its Green City Action Plan. Through intermediaries enabling partnering, the City of Cape Town averted Day Zero and some institutional silos were torn down, and the GCRO continually helps business, labour, civil society and residents in the region work together and make evidence-based decisions to improve the competitiveness, spatial integration, environmental sustainability and social inclusion objectives of cities in the region.

However, regulatory frameworks still inhibit, to some extent, the possibilities of innovation in local service delivery. What is needed is for more enabling environments and multi-sectoral delivery platforms to be created in cities, as complexity calls for multiple solutions from a range of players (SACN, 2020b).

**FIGURE 8:** All-of-society indicator for the ECSECC





## ACHIEVING URBAN RESILIENCE THROUGH MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS

---

Some of South Africa's largest cities have fully embraced the just urban transition and are attempting to balance a cooperative governance approach with all-of-society initiatives through working with city networks and intermediaries. Partnering initiatives are increasingly being used to address crises, such as water shortages (e.g., droughts), the impact of natural disasters (e.g., flooding), load-shedding, the COVID-19 pandemic and housing shortages, through enabling the formulation of shared all-of-society value propositions. The following case studies illustrate different partnering arrangements. Ekurhuleni has designed a three-phased, 15-year pathway to sustainability that has cross-party support and has been in place for the past eight years, while Day Zero in Cape Town was successfully avoided thanks to the contribution of all-of-society. In eThekweni, the municipality's response to climate change mitigation and adaptation is through both international and local alliances, specifically partnerships with communities to address riverine management.

### Ekurhuleni

The City of Ekurhuleni developed and managed its Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) 2055 over two terms of political office, from 2012 to 2021. The city has managed a conscious process of anticipating and planning for a just urban transition, which has meant facing the immense difficulties that arise from linking the just urban transition to municipal programmes and service delivery plans.

In 2019, the population of the City of Ekurhuleni was 3 774 638, an increase of 788 048 since 2009. The city's population may be growing at a decreasing rate (from 2.8% in 2011 to 2.1% in 2019) but is still expected to reach just over 4 million by 2030 and 8.8 million by 2050 (COGTA, 2019). The city's development challenges originate from a century of mining that devastated much of the landscape, which today is characterised by ubiquitous mine dumps towering over natural landmarks. In addition, urban fragmentation, compounded by historical deep governance and administrative fragmentation, placed a huge burden on integrative local government policy and strategy. To change its development trajectory, Ekurhuleni's GDS 2055 recommends a concerted and integrated programme focused on five strategic imperatives (the five Rs):<sup>17</sup>

Re-industrialise: for job creation and economic growth purposes

Re-urbanise: to achieve sustainable urban integration

Re-govern: Effective cooperative governance

Re-mobilise: To achieve social empowerment


Re-generate: sustainable environmental benefit

The trajectory to achieve these imperatives is divided into three phases (Figure 9) and seeks to ensure that Ekurhuleni transitions from being a Fragmented City to becoming a Delivering City (2012–2020), Capable City (2020–2030) and Sustainable City (2030–2055).

---

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.ekurhuleni.gov.za/about-the-city/strategic-direction/gds-2055.html>


**FIGURE 9:** City of Ekurhuleni proposed three-phase future



Source: City of Ekurhuleni (2016)

Despite several successes and positive developments, such as attaining clean audits for seven years since 2011/2012, and improvements in housing delivery and capital budget expenditure, Ekurhuleni has not yet accomplished its ambition of becoming a Delivering City. During 2012–2020, significant global and local socioeconomic and political changes affected the city’s performance in achieving its goals and transitioning to a Delivering City. These included declining growth rates, limited ability to implement the GDS properly and persistent service delivery challenges. Furthermore, since 2012, changes in policy development across all spheres of government have reshaped the strategic context within which the GDS operates (Figure 10).

**FIGURE 10:** Strategies and policies developed since 2012 with which the GDS should align



The GDS will need to be updated to respond to existing policy changes and to prepare Ekurhuleni for future policy change, in particular the new District Development Model (DDM), which seeks to improve the coherence and impact of government service delivery and development (COGTA, 2019). At the same time, the city will have to review its growth outlook and accompanying strategies in order to be able to adapt to shocks and stresses. Although a long-term city development strategy cannot anticipate all the possible shocks and stresses, it should be flexible and adaptable in order to ensure that the city is resilient enough to withstand any shocks, stresses and unforeseen disasters.

Through its GDS 2055, Ekurhuleni has done a good job in achieving directionality for a just urban transition for the city. However, despite being a good example of a whole-of-government approach, it has not succeeded in building an all-of-society shared value proposition. To implement the vision of a “Delivering, Capable and Sustainable City” will require mission-oriented governance, which will allow a shared all-of-society vision to emerge and will forge partnerships with non-state actors who can mobilise the resources and capacities needed for effective implementation. This approach involves extensive consultations with stakeholders, which take more time, energy and commitment from the city than the usual public participation processes. Ekurhuleni managed a successful programme of community engagement around the GDS, but the consultative multi-stakeholder forum that was set up to implement the GDS petered out due to insufficient support. Therefore, if the GDS is to be effective, cooperative governance needs to become a living reality for the city, which in turn needs to be willing to create the conditions for experimenting with new and innovative ways of partnering in order to drive the just urban transition.

## Cape Town: Avoiding Day Zero

Water security is a major challenge for cities throughout South Africa and beyond, due to the dual impact of population growth and climate change, as well as water infrastructure issues. In early 2018, Cape Town came close to turning off water supply to its residents, or ‘Day Zero’, as it came to be called. During three consecutive dry winters (2015–17), the water catchment areas that supply the city suffered their driest period since the 1930s – the city’s near-exclusive reliance on surface water made it vulnerable to drought.

The Day Zero experience demonstrated that “Cape Town is facing a new normal regarding its relationship with water” (Enqvist & Ziervogel, 2019: 12) and highlighted challenges relating to intergovernmental collaboration and community trust in local government. It also revealed the stark inequalities within the city: “residents in formal housing use 66% of the City’s water, while informal settlements account for only 4% of the consumption” and live with the reality of queuing at taps for water (Ziervogel, 2019: 3).

Day Zero was avoided thanks to the halving of water consumption within three months. The city used a mix of price and non-price mechanisms to encourage households, businesses and citizens to save water. Citizens responded by replacing lawns and water-sensitive plants with water-wise alternatives, reducing personal water use and using greywater for toilet flushing; while the commercial and business sectors invested in water-saving devices such as low-flow taps, water-efficient shower heads, and smaller toilet cisterns (Matikinca et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2020). Non-price mechanisms were found to be more effective in changing behaviour than increasing tariffs (Matikinca et al., 2020).

The response to the drought was complicated by the siloed nature of government and a lack of understanding of the importance of intergovernmental collaborations. Water catchment areas are not confined to administrative borders and so collaboration with other municipalities and government spheres is crucial, which was not the case early on in the crisis. For instance, the national, provincial and local government spheres each had their own ‘save water’ campaign slogans and logos. Nevertheless, one impact of the crisis was improved collaboration and stronger intergovernmental relations, helped to some extent by the existing good relationships that the city’s disaster management team had with other spheres (Ziervogel, 2019: 15).

Intermediaries, from the non-profit and academic sectors, played an important role in supporting collaboration. Organisations, such as GreenCape, Wesgro and the Western Cape EDP<sup>18</sup> acted “as knowledge brokers [...] pulling together information from sources outside of government” (ibid). These intermediaries shared information with the public and through the media. The EDP assisted the city in engaging with communities, as the city had not managed to link well with neighbourhood groups that had “pulled together at the height of the crisis to identify vulnerable households, collaborate on water saving responses [and], think about working together on water access” (ibid).

The Day Zero experience demonstrated the importance of a whole-of-government and all-of-society approach. The crisis “helped tear down some institutional silo walls”, which contributed to Day Zero being avoided (Enqvist & Ziervogel, 2019: 12). Ideally, collaboration with all sectors of society should be in place before a crisis occurs. Achieving this will require building trust with communities, in particular those that lack access to water. In this regard, intermediaries play an important role in facilitating collaboration across government and society. A crucial aspect is proactive, transparent and inclusive communication with citizens. Communications cannot be ‘one-size-fits-all’, as each community may respond differently. Water governance is about more than just keeping water running in the taps; it is also about meeting the daily sanitation and safety needs of areas affected by seasonal flooding.

## eThekwini: Transformative Riverine Management Programme

In 2004, eThekwini embarked on its city-wide Municipal Climate Protection Programme (MCCPP) (Roberts et al., 2012). The city adopted an incremental approach of learning-by-doing, to respond to climate-change impacts, such as increased stormwater run-off, water scarcity, the heat-island effect and rising sea levels. The MCCPP components include a pathway for a green economy, community-based ecosystem adaptation, and adaptation planning in the allied sectors of health, water and disaster management.

eThekwini defined urban resilience based on its particular context of high unemployment and the interlinked problems of high levels of inequality and disempowerment. The aim was to emphasise climate solutions that also generate societal co-benefits, such as community-owned conservation efforts, jobs or economic returns. Responding in this way to the particular socio-ecological context of the city ensured support from different social groups, even though it defied previously held understandings of resilience by donors, such as the 100 Resilient Cities.<sup>19</sup> The stance to *own their journey*, and respond in ways that work for the city and community members, can also be ascribed to the international and regional city networks that eThekwini is part of, cementing the notion that each city, along with its partners and stakeholders, must approach, define and reach for resilience in a way that works for that city.

18 “GreenCape, Wesgro and EDP are all funded by the City and Provincial Government, and take directives from the two governments.” (Ziervogel, 2019: 15)

19 <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/100-resilient-cities/>

The Transformative Riverine Management Programme (TRMP) is one of the key knowledge-sharing components in the municipality's Climate Change Strategy and CAP. The programme "builds on the city's considerable experience with ecosystem-based adaptation and its commitment to increase the resilience of eThekweni Municipality's most vulnerable communities".<sup>20</sup> The municipality includes 97 km of coast with 16 estuaries, and 18 major riverine systems that collectively are 7400 km long.

The C40 Cities Finance Facility (CFF) has assisted eThekweni to develop a business case for managing and transforming these watercourses to be resilient to climate change. The overall objective of CFF's intervention is to motivate for prioritising, expanding and funding community-based river management, which is aimed at improving water quality and reducing flood risks. The TRMP was developed from three projects within the municipality:

- The Sihlanzimvelo Stream Cleaning Programme (within the umHlangane River catchment area) helps the city manage flooding by removing debris and alien vegetation (Goodbrand, 2019). Community cooperatives remove "litter/waste and invasive plant species from streams areas to reduce stormwater blockages and create employment" (C40 CFF, 2019: 5). The streams are located in high-density, low-income settlements where poor river quality leads to risks to people's health and biodiversity, and to flooding. The city department responsible for roads and stormwater maintenance is the project leader, and 11 other departments participate in the project steering committee.
- The Aller River Pilot Project (ARPP) began in 2016 and aims to restore sections of the Aller River, to improve water quality and remove invasive species. The project is led by the Kloof Conservancy, a community-based organisation that promotes environmental awareness and protection. Community members living in the vicinity of river stretches are encouraged to take responsibility for river sections that they use, in partnership with the local authorities (C40 CFF, 2019).<sup>21</sup> 'Eco-champs' are trained to mobilise and build awareness within the local communities, working with eco-clubs in local schools and organising community events and cleanliness drives, and acting as intermediaries between the local government and the community (Martel & Sutherland, 2019).
- The Green Corridors/Green Spaces project, which began in 2020, seeks to "enhance local quality of life, living environments and sustainable livelihoods" (C40 CFF, 2019: 5). The project implementer is the Green Corridors NPC, a city-supported vehicle that seeks to uplift local communities, based on the principles of participation and community beneficiation. Local communities were employed to maintain, improve and create new riverine open spaces. Project activities include "upcycling / recycling waste from rivers and growing food near restored streams", as well as "community-based eco-tourism and nature-based youth development" (ibid).

The TRMP illustrates the benefits of learning-by-doing and building on existing initiatives in order to respond to climate change impacts. It demonstrates the importance of international networks and of building resilience in ways that work for the individual city, while generating societal and ecological benefits.

---

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.c40cff.org/projects/ethekweni-municipality-durban-transformative-riverine-management-programme>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.kloofconservancy.org.za/projects/take-back-our-rivers-project/>



## LESSONS FROM THE CITIES

# 2

Each of the case studies provides clear evidence that responses are shaped by the specificities of each local context. Furthermore, intermediaries are clearly playing critical roles in facilitating dialogue (e.g., the SACN-facilitated dialogues), building cooperative governance compacts to address specific challenges (EDP, GCRO, ECSECC), and enabling the flow of new knowledge into emerging policy formation and strategic thinking. Therefore, if the just urban transition is a process rather than an outcome, what matters is the directionality of this just urban transition. The evidence discussed in this chapter confirms that a successful outcome will depend on cooperative governance across all three spheres of government working within a broader all-of-society approach that includes non-state stakeholders from business and civil society.

All of South Africa's municipalities, and especially the metros, should include the just urban transition in their long-term strategic planning, with the understanding that just urban transitions are about complex processes rather than specific outcomes, and that a city's responses are shaped by the specificities of its local context. The challenge for all cities is to balance the long-term (15+ years) planning required with the short-term (five years) political cycle, to ensure a consistent commitment even during times of political transition and change.

### A multi-stakeholder approach is important from the start

Engaging with multiple stakeholders is essential, even though multi-stakeholder approaches require extensive consultations and take more time, energy and commitment from cities than the usual public participation processes. For instance, the City of Ekurhuleni managed a successful programme of community engagement around the GDS, but the consultative multi-stakeholder forum set up to implement the GDS petered out due to insufficient internal support.

Engaging early on with multiple stakeholders enables processes to be developed and allows people's ideas and concerns to be heard and addressed. An enduring and adaptable structure or social partnership is needed to support the multi-stakeholder approach. The EDP collectively drafted a memorandum of understanding that laid down the rules of collaboration from the outset for a (successful) transdisciplinary programme on water governance, while the UEN included various agencies and stakeholders in the governance process early on, and changed the nature and format of meetings over time. A multi-stakeholder approach enables different options to be explored, resulting in projects that have multiple benefits (which underlies the GCRO approach), while partnership projects with multiple benefits tend to leverage funding more easily.

## Knowledge sharing, peer learning and intermediaries play vitally important roles

City officials recognise the value of knowledge sharing and peer learning, but also have to juggle competing demands on their time and attention. To ensure that the required engagements take place requires intermediaries/facilitators that know and have existing trust relationships with the relevant actors. Examples include the SACN and SALGA, which convene the City Waste Managers' Forum and the Water Resilient Cities events; and SEA, the SACN and SALGA, the conveners of the UEN. These learning networks for waste, water and energy provide a catalyst for unlocking new knowledge, partnering, innovative thinking and experimentation within cities. Intermediaries also bring additional capacity and new knowledge to existing internal city knowledge, which reinforces experimentation and provides support to city practitioners, particularly when developing relationships with citizens and communities.

## Value propositions must be shared by all-of-society

Value propositions must be developed in a truly participatory manner and reflect inputs from all-of-society. The Cape Town resilience approach, and in particular the campaign to avoid Day Zero, succeeded because a shared all-of-society value proposition was eventually formulated and implemented through effective cooperative governance across all three spheres. The same applies to the approach adopted by eThekweni, even though in practice the city has been challenged for many years by informal settlement movements and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for ignoring demands for social and environmental justice. An easily understood yet profoundly transformative value proposition is required to inspire key social actors to enter into effective partnerships for change.

## Crisis can force cooperation

A cooperative governance approach is not easy, and the formal intergovernmental mechanisms (such as the MinMECs<sup>22</sup>) are rarely effective facilitators of active cooperation around specific projects. However, cooperation is forthcoming in times of crisis, as was the case with the Cape Town drought. The first responses to the drought were characterised by uncooperative governance, but the growing crisis led to the three spheres of government and non-state stakeholders finding a way to cooperate to head off Day Zero. It represents a classic example of a crisis-driven value proposition driven by a partnership that managed to mobilise an entire city to change how water was used.

---

22 The Minister and the nine provincial Members of Executive Councils (MECs) with the same portfolio





## CONCLUSION

In South Africa, most municipalities and most departments, even within well-resourced metros, are not coping well with their overwhelming challenges. Housing backlogs and human settlement pressures are intensifying, the COVID-19 epidemic has devastated many livelihoods, and many urban infrastructures are in a dismal state.

South African cities and towns are simply not ready for the climate emergency and the massive challenges and uncertainties that lie ahead. South Africa's instruments of government and governance are very well considered within an elegant constitutional dispensation and a sophisticated set of policies, planning instruments and evaluation methods. However, the picture is less rosy on the streets of precarious informal settlements, overburdened townships and wealthier resource-draining suburbs. Both Cape Town and eThekweni are thought leaders in the climate space, and Ekurhuleni has developed a sophisticated just urban transition approach. Yet the spectacle of rising inequality, unsustainability, lack of resilience and low capacity to deal with an increasingly crisis-prone future is evident in all three cities.

Given the rapid changes taking place in the energy, water and waste sectors, learning networks and intermediary organisations are invaluable. In the energy sector, the new roles for municipalities to procure renewable energy creates many opportunities, but the institutional complexities and financial barriers are enormous. Water quality and availability are of major concern to cities, due to the impacts of climate change and the poor state of wastewater treatment works. In the waste sector, landfills are filling up and pressure is mounting to mainstream recycling, resulting in many local governments experimenting with various innovative technologies and systems. Without facilitated learning networks or intermediaries, local governments will either not make progress or be forced to depend on expensive consultants.

The intermediary organisations (EDP, GCRO and ECSECC) demonstrate the importance of being deeply embedded in local dynamics and peculiarities – all three intermediaries secure funding from local and provincial government and employ staff who deal primarily with the specificities of a city. They support local and provincial government through facilitating partnering, providing inputs into policy formulation and (more importantly) implementation and directionality. They enable the transfer of knowledge of the granular detail of changing urban dynamics (e.g., informal settlements, changing market conditions, or infrastructure challenges such as water or energy).

The three metro case studies highlight the importance of collaboration across government and society. Chapter 1: Governing South African Cities emphasises that partnerships and coalitions with local stakeholders can be enabled by institutionalised and democratically legitimate forums for dialogue and collaboration. It further argues that local government must be placed at the centre, to avoid further fragmentation and ceding of urban autonomy to unaccountable private

sector actors, and that communities should be given a seat at the table. Ekurhuleni's GDS demonstrates how the political leadership, supported by capable officials, have crafted a long-term conception of the just urban transition that has survived two electoral terms. It is an example of a whole-of-government approach, although it did not manage to build an all-of-society shared value proposition. Cape Town was able to avoid Day Zero thanks to moving from an uncooperative governance (illustrated by the separate 'save water' campaigns mounted by the three spheres of government) to a cooperative governance response based on a shared value proposition. This was to a large extent due to the intermediary role played by EDP. The approach taken by eThekweni to respond to climate change shows that the just urban transition can be mainstreamed through building strong all-of-society coalitions, learning from international and local networks, and adapting to local circumstances.

As this chapter has demonstrated, cooperative governance comes alive when a balance is achieved between the top-down authorising environment and the bottom-up mobilising environment. Such a balance creates conditions for innovation and resource mobilisation across both state and non-state actors. For cities to drive just urban transitions will depend on partnering for the purpose of futuring and learning from experimentation in practice.





## RECOMMENDATIONS

Successful sustainability outcomes will depend on cooperative governance across all three spheres of government working within a wider all-of-society approach that includes non-state stakeholders from business and civil society. In this regard, the following recommendations are proposed.

### Develop new cooperative governance mindsets, practices and codes

The successful just urban transition will depend on mobilising political and institutional will to open spaces for collaboration, partnering and dialogue about all-of-society value propositions that may challenge the status quo. New professional, technical and administrative mindsets, practices and codes are needed to integrate cooperative governance into the operational practices and systems of local government, in order to:

- build relationships between municipalities and intermediary and service organisations;
- create collaborative spaces for transversal work and action between sectors and stakeholder groups;
- foster sustainability thinking that eventually translates into policy commitments and outcomes;
- build capacity to mainstream and replicate innovations as they emerge; and
- collaborate and coordinate across functions, agencies, sectors and levels of government in order to avoid siloed approaches.

Leadership capacity, organisational skills, institutionalisation and social cohesion will be required at all levels. Horizontally, new methodologies will be needed to improve collaborative project-based practices, while vertical, authentic, substantive participatory processes will enable civil society to further the aims of international agreements and associated national directives. National agencies will need to collaborate with cities in order to improve access to bilateral, multilateral and private institutions for implementing sustainability transitions, while cooperative governance and its results will have to be monitored, to ensure continuous improvement and achieve significant sustainability impacts.

### Support intermediaries

Intermediaries facilitate engagements in order to achieve a balance between the top-down authorising environment and the bottom-up legitimating environment, as well as the emergence of a shared vision of the future. As has been shown, intermediaries play a critical enabling role by facilitating partnering and accessing new knowledge for directionality. Municipalities need to recognise the importance of intermediaries, and cooperative governance intermediaries and service organisations should be supported financially.

## Develop long-term differentiated city plans

The just urban transition requires long-term planning (15+ years), but political terms are short term (5 years), which makes it difficult to ensure a consistent commitment during times of political transition and change. However, it is not impossible, as shown by the City of Ekurhuleni, whose GDS has not been altered over two political terms of office, while eThekweni's CAP was supported by and communicated to relevant decision-makers.

Every municipality, city and town will have its own just urban transition pathway shaped by its respective local contextual dynamics. The formulation of these pathways is guided by long-term achievable value propositions, which need to be transparent, easy to understand and developed through participatory processes. These value propositions and pathways need to be credible, indicator-calibrated and articulated in long-term city development strategies that embrace the key principles of the just urban transition, especially with regard to climate change, energy transition and water resources. These longer-term visions then need to be translated into medium-term strategies (e.g., BEPP) and the shorter-term SDBIP for each municipality.

## Develop and monitor indicators for sustainability

South Africa's reporting systems for climate change and resource sustainability are not aligned, which makes it difficult for cities to track progress towards their aspirations, such as poverty reduction, greater employment and equality. Differentiated systems are needed for regulatory indicators (monitoring technical compliance) and evaluation-based indicators (tracking desired sustainability outcomes and aspirational progress). Such systems need to be different yet linked or aligned to serve common but differentiated purposes, and should be co-developed through intergovernmental partnerships that are predicated on commonly desired outcomes. This could be achieved best by establishing common and visionary objectives for development, climate change and fiscal policies, which could then be made applicable to each city and could form the basis for aligning monitoring and evaluation systems.

## Build partnerships between cities and communities

A shared value proposition is needed to bind the spheres of government and partners in order to achieve just urban transitions in different cities. Cooperative governance does not wait for the next crisis but includes a commitment to effective participation that results in a balance between the top-down authorising environment and the bottom-up legitimating environment. In practice, authentic, substantive participatory processes ensure that civil society has the capacity to formulate positions and participate in partnerships. Therefore, municipalities should build pro-active partnerships between local government and civil society actors to further the aims of international agreements and associated national directives such as the Paris Agreement and the NUA. City governments have an essential role to play in setting goals and then developing plans in collaboration with other public sector actors, and business and civil society formations. They should also view themselves as facilitators of innovative approaches and unpack how the delivery of services could be more effective and efficient.







## Formulate a city integrated infrastructure plan

There is little evidence that South African municipalities have accepted the IUDF proposal that every municipality should formulate an integrated infrastructure plan (IIP). The IUDF proposed that IIPs complement the IDP, SDF and various initiatives by national departments. However, recent policy and regulatory shifts, which open up new opportunities for direct procurement of renewable energy by municipalities and new funding initiatives for water projects via the newly created Infrastructure Fund, suggest that it may well be time to revisit the IUDF proposal that municipalities craft their own IIPs.



# Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game

---

|   |  |     |
|---|--|-----|
|    | Introduction                                     | 173 |
|    | The Current State of Play                        | 179 |
|   | Disabling Institutional and Organisational Rules | 189 |
|  | Rays of Hope                                     | 197 |
|  | Conclusion                                       | 201 |
|  | Recommendations                                  | 203 |

|                                      |     |
|--------------------------------------|-----|
| <b>BOX 1: Citopoly</b>               | 177 |
| <b>BOX 2: Zanemvula and Cornubia</b> | 181 |
| <b>BOX 3: Slovo Park</b>             | 186 |
| <b>BOX 4: Visualisation studios</b>  | 199 |



## INTRODUCTION

After 20 years of democracy, despite government's many initiatives to drive integration, South Africa's urban spatial development patterns remain largely unchanged, inequality levels are constant and social vulnerability is spatially entrenched in apartheid planning logic. Zanemvula **SEE BOX 2** exemplifies the many well-intentioned government projects that have sought to transform human settlements into vibrant, humane and liveable neighbourhoods for communities. Fifteen years after being launched as a presidential priority project, Zanemvula remains a community in distress with houses and basic services, but no schools, no notable social and community facilities, poor transport links, high rates of unemployment and tense community politics that undermine the building of social capital (SACN, 2020a). Perhaps more alarming, Zanemvula is still labelled as a government 'priority' and is firmly part of the municipality's Built Environment Performance Plan (BEPP).

Zanemvula is not an isolated story. A similar fragmented approach to built environment delivery is found across government, highlighting the breakdown in intergovernmental cooperation and a failure to work meaningfully with communities. Yet South Africa's policy framework is clear about the need for spatial transformation, as shown in the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF), which emphasises the importance of an all-of-society approach (COGTA, 2016). The need for participatory democracy and intergovernmental cooperation is embedded in South Africa's Constitution and subsequent legislation, policies, strategies and plans.

Government has started many initiatives to improve delivery and drive integration, including efforts at policy and structural reform, capacity building and operational support programmes. Multiple initiatives have been put in place with the intention of supporting municipalities and improving their capacity to deliver. They include presidential and ministerial priority projects, catalytic projects, catalytic land development projects and mayoral projects. Operational support structures have been established, such as war rooms, project steering committees and working groups, mayoral project offices, special project task teams, joint planning or intermodal planning committees and the planning alignment task team. The most recent intergovernmental coordination mechanism is the District Development Model (DDM), which highlights the inability of any previous efforts to address cooperation.



Examples of national government initiatives affecting built environment delivery:

- **DEPARTMENT OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE (COGTA):**  
the IUDF, Back to Basics Programme and the Municipal Infrastructure Support Agency (MISA).
- **DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING (DHET):**  
The Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA).
- **DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REFORM (DRDLR):**  
The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA).
- **NATIONAL TREASURY (NT):**  
The City Support Programme (CSP), the CSP's annual Executive Leadership Course, the BEPP, the Municipal Standard Charter of Accounts and the City Budget Forum.
- **THE PRESIDENCY:**  
The Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture.

The previous State of Cities Report (SOCR) contains a chapter on “The Spatial Transformation of South Africa’s Cities”, which takes a deep dive into the nature of spatial inequality, and outlines the context and nuances of urban spatial dynamics (SACN, 2016). It focuses on the built environment, with a specific look at land, human settlements and public transport as the three main vehicles through which to achieve spatial transformation. The chapter makes recommendations for what might be required to transform South African cities and points out that transforming space also requires transforming politics and power, institutions and intergovernmental relations, and management and capacity, as “the transformation of space is fundamentally linked to other key structural transformations: of institutions, capacity building, and the reconfiguration of power and influence” (Williams, 2000).

The departure point for this chapter is the idea that spatial transformation is dependent on the governance capacity of the municipal institution. The chapter does not attempt to prove that spatial transformation is not taking place at the desired rate, an issue that was covered in the 2016 report, but interrogates the link between the slow spatial transformation in cities and the institutional governance capability for collaborative, dynamic and innovative practice. It builds on the recommendations of the 2016 SOCR and reflects on the additional complexity in the governance system since 2016, as a result of political coalitions leading multiple metropolitan municipalities in South Africa.

## Misdiagnosis of the real problems

On paper, cities seem central to spatial delivery, but in practice they are peripheral and unable to deliver on spatially targeted infrastructure and projects, whether working alone or with other government sectors, let alone with all-of-society. To enable cities to drive spatial transformation requires understanding the root causes of the gap between policy and practice and shifting perspectives to chart a way forward.

Like many governments in developing countries, South Africa is stuck in a “capability trap”, unable to “perform the tasks asked of them, and doing the same thing day after day is not improving the situation; indeed, it is usually only making things worse” (Andrews et al., 2017: 10). The result is little to show despite the time, money and effort spent. Central to the idea of being stuck in the capability trap is a constant misdiagnosis of the real problems. In South Africa, the problem is often viewed as weak municipal capacity, which is frequently reduced to poor human capacity and skills. In other words, there is a common perception that municipalities lack the skills or people needed to get the job done.

An important distinction to make here is between ‘capacity’ and ‘capability’ which are often used interchangeably. In this context, ‘capacity’ refers to what a person can do in a standardised, controlled environment, whereas ‘capability’ refers to what a person can do in their daily environment. Often the problem is assumed to be a lack of ‘capacity’, suggesting that skills and training would be required to upskill a certain individual or team, without understanding that the problem might have more to do with the organisational environment and its effect on individuals to reach their full potential.



This assumption results in two problematic responses:

- Engaging technical ‘experts’ who do not work in the municipal environment, do not fully understand the institutional dynamics, and duplicate work or usurp roles, exacerbating the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities (Palmer et al., 2017). National government’s Back to Basics programme takes this view, noting that municipalities need strong administrative systems and processes, as well as “competent and committed people whose performance is closely monitored” and the provision of “targeted and measurable training and capacity building” (COGTA, 2016: 12).
- The introduction of new tools and processes aimed at ‘helping’ municipalities get their work done, often aligned to grant funding. This results in municipalities becoming distracted from tackling existing challenges by having to administer additional processes that originate from elsewhere.

Focusing on implementation is critical to getting out of the capability trap (Andrews et al., 2017), but too often the resultant reforms focus on policy, programmes and projects, rather than on whether or not the desired outcomes are being achieved. These outcomes depend on how well the policy, programme or project is implemented, which is determined by the “capability for implementation” (ibid: 31).

## The Built Environment Integration Task Team

In 2017, the SACN re-established the Built Environment Integration Task Team (BEITT), as a core pillar of its built environment programme of work 2017–2021, to diagnose better the policy–practice gap and low implementation



capability. The aim of the BEITT is to understand the realities of municipal built environment practice (how things actually work) and to start to shift built environment practices. The BEITT comprises city practitioners, who provide a sound institutional basis for research and ideas, as well as representatives from COGTA, National Treasury’s CSP and funding partners – the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).

The BEITT’s objectives are:

- To formulate a collective city voice on issues of built environment integration and spatial transformation that is led by city practitioners and rooted in their lived experiences.
- To deepen the collective understanding of practice through case studies, thereby creating a repository of city experiences and practitioner voices to shape the discourse on spatial transformation.
- To continuously improve built environment practice in cities, by using a collective understanding of practice as shaped by the case studies and experiences.

The BEITT brings together city officials to focus on shared learning and qualitative outcomes, rather than focusing on policy and planning intent, with the aim of finding practitioner-generated solutions, sharing experiences and practices, and shifting urban governance practice in a multi-disciplinary manner.

The organisational and institutional focus areas that have emerged from the work of the BEITT provide the basis for this chapter. The chapter is, therefore, not a normative critique on the spatial transformation agenda in South Africa (this is covered in the 2011 SOCR and 2016 SOCR) but explores the governance systems that inhibit or enable spatial transformation.

## The spatial transformation ‘game’ is complex

Spatial transformation is a complex, ambitious goal. It involves many stakeholders operating at different scales who have competing ideologies and disconnected resources, but seldom the same goal. In South Africa, the reality is that the approach to spatial transformation has failed. It has failed to generate the systems capabilities for dynamic management capacity and highly skilled personnel to drive transformation. It has failed to intervene in the power dynamics that govern how decisions are taken and the political reality at play in city value chains. It has failed to grapple with power imbalances and breakdown in cooperation across government and between government and communities. The devolution of built environment housing and transport functions, which is central for addressing some of the power imbalances, has regressed, while national politics has undermined local government-led spatial transformation. SPLUMA was intended to be a ‘game changer’, as it devolves spatial planning and land-use management power to the local level. However, little has changed materially (SACN, 2017a) – as one municipal practitioner said, with SPLUMA “we have changed the bottle and not the wine” (Moonsammy, 2018).

Rules are foundational in any game, but the rules of the spatial transformation game are unclear, complex and challenging to navigate. The Citopoly game<sup>1</sup> illustrates how the rules of government prioritise administrative compliance over working with and meeting community needs (SEE BOX 1). Citopoly emerged from a BEITT research project, which investigated the practices and behaviours experienced by practitioners when implementing projects. The game was developed as a way to disseminate the research findings. It reveals the tension between practices that build organisational value and practices that build broader societal value, and how institutional practices are out of touch with community needs. The result is that project implementation compromises on delivering societal value to communities in the pursuit of delivering organisational value through compliance (SACN, 2020a). This is not to say that compliance is not important, but rather highlights the fact that the mechanisms, procedures and approaches in place are not focused on delivering policy impact. The perception is that these entrenched rules cannot be changed, and yet they are completely man-made.


---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.sacities.net/citopoly-2/>

## BOX 1 CITOPOLY

Citopoly demonstrates the constant tension between practices that build organisational value and practices that build broader societal value and performance.

The idea for Citopoly was born out of experimenting with ways of getting city practitioners more engaged in knowledge generation and application. The BEITT research into the implementation of built environment projects included extensive interviews with city practitioners, which produced many rich quotations illustrating the reality of built environment practices in cities. The team decided to explore gaming as a fun and interactive way to share the research insights and make use of the quotations. And so Citopoly was born. The verbatim quotations are the basis of a game that illustrates the conundrum faced by city practitioners, to build either organisational value or societal value. The team assigned specific consequences for gaining or losing value, as expressed in the quotations.




The first official playing of the Citopoly prototype took place at the BEITT's Earthrise Mountain Lodge retreat and was followed by a series of prototype games played with built environment practitioners in Johannesburg, Tshwane, eThekweni and Nelson Mandela Bay, as well as the National Treasury's CSP team. The Citopoly game went into design and production and was officially launched in February 2020 in Nelson Mandela Bay. Further sessions were held with the Western Cape Government and the University of Cape Town (UCT), eThekweni, South African Local Government Association (SALGA), the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) and the International Society of City and Regional Planners (ISOCARP).

With the onset of COVID-19, a virtual version of Citopoly was produced and played at the virtual Urban Festival in October 2020. Going virtual has enabled the team to improve and to expand the reach of Citopoly. For instance, Citopoly was played at the International Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI's) RISE Africa Action festival, which brought together urban development practitioners and civil society actors from African cities to engage with urban challenges. A follow-up session was held to explore other ways of using the game to facilitate conversations and community engagements. Although the main drawcard is the game and its methodology, sharing Citopoly also helps others to find interesting ways of using gamification to disseminate knowledge and facilitate conversations aimed at understanding what is hampering spatial transformation in cities.

## The rules of the game

Institutions are the rules of the game. They are the structural forces that shape human behaviour and represent both the formal and informal rules at play (North, 1990). The formal rules are established by the legal system as underpinned by the Constitution of South Africa **SEE CHAPTER 1: GOVERNING SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES**, while informal rules refer to the norms and power dynamics that result in unwritten agreements and ways of working. As in any game, the formal and informal rules are at play with each other, simultaneously and constantly changing; and if the rules are not clear, knowing what to do is very challenging.

**FIGURE 1:** The rules of the game



Urban systems are made up of complex interactions between rules and people at multiple scales, and yet the institutional environment that governs how decisions are made and how work gets done is not well understood. To understand what is going on in practice, the rules that shape behaviour in the built environment space need to be understood in relation to cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach. Having government spheres working well together and partnering effectively with different sectors of society is central to achieving spatial transformation outcomes. The rules of the game offer a way to start mapping and making sense of what is informing the current state of play, i.e., what is going on in terms of cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach within the built environment. They provide an in-depth and complex view of urban governance issues that are hindering spatial transformation, through exploring the complexities of devolution, transversal management, administrative/political interface, and participation and conflict with communities and stakeholders.

This chapter provides a perspective on what is going on in built environment practice, informed by the experience of city practitioners, highlighting the human passion and capability driving spatial transformation, as well as the systemic issues that get in the way. The quotations are from various BEITT meetings and engagements. After providing an overview of the state of play, the chapter looks at disabling institutional and organisational rules that hinder city practitioners from solving built environment challenges, and then provides some rays of hope by highlighting some inspired practices. It concludes with recommendations for changing and introducing new rules for the game, aimed at improving cooperative governance and all-of-society collaboration to achieve spatial transformation.



## THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

The previous SOCR argued that power and politics, institutions and intergovernmental relations, and management capacity and skills affect the achievement of spatial transformation and need further investigation (SACN, 2016). It called for an improved enabling environment, where cities would be central to unlocking an all-of-society perspective (ibid). However, the reality is that cities have struggled to steady their own ships during the 2016–2021 term of office, in the face of considerable shifts in political dynamics and increased uncertainty and volatility in the operating environment, as demonstrated by the water crises and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over and above everything else there needs to be consistency. But nothing in local government is consistent. We don't even have the 5 years we normally have for a consistent vision. With multi-party government changes, how do we root ourselves in an environment that keeps changing our feet?<sup>2</sup>

Cities are operating in turbulence, which appears to be the 'new normal' for public sector organisations and institutions across the world. Turbulence can result from (Ansel & Trondal, 2018):

- The external environment, such as droughts, disasters, rapidly changing technology or health pandemics, such as COVID-19.
- The organisation, "through factional conflict, staff turnover, conflicting rules, internal reform, complex operations, and so on" (ibid: 46), such as the impact of coalition arrangements on the operations of metros since 2016.
- The negative impact that 'doing the right thing' at one level may have on another level. Examples include the reporting burden placed on cities due to national government's policy reform (Palmer et al., 2017; SALRC, 2019) and the rise of "gangster-based business forums" demanding (for example) 30% of the tender value in response to local economic empowerment drives.<sup>3</sup>

Governing in turbulence to implement a spatial transformation agenda is not an easy feat, as acknowledged in much of the BEITT's programme of work. And yet every year billions of rands of investment is channelled into reform and support initiatives and into delivering built environment projects, as highlighted in the introduction. Much of the BEITT's work has been about unpacking the substantive aspects of what it means to 'operate in turbulence' and exploring how to improve the ability of municipalities to focus firmly on development within communities, through examining practices in relation to cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches.



### POWER AND POLITICS

This chapter does not cover the flows of resources through municipalities for the delivery of infrastructure and services. The deep and problematic connection to the funding of political parties is common knowledge among practitioners and political players in municipalities. This is a web that requires unravelling and raises real questions about the extent to which the political logic that underpins the functioning of local government are really aligned to the developmental intentions and ambitions upon which the municipal system was built.

<sup>2</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)

<sup>3</sup> Comment made at the Tshwane Property Seminar (2019) <https://www.tshwane.gov.za/Lists/CurrentNewsHome/CustomDispForm.aspx?ID=461&Content-TypeId=0x0100348F2425A35F3045BF18657362861A62>

## The quality of cooperation is not measured

The intergovernmental system is failing to foster cooperation because no-one is monitoring and measuring cooperative behaviour across government spheres. The Intergovernmental Relations Act (No. 13 of 2005) establishes “a complex set of statutory forums”, which have not been successful because of a lack of political commitment to these structures (Palmer et al., 2017: 64) and technical deficits, largely within provincial and national government departments that are unable to provide the necessary regulatory service and support to local government. Intergovernmental cooperation tends to focus on the *letter of the law* (legal structures and requirements that must be met) rather than the *spirit of the law* (ethos and mindset that inform practice), and yet “being the proud owners of a Constitution such as we have, without working to implement its *spirit*, is actually quite futile”.<sup>4</sup> The focus is on measuring or monitoring expenditure and outputs, not on the quality of intergovernmental cooperation. Yet expenditure and outputs exist in sector silos, meaning that the department responsible for the project budget is measured on its own priorities rather than on the other components required for spatial transformation. These components include housing choices, mobility choices (to improve access), economic opportunities (to improve people’s livelihoods) and land uses that encourage integrated and inclusive neighbourhoods.

The cases of Zanemvula and Cornubia **SEE BOX 2** illustrate the negative impacts on spatial transformation efforts when government operates in silos and relies on ineffective intergovernmental relations (SACN, 2020a). Both are presidential priority projects and have received extensive resources. In both cases, the same political party governed the three spheres of government responsible for delivering both projects for many of their life cycles. Neither project can be considered an example of a sustainable human settlement, and yet both were deemed successful because the lead government department or agency had met its specific mandate of building housing units and spending its budget. Zanemvula is a national project, initiated by the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and passed on to the Housing Development Agency (HDA), with little involvement from the municipality, while Cornubia is a municipal project in partnership with the private sector. However, other crucial departments (e.g., education, health, social services) did not play their part by providing the other components needed for creating liveable neighbourhoods. This meant that (in Cornubia) “the ribbon was cut on the houses without connection to electricity” and (in Zanemvula) “20 years on not a single brick [for schools] has been laid”. Zanemvula was included on the education department’s priority list, but nothing happened. “[I]t’s about alignment of budgets. [...] I’m concerned because could it possibly be that we’ve had four schools in the top 10 on the priority list [...] for 20 years and we still find that we haven’t any delivery there” (SACN, 2020a: 21).

These outcomes were not always from a lack of coordination from the project lead department. In the case of Cornubia, when other departments did not come on board, the municipal department of human settlements not only built the houses (as per its mandate) but also went beyond its mandate, by providing economic and skills development programmes.

---

4 Trevor Manuel, speaking at the Helen Susman Foundation Memorial Lecture 2014. <https://hsf.org.za/publications/lectures/helen-suzman-memorial-lecture-2014>

A spirit of cooperation is not based on meeting minimum quality requirements. In many instances, intergovernmental cooperation for projects becomes about communicating via email about deadlines for written comments, ticking a box of attendance at meetings, and tactically limiting opportunities for engagement by avoiding conflicting views and opposing ideas.<sup>5</sup> Few platforms exist for meaningful discussion and partnerships, where government departments can work together in a respectful, innovative and enabling way. In effect, no one is monitoring the multiple departments, agencies and partners, to ensure that cooperative implementation is taking place. Such cooperation would require changes in behaviour, improved accountability and rewards for all role players who play their part.

## BOX 2 ZANEMVULA AND CORNUBIA

### Zanemvula

The Zanemvula housing project has been ongoing since the early 1990s and involves Chatty, Joe Slovo West, Soweto-on-Sea and Veeplaas areas. It illustrates the challenges of intergovernmental coordination, especially for a long-term project.

In 2004, President Thabo Mbeki visited Soweto-on-Sea in Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBMM) with the Minister of Human Settlements and was shocked by the conditions in which people were living. Soweto-on-Sea was selected as a pilot for the then new Breaking New Ground (BNG) policy. A year later, Minister Sisulu set up a special collaborative 'team' comprising the national and provincial departments of human settlements, and the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality. In February 2006, the Zanemvula BNG pilot was launched and declared a Section 29 national priority project, a ministerial priority project and a presidential priority project (DHS & DPME, n.d.). It was then handed over to the HDA.

Despite being a priority project with talk of cooperative governance (including signed agreements), the reality became contestation and a breakdown in intergovernmental relations. In effect, Zanemvula is like an entangled web that has become more complex over the decades, as new players have entered the arena. It shows what happens when communities are not placed at the centre of development. The inability to cooperate and align budgets has meant that housing has been delivered without the socioeconomic infrastructure needed for community development.



<sup>5</sup> These are often the basis of issues discussed within the Planning Alignment Task Team meetings

## Cornubia

Cornubia is a large-scale presidential priority human settlement project in Durban North that is a partnership between Tongaat Hulett and the City of eThekweni. With a private sector partner driving the project, the story of Cornubia is significantly different to the story of Zanemvula.

In 2004, Tongaat Hulett decided to release vast portions of sugarcane land for development and approached eThekweni Municipality. The two parties signed an agreement in 2008, and subsequently the national and provincial departments of housing became partners in the project, which President Zuma launched as a national priority under the BNG policy. The municipality worked closely with Tongaat Hulett to drive the project forward, while the municipal human settlements department worked with community members to establish local economic and skills development programmes. The project has faced challenges with involving other municipal departments and, in particular, getting the provincial education department to re-align its priorities – despite Cornubia being a presidential priority project.

Although Cornubia's outcomes are better than those in Zanemvula, it is still not an example of a sustainable human settlement, as it lacks schools, public parks and quality public spaces. As one municipal practitioner involved in the project explained, "We have moved people from opportunity and now they are unemployed (or similar)".<sup>6</sup>

Cornubia is certainly a case that represents improvement in large-scale human settlement creation, evidence of a successful partnership between the city, the private sector and local community actors, and a better working relationship with the national department. However, cooperation among government spheres remains a challenge and requires further investigation.



## Local government is the 'junior' sphere

Despite being a major national asset with the greatest experience of post-democratic urban development, local government is still viewed as the weaker, less equipped junior partner. Typically, national departments summon, interrogate or instruct municipal officials, in a hierarchical 'big brother' tone. There is little, if any, accountability from other spheres of government that share responsibility for delivery in certain areas. In the case of human settlements, functions have been partially devolved to municipal level, but the national department regularly proceeds with mega-housing projects outside of the municipal spatial priority areas approved in spatial development frameworks (SDFs). Even progressive platforms that are meant to improve cooperation, such as National Treasury's City Budget Forum, are rarely empowering. The intergovernmental system has struggled to build the kind of

<sup>6</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)



partner-based relationships of trust, mutual respect and accountability and authenticity required to make a CSP, IUDF or DDM meaningful on the ground. Alarm bells should be ringing when municipal practitioners say that “they appreciate the City Budget Forum because it forces their principals to keep a focus on the municipal plans”, or that they “think the BEPP is a distraction” and are “debating internally whether the money associated is even worth it, but [...] have to comply to ensure good relations”.<sup>7</sup> The concern for the system should be why municipal principals are not focused on delivering municipal plans.

Local government is the sphere of government that is meant to interface with communities and mobilise input into government policies and plans, in particular municipal integrated development plans (IDPs) and SDFs. However, as highlighted above, other spheres of government do not view the municipal IDP and SDF as the over-riding plans in a municipality, while sector departments often develop their own spatial priorities that contradict municipal plans (SACN, 2020d). The government spheres may have different terms and budgeting cycles and most challenges are due to planning duplication for programmes and projects across the spheres. SPLUMA was to be the ‘game changer’ ensuring that spatial powers and functions resided at the local level, but the reality is that little has changed materially (SACN, 2017). In 2020 the City of Johannesburg approved the country’s first city inclusionary housing and nodal review policies lending significant weight to SPLUMA by changing the local government decision-making framework. However, policy shifts alone do not change practice (as indicated by the cautionary insights into the policy–practice gap in Chapter 3: Inclusive Cities).

National government’s latest attempt to address the breakdown in cooperation is the DDM, which promotes the production of ‘one plan’ for a district. However, the DDM has not addressed the disconnect between national strategic planning and local spatial planning. For a one-plan approach to work, national government’s Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) would need to be localised and align more clearly to municipal long-term priorities, not the current five years. Achieving the desired developmental outcomes will require that national and provincial governments respect the municipality’s spatial planning powers and provide policy and regulatory guidance, budget and support for implementing these plans.

## The focus is on technical delivery

The IDPs, BEPPs and human settlement plans all convey a message that spatial transformation can be hard engineered into South African cities through building infrastructure. The plans are informed by quantitative analysis, technical planning and budgeting, and are filled with planning jargon, intended inputs and outputs, and desired outcomes. However, they fail to reflect the diversity of community realities and nuances required to drive development on the ground and take a technical approach that is alienating for communities. City participatory approaches are highly ineffective and driven by compliance (Palmer et al, 2017), while the time pressures involved in council approval and budget expenditure mean that participation is viewed as an obstruction rather than an opportunity to improve project implementation and to build long-term relationships with communities, beyond projects. A common observation from IDP practitioners across the country is that, year after year, communities are frustrated by the lack of progress, transparency and coordination between departments that shows up during engagements (SACN, 2020d).

---

<sup>7</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)

For practitioners, the reporting burden and hierarchical, centralised decision-making mean that they spend more time reporting to their superiors and sector department counterparts at provincial and national level than delivering projects to communities: “We spend all our time looking upwards at our bosses and almost no time looking outward at our communities” (SACN, 2019c). The Financial and Fiscal Commission’s research into the impact of regulations and legislation on local government supports the sense from practitioners that the reporting burden is suffocating their ability to drive development (SALRC, 2019). Practitioners have to spend so much time on administrative compliance tasks or navigating internal demands and instructions that they have become disconnected from those they aim to serve. The system needs to change because the delivery of built environment programmes is disconnected from a focus on serving people and their communities and from the natural environment on which human life depends.

## Government is often not a good partner

The focus on compliance means that government has a very weak partnering culture among spheres or departments and certainly with communities and other stakeholders. Any partnering efforts remain the exception rather than the norm and are typically with large established organisations. The limited capacity of cities to engage, negotiate, build trust and partner effectively with communities and other stakeholders hampers the delivery of projects. Many would-be partners have been frustrated with the non-committal and bureaucratic responses of cities, at huge loss to implementing the urban agenda.<sup>8</sup> The IUDF, which is premised on improved partnering, has not galvanised an improvement over the past five years, beyond generating more talk about improved partnership.

The 2016 SOCR acknowledged that organised civil society is weakening, but the state’s role in enabling civil society is also problematic (SACN, 2016).<sup>9</sup> Strong civil society local collectives are active and working to effect change in South African cities. The SACN and the BEITT have engaged with the Steve Biko Foundation, the Ikhala Trust, The South End Museum, The Trevor Huddleston Memorial Centre, Reclaim the City, Ndifuna Ukwazi, Afesis Coreplan, the Socio-Economic Right Institute of South Africa (SERI), PlanAct and the Development Action Group, all of whom are working with communities or within community development. However, civil society’s experience of local government is not positive:

We don’t lack ideas. We lack trust. We don’t trust that things will happen. We are not short of ideas. We just need our current ones to work. Everything we are saying can happen, but we don’t trust that it will happen.<sup>10</sup>

During conversations at the Urban Festival 2020<sup>11</sup> and the RISE festival<sup>12</sup>, common complaints from civil society included not being heard by government and being frustrated with the lack of government commitment and accountability. Yet many expressed a desire for improved relations and openness to find ways to work with government.

---

8 [www.urbanfest.co](http://www.urbanfest.co)

9 See Section 4: Beyond 2021: A Local Government Outlook for more on the weakening influence of civil society.

10 Participant at the Visualisation Studios 2021

11 [www.urbanfest.co](http://www.urbanfest.co)

12 [www.riseafrica.iclei.org](http://www.riseafrica.iclei.org)

Adding to the problem is the poor link between different city participatory engagements and the ineffective ward councillor system that does not provide consistent community presence and the envisioned community leadership (SACN, 2020d; Palmer et al., 2017). Communities find themselves expected to engage with many different officials and stakeholders, such as the IDP team about the IDP and the water department about water plans.

Even municipal practitioners recognise that municipal participatory platforms and approaches are inadequate and poorly serve the interests of democratic development (Masiya et al., 2019; Palmer et al., 2017; SACN, 2019a). This is in part because of the compliance and technical systems that govern behaviour in city government, and in part because of a lack of experienced social facilitators who can drive dynamic and meaningful participatory processes (SACN, 2020a): “In order to enhance municipal service delivery, there is a need to strengthen the relationship between the City of Cape Town officials and communities, including civil society; rooted in public participation” (Masiya et al., 2019: 42).

## Participation is limited to projects

Cities have struggled to engage authentically and consistently with potential community partners around projects, whether initiated by cities or by other stakeholders. Most attempts at partnering tend to be around projects but do not lead to the development of ongoing relationships. For example, cities began engaging differently with the minibus taxi industry only when the bus rapid transit (BRT) systems were to be built, as the stakes and risks involved were high. In many cases, highly qualified social facilitators were contracted to facilitate the transition to a BRT system owned and operated by minibus taxi operators. Real and meaningful relationships were built that took the transformation of the minibus taxi industry to new levels in South Africa (SACN, 2016). However, since 2016, the transformation of the transport sector has slowed down dramatically, with very little new BRT planned capacity actually being built. While national grant funding was reduced, the missed opportunity was to continue to build relationships with the minibus taxi industry to provide industry-wide transformation, whether around a BRT project or not.

The reality is that government holds meetings and consultations only when projects arrive in an area or when the IDP is being discussed (SACN, 2020d). There is no sense of government engaging authentically and ongoingly with communities: “We have been a bit malicious in the way in which we have done public participation”<sup>13</sup>. The result is a lack of community ownership of projects. Such ownership is essential given the operational and maintenance limitations of municipalities and the increasing pressures placed on the fiscal environment. Furthermore, far too much time and resources are being spent on using the courts to instruct municipalities to work with communities and uphold agreements (Molopi & Ebrahim, 2017: 59):

[W]hile confrontational methods may lead to adversarial relationships with the state and run the risk of forming a barrier to future collaborations, SERI’s experience has shown that confrontation usually acts as a vehicle to usher in collaborative approaches with the state. The courts have purposefully tried to enable a collaborative environment between citizens and the state in confrontational atmospheres through the provision of ‘meaningful engagement’.

---

<sup>13</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)

Even when cities are instructed to work with communities, the experience is not always positive because cities are not well geared to work with others. Nevertheless, as the Slovo Park case illustrates, individual city practitioners can make a difference (SEE BOX 3), but this remains the exception rather than the norm. In such cases, practitioner ‘champions’ must work against the system to get things done, and their efforts are seldom celebrated by their own organisation – and when individual champions move on, relationships break and any progress made is lost.

### BOX 3 SLOVO PARK

The experience of the Slovo Park task team underscores the importance of collaboration between strong community-based organisations and progressive built environment practitioners. This needs to be driven at a local level to enable rigorous and participatory engagement across sectors, departments and spheres of government when managing upgrading projects. This case study illustrates the shift from delivering greenfield housing to upgrading informal settlements, through the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP). Incremental in-situ upgrading differs markedly from conventional urban planning and greenfield developments and requires different skills to ensure minimal disruption to livelihoods and existing settlement patterns.

In April 2016, the Gauteng High Court ordered the City of Johannesburg to upgrade the Slovo Park informal settlement in-situ, and the Slovo Park Community Development Forum (SPCDF) demanded a multi-stakeholder task team to ensure community participation in decision-making. The Slovo Park task team comprised officials from the national, provincial and municipal departments of human settlements; the city’s lawyers; and the SPCDF, SERI, and built environment practitioners who had worked alongside the SPCDF since 1991 (when Slovo Park was established). Over the next four years, the task team met 33 times and was led by three different city housing officials, who each took a different approach. The first official engaged the task team but implemented a greenfield development agenda, while the second official disengaged the task team and ignored the court order to upgrade the settlement. The third official made use of skills within the task team and stakeholders to co-draft an UISP-compliant application.

- In 2017, the city’s funding application was not UISP-compliant, as it skipped phases 2 and 3 of the UISP process and took a greenfield approach. Its plan was to demolish Slovo Park, displace over 2 000 households and build top structures only.
- In 2018, City Power electrified Slovo Park.
- In 2019, after task team negotiations and advice from progressive planners at the University of the Witwatersrand and 1:1 Agency of Engagement, the city redrafted its funding application, to align it to incremental service delivery, land acquisition and public participation workshops. After approval from the task team members, the city submitted its funding application to the provincial human settlements department.

After 20 years of broken promises, Slovo Park would be upgraded, building on what already existed to improve the lives of those living there. This would not have been possible without resilient community leaders and the UISP champions working within the city housing department. The experience shows that the nature and consistency of municipal leadership, and in particular the approach adopted by officials, directly affect project implementation and progress (or not) in upgrading of informal settlements.

## The wellbeing and concerns of people are not foregrounded

People are the ultimate beneficiaries of spatial development interventions. Yet deeper connections to the human condition seldom feature in approaches to built-environment investments. Success in spatial transformation is as much about the psycho-social aspects of our cities – how people feel and perceive the places they live in; what their dreams and aspirations are; and how connected, invited and involved they feel to places – as about the buildings. As a participant in the Visualisation Studios held in 2021 observed, “We forget that cities are about the intangible. It’s not about the buildings. Those are just tools”.<sup>14</sup> The psychological and social aspects that inform perceptions, ambitions and behaviours are rarely engaged. Instead, the current approach to spatial transformation emphasises – and rewards – well-developed technical plans carried out by planning and engineering technocrats.

When we talk of the built environment we tend to focus on the hard infrastructure, but it’s also about addressing the psycho-social issues that exist and dealing with these so called ‘soft’ issues is often the most difficult part.<sup>15</sup>

The need to foreground wellbeing extends to city practitioners working to transform space. The BEITT’s work has highlighted that many practitioners carry traumas associated with their past and present into their work. Personal trauma is an issue that was raised repeatedly in the BEITT group, as a real institutional factor that stifles progress and is likely to have been heightened by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. “We need happy, healthy practitioners to build happy, healthy communities – who is looking after the wellbeing of practitioners?”<sup>16</sup>

Government continues to think that it is working *for* the people, not *with* the people. It spends very little time, effort and investment in understanding the reality of people’s lives – their challenges, resources and skills – or exploring possible solutions to implement in partnership with communities (SACN, 2020b). A practitioner raised some of these issues when talking about the roll-out of a BRT system (SACN, 2018d: 7):



**WE NEED HAPPY,  
HEALTHY PRACTITIONERS  
TO BUILD HAPPY,  
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES –  
WHO IS LOOKING AFTER  
THE WELL-BEING OF  
PRACTITIONERS?**

<sup>14</sup> <https://thetrinitysession.com/current-projects/sacn-visualisation-studio/>

<sup>15</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)

<sup>16</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)



**CITIES COULD DO WELL TO IMPLEMENT STANDARDISED APPROACHES TO LOCAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT THAT PLACE HUMAN BEINGS WITHIN COMMUNITIES AT THE CENTRE OF DEVELOPMENT.**

You want the community to care about your station, but you don't care enough about them to allow them to work in it? Before people can care about what is most important to you, you need to start thinking what is important to them and it's not so much about the safety of the station, it is about the safety of the neighbourhood.

This failure to listen deeply, understand and work with communities hampers an all-of-society approach. Over the past two decades of delivering housing and infrastructure, government has failed to acknowledge that people's primary concern is economic access, and that people seek economic opportunities rather than houses or better places to live (SACN, 2018a; Pieterse & Owens, 2018). By separating economic development work from built environment work, municipalities fail to acknowledge the potential role of built environment projects in economic development. Furthermore, cities do not have a standardised local economic development policy and consistent approach towards built environment projects. Different departments engage communities using different approaches, which results in frustrated communities that have an inconsistent experience of the same city organisation. For example, in Patterson Park, two city agencies separately procured local contractors at different rates to work on the same project (SACN, 2020a).

Communities have high socioeconomic expectations of built environment projects, which is understandable in a country with high unemployment and historically embedded structural marginalisation of poor, black communities. However, cities are not doing enough to manage these expectations proactively through local jobs, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and procurement set-asides (SACN, 2020a). The results of poorly managing economic expectations range from violence at the one extreme, including 'gangsterism' (as seen in the activities of the 'business forums'), death and corruption, to poorly managed sub-contracting arrangements, a lack of meaningful skills transfer and the sidelining of local SMMEs and informal workers, at the other extreme. Cities could do well to implement standardised approaches to local economic empowerment that place human beings within communities at the centre of development.

The current state of play reveals a breakdown in cooperative governance and a failure of cities to work with all-of-society. Despite clear rhetoric and policy direction, the rules of the spatial transformation game are not designed to allow implementation to flow effectively, with well-functioning intergovernmental cooperation and the active participation of all-of-society. The next section explores some of the rules informing this state of play and which need to shift to unlock potential within the system.





## DISABLING INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL RULES

The current state of play, as described above, is not new for anyone working in (or closely with) city government. The underlying drivers of the practices behind the current state of play are essentially the rules driving systemic behaviours in all spheres of government. They are part of the ‘messiness’ of government, as “[t]he state is crossed by multiple rationalities, interests, and objectives, and in particular internally: between multiple levels of the state, diverse departments and units, and different professional and political positions within them” (Bénil-Gbaffou, 2018: 2143).

While (as with all organisations) cities may have issues with ‘cadre deployment’ and questionable skills, there is sufficient evidence to debunk the myth about the lack of human capability. In fact, metropolitan municipalities employ some of the most highly qualified, passionate, capable and committed development practitioners in the country. The real issue is not human capacity but rather the rules at play that do not enable integrated built environment delivery but actively disempower skilled practitioners (SACN, 2020a). What slows down progress is often “the bureaucracy and red tape needed to follow through on the implementation of plans” (SACN, 2018c: 6). These rules need to be addressed if the state is to drive spatial transformation efforts through improved government cooperation and an all-of-society approach.

### Domination of silos

Silos are not a new phenomenon in the discourse about integration challenges, but the solution is always that people need to find better ways to work together. The BEPP was introduced to ensure greater integration but, while it has certainly fostered integrated planning, it has not resolved the issues that hamper integrated implementation (SACN, 2020a). The BEITT’s work demonstrates that practitioners know that they ought to be working collaboratively so try immensely hard to do so, but they do so against and despite the silo-based system (ibid; Talking Transformation, 2020). The problem is not the people or the quality of the plans, but rather the systems that reinforce and reward silo-based behaviour.



### SILOS INHIBIT SUSTAINABILITY

The built environment cannot be separated from the environment, as the impacts of urbanisation run parallel to the impacts of climate change. However, the silo architecture of government has stifled efforts to mainstream environmental sustainability into municipal practice (see Chapter 3: Sustainable Cities). In cities, environmental sustainability units or departments set their own priorities and projects, and their workstream (as with other workstreams in municipalities) is departmentalised into its own silo. If cities are to deliver sustainability, all departments will need to take responsibility for changing how they work, not hold one department responsible. The BEPP includes a climate change component but this still plugs largely into silo-based organisational structures and fails to deal with the implementation capability required to advance built environment delivery to protect and enhance the natural environment. In municipalities, the environmental agenda is often not the focus of built environment practitioners. The BEITT has seldom raised the environment as a major issue because it is seen as the responsibility of municipal environmental departments.



IN EFFECT, THE SYSTEM  
ENCOURAGES A CULTURE OF  
“ONLY DOING WHAT MY  
MANAGER TELLS ME TO DO,  
AND HE ONLY DOES WHAT  
IS IN HIS SCORECARD

The rules that inform the highly siloed bureaucratic design of government mean that municipal priorities are established at a departmental, not organisational, level. Despite no one department being able to deliver complete place-making ‘products’, such as neighbourhoods, each department establishes its own priorities and then bids for resources (National Treasury, 2018; SACN, 2020a). Cities acknowledge the need to shift towards transversal management and practices, but the dominance of silos and the behaviours they reproduce are difficult to change. For example, a standard practice for transversal projects is to establish a project steering committee (PSC) comprising representatives of different departments. However, the resources for implementation are allocated to the department that ‘owns’ the project, with the result that the other departments within the PSC participate at a planning level only, not during implementation, as their project priorities are different. The rules of delivery will need to change to facilitate a change in behaviours.

## Design of performance management

Municipal formal performance management systems stem from the new public management reform, when private sector performance management was imported into the public sector, even though the public sector requires a different set of performance measures. Both formal and informal performance management systems are found within cities. The formal rules are based on codified rules (legislation, policies etc.), while the informal rules are “based on uncodified rules and practices, such as bureaucratic rules and political influence” (SACN, 2021a: 3). The informal rules become the de facto performance management system and cascade into the operating environment through relational gestures, urgency of response from principals and what is prioritised and done, especially when a change in political leadership occurs.

Performance management and performance measurement are not the same (Ammons & Roegnik, 2015; Kroll, 2015a) and, in practice, the emphasis tends to be on what is measured. In municipalities, performance is based on inputs (how much of the budget was spent) and outputs (how many things were delivered). The general sense from practitioners is that performance is measured by whether or not the budget is spent (SACN, 2019b). Performance rewards are silo-based, i.e., on an individual department’s inputs and outputs, rather than on a department’s integrated contributions to the organisation’s products and services (SACN, 2021a). For example, the Zanemvula project teams were “measured against the number of units delivered within a particular budget and timeframe”, rather than evaluated and monitored on the progress of the overall project (DHS & DPME, n.d.: 156).



The system also incentivises unambitious targets – it is well-known that senior managers working in local government set easy-to-achieve targets to ensure that they receive their bonuses (Palmer et al., 2017). In many municipalities, only senior managers sign performance contracts (ibid), which means that the people driving project implementation often do not have clear performance targets. While this openness presents a possible opportunity, in strong hierarchies subordinate officials tend to serve the achievement of senior manager scorecards. In effect, the system encourages a culture of “only doing what my manager tells me to do, and he only does what is in his scorecard”,<sup>17</sup> which is unsurprising in a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical organisation. Furthermore, in the absence of other possible measures, internal audits have become a central performance management tool, despite their perverse impacts on public sector operations (Palmer et al., 2017; Andrews et al., 2017).

## Disabling, incoherent and over-regulation

The regulatory environment is a major shaper of institutional rules. Currently, the multiple pieces of legislation that cascade down to the local sphere from national sector departments are not rationalised and have different logics and underpinning philosophies that inform longer-term thinking. Furthermore, over-regulation is strangling municipalities (CLC, 2008). The more rules and regulations that municipalities need to follow, the less scope there is for innovation, discretion and governing in response to community needs. The reporting burden thus created disables municipalities in driving coherent integrated planning and delivery (Palmer et al., 2017), while the legislation of different sector departments often creates contradictory processes resulting in a regulatory minefield (De Visser, 2018: 12):

Municipalities are certainly not the only ones to blame for the parlous state of local government. Municipalities are very often at the receiving end of incoherent laws, policies and funding streams. This is a result of national and provincial departments fighting for turf, or simply not coordinating with one another.

Municipalities are not able to follow a one-plan approach, which the DDM calls for, because of the many regulatory touch points, often with competing logics, that apply to the implementation of built environment projects and require the contribution of multiple sectors.

A One Plan will never work until all the legislation issues are resolved, we have a project now that has taken years to complete an EIA for but it is a municipal priority, we can't do anything until we have that resolved, how will the One Plan fix that?<sup>18</sup>

The increasing supremacy of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) as *the* governing legislation for municipalities is an important aspect of the regulatory discussion. The audit is all important, and a deep fear of audit outcomes and the Auditor-General has resulted in a play-it-safe culture developing across municipalities. Nevertheless, despite a general perception that the planning environment is heavily over-regulated, certain agencies and departments are finding ways to mitigate the regulation and navigate it creatively to deliver impactful work. This suggests that the issue is not the regulation itself, but perhaps the way in which municipalities interpret and implement it.

<sup>17</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)

<sup>18</sup> Quote from a BEITT member (2020)



WE ARE BEING TOLD HOW  
TO DO OUR JOBS BY  
ADMINISTRATORS, BY AUDITORS,  
AND IT IS RIDICULOUS, BECAUSE  
HONESTLY WHAT DO THEY  
KNOW ABOUT DELIVERING  
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS?

## Interpretation of the MFMA

The MFMA is meant to enable development. However, the way in which it is interpreted or perceived often acts as a disincentive for creative and authentic solutions and affects project implementation at a systemic level (SACN, 2021b). There is nothing written in the MFMA that actively or directly contradicts spatial transformation goals, but the way the MFMA is implemented in practice often results in a stifling environment for built environment practitioners and contributes to the perception of an over-regulated environment (SACN, 2021b).

Compliance, rather than cost effectiveness or responsiveness, is embedded in procurement processes, while audit fears make partnering with local actors difficult, especially if it concerns informal activities and unsolicited bids. For example, the MFMA does not make provision for including in the project team informal traders who will be affected by a transport interchange upgrade project (SACN, 2020a). The result is compliance-driven, ‘play it safe’ behaviours that can disable development<sup>19</sup> and have dire consequences for locally responsive spatial transformation (SACN, 2021a). Although “being authentic in the profession is more important than achieving clean audits (we are not here to have clean audits; we are here to deliver)”,<sup>20</sup> in practice, municipal practitioners may choose to ‘play it safe’ and do nothing rather than take action to drive development outcomes, particularly if that action could trigger an audit finding in the system. “We are being told how to do our jobs by administrators, by auditors, and it is ridiculous, because honestly what do they know about delivering infrastructure projects?”<sup>21</sup>

The MFMA informs supply chain management and procurement policies, which are affecting the ability to achieve delivery and local empowerment. While many argue that it is not an MFMA issue, the play-it-safe culture and malicious compliance behaviour are systemic. Furthermore, the tendering system is outdated, overly bureaucratic and does not adequately serve project intentions. Improving the procurement system has great potential for unlocking value in built environment delivery, and South African cities could learn from some international practices that seek to make public sector procurement more creative, open and transparent and foster improved value for money.<sup>22</sup>

19 Boraine A and Swilling M. ‘Ramaphosa’s New Dawn is here – but what it will take to bring the civil service back to life?’ *Daily Maverick*, 30 May 2019. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-30-ramaphosas-new-dawn-is-here-but-what-it-will-take-to-bring-the-civil-service-back-to-life/>

20 Quote from Dr Mathetha Mokonyane CSIR (2021)

21 Quote from a city practitioner at a SPLUMA MFMA roundtable (2020)

22 The National Treasury CSP has invited City Mart to share the innovative procurement practices they have used to support local government around the world [www.citymart.com](http://www.citymart.com).

The legislative environment and law-making for municipalities require urgent attention, with less focus on preventing corruption through sanction and more focus on enabling development. Addressing corruption is important, but enforcing criminal law is a much more effective tool for dealing with corrupt behaviour than tighter government laws and regulations.

## Complexity of the political-administrative interface

A crucial issue to emerge from the BEITT's work is the political-administrative interface challenges that stifle the system and profoundly affect integrated built environment delivery (De Visser, 2010; SACN, 2019a). Politics affects both the written and unwritten rules within municipalities. Local government is an inherently political environment, relying on politicians to navigate the political realm, engage city stakeholders and provide direction to the administration (SACN, 2019a). At the same time, municipal administrations must deliver technical, social, economic and financial products and services to communities and transform the apartheid spatial legacy.

### Short term vs long term

Politics has short time horizons – five-year electoral cycles – whereas spatial transformation requires a long-term agenda, as infrastructure and services are delivered over many political terms. The result of an over-reliance on political directives (“We can’t move without council approval”) is that short-term political pressures undermine the long-term efforts of municipalities. This is the case even when the same political party governs over many terms (as every politician wants to leave their respective mark and rise up the political party hierarchy) but is even more severe in cities governed by coalitions.

Senior built environment practitioners believe that strengthening the role of city managers would help address this issue, as city managers are increasingly becoming administrators rather than strategic leaders. With the weakening strategic focus of city managers, the administration is pulled in many different directions according to the politics of the day (SACN, 2019a). The constant changes in direction and areas of emphasis undermine the ability of cities to work collaboratively with partners across both government and society.

### Party power politics

The hierarchical political party structures are contrary to the ideals of a sphere-government system (SACN, 2018c). According to the Constitution, executive mayors are equal to premiers or ministers, but they seldom share the same rank within a political party. This undermines local political decision-making power and results in ‘higher’ provincial and national political powers overriding local spatial development decisions. In addition, while a written priority may remain in place, new, unwritten or conflicting priorities may emerge elsewhere in government thus affecting city priorities. One example is the Mega Human Settlements Programme, which emerged in 2016/17 and contradicts the written rules (e.g., SPLUMA) for transforming spatial patterns in South African cities. As Bénit-Gbaffou (2018: 2143) observes:

Opposition from above is equally limited: the housing policy is too central in the ANC post-apartheid vision to be challenged, even if the National Treasury starts questioning whether this is the best use of public resources. State officials ignore the contradiction because they can. Sticking to the policy as it is, ignoring its shortcomings, is rewarding politically and

development-wise. They persist in their actions in spite of the contradictions they are aware of. They might respond to it through informal practices on the ground, and this grey area certainly opens a space for corruption. But officials do not seem to use the contradiction as an “idiom of urbanisation”, to fulfil collective objectives, developmental or speculative.

In some instances, administrators hold higher political rank than their managers or political principals, which may result in a lack of clarity over who is giving direction and in problematic internal team dynamics (SACN, 2019a). Linked to this is “the current practice of deployment [which] is more about aiding and abetting corruption [...] than ideology and synergy” (SACN, 2018c: 8). Ideally, administrative appointments should be made based on “recommendations from multi-stakeholder panels” (ibid). The National Implementation Framework towards the Professionalisation of the Public Service is a recent attempt to create clearer boundaries between the political and administrative arms of government.

### Ward councillor system

The extent to which ward councillors are performing their envisaged role, as representatives of the community working to translate the municipal vision into local community development, is questionable. The ward councillor system and its interface with the administration affect the delivery and budgeting of built environment projects, as “the IDP is a project register”<sup>23</sup> where each ward councillor is competing to get projects and budgets for their ward. Although directly opposed to the technical, spatial targeting budgeting prioritisation promoted by National Treasury, the current national budgeting frameworks underacknowledged the political budgeting reality (National Treasury, 2017: 12; 2018: 5):

Strategy-led budgeting is essential if a Metro’s Budget is going to progressively build towards the outcomes of a compact and spatially transformed city. Consequently, the MTREF<sup>24</sup> Budget’s prioritization of resources in space according to the spatial targeting areas should be measured year on year to track this progression. The BEPP should therefore close the loop by presenting the spatial budget mix, both in terms of capital allocations and operating allocations associated in particular with the maintenance and renewal of infrastructure.

At present, the BEPP is an eligibility requirement for the Integrated City Development Grant (ICDG). The ICDG is an incentive grant that rewards the application of infrastructure grants, as part of the total capital budget, toward catalysing spatial transformation through a spatial targeting approach at a sub-metropolitan level.

In practice, budgeting is a highly political process, in which council is making negotiations and trade-offs and which is heightened in coalition arrangements. The consequence is that the so-called spatial transformation priorities in city planning and budgeting documents are compliance priorities, rather than shared and deliverable political priorities. National Treasury needs to work more closely with the Finance Ministry to bring the political nature of municipal budgeting processes into consideration.

---

<sup>23</sup> IDP manager (2019)

<sup>24</sup> Medium Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework

To deal with the complex political-administrative interface, city practitioners have to rely heavily on relationship-building techniques and tactics that allow them to navigate the political terrain (SACN, 2019a). However, such an approach is unsustainable when driving a transformation agenda because of the high levels of political turnover. For practitioners who are able to build relationships without becoming politically compromised, their gains are often short lived due to the political turnover and the consequent administrative turnover that has a major impact on delivery. The case of Slovo Park highlights these issues **SEE BOX 3**.

Nevertheless, South Africa's history contains moments when the political-administrative interface worked, when the politicians and administrative teams worked together within and across government to deliver under immense time and budget pressures. For example, the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup worked because everyone had the same focus. More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a declared national state of disaster that brought levels of focus to the work of government not seen since 2010. These two examples show how a clear and shared focus can galvanise improved political and administrative collaboration. In both cases the existing rules needed to be changed to get the job done. The challenge is not only to give spatial transformation an emotive and nation-building focus and to build a shared and clear vision of the future with all-of-society, but also to ensure that the rules in play can enable collective and shared action.

## Lack of project evaluation and learning

Although government programmes include monitoring and evaluation, no real learning is taking place across built environment projects. A recent study conducted by SACN (2020a) on four large-scale, priority built environment projects found that no evaluation was conducted on their implementation. Government annual performance plans are designed as a list of projects, with government moving on to the next project without ever taking stock of what happened in the implementation of the previous project. As a result, there is a lack of shared understanding of why projects fail or miss the intended delivery dates. Yet embedding learning is a key element for building the know-how required to implement projects effectively (Andrews et al., 2017). The notion of learning as critical to organisation performance is not a new idea (Senge, 1990), but cities are failing to build organisational learning informed by actual practice and results: "There's this fear of failure. It's seen as unacceptable even though it's a part of life. We don't want a project to fail, but we need to learn from previous experiences of failure."<sup>25</sup>

In eThekweni, the Municipal Institute of Learning (MILE) became renowned for providing operationally inspiring and reflective learning in an integrated manner, and yet practitioners involved in the Cornubia case study indicated that there was no systematic evaluation of or learning from the project, which was at the time moving into phase 2.

---

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Nobukhosi Ngwenya of ACC UCT (2021).



THE DEEP DIVIDE BETWEEN CITY GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE IS EVIDENT RIGHT FROM POLICY FORMULATION TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.

## Deficit of social and creative skills

In municipalities, an implicit rule when delivering built environment projects is that technical, design and engineering skills are prioritised over social science and creative skills. When a project is about to break ground, community liaison officers may be instated, but they often create tensions and yield ineffective and inconsistent results. Highly skilled social facilitators can be the bridge that enables the city to relate more authentically and meaningfully to communities, and to work more effectively with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations with experience in communities. Strong social facilitation enables meaningful community engagement and connection and, ultimately, more effective project outcomes: “Social facilitation is a model that promotes participatory development through community empowerment initiatives that enable people to organise for collective action and mobilise resources and solidarity in pursuit of shared community development outcomes”. (Habitat for Humanity, 2019: 5)

The deep divide between city government and the communities they serve is evident from policy formulation to project implementation. While the IUDF calls for an all-of-society approach, the reality is that government has not built the kind of authentic relationships and trust with community stakeholders needed for such an approach, which is further undermined by the uncooperative practices across spheres of government. Social facilitation is increasingly seen as crucial for delivering a developmental agenda (Habitat for Humanity, 2019; Hendler & Fieuw, 2018). It is not easy work and requires highly skilled and well-grounded practitioners capable of seeing the bigger picture and aware of any existing trust deficit (SACN, 2020a), as the Noordgesig case study demonstrates in the Rays of Hope section below.

For cities, a ‘game changer’ would be to build internal capacity for social facilitation and to promote a single interface between the city organisation and communities, whether when delivering products and services in an area or building ongoing partnerships. Some believe this capacity should reside in the community, as it requires “almost daily and constant interaction between social facilitators and residents” (Hendler & Fieuw, 2018: 99). In this regard, no one size fits all, but it is questionable that such community capacity could be enabled without some facilitation capability within the state. Municipal development agencies offer some important lessons on how the state could build social facilitation and leadership within communities. Such agencies are also able to ‘operate in turbulence’ while empowering staff to experiment, innovate and partner with communities, albeit on smaller scale projects. Municipalities could learn from these approaches and mainstream community-centric project implementation that builds trust, partnerships and enables community ownership of projects.



## RAYS OF HOPE

---

The realities of built environment practices, as highlighted above, demonstrate that systemic and structural issues do not allow the potential and talent within the system to rise and drive development in impactful ways. However, within cities can be found emergent practices and pockets of dynamism, innovation, resilience and delivery that warrant celebration and investigation. These practices show that improved cooperation and an all-of-society approach are possible in a sea of structural paralysis and malicious compliance culture where ‘doing nothing’ is rewarded over ‘trying something’. The key is to provide space for more experimentation and deliberate learning in order to grow transformation practices or more ‘room for manoeuvre’ within the existing rule constraints embedded in historical biases (Levy, 2015). Various city development agencies are doing interesting and exciting work, perhaps as they have slightly more ‘room to manoeuvre’ than municipal departments, and some rays of hope are emerging from within metropolitan municipalities that are worth sharing and learning from.

### Shifts in intergovernmental practice

National COGTA, as the department responsible for cooperative governance, has an essential role to play in improving the quality of interaction and cooperation moving forward. The planning alignment task team chaired jointly by COGTA and National Treasury is an important platform for discussions on improving intergovernmental planning and has sought to foster dialogue between the different spheres and departments. In 2019/20, in partnership with National Treasury’s CSP and the SACN, COGTA ran a co-creation process with the metro IDP practitioners to review the IDP guidelines. The emphasis was on learning from practical municipal experience to develop a guideline that could be better used to inform IDP practice. This project shows that a different approach to intergovernmental cooperation is possible and can energise people to co-create changes to the government system (SACN, 2020d). The IDP guideline review process demonstrated that the quality of cooperation can be improved through investing in listening to cities and facilitating generative engagement.

### A transversal approach to prioritisation

The eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality has been working to change the rules by embedding transversal management into their operational reality. A capital budgets committee, championed by the city’s Chief Operating Officer, has been created at an organisational level to facilitate transversal projects that are funded by the city and require multiple departments to work together. It has a set of criteria for prioritising projects across departments by bringing a collective focus to projects. This approach is exciting because it begins to transform how projects are prioritised in the organisation, away from an isolated department to a city collective. If applied to Cornubia, then each of the departments responsible for contributing to the project’s success would need to ensure their respective components are prioritised and resourced; and, if not, departments would have to shift their priorities to access funding and achieve their targets. While this assists in collective prioritisation, the city will also need to consider how to foster collaborative practice and culture in implementing projects.



## Different ways of partnering

The Mandela Bay Development Agency (MBDA) has taken a culturally led approach to upgrading public spaces in the inner city. A development facilitator led the process by contracting local artists to design and curate a cultural heritage-based urban upgrade. By deliberately creating the space for artists to imagine, design and create places in cities, the results are vibrant and interesting public spaces that allow people to explore and experience place in culturally connected ways. Municipalities could also include more creative and artistic skills and processes in their workflows. Such processes within the built environment bring a heightened sense of energy and inclusion, as art-based engagement modes are more accessible and universally open to interpretation and involvement **SEE BOX 4**.

The Bellhaven Harm Reduction Centre in eThekweni is an example of a successful all-of-society approach, where the city enables multiple sectors (NGOs, academia and the private sector) and its own departments to come together to deliver a transformative project. The project was a response to COVID-19 and the need for the city to provide shelter for its homeless population. It is a groundbreaking approach to the issue of substance abuse based on care and partnership. The centre provides a much needed sanctuary for those struggling with addiction and recovery, and includes psycho-social support, as well as a garden, community hall and washing infrastructure. The centre is not run by the city but through a consortium of NGOs and dedicated individuals. The city has provided the building and infrastructure and has aligned its departments, bringing multiple municipal units together, including: the deputy mayor and mayor's offices, urban regeneration, health, social development and safety and security (through Safer Cities, the custodian of the building, and Metro Police who have become champions of the harm reduction effort).

VIEW THE GOOD  
HOOD PROJECTS  
HERE





## BOX 4 VISUALISATION STUDIOS



# 2

In 2021, the SACN launched a series of visualisation studios, with the aim of bringing together all-of-society to develop visuals that reflect what a spatially transformed South African city could look like. From April to September, a series of multidisciplinary workshops took place virtually, using online platforms such as Zoom and WhatsApp. A creative consultancy and visual arts collective facilitated the sessions using visual tools and participatory engagement methodologies. ‘Ambassadors’, or people in the community who understood and supported the aim of the visualisation studios, assisted the SACN by providing access to their networks and becoming advocates.

Participants came from across the all-of-society spectrum and included students, entrepreneurs, city officials, activists, artists and academics who shared their lived experiences and aspirations for their future cities in one virtual room. The facilitator asked participants about their experiences, challenges and aspirations for their cities, which were captured live by visual artists. This method allowed people who had not interacted before the space to reimagine the future of their cities and collectively develop visuals that could reflect each city’s future.

Each studio was designed to extract rich content related to the discussion or to draw out a series of commonalities. Some of the activities required participants to build their future city using household items and present this to the group, while other activities were centred around identifying common ‘sore points’ that were used to develop a manifesto. The resulting visualisations and their summaries, as well as an online exhibition, curate the rich narratives and complex data to emerge from the studios and have the potential to influence future design.

The methodology used demonstrated a new way of ‘doing participation’ that is inclusive and acknowledges the lived experiences of city residents. It also highlighted the need for innovation in the public participation process, as one city practitioner reflected, “We have been using the same public participation tools for 20 years”. The visualisation studios treat public participation as a process, not an event, thereby contributing to building the relationships that are crucial for sustained community involvement and ownership of projects. The methodology requires time but demonstrates the creativity across all-of-society. Processes such as the visualisation studios will become increasingly important, as difference and diversity become more prevalent and authentic, meaningful engagement is needed for successful public engagements.




**9**  
SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES



**4**  
SESSIONS PER CITY



**100+**  
PARTICIPANTS



## Long-term participation

In Tshwane, the Community Oriented Substance Programme (COSUP) provides substance-abuse health and care services in the community. This multi-disciplinary programme is designed and implemented by a small core team, including committed officials and academics from the University of Pretoria. It is based on evidence and has support from all political parties, which has enabled the programme to continue through changes of political and administrative leadership. An important aspect of the programme is that community members and former substance abusers are active players in the programme, giving meaning to the adage ‘nothing about us without us’ and enabling interventions to be redefined and adjusted to respond to local conditions.

VIEW THE  
TSHWANE  
CASE STUDY  
HERE



In Cornubia [SEE BOX 2](#), the ongoing partnership of the private sector, has kept the project moving forward. Officials leading the Cornubia development admit explicitly that without Tongaat’s involvement, the project would never have progressed as far, as Tongaat was often the driver, pushing the city to make progress and ‘get things done’ (SACN, 2020a). Less-resourced potential partners might not have had the same power and status to pull cities along, and so it is important to explore how cities can embed effective partnering with large- and small-scale partners from across society.

## Human-centred city practice

Two projects, in Tshwane and Johannesburg, demonstrate how possibilities open up when human beings are placed at the centre of development and local stakeholders are involved before built environment solutions are implemented.

When the City of Tshwane upgraded the Mabopane Urban Precinct Hub, city officials connected to human reality by empathising with the informal traders who would be affected by the closure of the facility during construction. Instead of dismissing the traders’ concerns (because city procurement rules ignore this reality), the project leaders found a way to bring the traders into the project as local advisors, providing them with some financial compensation but also gaining valuable insights from the users of the space (SACN, 2020a).



In Noordgesig, the JDA worked deliberately to empower the community, by building trust, being present and transforming the collective outlook of the community before the start of the built environment project. The city practitioner who led the project was a development facilitation specialist and understood the importance of being present in the community, being available and showing up authentically in order to build trust. The crucial difference in this practice was that the practitioner was able to prioritise time spent with the community rather than time spent reporting and accounting ‘upwards’.



## CONCLUSION

In 2018, two decades after President Thabo Mbeki's visit to Zanemvula **BOX 2**, President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Lusikisiki Municipality to open a police station and was similarly shocked by the lack of delivery. He undertook to improve coordinated delivery and, following discussions with COGTA, the DDM was born. The DDM promises to address systemic issues, but its problem diagnosis is worryingly familiar, i.e., municipalities have not been able to develop effective plans, do not have the human capacity to steer government investment and a strong 'one plan' is needed for all of government. However, as this chapter has highlighted, unless the rules of the game are addressed, there is a real risk that in 20 years' time, another president will visit another community, have the same experience and find the system falling into the same capability trap. The breakdown in cooperative governance is not simply because of the lack of a strong plan, but because of the formal and informal rules that shape behaviour in the cooperative space, in particular the impact of partial devolution of functions, the political-administrative interface and the lack of deep community engagement and partnerships. Therefore, if whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches to development are to succeed, a shift in municipal practice is required, which means changing the rules of the game. This is not a straightforward task, as urban systems are very complex.

The journey of the BEITT highlights the passion and human capability that exist within the system, as well as the disabling rules that hinder city practitioners from actively solving community development challenges. The BEITT has provided a space for reflection and learning, which is seldom found within city institutions, and reminded practitioners of the wide gap between city intentions and actual practices and results. This chapter offers some of the leading perspectives, based on municipal practitioner experience, into what matters most for South Africa in the efforts to exit the capability trap and make progress in driving spatial transformation.

Spatial transformation depends on the collective actions of many stakeholders – policies, strategies and plans are not enough. This chapter reframes the challenges, and calls for a set of different interventions to unlock transformative practices that have community development at the centre. Intergovernmental and municipal systems should enable local government practitioners



For cities to evolve and improve spatial outcomes, they need to harness the energy of practitioners to disrupt the status quo. This requires creating an organisational space for trying out new ways of working and actively encouraging new ideas.

and politicians to build and sustain meaningful relationships with communities, empowering them to be leading partners of development and to see themselves and their neighbours as part of a transformation agenda. This requires a shift in the way things are done, but at the same time opens possibilities to new ideas, directions and solutions for turning the tide in the fight against spatial inequality, inefficiency and injustice. It starts with making hard decisions and choices during the next term of office, and not continuing to misdiagnose the problem as simply inadequate municipal capacity.

The next local government cycle starts amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which has made partnering a focus of the municipal working reality. Cities will need to do more with less, by working with others, pooling resources and energies, and building their internal capabilities. The COVID-19 moment has highlighted the importance of changing the rules of play but, most importantly, of acknowledging that rules must be changed to achieve better outcomes. The choices are to introduce a new set of rules, which will affect vested interests in the private and public sector, or to continue down the current path, in the belief that slight ‘tweaks’ to the same set of rules will deliver transformed outcomes.



Establishing a new set of ‘rules’ can create the positive disruption required to unlock potential in the system and grow implementation capability.

The stories and experience of many built environment practitioners hopefully hold enough value to warrant some reflection and attention to these areas. The reality is that, if the rules described in this chapter are not addressed with urgency and in a way that places communities at the centre, any well-intended new plan, programme or project will not result in the intended outcomes. New rules of the game are required to put cities at the centre of facilitating development with enthusiasm, purpose and creativity.

This chapter does not claim to identify all the rules or provide a new rule book for the spatial transformation game. However, it does offer some insights into the areas where new rules are required. An exciting project would be to uncover and map out the full set of rules, and to test and explore new ones. The formal rules operating across government certainly need better alignment and rationalisation, but there are opportunities to make quick changes to the informal rules, such as through cultural responses, norms and performance pressures and incentives within municipalities. National government could create the regulatory and legislative space for cities and their partners to experiment more easily. It could change reporting and performance measurements to encourage intergovernmental cooperation, while cities could change some significant operating rules. The recommendations below propose rules that could build the implementation mechanics required to propel the spatial transformation arena into the future.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

# 2

The rules governing municipal practice are established at multiple levels of the system – institutional, organisational, team and individual. The drive to establish new sets of rules to inform development work would need to be owned and led from within the system, although people operating outside the system could play an advisory role.

### Encourage transversal management in cities

- City performance management systems should reward city practitioners who solve challenges collaboratively, innovatively and dynamically, and be based on how far actions yielded community development.
- City departments should not be allowed to select and prioritise projects in isolation, but be given the authority to work transversally, thereby enabling the other departments (planning, economic development, sustainability and finance) to drive integrated implementation. For example, economic development should develop a standard city local empowerment strategy to be used transversally across all projects.
- COGTA should introduce a developmental audit, which monitors behaviours and processes as stringently as a financial audit but emphasises value for money, development and social return.

### Measure and reward intergovernmental cooperation

- COGTA should collaborate with national government on city processes to prioritise collective not individual outcomes.
- Cities should be supported to lead clear and well-facilitated processes of collective spatial and project prioritisation at the beginning of an administrative cycle and annually thereafter.
- COGTA should develop a maturity matrix for measuring the quality of intergovernmental cooperation linked to the IUFD and DDM.
- Cities should not take the lead on renewed intergovernmental co-operation but should offer to host engagements, forums and meetings differently, i.e., work creatively, use facilitated methods, connect in human ways, and pull in social facilitators to assist with building relationships across spheres of government.

### Review legislation and regulations

- National Treasury should review the behavioural impacts of the MFMA on municipalities. It should work with cities to explore new, more open and enabling regulatory environments, as the MFMA regulations and audit supremacy are not preventing corruption but are hampering development.

- COGTA should rationalise the local government legislative environment, to assess the sectoral legislation contradictions and over-regulation born from different disciplinary and philosophical departure points, and work across the intergovernmental system to develop a seamless web of legislation for a one-plan approach.
- The regulatory environment should create explicit space for cities to experiment and try new approaches that strive for value for money, community-centred development; for example, celebrate and reward different supply chain management approaches that place development and transformation at the centre.

### Improve the political-administrative interface

- SALGA and city leadership should empower politicians to educate administrators on the political realities and pressures of local government – the administrative internal operations are an open book, but the political world is not.
- Administrators need to become interested in the political system in which they work and invest in platforms for sharing and engaging.

### Build capacity and learning

- Cities should develop monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools that foster deep reflection and learning.
- Cities should include M&E as a learning tool in all projects, as a method to build relationships and drive discussions with peers and other spheres of government.

### Integrate social facilitation skills

- Cities should make social facilitation a critical constant, by hiring skilled social facilitators and allowing them to work across departments and lead collective visioning, planning, project landing and partnering. Social facilitation should be a transversally embedded city capability that shapes the work of the various departments through an evidence base of community engagement and partnership.
- The local empowerment strategy should be linked to social facilitation work streams, so that there is a smart link between building relationships with communities in areas where projects will be delivered and actual implementation of projects.



## CONCLUSION

Section 2 has provided perspectives of how cities have used cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach towards becoming more economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed. What emerges is that to stand any chance of meeting their long-term goals, cities need to adopt whole-of-government and all-of-society practices, which are also a useful starting point for addressing different governance concerns that are interconnected and interdependent.

**CHAPTER 1. Governing South African Cities** notes that, over the past five years, little progress has been made towards achieving the vision of the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) – economically and socially inclusive, sustainable and spatially transformed cities. Despite its noble intent, the current intergovernmental system has failed to produce the developmental local government needed to achieve the ideals of the Constitution and subsequent legislation and policies. As the country gradually emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is both an urgent need and considerable political will for a new approach to urban governance. The chapter argues that the time has come to do things differently, to adopt a new approach to governance and to relook at the urban governance structures. This means fully enabling urban autonomy, through empowering and devolving power, functions, responsibilities and resources to local government. Cities need to take full responsibility for rights-based and developmental government that is accountable to the communities that they serve. This will require improving cross-sectoral alignment, interactions with city stakeholders, and community participation; and depoliticising and professionalising the administration.

**CHAPTER 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion** shows that different economic actors need to interact, encourage dialogue and cooperate constantly in the interest of devising solutions to common challenges. This is essential for the (re)development of cities that are able to provide economic opportunities and benefits for all, especially the marginalised and vulnerable. The chapter highlights the importance of economic actors coming together to better understand city economies, and provides a profile of the current structure and composition of the nine cities. It describes some of the cooperative structures that cities can use for collaborating around available economic development levers and provides examples of how these levers can be used, including how communities can become engaged. Finally, the chapter draws lessons and recommendations that might be adopted in future efforts for economic growth, redress and governance.

**CHAPTER 3. Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing** shows that whole-of-government and all-of-society practices are inherent to building more inclusive cities. Urbanisation is a driving force for development when managed correctly, but may also lead to greater inequality and exclusion. Inclusion is rooted in the need for transformation and spatial justice, and greater inclusion results in improved quality of life or wellbeing of citizens. South African cities are spaces of exclusion and inequality, but pockets of excellence show that cities can become more inclusive through adopting whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches. These examples highlight the importance of community ownership and participation, and of the role played by integrators or champions. The chapter argues for the shifting of the foundations of urban institutions, systems, processes and stakeholders, as current efforts only skim the surface of power and politics, and allow inequality to grow. The multidimensional nature of inclusion and wellbeing demands effective cooperative governance and an

all-of-society approach. Cities need to co-create with communities. This requires people-centred and inclusive public systems, processes and practices; skilled city practitioners who are able to work with complexity and with multiple stakeholders; and the upscaling and institutionalising of good practices to yield sustainable inclusion and wellbeing outcomes for city dwellers.

**CHAPTER 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition** emphasises the institutional and cooperative governance arrangements that constrain sustainability transitions in cities. For just urban transitions to become a reality, specific interventions that harness partnerships are required to enable shared value propositions, and joint planning and implementation. Partnerships are also best facilitated by networks, intermediaries and knowledge brokers who have high degrees of autonomy and can establish the practical ground rules for partnering. The chapter explores how a shared value proposition can be formulated across sectors of society by offering examples of transversal cooperative initiatives and urban-level intermediaries, as well as city case studies reflecting different partnering strategies.

**CHAPTER 5. Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game** reveals the structural forces in municipalities that shape the behaviours of practitioners, which in turn hinder whole-of-government and all-of-society practices that support the attainment of spatial transformation goals. These forces, or “rules of the game” are both formal (legislation) and informal (institutional norms and power dynamics), and have contributed to the current challenges with intergovernmental cooperation and meaningful community engagement and partnerships. These rules can be transformed or shifted, by building on good practices, such as the examples included in this chapter, and modifying operating rules, reporting and performance measurements to encourage (and reward) intergovernmental cooperation, transversal management, human-centred practice and long-term community involvement. The chapter does not claim to provide a new rule book for the spatial transformation game, but rather offers insights into areas where new rules would propel the implementation of spatial transformation.





# 3

## COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIP

### City Perspectives and Voices

---

- 208 Introduction
- 209 Summary of the Case Studies
- 211 The Research Project
- 213 Lessons and Insights
- 216 City of Johannesburg
- 220 City of Tshwane
- 224 City of Ekurhuleni
- 228 eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality
- 232 City of Cape Town
- 236 Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality
- 240 Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
- 244 Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
- 248 Msunduzi Local Municipality





**THE CASE STUDIES  
DEMONSTRATE THAT LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT HAS HAD MIXED  
RESULTS IN WORKING WITH ALL  
SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT  
AND SECTORS OF SOCIETY  
(INCLUDING CIVIL SOCIETY AND  
THE PRIVATE SECTOR).**



## INTRODUCTION

This section presents nine case studies of city projects, which showcase how cities have used cooperative governance and all-of-society approaches, and offers governance insights into and lessons about implementing these approaches. The case studies demonstrate that local government has had mixed results in working with all spheres of government and sectors of society (including civil society and the private sector). Nevertheless, it can be done successfully, despite the challenges of municipal environments and other spaces. Accordingly, some case studies illustrate how whole-of-government and all-of-society approaches can lead to positive change, while others highlight the systemic and project-level barriers within the governance system that hinder the implementation of such approaches, as well as the responses and recommendations to overcome them.

The case studies are presented in the following order: Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, eThekweni, Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay, Buffalo City, Mangaung and Msunduzi. Each case study begins with a brief description of the project and then explores emerging governance insights and lessons. It should be noted that the case studies are presented in summary form, for ease of engagement, and links to the full case study reports are provided at the beginning of each summary.





## SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDIES

# 3



### City of Johannesburg

Action and pressure from the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein community led to cooperation between the City of Johannesburg and the Gauteng Provincial Government to upgrade a five-room consultation clinic into a Community Health Centre. The Johannesburg Development Agency supported the process as an implementing agent.



### City of Tshwane

A core partnership between the City of Tshwane, University of Pretoria and local communities, working through a network governance model with other partners and a broad spectrum of actors, provides evidence-based, community-oriented substance-use health and care services to communities in the greater Tshwane area.



### City of Ekurhuleni

Communities become partners in informal settlement reblocking<sup>1</sup> using a committee-based governance model that assists in raising the profile of reblocking within the community and municipality. Reblocking develops into both an effective short-term and a systemic long-term solution to urban informality.



### City of eThekweni

During Level 5 lockdown, municipal leadership and staff were able to mobilise their partners and stakeholders (including engaging with other government spheres) through new and existing coordinating structures, and to unlock municipal resources to improve the health and wellbeing of the city's homeless.

<sup>1</sup> Reblocking refers to the rearrangement of dwellings and the installation of basic infrastructures in informal settlements, with the aim of creating a safe, serviceable and habitable environment.



## City of Cape Town

The Western Cape Provincial Government, the City of Cape Town, civil society, individuals and the private sector came together to mobilise their resources, using a network approach, to address the COVID-19 lockdown food crisis in the Cape Town city-region and beyond. The crisis further facilitated social, organisational and technological innovation.



## Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality

The transition from a paper-based planning application system to a technology-based Electronic Municipal Application Management System (e-MAMS) resulted in improved ease of doing business with the municipality and, by extension, improved relationships between the municipality and business/citizens.



## Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality

Despite many challenges, positive steps have been taken to enable effective collaboration between a wide range of stakeholders with different views and objectives. The common aim is to unlock the economic potential of the Port of East London, a large-scale and complex catalytic development project for the region.



## Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality

Cooperative governance arrangements are in place and others are still required in order to move forward key developments geared toward spatial transformation and socioeconomic development: the airport node, the Waaihoek precinct and the Naval Hill redevelopment.



## Msunduzi Local Municipality

Efforts made by the city's new leadership to turn around the challenge of poor internal controls involved acknowledging and comprehensively addressing their causes and outcomes.



## THE RESEARCH PROJECT

---

# 3

The South African Cities Network (SACN) commissioned a research study, which began in March 2020 and ended in June 2021, that produced these nine case studies. The empirical and case study-based approach was chosen both for practical reasons (i.e., time and funding) and with the intention of developing new, nuanced governance stories that were selected and told by the cities themselves. The study required researchers and municipalities to work together to co-create and co-own the research process and outputs.

### Co-creation with municipalities

The reasons for directly involving the participating municipalities in the research process included:

- To strengthen and diversify the State of Cities Report (SoCR) production process.
- To improve SACN's communication with its participating cities around the SoCR.
- To enable the distribution and uptake of research findings within municipalities during the research process.
- To develop the capacity of both researchers and municipalities to conduct co-created and co-owned research.
- To improve the understanding of researchers and municipalities of good existing policy and practice and related challenges, and improvements that can be made.
- To work with, rather than on behalf of, municipalities to analyse the governance landscape and develop a collective governance agenda.
- To improve the relevance, usefulness, quality and value of the SoCR for target audiences.

### The research process

The SACN undertook a preliminary exercise with the City of Ekurhuleni to produce a co-designed and tested research process, which was then applied across eight municipalities.<sup>2</sup> The process comprised the following steps.

1. Gain insights into the broader governance dynamics that most affect the municipal environment, and work with the municipality to identify preliminary projects that could serve as case studies.
2. Test the preliminary projects in the municipal environment and shortlist two to three projects.
3. Test the shortlisted projects in the municipal environment and select one project.
4. Interrogate the project within the municipality.
5. Develop the narrative.
6. Test the narrative within the municipality.
7. Refine the product.
8. Expand the research with insight from actors from different sectors of society outside of the municipality.

---

<sup>2</sup> A different process was used for Cape Town.

The research process was qualitative, inductive and cross-sectional, and required the collection of both primary and secondary data, through desktop studies, interviews, focus groups and surveys.

Given the qualitative and participatory nature of the research process and the interconnectedness of governance concerns, a governance framework was used in which equal weighting was given to issues of cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach, the capability of the state, the political-administrative interface, and values and principles. The aim was to encourage and enable municipalities to engage with the SoCR theme (cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach) broadly and as they saw fit, and to maximise the richness of data collected, reflecting important connections between various governance concerns. This can be seen in the nature and diversity of case studies eventually delivered.

## Critical success factors

The following critical success factors emerged during the implementation of the research process:

- **Onboarding:** Ensure the municipality is adequately onboarded prior to the study, in terms of the required permissions (at the right levels) and that the necessary relationships are in place – and where necessary develop new relationships.
- **Flexibility:** Adapt the research process and data collection methods in response to the research environment to ensure success, without negatively affecting the study's integrity.
- **Champions:** Central to the success of the project are the individual municipal officials, councillors and entities (i.e., units and departments) that were committed to the SACN's research work. Once permission to undertake the research had been granted at the appropriate municipal level (e.g., Office of the City Manager or Mayor), these champions navigated, organised and gained buy-in for the project in the municipal environment, and provided access to necessary resources (e.g., documents, people, facilities).





## LESSONS AND INSIGHTS

# 3

State capability is central to effectively addressing South Africa's development challenges, but achieving the desired development outcomes at the appropriate scale requires collaboration among municipal departments, across spheres of government and with other sectors of society.

### Cooperating across departments and spheres

Integrated service delivery needs cooperation, especially when the different spheres have dual mandates or concurrent functions, or when different municipal departments have interconnected/overlapping mandates or functions. Cooperation, which recognises the individual mandates and harnesses the strengths of different departments and spheres, is essential to effective delivery. In a climate of growing delivery backlogs, evolving needs and a shrinking fiscal space, cooperation can help to fast-track and expand delivery, generating associated lessons and sharing of best practices (even between municipalities). Cities need to build new cooperation platforms and improve existing ones. Such platforms assist in removing blockages to effectively working with other sectors of society, raise the profile of projects in local government and other arenas, and enable concerns beyond the mandates of participants to be addressed.

### Partnering with other sectors of society

Platforms for cooperation among different spheres of government and stakeholders across society help to foreground the importance of developmental local government. An effective partnering mechanism can be used to build on existing partnerships, setting up horizontal networks of partners and actors with clear roles and responsibilities housed within cooperative governance structures. These structures create an environment that enables the understanding, flexibility, creativity, innovation and responsiveness necessary for effective delivery at the local level. Local government must recognise and accept that it is one of many players, and its role is to provide leadership and an enabling environment for establishing partnerships to mobilise the resources and efforts of all stakeholders. Cooperative governance structures advocate collective action, mitigation and problem-solving through continual learning, adaptation and improvement, and enable actors to work to their strengths and organise themselves around a shared vision and a common, specific purpose and objectives. The state's capability to deliver services can be dramatically improved by beginning work using a 'good-enough' approach with a few of the right people from these structures, instead of waiting for complete and 'perfect' plans, data and partnerships to be in place.

Like a network-based approach to partnering, a committee-based governance model can also be effective for external partnering. Cities can use existing local government committee structures, such as ward committees (provided the will and expertise exist to use them correctly). These structures can be used as a primary mechanism for distributing information, communicating and making decisions. Committees at multiple levels act as cascading structures through which information flows top-down and then bottom-up, from departments to executive functions and to communities.

## Working with communities

Communities do not distinguish between different spheres of government. They have the power to hold local government (and by extension other spheres of government) accountable and to prompt the required action. If needed, communities are able to organise, even where structures do not exist, and engage government on matters that affect them. Communities can help local government deliver better services in terms of quality and quantity if they are meaningfully involved in and inform all service delivery stages, even at project or systemic level. Such community involvement must build on and capacitate existing community structures, with the intention of maximising delivery reach and resilience. Communities provide important on-the-ground information about their requirements. Embracing this information brings local government closer to communities and makes it better able to provide needs-based services and to plan based on more accurate data. Communities must be able to exert their power, agency, ownership and leadership in engagement spaces, which must also build mutual trust, respect and accountability, while leveraging community-based resources. With genuine intentions and hard work, collaborating with communities becomes easier and leads to results when combined with an integrated approach across departments/spheres of government and meaningful, transparent stakeholder engagement. It also helps to build a social compact with communities by giving credibility and accountability to the work of government.

## Leveraging intermediaries

Intermediaries can foster collaboration between public, private and civil society actors by facilitating relationships based on mutual trust and respect beyond organisational boundaries. They enable communication, understanding, accountability, transparency, conflict resolution and the sharing of information and experiences. In many instances, these intermediaries are part of networks and systems that local government needs or wants to engage with and are able to offer intelligence (evidence), skills and funding. They also have more leeway to experiment with new approaches and make and learn from mistakes.

## Using evidence and technology

Evidence-based interventions, which have a sound rationale and vision and adequate political buy-in, are more resilient and more likely to continue over the long term, even in conditions of political change. They can also help the political-administrative interface function better and inform development work beyond their mandates; for example, informal settlement upgrading can inform the development of township economies. Partnering with other spheres of government and across sectors of society can assist with collecting additional data. However, while data informs, it is not the goal, and data-led decision-making should not ignore the invaluable, unmeasurable and intangible assets that are relationships and partnerships. Technology can also make data collection easier and more accurate, and improve service delivery directly, but human agency and collaboration are needed to make technology work.



## Harnessing political leadership and support

Local government leadership must be forthright. It must acknowledge and develop a comprehensive plan to overcome challenges, create an enabling municipal environment and be supported by all spheres of government. Effective intergovernmental cooperation requires an aligned and coordinated interface between political and administrative environments across different spheres of government. The interface must be clearly defined, with a clear separation of the roles and responsibilities of councillors and officials. Councillors have an important role to play in raising the profile of projects in municipalities and helping the administration to connect with and understand communities. The municipality is thus able to share information about the objectives, planning and implementation of interventions and how the community can be involved. Councillors can further lend credibility to the work of municipalities, by bringing together different communities, assisting them to find common ground and resolve possible tensions.

## Learning from crisis

A crisis (COVID-19) fostered effective cooperation among spheres of government, which would not have materialised as quickly under ordinary circumstances. These lessons are important, and action should be taken to sustain these gains. In times of crisis, political leadership is essential for harnessing the necessary resources, capacities and skills, including those offered by social networks, and for preventing fraud and corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic presents a unique opportunity to create bold new local government strategy, policy and operating procedures, which not only respond to crises but also anticipate them by responding proactively in various areas going forward.

The pandemic prompted the development of numerous social, technical and organisational innovations along service delivery value chains, which could be extended beyond their initial contexts. For example, innovations to address food insecurity could be applied to the development of township economies. The pandemic also demonstrated the capability, innovation and excellence of local government practitioners, and their willingness to go beyond the call of duty. Going forward, the focus needs to be on building on the emotional intelligence shown by these officials and programme champions, who exemplify a human-centred, empathetic, progressive, flexible and ethical public service. What is also needed is to employ appropriate candidates, address technical skills deficits and enable officials to focus on development outcomes rather than on municipal activities only.

Local government needs to better understand, embrace and find ways to work with different kinds of informality, as the informal economy is important for sustaining people's livelihoods and a critical pathway for growing the inner-city economy. This needs to be recognised post-COVID-19, through devising a more deliberate, committed and consistent approach to supporting people who occupy public spaces, live in sub-adequate shelter or work in the informal economy.



# CITY OF JOHANNESBURG



## A whole-of-government approach to community healthcare

Health is a concurrent function, which means that the mandates of provincial government and local government intersect to deliver services that meet the needs of communities. For years, the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein community had been calling for the upgrading of the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein clinic, which was inadequate for its needs. The City of Johannesburg responded by upgrading the facility to an Ideal Clinic, which was within its mandate, instead of a Community HealthCare Centre (CHC), which the community wanted but which fell within provincial government's mandate. This story highlights how community action and pressure brought the two spheres of government together, resulting in the joint upgrading of the clinic to a CHC.



## OVERVIEW

The Ebony Park/Kaalfontein five-room consultation clinic was inadequate to meet the community's demand for health services in the area. The closest and best alternative (Tembisa Hospital) was difficult and expensive to access, and over-flowed with patients especially when the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein clinic was closed. Therefore, the community asked for the clinic to be upgraded to a CHC that would include a maternity and obstetrics unit and a 24-hour emergency facility. While city officials recognised the community's needs, local government does not have the mandate to build a CHC that provides 24-hour healthcare services (including an emergency facility and maternity and obstetrics unit) – such a facility falls under the mandate of provincial government. The Ideal Clinic that was delivered instead was therefore rejected by the community.

## Community action for healthcare delivery: a timeline of events

The first community calls for an upgraded clinic date back to 1992. By 2013, the clinic had still not been upgraded. The community submitted a petition to the City and invited the Member of the Mayoral Committee (MCC) to visit the local health facility. As a result of these actions, in 2015/16, the city listed the clinic as a medium-term project and allocated a capital budget. After approving the budget and the land, the city began the process to upgrade the clinic. The facilities were designed as an 18-room Ideal Clinic, which provides primary healthcare services and chronic and acute care, but not 24-hour services. At the time, the City and the provincial infrastructure development team were unable to successfully undertake the joint planning of the facility. Instead, a key partner in the development process was the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), which acted as an implementing partner/project manager in the creation of a four-stage prototype clinic infrastructure model.

### TIMELINE OF EVENTS



## From City Ideal Clinic to whole-of-government CHC

Prior to the clinic's completion, a senior city official gave the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein community a progress update. However, when the community realised that the new clinic did not have 24-hour emergency services nor a maternity and obstetrics unit, they refused to accept the clinic. Faced with this community backlash and refusal, a united city leadership contacted the district health leadership, which escalated the issue to the Office of the MEC. As a result, the provincial government issued a letter of intent for partnering with the City to deliver an CHC, and the City and province signed a service-level agreement. The provincial government funded the required structural changes to the facility, which was supervised by the JDA. On 20 February 2020, the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein CHC officially opened. Initially it was jointly run by the City and provincial government, but the City subsequently phased out its involvement, and the provincial government took over running the facility.





### Communities have the power to hold government accountable

The community's action had a catalytic impact on overcoming the poor vertical intergovernmental linkages ingrained in the system. By holding officials accountable for delivery, the community motivated interdepartmental collaboration and the establishment of joint delivery teams. In addition, a positive spinoff from the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein experience was that the community had to organise itself, appoint leadership and create communication structures that fed into formal structures, such as ward committees and the district healthcare committee. By galvanising a unified government response, these grassroots structures gained credibility in the eyes of the community and the government. Over the years that it took to convert the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein Ideal Clinic into a CHC, these community structures have remained strong and active. This shows the importance of engaged and organised community participation for realising the benefits of a responsive and accountable whole-of-government healthcare approach.

### Intergovernmental collaboration is crucial for effective service delivery

The provision of health infrastructure and services is a concurrent function, meaning that it is shared across local and provincial spheres. In fulfilling this function, each sphere of government has its individual strengths. Provincial government has access to financial resources and skills, and has the mandate to deliver 24-hour healthcare facilities, whereas the City has access to on-the-ground intelligence about what communities need. Therefore, collaboration among spheres of government playing to their individual strengths is crucial, especially given growing backlogs, evolving needs and shrinking fiscal space. Moreover, communities do not distinguish between government spheres and expect the state to deliver services as one. In practice, intergovernmental collaboration means joint planning as well as aligning operating systems and procedures, to ensure the holistic delivery of 'one health system' to the required standards and within required timeframes.

### An implementing agent can accelerate delivery

The City's health department used the JDA as an implementing agent. This enabled the City to respond quickly to the community's demands, and to convert the Ebony Park/Kaalfontein Ideal Clinic into a 24-hour CHC. The clinic's conversion required structural changes to be made, which was funded by the provincial health department and supervised by the JDA. Working with the JDA increased efficiencies and reduced delivery timeframes and costs without sacrificing quality. Efficiencies included simplified procurement processes and instant access to quality specialist services. Improved service delivery performance resulted in greater budget allocations, which enabled the health department to expand its infrastructure development programme. The City and the JDA also developed an infrastructure development model that is informed by national standards for primary healthcare facilities and incorporates a 'reflection and learning' process. This model enables the City to initiate and complete an infrastructure project within a five-year budget cycle, and allows it and its partners to avoid overlapping mandates and duplication. Nevertheless, the City has recognised that the model needs to include more community engagement, especially during the project pre-planning and planning phases. The JDA has a facilitation unit, which could be brought on board to improve community consultation processes and engagements.

## Integrated action needed to enhance development outcomes

Planning for health facilities should form an integral part of human settlements planning, and the health department should be involved in designing, planning and implementing infrastructure projects. Although the City has integrated strategic planning and prioritisation mechanisms in place (e.g., an annual integrated strategic planning session that includes city departments and municipal-owned entities), closer cooperation is needed between the City's health and human settlements departments. Greater involvement of the City's health department in spatial planning discussions would contribute to strengthening its ability to provide services and to plan for the identification of spaces for the construction of CHCs in a timely manner.



## Need for recognition of the effects of limited local government mandates on service delivery

The initial failure to deliver what the community needed was not due to a lack of communication among the various parties. There was communication between the City and the community, between the City and provincial government (although not very effective) and between the city officials and politicians. The City was willing to listen to the community to understand their needs and to work with the provincial government to deliver what the community needed but was constrained by its limited mandate that did not extend to providing 24-hour services. Although local government does not have the resources to address all community needs, especially those of under-served, marginalised urban communities, it often bears the brunt of citizens' dissatisfaction with service delivery. A better understanding is needed of the barriers that limited mandates pose to local government service delivery and the importance of intergovernmental collaboration in overcoming them.

## The effects of challenges in the political-administrative interface on integrated service delivery

Over the course of time, challenges with the workings of the political-administrative interface at various levels hampered progress on the delivery of a CHC. For instance, the provincial infrastructure team was not involved in jointly planning the healthcare facility. Usually, this sort of challenge can be escalated to the District Health Council (DHC), which is chaired by the MMC for Health and embodies the political-administrative interface. Local and provincial government are connected through the DHC and the Provincial Health Council, which is chaired by the Provincial MEC for Health. However, at the time of the initial planning of the clinic, the DHC was not fully operational due to political changes. This may have affected the operations of key provincial planning structures, leading the City to proceed on its own. Subsequent actions by a united city leadership led to the successful escalation of the issue to the Office of the MEC, resulting in the provincial government issuing a letter of intent for partnering with the City to deliver a CHC. This demonstrates the importance of an aligned political-administrative interface in providing integrated service delivery and cooperation in joint operations.





# CITY OF TSHWANE

## A 'network governance' approach to community substance use

The Community Oriented Substance Use Programme (COSUP) is an evidence-based, community-oriented programme, which provides substance-use health and care services to local communities in the greater Tshwane area. Designed and implemented through a core partnership between the City of Tshwane, the University of Pretoria and local communities, the multi-disciplinary programme operates through a network of co-created partnerships with a broad spectrum of actors. Delving into the working arrangements between these various actors and their evolution over time provides the lens for exploring the power of cooperative governance across the service delivery value chain.



### OVERVIEW

A rise in substance use places services (health, police, homeless shelters) under pressure and undermines social cohesion. Anecdotal evidence had shown an increase in heroin trafficking, drug availability and drug-related treatment admissions in Tshwane, which was of concern to both politicians and city health officials. Building on Tshwane's role as South Africa's research and development hub and government centre and the strategic pillars set out in its "Tshwane 2030 vision" the City set out to find a practical, accessible, affordable and science-based response to the reduction of the incidence of drug dependency and its burden on society. This led to the establishment of the Community Oriented Substance Use Programme (COSUP) in 2015, through a partnership between the City of Tshwane, the University of Pretoria and local communities. Connected by a common purpose and intention, the COSUP partnership was successfully rolled out in the following years in collaboration with a co-created network of government and societal actors. COSUP's strengths and versatility were brought to the fore when the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a country-wide lockdown. In 2020, the COSUP network was extended for another three years.

## The co-creation of COSUP

Health officials and politicians in the City of Tshwane were concerned about the rise in drug use in the city and its negative repercussions for people's wellbeing. In May 2015, this concern caused the Mayoral Committee (Mayco) to ask the Department of Health and Social Development (DHSD) for a targeted evidence-based programme to address drug and substance use in communities. As the city had a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the University of Pretoria (UP), health officials approached the university to conduct an analysis of drug and substance use in the city. Based on the research findings, the DHSD requested UP to submit a proposal for an evidence-based, harm-reduction approach to substance abuse, which was done in November and approved by Mayco in December 2015. The city then signed a service level agreement (SLA) with UP for implementing COSUP in the greater Tshwane area. By mid-2019, COSUP had 17 functional and viable sites, including 12 drop-in centres where community members could access ablution facilities, food, computers, psycho-social services and safe spaces for socialising. Following this success, the COSUP intervention was extended for another three years from 1 July 2020.

## Network governance model

### CORE NETWORK PARTNERS



The COSUP uses a network governance model, which balances flexibility and agility and a 'containing structure', in which each core network partner fulfils its own role. The City of Tshwane is responsible for programmatic monitoring, oversight and reporting, and managing the community development workers (CDWs) who support COSUP sites. UP is responsible for the day-to-day operation of COSUP sites, which includes site support (e.g., data collection) and oversight, education, research and training activities. Community engagement is ingrained in the COSUP organisational DNA, based on the 'nothing about us without us' mantra and collaboration with peer educators and community advisory groups. The core COSUP network partners collaborate with a broad spectrum of actors and institutions, while organisations in the network share resources (e.g., information, skills), provide training and referrals, and debate ideas for creative problem-solving. Linkages are encouraged among the homeless, sex workers, law enforcement, substance users and service providers in healthcare, education, skills development and mental health. Other key partners include the provincial health department, national and provincial social development departments, the Central Drug Authority, ward councillors, regional drug action committees and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). COSUP governance practices reflect the four hallmark features of a network governance model: reciprocal



interdependence, as members have a strong and common goal that can be attained only through working together; a high level of mutual trust and respect, regular communication and commitment; a horizontal structure of interdependent actors who have operational autonomy and share power; and a self-regulating system in which decisions are negotiated by the network.

## COSUP, the homeless and COVID-19

COSUP's strengths and versatility were brought to the fore when the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a country-wide lockdown, which meant that the city had to accommodate all homeless people. Recognising the need for skilled people to treat homeless people who were substances users and would go into withdrawal with no access to drugs, the city asked COSUP to assist. The experience highlighted the value of the partnership between the city, UP and other actors. Everyone knew each other, which made it easier for all the teams to work together and provide services to shelters and other places of safety. Partners provided resources, which meant that resources did not have to be taken from city clinics. Almost double the usual number of clients were assisted with withdrawal and associated health issues. The overriding lesson was that being in a safe and stable environment makes it easier for substance users to access multifaceted services, thus improving retention.



## GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS

---

### Network governance can enhance state capability

A capable state is one that is well organised, resourced and competent. The City of Tshwane displays most of these characteristics, with a dedicated core team of officials who have a deep understanding of the city's socioeconomic challenges, as reflected in the five strategic pillars that underpin the Tshwane 2030 vision. However, City officials also realised that drug use is a complex social issue with multiple causes and impacts and that achieving its strategic objectives demanded a high level of resources, specialised skills and knowledge. This insight motivated officials and politicians to co-create a network of partners to deliver a targeted community-orientated drug use programme. COSUP's success has helped people overcome their initial aversion to a harm-reduction approach, and the demand for COSUP services is currently greater than the programme's capacity. The Tshwane story highlights how the municipality's ability to initiate, establish and participate in cross-sectoral partnerships and programme implementation has enhanced its capacity to deliver services. COVID-19 brought to the fore the value of a network governance model as the existing multi-disciplinary engagement between the City and its partners allowed teams to work together and continue providing services, thereby meeting the expectations of citizens.

### The importance of clear roles and responsibilities for effective collaboration

COSUP works because the partners have clear roles and responsibilities. All partners agree that COSUP is a city initiative. It is supported by both the political and administrative arms of local government, with officials guiding and monitoring the programme's implementation in line with the city's strategic objectives. The UP provides specialist knowledge and skills and assists in building a strong evidence base. Community members are active players in the programme and are essential for building trust with beneficiaries and referring them to COSUP's services. Active community engagement builds mutual trust and respect, gives meaning to the adage 'nothing about us without us', and enables interventions to be redefined and adjusted to respond to local conditions. NGOs are also involved in delivering the programme, although COSUP recognises the need to include them more. It has also recognised the need for stronger intergovernmental collaboration between the City and provincial government.



## The power of an evidence-based approach during times of political change

COSUP takes a holistic, evidence-based ('practice with science'), harm-reduction approach to public health and is based on the principles of community-oriented primary care. A solid evidence base, combined with a cooperative approach, is crucial for getting support from all political parties, even when there are political changes in municipal leadership. At the start of COSUP, all political parties were fully informed of the project, enabling them to get support from their constituencies for the programme. This meant that, when the political administration changed, the new administration did not need convincing about the project, as they had supported it before they were in power. The evidence-based approach also contributed to a symbiosis between official and political role players, with the city's political and administrative components functioning as one in relation to COSUP. This illustrates the importance of both an evidence-based approach for a programme's long-term continuity, and a functioning political-administrative interface for enabling cooperative governance.

## LEARNINGS

### The strength of a dynamic implementing partnership

The COSUP partnership is flexible, agile and responsive to the implementing environment, facilitating collective dialogue, understanding, insight development, problem-solving and innovation. It is able to manoeuvre as needed through rapid, horizontal communication, has the required reach and resilience, can enable structured and evidence-based collaboration, and can learn and adapt. Flexibility and agility require a 'containing structure', but also a flexible working relationship in which roles and responsibilities of actors can morph. Therefore, an organisation needs to find the best balance between these seemingly opposing forces. A network governance model represents this balance, as existing relationships can bring partners on board efficiently and in a way that enables everyone to play to their strengths, while expanding their footprint.

### The role of university as intermediary

An intermediary, such as a university, comes with additional benefits, providing access to cutting-edge science, and having a reputation of being well-governed. The key advantage of using an intermediary organisation is that it instantly 'plugs' the city into a broader, existing and well-functioning system, which has a wide range of specialist professional, knowledge and infrastructure resources that can be used in delivering a programme such as COSUP. An intermediary such as UP also has connections to external knowledge resources, where they can showcase programme successes, learn from others, experiment with less conventional approaches, and learn from mistakes.

### The importance of integration with existing structures and processes

COSUP was designed based on building and capacitating existing structures in communities. Where possible, COSUP sites blend in with existing physical infrastructure, so that services are accessible to community members. The programme also operates within established city structures and processes, such as steering committees, task teams and oversight forums, while engaging with communities either through ward committee channels or NGOs. However, there is still scope for improving the programme's integration across sectors and with public primary healthcare facilities, and for extending its reach to vulnerable substance users in society, such as women.





# CITY OF EKURHULENI



## A committee-based governance model to informal settlement reblocking

To address a growing housing backlog in line with its pro-poor agenda, in 2015 the City of Ekurhuleni launched its Reblocking Programme. The programme represents a multi-layered approach to the decongestion of informal settlements through the rearrangement of dwellings and the installation of basic infrastructures, in order to create a safe, serviceable and habitable environment. Central to the programme is the use of a committee-based governance model, through which the city and communities have become partners in reblocking. This story illustrates the benefits of such a model for the management of informal settlements, and how it has evolved from an interim short-term solution to a systemic solution for solving the challenges arising from urban informality.



THERE ARE

**119** INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS:  
**67** ON MUNICIPAL LAND AND THE  
REST ON PRIVATE LAND.



BY 2020,

**35** INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS  
ON MUNICIPAL LAND HAD  
UNDERGONE REBLOCKING.



THE CITY OF EKURHULENI'S  
TARGET IS TO UPGRADE  
**15** INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS  
PER YEAR.



## OVERVIEW

Like many other South Africa metropolitan municipalities, the City of Ekurhuleni faces a growing housing backlog. Insufficient affordable, formal housing options have resulted in low-intensity land invasions and the mushrooming of informal settlements. These settlements are often located on unsuitable sites, are congested and lack basic infrastructure and access to services, resulting in health, fire, security and socioeconomic risks. The City's long-term Growth and Development Strategy 2055 (GDS 2055) highlights its pro-poor agenda, which includes "the provision of liveable spaces where people have dignity" as one priority catalytic project. In line with this agenda, in October 2015, the City launched its Reblocking Programme, which involves the decongestion of informal settlements

through rearranging dwellings and installing basic infrastructures. The programme covers all of the city's wards, which contain a total of 119 informal settlements, of which 67 are located on municipal land and the rest on private land. By 2020, 35 informal settlements located on municipal land had undergone reblocking. The city's target is to upgrade 15 informal settlements per year.

## A committee-based governance model

Reblocking activities cut across departmental boundaries and affect external stakeholders. Therefore, a prerequisite for successful reblocking is a multi-layered decision-making process that can gather and assimilate disparate information from many sources. The City of Ekurhuleni chose a committee-based governance model as the primary mechanism for distributing information, communication and decision-making for the project. This model consists of three core committee types, which are cascading structures through which information flows top-down and then bottom-up, from departments to executive functions to communities. The three committee types include:

- Technical-delivery committees (e.g., the Informal Settlement Task Team) are multidisciplinary teams whose focus is ensuring interdepartmental integrated and coordinated implementation.
- Executive-oversight committees (e.g., Infrastructure Services Technical Cluster Committee, Human Settlements Portfolio Committee, Special Mayoral Project Meeting) focus on oversight and unblocking bottlenecks.
- Grassroots committees (e.g., Ward Committee, Local Area Committee and community-based committees) ensure community participation and gather insight into on-the-ground conditions.

## Reblocking in practice

In practice, reblocking is a four-stage process, involving pre-planning, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Although each reblocking project has the same structures and processes, the scale and complexity of the reblocking exercise and the level of stakeholder participation across the four different stages are determined by the characteristics of each informal settlement. This means that a universal, standard governance narrative for reblocking at the programmatic level does not exist. However, the committee model represents an important tool for galvanising community participation around a shared goal, where the City and communities become partners through co-creation and co-ownership of reblocking. Key benefits of reblocking through a committee-based approach include:

- The generation of baseline data from which to move households up the service delivery ladder, allowing the City to manage urban growth more proactively and strategically.
- The provision of access to resources (such as water, electricity and transport), representing a catalyst for more vibrant communities.
- The stabilisation of the City's funding because it reduces illegal connections, increases the demand for services and improves the City's ability to bill for services.

Post-implementation, the City's motivation for reblocking evolved from an interim short-term solution to a systemic solution for solving the challenges arising from urban informality. Currently, reblocking enjoys a high level of political support in the City, with the Mayor and Member of the Mayoral Committee (MMC) for Human Settlements regularly engaging with communities on substantive issues. In addition, the profile of reblocking was raised across departments by the leadership of Strategy and Planning and the creation of a monthly multi-disciplinary task team. As a result, the City is unified around making reblocking work and driving its implementation going forward. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic further added impetus for accelerating reblocking, especially de-densification and the delivery of better-quality, more accessible water and sanitation services.





### Communities can enhance state capacity for service delivery

A key characteristic of the reblocking process is the high degree of community involvement at all stages. Communities are, for example, involved in all major design aspects, such as infrastructure, social services, and employment-generation programmes. In doing so, communities become active role players within local government, exerting their power while providing important on-the-ground information about their requirements. This contributes to bringing the City closer to the community and enhancing the City's capacity to provide informed and needs-based services and to plan based on more accurate data. Central to fostering this capacity going forward will be to continue to facilitate active community involvement, buy-in, co-ownership, agency and leadership; create a space for communities to be educated, consulted, empowered; and leverage community-based resources including existing social networks.

### Importance of mutual trust and understanding for collaboration

The City has earned respect from stakeholders for its hard work and genuine intention to deliver on its pro-poor agenda by tackling a complex and challenging problem, so people can live in a more human and dignified manner. The city's participatory approach (treating communities as partners) has also helped to build trust with communities because it empowers communities to have a voice and play an active role in improving the quality of their lives. Taken together, the approach and delivery have strengthened the social compact between the city and communities, by creating a greater sense of accountability and credibility, because communities can see that the city's pro-poor agenda is not just words but rather action, and they can see the benefits. As the demand for reblocking increases, it will be important for the City to maintain these relationships and, by ensuring transparency and accountability and guaranteeing that informal settlement selection criteria is applied consistently and transparently, to avoid selection being politicised and protect reblocking from any partisan interests.



### Importance of an effective political-administrative interface

The political-administrative interface is important, not only to ensure that the reblocking programme enjoys the priority it deserves in planning and budgeting processes, but for the city's political and administrative elements to work together to achieve the programme's objectives. Political role players have an important role in connecting with communities, to better understand the needs of communities through engaging with ward committees, to share information with communities regarding the objectives of reblocking and to determine how they will be involved in programme planning and implementation. Hence, working arrangements for reblocking depend on strong interdepartmental collaboration and political-administrative interface. In this regard, the MMC plays an important role in mobilising support from affected communities as well as through their councillors, so that the oversight and roll-out of the project is directed properly, while the ward councillor is central to bringing together different communities and resolving possible tensions among different neighbourhoods.



## LEARNINGS

### Working with the reality of informality requires ‘good enough’ and incremental processes

When reblocking was first implemented, formalised project management practices were not yet in place, making interdepartmental coordination difficult. However, the City moved ahead by incrementally implementing a ‘good enough’ planning and process, with a focus on a known end point rather than finalised micro-level planning procedures. This is a productive approach, as in practice working with urban informality is not a linear process but requires managing ambiguity and building partnerships with communities. Central to the success of this approach is good communication, coordination and systemisation processes that support working in an agile manner, together with an openness to ongoing reflection, learning and experimentation.

### The potential of reblocking for facilitating wider socioeconomic development

The reblocking process assists the City in collecting data for informing service delivery; breaking down illegal practices associated with informal settlements (e.g., illegal electricity connections); and communicating the higher-level objectives associated with reblocking (e.g., social justice). Reblocking focuses on providing a basic service but could, for example, be used as a tool to improve socioeconomic options for communities by promoting informal markets. For instance, there is an opportunity to link reblocking and township economy interventions (e.g., roll-out of Wi-Fi) and to involve communities in areas with greater potential for skills transfer.

### Fast-tracking local progress through stronger intergovernmental coordination

While reblocking focuses strongly on local cooperation it also includes elements of intergovernmental collaboration (local, provincial and national government), with all three government spheres working together to achieve their different objectives. Given the importance of spatial justice, together with reblocking’s shorter term gains, of more liveable conditions and enhanced dignity, calls have been made for stronger intergovernmental coordination around the practice of reblocking. Such coordination would support the fast-tracking of local progress on reblocking and associated benefits and learnings. It could also facilitate the application of this approach in other cities that are in need of short-term interventions to facilitate safer and more liveable neighbourhoods.





# ETHEKWINI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY



## A multi-stakeholder response to homelessness during the COVID-19 pandemic

This case study shines a spotlight on the City of eThekweni's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular to the homeless during Level 5 lockdown in March and April 2020. The activation of a multi-stakeholder Task Team on Homelessness and other coordinating bodies illustrates how the municipal leadership and staff were able to mobilise its partners and stakeholders quickly and creatively, engage with other government spheres and unlock its own resources at a crucial time. As such, this story not only shows how the City and its staff and partners contributed to improving the health and wellbeing of the city's homeless, but also provides insights and lessons to build on in a post-COVID-19 world.





## OVERVIEW

Like other South African cities, eThekweni Municipality was faced with an unprecedented crisis at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered a nationwide lockdown beginning in March 2020. With national government being in emergency mode, pressure mounted on local governments to come up with rapid decisions and interventions to alleviate the socioeconomic consequences that emerged from the enforcement of the lockdown at the local level.

### Setting up coordinating bodies

The municipality quickly established the Joint Operations Centre and the COVID-19 War Room, as well as a Multi-Disciplinary Task Team (MDTT), to provide technical expertise aimed at preventing the spread of COVID-19, managing risk and communications, and implementing War Room recommendations. In the MDTT, stakeholders were equal partners able to monitor and solve problems. It also established the City Budget Forum, an innovative cooperative governance support mechanism that successfully brought together multiple government stakeholders working across different spheres and sectors. Through this vehicle, process issues were translated into regulations that were implemented and contributed to functional intergovernmental cooperation.

### Assisting the homeless through multi-stakeholder partnerships

To coordinate an integrated response to the specific needs of the homeless during lockdown, the Deputy Mayor activated the City's existing Task Team on Homelessness, which had been in place before the pandemic. This Task Team brought together city officials from different municipal departments, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and universities to provide services to the homeless. This involved the identification of 13 safe spaces across the city, which were equipped with ablution facilities, basic shelter and hygiene packs. The safe spaces included mobile clinics that screened and tested for tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS. They also offered wound care, referrals to local hospitals and psychiatric services (from one of Durban's leading psychiatrists). The Metro Police was brought in from the onset and played an instrumental role in the overall successful management of the sites through its human-rights approach to the homeless. Taken together, the response was so effective that the consequence was a significant improvement in the health and wellbeing of the homeless at the designated sites.





### Effective political leadership is invaluable in times of crisis

Central to the activation of the Task Team on Homelessness was the role of the City's political leadership, illustrating the importance of politicians in harnessing the necessary resources, capacities and skills in times of crisis. As the head of the Executive Committee (EXCO), the Mayor was able to mobilise funding that even senior managers or other ward or PR councillors would not have been able to do. In addition, the political leadership exercised important symbolic capital by being visible and active at the sites with the frontline actors, which had a major impact on other stakeholders and helped inspire confidence and credibility in the partnership. Through asserting the rights of the homeless, the Mayor and Deputy-Mayor made an important statement not only to homeless people but to others in the city. In doing so, the leadership was also able to mobilise important social capital, by activating networks, which themselves unlocked more, much-needed resources. Going forward, the value of effective political leadership in responding to challenges at the city level should be recognised and supported.

### The city as an enabler of multi-stakeholder collaboration

The municipality is only one player that needs to work in concert with others, and its role is to provide an enabling environment, so each stakeholder can mobilise their respective resources. The horizontal cooperation between local government and its civil society partners showed that genuine stakeholder partnerships can yield developmental outcomes. For municipal officials, the coordinated and integrated homeless response to the pandemic, achieved only through working in partnership, had a major impact. An important factor in the success of the response was that the City was able to build on the Task Team on Homelessness which had been in place before the pandemic and that there was awareness and recognition of the roles to be played by each partner. The municipality's role is to provide leadership and create an environment that allows each of the partners to be able to take action. Going forward it is important for the City to build on its role as an enabler, not a 'provider' of stakeholder engagement.



### The pandemic as a catalyst for intergovernmental cooperation

The pandemic resulted in alliances and cooperation among spheres of government that would not have materialised as quickly under ordinary circumstances. Mechanisms such as the City Budget Forum represent an innovative cooperative governance support mechanism, which successfully brought together multiple government stakeholders working in different spheres and across sectors through the National Treasury's City Support Programme. This forum became an important mechanism that could be a powerful platform for building financial sustainability and addressing the city's major socioeconomic needs beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. It illustrates the importance of building on the insights from the emergence of such mechanisms in response to crisis and sustaining their function to promote long-term intergovernmental relations.



# LEARNINGS

## Learning from crisis as opportunity

While the pandemic revealed challenges within the municipal system and wider intergovernmental system, it also provided an opportunity for introspection about how to build a municipality able to respond to the ‘new normal’. Municipalities need to think about changing everyday practice and embedding the ‘new normal’, to prepare for other crises (health, environmental, resource or unrest) that will require them to respond and collaborate differently with multiple stakeholders on a much more continuous basis. As such, COVID-19 presents a unique opportunity to create bold new strategy, policy and operating procedures, which not only respond to crisis but also anticipate forward planning for the municipality to respond proactively in various areas. This is illustrated by the creation of a platform for transversal thinking about long-term strategy as one of the offshoots from the Multi-Disciplinary Task Team. Including a reflection on the lessons learned from the City’s COVID-19 response in its next Integrated Development Plan (IDP) would represent a further opportunity to integrate multi-stakeholder approaches in addressing issues of sustainability and resilience going forward.

## Building on excellence

The eThekweni response to the homeless during the pandemic appeared to challenge the dominant narrative, that a typical South African municipality lacks the necessary skills, capacity and work ethic to respond effectively. Instead, in its response to the pandemic, many City officials showed capability, innovation, excellence and a willingness to go beyond the call of duty during this crucial time. Going forward, the focus needs to be on building on the emotional intelligence shown by these officials and programme champions as an example of what human-centred, empathetic, progressive, flexible and ethical public service looks like. This would be in addition to employing appropriate candidates, addressing technical skills deficits and enabling officials to focus on development outcomes rather than on municipal activities only. Officials must embrace the notion of being civil servants who are committed to serving the public interest, while acknowledging the strengths of different stakeholders and enabling shared decision-making and assessments. This also requires leadership support for the creation of an enabling municipal system, which supports creativity and innovation, and rewards excellence.

## The need to rethink approaches to informality

The city’s engagement with the homeless in response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed a need to focus on the impact of COVID-19 on informal workers and to rethink existing approaches to informality. The informal economy is not only important for sustaining people’s livelihoods, but also represents a critical pathway for growing the inner-city economy and could make a very real contribution in assisting the municipality in its interventions and relieving its economic burdens. Hence, post-COVID, it would be important to build on this recognition and devise a more consistent approach and commitment to supporting individuals who occupy public spaces and other people living in sub-adequate shelter or working in the inner-city’s informal economy.

Several strategies have already been put in place to help rebuild this fragile economy, including a six-month rent waiver on informal trading stalls and a zero increase in rentals over the next financial year. Other aspects of the city’s post-COVID economy recovery plan involve supporting tourism and industrialisation; accelerating radical socioeconomic transformation; speeding up construction, infrastructure and investment projects; and operationalising a socioeconomic fund that is being championed by the Mayor.





# CITY OF CAPE TOWN



## An all-of-society approach to the COVID-19 food crisis

On 26 March 2020, South Africa entered a hard COVID-19-related lockdown that resulted in the closure of national government food relief distribution channels, exacerbating the Western Cape's chronic food insecurity problem. In response, the provincial government, local government, civil society, individuals and the private sector came together and mobilised their resources. This story highlights how an all-of-society approach came into action in the Cape Town city-region, and how the food crisis became an opportunity for social, organisational and technological innovation.



### OVERVIEW


The national hard lockdown had an immediate and severe impact on the livelihoods of poor communities. Overnight, informal activities ceased and formal businesses stopped trading. At the same time, the national food relief system was shut down, as it was not designed to accommodate an unforeseen event such as the COVID-19 pandemic, with its hygiene and social distancing requirements. Many food relief channels were suspended or reduced, including the National School Nutrition Programme (NSNP) and Community Nutrition and Development Centres (CNDs). But as national relief channels closed, the demand for food spiked, exacerbating the existing food insecurity problem in the Western Cape. Although national government introduced various measures to alleviate socioeconomic hardships, their implementation was delayed. To fill the food gap, civil society, government and the private sector took action, leading to the organic emergence of an all-of-society approach to address the food crisis.



## An all-of-society approach to the food crisis

The first responder was civil society, which marshalled resources and established food distribution networks. Community Action Networks (CANs) sprang up organically to address immediate community needs. Cape Town Together (CTT), a self-organised volunteer network, formed to connect the CANs and individuals in communities in the Cape Town metropole. On 30 March 2020, the Economic Development Partnership (EDP), an intermediary organisation, convened an online session between CAN representatives and the Premier of the Western Cape, at which parties agreed to work together to coordinate food-relief efforts. Subsequently, the Food Relief Forum (FRF) was established as a government-led mechanism for coordinating resources and mobilising actors. On 23 April 2020, the FRF held its inaugural meeting, which was attended by CANs, the City of Cape Town (COCT) and the Western Cape government (WCG). By mid-May 2020, the Forum was fully operational, providing meals and distributing food parcels with the support of macro-level aggregators such as the Solidarity Fund, a national initiative which worked with two logistics companies to source, pack and deliver food to local organisations, and private corporations which were actively involved in providing food parcels or making donations to intermediary organisations for distribution to grassroots 'last mile' structures.

### FOOD NETWORK ACTORS



## Towards a long-term strategy to addressing food insecurity

From July 2020, the FRF noticed a decline in the need for emergency food relief. As the country entered partial lockdown, national food relief programmes started operating again, and emergency grants were reaching recipients. By October 2020, the FRF mandate had changed, shifting to balancing short-term interventions and long-term strategies in the food system. The FRF's work led to the establishment of the Western Cape Food Systems Working Group, a transversal, multi-sectoral forum that explores ways of addressing food insecurity through evidence-based, coordinated learning and action.





### Intermediaries can foster mutual understanding, trust and accountability

The EDP played a crucial role in bringing together public, private and civil society actors throughout the food crisis. It convened and facilitated the non-governmental organisation (NGO) WCG Food Relief Coordination Forum, participated in intergovernmental committees and dialogues and was key to unlocking the catalytic role played by civil society in marshalling resources from diverse groups and establishing food distribution networks. This illustrates the value of intermediary organisations and how they can contribute to collaboration by bringing actors together and helping build relationships based on mutual respect and trust. Intermediaries ‘bridge the gap’, encouraging partners to work across siloes and beyond institutional mandates; keeping communication channels open and active; ensuring that information and experiences are shared; and mediating conflict situations. They can also connect two different systems in a way that allows them to co-exist and complement each other: bureaucratic, hierarchical government (providing on the ground insights) and flexible, informal NGOs and community organisations (helping to better understand and navigate the government system and overcome any related challenges).

### State capability as key to addressing food insecurity at scale

The WCG stepped in as the most active public sector actor in providing food relief. This was followed by local municipalities with actions that cut across the food relief system, including: mobilising and distributing resources at the macro level; working with large aggregators delivering supplies to provincial warehouses; partnering with civil society in communities that operated kitchens or provided parcels; operating feeding schemes at schools; and setting up Wi-Fi hotspots in communities. However, despite this herculean effort in partnership with civil society, provincial government and municipalities distributed only a fraction of food compared to national government’s food relief programmes under normal pre-COVID circumstances. This shows that there is no substitute for national government’s food relief programmes, as implementing feeding programmes at scale requires the national state’s capacity. However, the Cape Town experience shows that other spheres of government and the private sector have an important role to play in the effective roll-out of food interventions.

### The importance of intergovernmental collaboration

The provincial government played a key role in driving the Western Cape food relief network, partly building on its experience in distributing food aid. While local government also stepped in, their involvement in food security has been minimal because of mandate issues. However, the involvement of municipalities in food security is crucial because, unlike other spheres of government, they have comprehensive local insight and are caretakers of the resources necessary to empower food security among communities. Newly created structures such as an internal government planning committee, which include the COCT, municipal districts, seven provincial departments, and the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) represent examples of organisational innovation and mechanisms for the creation of a food relief system that is anchored in collaboration across governmental spheres. Going forward, it will be key for the national government to work with these food networks, and for parties to re-imagine a new food relief system that draws on the reach and scale of the state apparatus, but uses the network governance model that evolved in the Western Cape.

## Building on innovative practices to advance local economic development

The COVID-19 experience revealed structural flaws in South Africa's food system and was the impetus for developing innovative practices to address food insecurity. The FRF found that food parcels do serve a purpose under certain conditions. However, they are not an optimal food-relief solution, due to numerous composition and distribution challenges, and are not a sustainable means of addressing food insecurity in communities. Alternative practices introduced include digital vouchers for community kitchens that could be used to purchase food and (later) electricity and data, rolling out Wi-Fi hotspots and encouraging communities and community practitioners to harness their agency to find solutions. Building on these innovative practices does not just allow for a more sustainable approach to addressing food insecurity, but also represents an opportunity to develop local township economies in ways that harness and contribute to social, cultural and organisational capital and cohesion, and crowding resources into communities.

## The importance of an inclusionary approach to informality

Informal socioeconomic activities are central to township economies and meeting the needs of vulnerable communities. However, these contributions are not sufficiently understood. As a result, the compliance-based public sector regulatory environment is ill-equipped to direct public resources to informal and unregistered entities, which means that its interventions are often unable to reach the people being targeted. Important opportunities exist for civil society to work with government, bridging the gap between the public and informal sector. For instance, CANs in Cape Town facilitated a buddy system that enabled informal, unregistered CBOs to link with formalised and registered NGOs. Central to exploring long-term opportunities and partnerships, which build on this inclusionary approach to informality, is a better understanding of the workings of the informal sector on the part of the public sector. This will require understanding the risk-reward relationship associated with allocating resources and, in turn, the development of tools that measure intangible assets and the opportunity costs of no action.

## An adaptive approach to cooperative governance and decision-making

The FRF illustrates how a cooperative governance network model works in practice based on an all-of-society approach to collaboration. Central to this approach is recognising that collective action and problem-solving require continuous learning and adaptation, and the creation of a flexible, creative and enabling environment for partners. This means that adaptive organisations respond better than hierarchical organisations to societal problems. What is important is for actors to work to their strengths and organise themselves around a shared vision and a common specific purpose, rather than around institutional structures and mandates. Furthermore, instead of waiting for complete and 'perfect' plans, data and partnerships to be in place, begin the work with a 'good enough' approach that is continually improved upon and undertaken with a few of the right people. Such an approach also enables the more effective use of data and technology by people with a shared purpose. Data informs but is not the goal, and data-led decision-making can result in invaluable, unmeasurable and intangible assets being ignored, such as relationships and partnerships. Technology can make data collection easier and more accurate, but human agency and collaboration is needed to make technology work.





# NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY



## Improving ease of doing business through e-MAMS



### OVERVIEW

This case study explores the importance of effective planning application processes for small businesses. Delays in processing land development applications have an impact on investment attraction and business expansion and growth, and are key indicators for the ease of doing business within a region. To improve planning processes and related communication and cooperation with the local business community, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) has introduced an Electronic Municipal Application Management System (e-MAMS), which includes the Electronic Land Applications Management System (e-LAMS) and the Electronic Building Plans Application Management System (e-BPAMS). The introduction of these systems represents an important mechanism to address existing shortfalls in the City's land-use application processes, which were exacerbated by closure and disruptions caused by COVID-19.

### The importance of an effective land application system

Planning decisions are a key municipal function and require input from several internal departments. For years, such cross-departmental collaboration was hampered in the NMBM. This contributed to delays in approvals and a backlog of queries on planning applications. In 2020, the COVID-19 lockdown resulted in the closure of many City departments, causing further delays. A survey of the local business community conducted between 2019 and 2020 had already highlighted the significant impact of such delays on business viability and operations, illustrating how ineffective land application systems can affect a city's attractiveness for investment, business expansion and growth.

## Introduction of the e-MAMS pilot project


To improve application processes, the municipality introduced e-MAMS, which includes the Electronic Land Application Management System (e-LAMS) and the Electronic Building Plans Application Management System (e-BPAMS). This electronic system replaces the paper-based system, which had resulted in high workloads for staff, and opportunities for political interference and influence over applications by city officials and for applicants to bypass the system, resulting in decreased revenue from application fees and increased expenditure on law enforcement (to follow up on uncontrolled building and land developments).

The e-MAMS system provides a platform that enables the integration of city planning systems and the automation/digitisation of submissions, workflows and decision-making, with a step-by-step process that highlights fields to be completed, reducing the number of incomplete applications and associated delays. It also offers a document management system and can be integrated into performance management systems. Phase 1 of e-MAMS includes the e-LAMS and e-BPAMS functions. Applications can be submitted online, after which notifications of progress are sent to the applicants via email and SMS. Officials can track and extract current information related to the applications. The system also includes 'checkpoints' in the process to allow for authorised sign-off.



Taken together, this system brings benefits in four areas: people, data, processes and systems.

### ANTICIPATED BENEFITS OF E-MAMS







## LEARNINGS

### Towards stakeholder engagement in a post-COVID-19 city


The COVID-19 lockdown had a significant negative impact on municipal planning processes, budgets, timeframes, priorities and compliance reporting on project funding. At the same time, learning from this impact and the ways that were found to overcome it may offer important opportunities for significant shifts in focus, methods of working and approaches to political instability in the post-COVID-19 city. The practicalities of keeping the local authority working during the COVID-19 lockdown have been significant and unprecedented. The ways in which the local authority had to engage with civil society, communities and business during the lockdown, illustrate an important positive 'shift in focus' and way forward in future engagements.

### Importance of intergovernmental collaboration to support local businesses

While more streamlined internal processes of coordination are central to improving the effectiveness of service delivery, collaboration between local and national government spheres is just as important. As legislation around spatial planning and land use management as well as around business largely sit with national government, national regulations can create obstacles for businesses that are beyond the scope of the local authority. There is therefore a need for more engagements between the municipality and national government around business regulations in support of local businesses.

### Importance of sharing best practices for improving the ease of doing business

The experiences of the private sector differ from metro to metro, based on existing local processes, political leadership, staff capacity, technological systems and the ability to make decisions efficiently. South African cities have been slow to institute regulatory reforms to improve the ease of doing business, and yet such reforms can produce significant results. For example, by automating municipal processes, Mangaung Municipality was able to reduce the time taken to transfer property. The NMBM also improved its processes for getting electricity. As per a World Bank suggestion, metros will need to focus on improving lesson-sharing, learning from the best practices of other municipalities to improve their performance.





# BUFFALO CITY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY



An all-of-society approach to unlocking the economic potential of the Port of East London



## OVERVIEW

The Port of East London represents a major economic node and a strategic asset to the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM). Together with the Mercedes Benz South Africa complex, the East London Industrial Development Zone (ELIDZ) and airport, the port has been recognised as part of a strategic corridor of investment that drives the economy of East London and the region. Unlocking the catalytic potential of the port requires collaboration between a wide range of public and private stakeholders who have different views and objectives. This story sheds light on the recent steps that have been taken by the BCMM and other stakeholders to bring these actors together in pursuit of a common vision for the development of the port.

### The catalytic potential of the Port of East London

The construction of the Port of East London, South Africa's only river port, began in 1872 and has played a pivotal role in the historical development of the region, particularly from the 1960s to the 1990s. However, a lack of investment in the port's capacity and facilities and a changing industry focus have limited opportunities for its expansion. This hinders the port's ability to attract new markets or meet the evolving needs of its existing customers, impacting the region's wider development. This includes the port's existing relationship with the automotive industry, the largest employer in the BCMM, and the neighbouring ELIDZ, which was established in 2020 with the aim of attracting investors for the export market. The ELIDZ has attracted an estimated R8.6-million in investment and currently has 26 investors that derive almost half of their income from the export market using the port to import and export their goods. Between 2020 and 2023, proposed projects to the value of R515-million are planned for the port, including the replacement of the Buffalo Bridge, expansion of the car terminal, the Signal Hill Development and tourism and leisure facilities.

## Steps towards achieving a common vision

The materialisation of the various projects and investments that have been proposed for the port require collaboration between a wide range of public and private stakeholders. In addition to the BCMM, public stakeholders include Transnet, the custodian of South Africa's ports and terminals, the National Ports Authority, which governs the port, as well as other national and subnational state agencies and state-owned enterprises. Private stakeholders include local businesses and external investors. Among this range of stakeholders, some favour a developmental approach to the port's development, while others prefer a focus on financial feasibility. COVID-19 and related impacts have added further pressure on decision-making around prospective investments and budget allocations to the port, but have also fostered a way forward for the collaboration of parties around a common vision. Three recent interventions illustrate the steps taken toward achieving such a common vision.

- **A visit by the Transnet Board to the Port of East London:** In 2019, the Transnet Board visited the port following an invitation from the Port Manager with the support of the port's executive management team, BCMM and the private sector. It was the first visit by a Transnet board to the port in at least 10 years. The intention was not only to showcase the port but also to use the visit as a way of catalysing development, by directly engaging with the ultimate decision-makers at Transnet. The visit by the Transnet Board is widely seen as key to reigniting the redevelopment process for the port, as it provided its members with first-hand experience of the development needs of the port and the benefits of investing in it to support regional economic growth.
- **The establishment of the Port Consultative Committee (PCC):** The PCC is a statutory structure set up by the Department of Transport with a view of ensuring that all economic participants at the country's major ports have equal access and contribution to the management of the port's infrastructure and associated resources. The PCC also fulfils part of the mandate of the Ports Regulator of South Africa, including conducting public participation processes as part of the economic review of ports. On an operational level, the PCC brings together all the stakeholders involved in the Port of East London every month (with local decision-makers), and every quarter (with national decision-makers). This allows terminal operators and cargo owners to engage directly with executive decision-makers at Transnet, the Port Regulator, the Department of Transport and the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC).
- **An intergovernmental memorandum of understanding (MOU) and technical task team:** In 2019, the BCMM, the Buffalo City Municipality Development Agency, Transnet and the ELIDZ signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), to create a common platform for constructive engagement on various concerns affecting the port, the municipality and the ELIDZ. Following the signing of the MOU, an intergovernmental technical task team was established. This task team includes BCMM and state-owned enterprises such as the Buffalo City Municipality Development Agency, Transnet and the ELIDZ. It meets periodically to address targeted infrastructure planning and budgeting related to (among others) the spatial development agenda for the BCMM's West Bank Economic Corridor that incorporates the Port of East London.



### The importance of a shared vision and common objectives for unlocking local development

Different stakeholders by nature have different objectives and interests. For instance, Transnet views ports as commercial, profit-making entities, and so any investment in upgrading and maintenance needs to be counterbalanced by increased usage fees. In contrast, for provincial and local government and local port management, the value of such investment is based on a socioeconomic motivation rather than purely financial feasibility. They see infrastructure investment as a means to support the expansion of the region's economy, which carries risks because benefits may be reaped only in the future. As a result, the Port of East London has found itself in a 'Catch 22' situation because to make a successful business case and attract investment, the port's infrastructure needs to be upgraded. The visit of the Transnet Board to the port in 2019 represented an important step toward the establishment of a shared vision for the port and its significance in the wider region. Going forward, efforts will need to ensure that the momentum generated by the Transnet Board's visit to the port is sustained through ongoing engagements.



### An all-of-society approach requires a platform for intergovernmental cooperation

While all stakeholders involved in the Port of East London agree on its importance, they had struggled to align their views and objectives in pursuit of a shared vision and common objectives because there were few mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation. The newly established Port Consultative Committee (PCC) and the intergovernmental technical task team provide platforms for cooperation and collaboration between multiple public and private sector stakeholders, helping to facilitate greater transparency and accountability, and fostering trust among all parties – all of which are integral parts of values-based governance. Going forward, it will be key for platforms to translate this collaboration into concrete development outcomes.

### The importance of local leadership

Effective local leadership has been key to some of the more recent successes around the development of the port. Much of this leadership has historically been centred on the local Transnet port management team and the private sector, with the BCMM playing more of a supportive role. The signing of an MoU between BCMM, Transnet and the ELIDZ gives the BCMM a more active leadership role in the development of the port. By continuing to pursue a cooperative governance approach that places value on good local leadership, trust and accountability and a clear identification of the roles and responsibilities of each of the different role players involved, the potential exists for the successful development of the port.

## LEARNINGS

### Good relationships between the public and private sectors are crucial for local development

Buffalo City's economy is driven largely by public infrastructure investment, which is perceived to have a positive impact on the private sector, and so relationships between all spheres of government and local business are considered crucial but take time to build. Notably, in recent times important opportunities to develop these relationships have been identified. For instance, through partnerships with the Eastern Cape Development Corporation and the Department of Trade and Industry's Export Development Programme, the BCMM can support the establishment of a pool of emerging exporters as good ambassadors for the city and a way of building trust between the city and its investors. The municipality also aims to identify key sectors and enable small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) to participate in and benefit from the formal economy (e.g., local SMMEs that service the automotive industry), thereby expanding the value chain.

### Importance of effective multi-level governance

The implementation of catalytic development projects also depends on effective alignment between the different objectives and mandates of multiple levels of government. For instance, certain strategies and decisions regarding port development are made at national level, which can create uncertainty and a hesitancy on the part of local authorities to make local decisions without the knowledge and approval from the national authority. Moreover, local or regional decisions are often dependent on the functioning of another provincial or national public sector entity over which the local entity has no control. It is important to recognise the mandates of each sphere of government in order to improve multi-level collaboration and governance.

### The value of a project approach to local development

Large-scale and complex catalytic development projects by their nature carry a high degree of risk, which may be counter intuitive for government bureaucracies that are organised to be risk-averse, particularly when a high degree of transparency and reporting is required. To overcome this, decision-makers may adopt a project approach, whereby a coordinating team is established that comprises senior decision-makers at both national and local levels. Comprehensive decision-making authority is then delegated to this team. Such a project approach may also contribute to improved communication and faster implementation of agreements, which will be central to facilitating bureaucratic processes between local and national stakeholders and moving the port project forward.





# MANGAUNG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY



## Cooperative governance for accelerating spatial and economic development



### OVERVIEW

Mangaung has always played an essential regional services function, from its early days as a trading post, serving surrounding agricultural areas and small towns, to more recently, as a home to education, sporting and healthcare facilities that attract people from beyond the municipality's borders. However, like many other South African metropolitan municipalities (metros), Mangaung suffers from inefficiencies and inequalities that are a result of segregated colonial and apartheid planning. This story highlights three projects aimed at addressing the City's socioeconomic inequalities: the airport node development, the Waaihoek precinct and the Naval Hill redevelopment. All projects have significant catalytic potential, but progress on implementation could be accelerated through more effective cooperative governance with various partners.

#### A city under pressure

In 2001, three urban areas (Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu) were merged to form Mangaung. After playing a prominent role in hosting the soccer World Cup in 2010, Mangaung was declared a metro in 2011. This gave the municipality more budgetary independence but also meant that it lost its regional connections, as it was no longer part of a district municipality. This link was somewhat re-established in 2016, when Naledi Municipality (including the small town of Soutpan) merged into Mangaung. However, the expansion of Mangaung meant that the municipality had to not only serve more people but also provide services over a larger geographical area. It was difficult for the metro to handle the resulting fiscal pressure, leading to it being placed under administration in 2019. Over the last five years, Mangaung has continued to struggle financially, making it more dependent on external grant funding for both land development and infrastructure investments. This has affected the municipality's ability to make decisions and steer development.



## Addressing socioeconomic inequalities

Mangaung has a smaller economy than other metros and is not home to any large enterprises or headquarters of national or international corporations. Mangaung's dominant economic sectors are therefore government services and regional services. Like many other South African cities, Mangaung also suffers from inefficiencies and inequalities that are a result of segregated colonial and apartheid planning. Apartheid planning resulted in a fragmented spatial form and low densities. Suburbs developed according to race and were divided by buffer strips, railway lines and industries, resulting in three industrial development points, daily commuters and long-distance migrants. While the merger in 2001 created the potential for an integrated planning system, finding appropriate ways of integration and planning for higher densities remains difficult.

Three projects have been identified to address Mangaung's socioeconomic inequalities by revitalising the local economy; increase densities; improve transport; create an industrial base; and link economic development, residential development and heritage, with a focus on the eastern part of the city.

## The airport node development

The airport node development represents the first significant development of the N8 Corridor project, which dates to the first Mangaung Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and Free State Provincial Development Plans. The N8 Corridor had to link several nodes: the central business district (CBD), the airport node, Mandela View, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. The airport node comprises two main components: industrial stands around the airport and residential stands at Estoire and Raceway Park (a private sector development). The aim of the development is to undo the legacy of apartheid, during which settlement planning mainly occurred to the south of the N8 and industrial planning in the Ooseinde industrial area, by creating new settlements to the north of the industrial area and economic (industrial) activity and human settlements in the eastern part of the city. The intention is to provide a high-density area to support opportunities for transit-oriented development, prevent urban sprawl and develop an industrial base for Mangaung, thereby repositioning the city both economically and financially. A conditional grant from National Treasury provided the original investment for the industrial stands' infrastructure, while the private sector is responsible for developing Raceway Park. Currently, the project is still in the process of township establishment, a task being undertaken and funded by the Housing Development Agency.

## The Waaihoek precinct

The Waaihoek precinct has substantial heritage value, being the first black settlement in Bloemfontein and home to the Wesleyan Church, the birthplace of the ANC in 1912. The aim of the precinct development is to take advantage of heritage to revitalise the southern part of the central business district by improving linkages, providing incentives for private business, accommodating informal trading, building a range of subsidised and market-driven housing (to increase densities) and unlocking heritage potential. It is seen as a catalytic project to develop other heritage sites. In addition, the project's precinct and residential components align well with the Mangaung Spatial Development Framework (SDF), which envisages an increase in the residential component of the CBD to the north and south. The project is funded through the Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant from National Treasury but requires land arrangements as well as a range of complicated arrangements with existing business interests. Progress with implementation has therefore been slow.

LOCATION OF SELECTED PROJECTS IN MANGAUNG



## The Naval Hill redevelopment

The redevelopment of Naval Hill is aimed at creating a world-class tourism attraction using the Naval Hill Game Reserve's natural and cultural value. The project includes a range of initiatives, such as the establishment of a digital planetarium, the development of the Mandela Statue together with restaurants and walkways, and the upgrading of viewpoints on Naval Hill. Naval Hill attracts numerous visitors, with over 500 000 people visiting the site in 2019, and the game reserve is popular among joggers and walkers. The project is funded through a small portion of external grants. To date, the restaurant and kiosk have opened. The digital planetarium, the second one in Africa, has been developed under the auspices of the University of Free State's Department of Physics.



## GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS

---

### Need for good intergovernmental relations to translate into joint planning and implementation

Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality has cordial relationships with other spheres of government, which are involved in the planning of key development projects. For instance, the airport node is part of the N8 Corridor project and is included in both municipal and provincial development plans. However, although national and provincial stakeholders were involved during the initial phase, the project remains an internal municipal project, and there has been limited joint planning and implementation with other spheres of government. In the case of the Waaihoek precinct, provincial government was involved in the planning and financially supported the initial upgrading of the church, but implementation has been slow. It is important to build on existing good relationships to develop more effective mechanisms for joint planning and implementation across multiple levels of government, in order to contribute to accelerating progress on these projects.

### Need to build on existing state capability to accelerate progress

Municipal capacity to plan, manage and finance urban growth are core to good urban governance, especially when it comes to complex spatial and economic development projects that are managed over multiple years. This assumes a capable state, which refers to both institutional capacity and staff competencies. The municipality employs many capable and competent individuals. Nevertheless, all three projects have experienced delays due to financial, as well as human capacity issues. To address these issues, there is a need to build on existing competencies, project implementers and champions and expand them across the municipality because complex projects require a broad institutional approach, as well as continuity in the thinking, planning and management of projects to ensure project and institutional memory is not lost. In addition, municipal procurement processes must function appropriately to ensure continuity in procuring services for the projects. Finally, the municipality's integration of (and financial contribution to) projects and effective collaboration among its departments are also central to ensuring that the necessary infrastructure-related investments are made timeously, so as not to hamper progress.

### An effective political-administrative interface is crucial for project implementation

The projects in Mangaung show that, with appropriate plans based on a sound rationale and vision, it is possible to have continuity between different political-administrative regimes. Some of the projects date back to the early years of the city's establishment as a metro but continue to be supported



and maintained over time, pointing towards appropriate institutional capability for long-term planning. However, effective project implementation requires an appropriate political-administrative interface that provides political oversight, while leaving enough room and support for municipal officials to operate and focus on the overall direction of the projects on spatial restructuring and economic revitalisation.

## LEARNINGS

### Importance of evidence-based decision-making

The planning of complex spatial and economic development projects requires an appropriate knowledge base for making decisions. Technical exercises, such as a cost-benefit analysis and potential impact, have therefore become increasingly important in public decision-making and governance. Decision-makers need to have internal and external systems in place to review the risks and potential benefits of proposed large public investments, and to ask tough questions about these investments. The three projects in Mangaung are all designed based on sound rationale, i.e., the need for spatial integration and economic development in order to address the spatial legacy of apartheid planning. This has contributed to their continued support over time. However, a stronger evidence base could have accelerated progress on their implementation or their expected return on investment. Going forward, it is important to ensure that projects are evaluated in terms of urban efficiencies, through independent external reviews or by capitalising on the city's existing memorandums of understanding and regular contact with the city's two universities (University of the Free State and Central University of Technology) and their knowledge and research bases.

### Importance of public-private partnerships

The private sector plays an important role in supporting local economic development. Hence, a closer relationship with the private sector can assist municipalities in understanding the market and local economy and in marketing projects such as industrial sites. Mangaung has agreements in place with the private sector for housing developments, as it recognises that working with the private sector provides more flexibility and sharing of risks, attracts more private sector development and speeds up development efforts. However, it has no examples of public-private partnerships in other areas where the private and public sectors share risks, costs and profits. The contribution of the private sector could be strengthened by making it a source of market information for decision-making on the municipality's economic development strategy and direction, rather than limiting it to the outsourcing of work in specific areas of development.

### Importance of community participation

In most cities, community participation takes place through a formal, legislative process, as part of the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process, providing a framework for the work of municipal officials. In Mangaung, community participation has been integral in all projects. In the airport node development, public participation took place through the involvement of ward councillors. In the Waaihoek precinct, public participation precinct was more extensive, with regular meetings with the minibus-taxi industry, informal traders and formal shop owners, in addition to engagements with the relevant ward councillor. While such substantial participation processes take time, they are crucial to unblocking potential project problems and guaranteeing effective progress.





# MSUNDUZI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY



## A turnaround approach to overcoming poor internal controls



### OVERVIEW

Like many local authorities in South Africa, Msunduzi Local Municipality is struggling to achieve clean audits and deliver on its mandate. The municipality was placed under administration in 2010 and then again in 2019 which has, together with the COVID-19 pandemic, made more apparent the broader governance issue of poor internal controls, aggravated by a loss of skills, poor leadership and unfilled vacancies. This story highlights the efforts of the municipality's new leadership in turning around the challenges of poor internal controls by acknowledging and comprehensively addressing their causes and outcomes.

### A history of governance challenges


Msunduzi Local Municipality has faced governance challenges since its creation in 2000, when various municipal areas (Pietermaritzburg, Msunduzi, Ashburton, Vulindlela, Claridge and Bishopstowe) were amalgamated. For the first five years, the powers and functions of the municipality and the district authority of uMgungundlovu were not properly defined. The challenge of integrating internal systems, policies, procedures and resources among these various municipalities was further compounded by poor financial controls. This resulted in the municipality being placed under administration in 2010. While this intervention resulted in the municipality achieving a clean audit in 2014/2015, the municipality never fully recovered from the 2010 crisis and experienced a high turnover of senior staff, while internal control issues multiplied. In 2019, the municipality was again placed under administration by the provincial government due to irregular expenditure and a lack of political oversight and leadership.



## Towards a turnaround approach to addressing the causes and outcomes of poor internal controls

A new Mayor was elected in 2019 and a new City Manager was appointed in 2020. In spite of the added challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic that has since emerged, this new leadership is determined to address the issues that resulted in Msunduzi being put under administration for a second time in 2019. Its focus is on tackling a set of interrelated issues, rather than limiting its approach to financial issues. Notably, Msunduzi acknowledges that in hindsight, ignoring or not paying enough attention to broader issues during the first administrative review in 2010/2011 failed the municipality, as other governance challenges were not addressed, in particular internal controls related to human resources, financial and information technology management. These controls enable the City's political leadership to ensure that the administration is achieving its objectives through efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. When internal controls are poor, not functional or non-existent, they influence and affect the effective functioning of the municipality. Therefore, the second administrative review is focused on a much broader and complex set of governance issues and relationships that cause and reinforce the lack of internal controls.

### COMPLEX CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS



Msunduzi's turnaround strategy is based on four pillars:

1. Finance and Governance
2. Service Delivery Model and Performance Management
3. Organisational Reconfiguration and Capacity Building
4. Combating Fraud, Corruption and Misconduct

Alongside the adoption of this strategy, the new leadership has taken urgent steps to fill senior management positions as a matter of urgency, and has recognised that an important control measure to address is the lack of consequence management, which permeates all levels of the municipality. Although the city still has a long way to go, the Council is functioning properly and has a quorum at meetings. Critical vacancies have been filled, and 70% of the 2018/2019 audit findings have been addressed.





### **Strong leadership is important for turning governance around**

Weak, ineffective or lack of internal controls lie at the heart of urban governance challenges, and are aggravated by the loss of skills, ongoing changes in leadership and unfilled vacancies. Recognising the existence of these challenges is a crucial first step to overcoming them. They also require a comprehensive response implemented by strong leadership. Without strong leadership, the municipality will not be able to deliver on its goals and objectives. What is needed is political and administrative leadership that is forthright, ethical, respected and supported by the national, provincial and local spheres of government. To achieve this, politicians in every sphere of government must be committed to respecting and supporting good municipal leadership and creating an enabling governance environment for all.

### **The political-administrative interface must be clearly defined**

Although many officials welcome being relieved from some of the responsibility of interacting with communities, councillors have become more involved in service delivery than their mandate warrants. The line between politicians and officials, or the relationship between the council and the administration, needs to be clearly defined: politicians are responsible for setting policy and ensuring oversight – and should not interfere in operational issues. Operations represents the sphere of employed officials who, in turn, should not aspire to be politicians. Hence, improved service delivery depends on a clear separation of roles and responsibilities between these two spheres.

### **The need to acknowledge and identify how governance issues are interrelated**

The issues that result from poor internal controls are numerous, complex and interrelated. They play out in a cyclical manner and involve a complex causal web of interrelated tangible and nontangible issues. As a result of these interactions over time, the Council becomes weak and destabilised, while the administration becomes ineffective, chaotic and dysfunctional. The danger is that it creates fertile ground for internal controls to worsen, leading to fraud and corruption becoming entrenched and extremely difficult to reverse. This means that strategies to overcoming governance challenges cannot be limited to addressing one aspect or another. Instead, they require a comprehensive approach that acknowledges and identifies the role of a broad set of issues and how they interact.



## LEARNINGS

### Need for functional human resources to improve service delivery

Poor internal controls have an important impact on human resources. In the case of Msunduzi, they resulted in high staff turnover, especially of senior officials, and high staff vacancy rates, coupled with a high number of acting positions, especially at supervisory, managerial and senior managerial level. Such political and administrative instability makes addressing service delivery issues difficult. They also contribute to extra workloads for existing staff, which results in low morale. In a context of limited financial resources, the municipality needs to find creative ways to address this issue. Some solutions may be to redefine workflows and tasks, use technology more strategically and operationally to improve efficiencies and impact, employ interns, or hire retired professionals to assist in skills transfer.

### Importance of hiring the right people for the job

In combatting corruption, the starting point must be to hire the right people who are not only technically competent but have the best interests of the municipality at heart and are passionate about serving and developing communities. However, hiring the right people is only the first step, as even the right people may be rendered impotent when faced with other pressures and influences. For instance, they may find themselves accountable to outside individuals (not to the municipality), or under so much pressure that they become tainted by corruption or decide to resign from the position. In some cases, officials choose to take a back seat to stay out of trouble, rather than do their job effectively. Therefore, hiring the right people for the job needs to be understood in the context of the difficulties and complexities that exist within local government. In addition to hiring the right people, it is important to improve the competencies of employees through mentorship, peer learning and change management, and to actively instil an ethical organisational culture.

### Importance of strong oversight for overcoming fraud and corruption

In Msunduzi, under the previous leadership, a weak, destabilised Council was unable to provide proper oversight of an ineffective and chaotic administration, which led to a lack of consequence or risk management. This opened up the door to exploitation for financial and other gain, which could be reinforced by political interference or by leadership gaps in the municipality. Going forward, strong and effective political oversight is needed not only to overcome this disregard for the rule of law, but also to create an environment in which officials feel safe to speak up about practices of fraud and corruption.





## CONCLUSION

The nine case studies provide insight into how cities have used cooperative governance and the all-of-society approach to achieve their objectives. They demonstrate instances when local governments worked effectively within challenging environments, not only with other spheres of government but also across sectors of society. However, they also highlight some of the barriers within the government environment that need to be overcome before these practices can gain real traction at the project and systemic levels within municipalities.

The reality is that working in the municipal environment is challenging, and each municipality has its own political and operational dynamics. In such an environment – and even more so during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in lockdowns and a shift to virtual and remote work in municipalities and beyond – two factors determine a research project’s success:

- i **Relationships.** The nature and strength of relationships between researchers and municipalities play an important role. Under ‘normal’ conditions, prior to the research process, it is important to obtain the municipality’s support for the project (getting the required permissions at the right levels and building effective relationships between researchers and municipal councillors and officials). Under ‘adverse’ conditions, such as COVID-19, it is essential.
- ii **Adaptability.** The extent to which the research process and data collection methods can be adapted is crucial. Adaptation to the research process and data collection methods needs to be allowed during implementation, provided it does not affect the integrity of the research.



# 4

## BEYOND 2021 A Local Government Outlook

---

- 254 Introduction
- 255 Where Have We Come From?
- 259 The Challenges and Issues Facing Local Government
- 268 Where Do We Go To From Here?
- 270 The Last Word





## RESEARCH SOURCES

The issues, challenges, insights and recommendations are informed by the inputs of a broad range of experts and organisations that have been involved directly with local government policy development and implementation over the past 25 years. They have provided thought-provoking and varied views, which reflect the debates and complexity of local government in South Africa.

Input was sourced from the Virtual Conference: ‘Celebrating 25 Years of Local Government’ in November 2020, which was facilitated by the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the Government and Public Policy (GAPP) thinktank. The conference brought together over 70 participants, including leaders in local government, politicians, researchers, policymakers and some of the key architects of the post-apartheid local government system. In addition, a series of workshops and interviews were conducted with representatives from the younger generation, to explore the challenges facing local government and the reforms needed to rebuild and reposition our cities as engines of social and economic growth.



## INTRODUCTION

South Africa has a progressive and forward-thinking legislative framework and policy approach that focuses on ‘righting the wrongs’ of apartheid. Local government is placed at the core of rebuilding communities within a racially and socially integrated society, promising communities a local ‘voice’, accountable leaders and equitable access to basic services and infrastructure.

Yet, as local government enters democracy’s sixth administration, the results from the past 25 years have been mixed. Yes, South Africa has institutionalised a system of local government, and many people in its cities are experiencing a better quality of life, with improved access to basic services, housing, health and education. However, many municipalities are in a dangerous cycle of decline and have lost credibility with their communities, service delivery is inequitable, and there is a huge discrepancy in skills, capacity and resources between urban and rural municipalities. Despite its founding directive and best intentions, local government has not been able to deliver adequately on its developmental mandate. The reasons are multi-faceted and complex, which makes defining the best and most appropriate solutions to the challenges facing local government very complicated.

This chapter constitutes Section 4 of the State of Cities Report (SoCR) and continues the discussion started in Chapter 1. Governance in South African Cities of Section 2. Its core intention is to define a reform agenda for local government. In line with the theme of the SoCR, the chapter highlights that, while reforms are needed for better cooperative governance and all-of-society practice, they are connected to other important governance reforms. The chapter starts by tracing the journey of democratic local government, which includes an overview of the vision and thinking that informed the role and powers of local government. It then unpacks some of the complex challenges that have affected the performance of local government, examining some of the underlying assumptions and principles that have informed local government policy and practices. The chapter concludes with recommendations for beyond 2021.

WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM?



CHALLENGES AND ISSUES FACING LOCAL GOVERNMENT



WHERE DO WE GO TO FROM HERE?







# WHERE HAVE WE COME FROM?

The purpose of this section is to provide a broad overview of the history of local government in South Africa and to reflect on the core ideals and principles that inform and define the current system of local government.<sup>1</sup> It provides a framework for understanding local government’s successes and challenges, and for questioning whether the assumptions underlying the current system are still relevant and appropriate.

## TIMELINE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1980–2021

### THE EARLY DAYS (1980s–2000s)

1980

- **Black Local Authorities** (in rural and township areas) that have limited powers with a virtually non-existent rates base
- **White Local Authorities** (in municipalities) that have adequate powers and functions, and receive rates income for services rendered
- **Local Advisory Committees** that oversee the management of Indian and Coloured areas in what is then the province of Natal

**1985** The **Regional Service Councils (RSCs)** and the **Joint Services Boards (JSBs)** are established to support “development related projects within the politically turbulent black areas”.<sup>2</sup> The RSCs are intended to deliver bulk services across regions that are less clearly consolidated than more established municipal areas. They are not accepted by black communities but achieve some success in improving services and redistributing funds to poorer areas. They are later incorporated into the notion of district municipalities (part of the current local government model).

The civic movement, which emerges before the start of the official negotiations, is extremely powerful and active, and plays a critical role in the final phase of apartheid and its eventual downfall. This has relevance for current challenges related to community engagement and the implementation of the all-of-society approach.

1990

#### EARLY 1990s

- **Increased protests**, following release of political prisoners and unbanning of political parties
- **Formation of local negotiating forums**, which focus on enhancing service provision and improving the living conditions in township areas, and demand a transition to a single tax base – giving rise to the well-known slogan, ‘One city; One tax base’
- **Transitional arrangements** put in place

**1992** The **African National Congress (ANC’s) Regional Policy** is prepared for the constitutional negotiations. It contains the origins of South Africa’s current constitutional structure of decentralisation and three spheres of government. The process includes a debate among the political parties about what to call the second level of government (‘regions’ or ‘states’) – ultimately, they agree on ‘provinces’, as a compromise.

The Regional Policy prefigures the current local government legislative framework:

- Adoption of a 10-region model (ultimately 9 provinces).
- Strong focus on metropolitan government.
- Fiscal decentralisation that emphasises “the need to strengthen local control over the use of public resources”; acknowledges the link between paying taxes and receiving public services; and stresses the need to address inequality through redistributing resources at national level, which places some limits on the extent of decentralisation.

CONTINUED TO PAGE 255

<sup>1</sup> See Section 2, Chapter 1 ‘Governance in South African Cities’ for details of the legislative and policy framework covering local government in South Africa, especially in relation to cooperative governance and an all-of-society approach.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.salga.org.za/Documents/Knowledge%20Hub/Local%20Government%20Briefs/15-YEARS-OF-DEVELOPMENTAL-AND-DEMOCRATIC-LOCAL-GOVERNMENT.pdf>

1990s

**1993** (March): The **Local Government Negotiating Forum** (LGNF) is established, comprising existing local, provincial and national governments, and non-statutory groups led by the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), including the South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU) and extra-parliamentary parties (ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania or PAC).

**1993** The **Local Government Transition Act** (LGTA) No. 209 of 1993 paves the way for the transformation of the local government system and the inclusion of local government as a third sphere of government in the new Constitution. The LGTA lists the functions of local government that will subsequently inform the provisions for local government in the Constitution; establishes representative provincial committees appointed by the **Transitional Executive Council** (TEC) to provide checks and balances on provincial power; establishes the national **Demarcation Board**; makes provision for organised local government; and introduces the concept of 'cooperative government'.

Agreements made through the LGNF:

- Provision of equitable services, based on the concept of 'one municipality, one tax base' and the notion of payment for services.
- Local government provisions to be included in the Interim Constitution, specifically recognising local government as a "deliberative legislative assembly with legislative and executive powers".
- A broad concept of the role, powers and functions of municipalities.

**The concept of cooperative government, as outlined in the LGTA, was entrenched as a guiding principle in the Constitution, and ultimately defined a way forward for intergovernmental relations in South Africa.**

**1995/6–2000**  
**INTERIM PHASE**

**Transitional metropolitan councils** are established following the municipal elections.

**1996** The **Constitution** establishes local government as an independent sphere of government.

**1998** The **White Paper** defines the policy of developmental local government.

**1998** The **Municipal Structures Act** No. 117 lays out categories of municipalities.

**1999** The **Municipal Demarcation Board** (MDB) is established to oversee the redrawing of municipal boundaries.

A wall-to-wall system of local government is adopted, to tackle the apartheid legacies of spatial distortion, by disintegrating the boundaries between the previous white cities and the black 'homelands'.

**1994–1995**  
**PRE-INTERIM PHASE**

Negotiating forums become statutory structures, and '**local governments of unity**' are established.

Temporary councils are established in areas where councils already exist, with predominantly white areas being enlarged to include black areas.

Nine **provincial advisory demarcation boards** are introduced to create boundaries for the 1995/6 elections.

The municipal elections take place in 1262 municipalities.

**2000**  
**LAUNCH OF DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

**2000** Local authorities are consolidated into **metros, districts and local municipalities** (284 in total).

**2000** The **Municipal Systems Act** No. 32 affirms municipal autonomy, introduces **integrated development plans** (IDPs) and regulates public participation.

**2000** The **first non-racial, inclusive local government elections** are held.

## TWO DECADES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT (2001–2021)

2000s

### 2001–2006

**2003** The **Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG)** is approved, with the aim of ensuring all South Africans receive basic services and in response to the growing number of service and infrastructure blockages and breakdowns.

The **Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) No. 56** establishes standards and requirements for the sustainable management of municipal finances.

**2004** 'Project Consolidate' is launched by the then Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) to deal with the 136 municipalities identified as being in distress. The aim is to improve municipal performance, accountability, service delivery and governance, with a particular emphasis on weak cooperation among government spheres, declining participatory democracy and a lack of support from provincial and national government.

**2005** The **Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act No. 13** lays out the interdependent and interrelated relationships between the three government spheres, as well as intergovernmental forums and mechanisms.

**2006** The **second local government elections** are held. The ANC retains its majority with two-thirds of the vote.

Cities enjoy a period of robust growth and economic progress, with increased consumer spending and a resultant growth in GDP, but also face service delivery and infrastructure pressures, as a result of rapid urbanisation.

Despite challenges around inequality and service delivery, the South African economy is growing.

### 2007–2009

**2007** For the first time since 1994, the government budgets for a **surplus**.

**2008** The world is hit by a **global financial and economic crisis**.

**2009** The **Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA)** replaces the DPLG as custodian of cooperative governance, with an additional emphasis on partnering with institutions of traditional leadership.

The State of Local Government Report lays the basis for the development of the **Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS)** published in November.

South Africa is hit hard: job losses, an outbreak of xenophobic attacks, demonstrations around service delivery, and a recession from 2008 to 2009.

### 2010

South African hosts the **FIFA Soccer World Cup**, but urban disadvantaged groups do not benefit.

There is a shift in housing policy from eradicating to **upgrading informal settlements** and from building new houses to **creating sustainable communities**. However, instead of shifting the apartheid spatial legacy, this approach continues to locate poorer populations in peripheral areas and perpetuates neighbourhoods separated by race and class. In addition, it affects productivity, resulting in long and expensive commutes for poor urban residents.

Prior to the FIFA Soccer World Cup, there is massive spending on infrastructure: new stadiums and transport initiatives (Gautrain, bus rapid transit systems, airport expansion).

2010's

2011

The **third local government elections** are held. The ANC wins just under 62% of the vote.

**Buffalo City** and **Mangaung** are upgraded to metros, bringing the total to 8.

2013

The **Spatial Planning and Land-Use Management Act (SPLUMA)** No. 16 provides for the devolution of a range of functions to municipalities, overseen by national government, and a cooperative approach to strategic spatial planning and land-use management.

There is an increased focus on the centrality of cities in supporting economic development and planning.

2014–2015

The SACN works closely with COGTA to develop South Africa's urban policy framework.

2019

President Ramaphosa introduces the **District Development Model (DDM)**, as a platform to improve cooperation between the various spheres and entities of government in delivering services and to support the developmental outcomes of local government. The DDM concept is about identifying the competitive advantages within each district and then linking local economies with district and national economies to improve economic growth.

2018

The United Nations (UN) adopts the **New Urban Agenda (NUA)**, to provide guidance on managing sustainable urbanisation.

South Africa aligns the priorities of the IUDF with those of the NUA.


The NUA and IUDF both emphasise the importance of all-of-society and whole-of-government approaches.

2016

Cabinet approves the **Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF)**, South Africa's urban policy framework aimed at managing urbanisation and achieving economic development, job creation and improved living conditions for its people.

The **fourth local government elections** are held. Support for the ANC falls to its lowest level since 1994. With the ANC's diminished dominance, coalition and minority governments became more widespread.

IUDF vision and goals



2020–2021

**2020** A new **Municipal Demarcation Bill** is drafted to replace the Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 and sets out new factors to be considered when determining municipal boundaries. It stipulates that the Demarcation Board may make boundary decisions to move a whole municipal ward only once every 10 years.

**2021** The **fifth local government elections** are held. The ANC loses its outright majority in all metros (Cape Town: DA leadership; Gauteng City-Region metros: DA-led coalitions; Buffalo City, Mangaung and Nelson Mandela Bay: ANC leadership, despite a decline in support; eThekweni: ANC-led coalition).

The COVID-19 pandemic hits South Africa, halting many processes, as everyone focuses on crisis management and emergency governance issues. The pandemic highlights and exacerbates the broader economic, developmental and governance issues that local government has faced over the previous decade.



## THE CHALLENGES AND ISSUES FACING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

### The ideal and reality of the cooperative governance system

Despite the ideal of cooperative governance and the urgent need for all three spheres of government to work together to achieve local government's developmental goals, the past 25 years have revealed a disconnect between political governance and the economy, and a weakening of local government.

### Disjuncture between constitutional and political arrangements

The Constitution considers local government as an equal and autonomous partner within a non-hierarchical structure of government 'spheres', but this has been diluted by political arrangements and party structures, which are hierarchical by their nature. The result is a general weakening of the local 'voice', with more importance given to provincial (rather than local) leaders and officials; many highly qualified politicians and experts moving out of the municipal system into provincial and national departments; local issues being 'nationalised', when national and provincial government determine programmes and are involved in the detail of local provision; and a lack of fiscal decentralisation, leaving municipalities under-resourced and unable to sustain themselves financially.

### Concurrent and overlapping responsibilities among government spheres

Cooperative governance requires a regulatory environment that is clear and appropriate in respect of the functions of local, provincial and national government, as well as effective implementation of these various functions within each sphere of government. Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution set out the concurrent and exclusive functions for local and provincial government. The allocation of powers and functions was decided during negotiations in the early 1990s, resulting in certain decisions that are not currently as logical or practical as they might have been. For instance,



## CORE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT – IN BRIEF

- Local government is one of three distinctive, interdependent spheres of government with its own legislative and executive powers.
- Local government is – and must be – a primary driver of growth and inclusion.
- Local government is responsible for governing the local affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial supervision. It governs in a transparent and accountable manner and in the interests and for the development of communities.
- Planning and governance are participatory and from the bottom-up, with communities driving strategies and programmes based on their localised, developmental needs.
- Local government fiscal arrangements recognise the link between paying taxes and receiving services, and the need to strengthen local control of public services. However, the basis for redistribution (to address inequalities) is national, which constrains the extent to which the fiscal system can be decentralised.
- All citizens, especially the poor and other vulnerable groups, have the right to basic services and amenities that must be delivered by municipalities within the limits of their resources.

# 4



## KEY QUESTIONS

- Is the structure of South Africa's political system, as set out in the legislative framework, still appropriate? What is needed to enable local government to fulfil its core functions within a coordinated system of cooperative governance?
- What does strengthening the 'local voice' mean? Which practical measures need to be put in place to give municipalities more prominence in local and national issues?
- Is provincial government's role sufficiently clear, or does it need to be revisited?
- How can local government be given more authority over issues that directly affect local communities, in particular a more prominent role in planning and defining priorities related to functions that currently sit at the provincial and national level?
- In devolving cross-cutting functions (e.g., transportation), should there be differentiation between provinces?

the Constitution makes provision for provinces to take over municipal functions when a municipality fails to fulfil its obligations, which blurs the lines around municipal autonomy given the discrepancies between well-functioning and struggling municipalities. The Constitution also envisages that many functions (e.g., housing and transport) would devolve to municipalities that have the capacity to manage them. However, while devolution has taken place, it has only been partial, and municipalities have not been given the necessary funds, scope of responsibilities or clear performance and accountability guidelines.

## The structure of local government and the role of cities

### Discrepancies across municipalities

The wall-to-wall approach was intended to create inclusive, integrated, developmental and accountable municipalities, but it has not lived up to this vision. It has resulted in overbounded regions with little connection and few linkages between areas, towns and the communities they serve. Recent amalgamations have produced enlarged municipalities that contain prosperous urban areas and marginalised outlying township and rural areas. Most of the many municipalities in financial distress are found in rural areas, which are becoming centres of poverty, inequality and unemployment, and not all municipalities have the capacity to deliver on their constitutional mandate. The different categories (A, B and C<sup>3</sup>) of municipalities have huge discrepancies in taxable income, per capita spend, grant dependency, skills and capacity. These discrepancies exist even within a single category. For example, Category A municipalities (metros)<sup>4</sup> are not homogenous and, while they may have a similar composition, their socioeconomic profiles are different.

### Centrality of cities and urban-rural linkages

Although the eight large metros account for well over 60% of economic activity and over 50% of national employment, the centrality of cities is not evident in national policy documents and economic analyses. As the drivers of development and economic growth, cities require special focus and status within South Africa's intergovernmental system. Many of the metros also include extensive rural areas, highlighting the fact that rural and urban areas increasingly coexist within South African cities and are interlinked. This is recognised in policy, with the IUDF stating: "Urban development is not an alternative

<sup>3</sup> Category A: metropolitan municipalities, category B: local municipalities, category C: district municipalities.

<sup>4</sup> Metropolitan areas are "large, densely populated urban conglomerations, often covering multiple city structures" (<https://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-21-metros-in-sa-debate-on-national-policy-choices/>)

to rural development. Rural and urban areas complement each other and coexist in production, trade, information flow and governance. They are further connected through flows of people and natural and economic resources”.<sup>5</sup>

## The two-tier system and the District Development Model

The District Development Model (DDM), which was adopted in 2020 and is currently being piloted and refined, is the most recent of government initiatives to enhance local government. There are several conflicting views and tensions around the DDM. Some experts believe that the DDM proposes a centralist approach that subordinates the autonomy of local and provincial government, as existing municipal and provincial resources will be redirected to a collective plan and budget. A concern is that the DDM is an elaborate institutional system, which will add another unnecessary layer of committee-based planning, resulting in huge costs, a few signature projects, and a waste of time for experienced local government practitioners. Others believe that the DDM is a valuable tool for ensuring improved intergovernmental relations and cooperative governance, as its aim is to foster much closer cooperation and coordination in planning processes among all three spheres of government. Nevertheless, a regional or district-level entity is needed, to provide region-wide services and administration and to coordinate support from national and provincial government (i.e., as a deconcentrated form of national and provincial government support).

## Restructuring and change

The transition to democratic local government and wall-to-wall municipalities required massive restructuring processes, which were incredibly disruptive. Local authorities and their sub-structures were reconfigured and consolidated, and later larger urban areas became metros (‘unicities’). On average, public administration takes approximately seven years to stabilise after a restructuring, and so the constant restructuring of local government has started to break down institutional stability within municipalities. Therefore, any further changes must have as little impact as possible on the administrative systems and functioning of municipalities. Furthermore, making structural changes to administrations and technical changes to legislation and policy do not – and will not – fundamentally alter the on-the-ground problems unless the underlying political and implementation challenges that continue to plague municipalities are tackled.

<sup>5</sup> <https://iudf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/IUDF-Integrated-Framework-2016.pdf>, page 28.



## KEY QUESTIONS

- Are district administrations still relevant for efficient service delivery, or should an alternative structure be considered?
- Is the DDM an appropriate tool to deal with the challenges of cooperative governance? How can it be used and structured to improve cooperative governance without subverting municipal autonomy?
- As not all metros are equal, should the Constitution be amended to incorporate non-metro Category A municipalities?
- Should metros be spheres of governments with their own voices and their own relative autonomy from the local government system (as ‘city-states’)?
- How can cities be placed at the heart of South Africa’s national growth strategy?
- Is there a need to look at a new way of localising development and to move to a single-tier system of government, which could be differentiated or applied across the board to all municipalities?
- What does a more differentiated approach to local government mean? What would be the best vehicle to implement such differentiation?
- How can change be implemented with minimal impact on the administrative system and functioning of our municipalities?



## KEY QUESTIONS

- What would it mean to rethink the political model of local government and to establish and professionalise an administration at the local government level?
- How can strong and resilient administrations be developed and insulated?
- What can be done to deal with coalition governments in a more systematic manner to ensure that political instability does not affect the municipality's day-to-day operations?

## Municipal leadership, politics and administration

The effective functioning of a municipality (or any entity) begins with its leadership. Good leaders set the tone both strategically (in relation to a municipality's goals and objectives) and ethically (in exemplifying good moral values and taking an active stance against corruption). However, mayors are considered to have less political authority than provincial leaders and are chosen by the party hierarchy, not by communities through elected councillors. Mayors and municipal managers need provincial and national government support (through legislative instruments and other tools) that does not infringe on the autonomy of local government. Furthermore, the blurring of boundaries between the administration and political leadership has resulted in confusion over roles, and political-administrative tension and conflict. Political changes are inevitable but should not have an impact on administrative functions – changes in political leadership may alter the strategic direction but should not affect the effective functioning of a municipality.

### Factionalism and coalitions

Party factionalism and coalitions should not – but do – affect the functioning of local government. In some instances, factionalism has hindered efficient administration, resulted in a lack of direction and decision-making, interrupted service delivery and reduced investor and business confidence. Coalitions often arise out of convenience rather than ideology, which creates enormous difficulties within councils, as seen during the 2016–2021 administration, when portfolios were divided and the leadership was often unable to hold coalition partners to account. The question is whether coalitions undermine the will of democracy when minority parties become 'power-makers'. Coalitions are likely to become the norm in South Africa, but political parties appear to lack the necessary political maturity and prefer retaining control to respecting democracy.

## The ideal and reality of the all-of-society approach

The all-of-society approach refers to the broader environment within which municipalities operate, including the private sector, civil society, faith-based organisations, thinktanks and other private or community organisations. The Constitution entrenches a bottom-up, participatory approach to governance that focuses on community-driven development. However, the reality is that delivery has been overwhelmingly 'from above', with local government hesitating to build relationships with the private sector and mistrusting private individuals and companies that seek to assist government. Political parties, not community interests, drive policies, while participatory processes have been reduced to tick-box exercises.



## The weakening influence of civil society

The Constitution recognises the important role of civil society in providing oversight, monitoring human rights and providing citizens with the tools to know and exercise those rights. Since 2000, civil society has weakened, although civil society groups have continued to hold the democratic government to account around issues of corruption and protection of rights. Active civil society members have been co-opted into government, and capacity has gradually and increasingly shifted into the state, while state-driven development and the increased centralisation of funding has alienated civil society from contributing meaningfully to local issues.

## Ward committees

Ward committees were set up to enable community participation and promote social cohesion, based on the idea that ‘the people must govern’. Ward committees are supposed to enjoy sufficient autonomy to exercise oversight over their own local council and to hold councillors accountable. Ward committees have fulfilled these functions to some degree but have also fallen short and not allowed residents to find their voices. In many municipalities, ward committees are not autonomous but an extension of the governing party, chaired by the ward councillor and comprising allies of the councillor. This has led to the blurring of accountability and oversight, and voters being unable to hold their councillors to account for failed service delivery.

## Participatory governance and community engagement

The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) is a cornerstone of developmental local government through which the municipality develops plans and budgets that incorporate the inputs of citizens, business and civil society organisations in a systematic and strategic manner. The implementation of the IDP is complicated by various issues, including the directive to integrate local needs into the broader planning frameworks of provincial and national government, over which municipalities have little say.<sup>6</sup> Municipalities are not using IDPs adequately to achieve social, economic and other objectives through an all-of-society approach. The IDP model itself is not a failure; the failure lies in the inability to give real expression to what the model intended regarding localising development issues and including communities in local government affairs. There is a lack of innovation in engaging citizens, academic and research institutions and the private sector, while

<sup>6</sup> In addition, national government’s approach to priority programmes appears not to support the view of local government as the engine of economic and social growth; e.g., the failure to provide schools in new housing projects.



## KEY QUESTIONS

- Which mechanisms can be used to empower civil society to harness its capacity to engage actively in development issues?
- How can ward committees be revived, to perform the functions that they were initially tasked with?
- How can IDP processes and public participation processes be used to reflect local needs and close the delivery gap, and save the credibility of IDPs?
- What can be done to encourage community experts to become more involved in government planning processes around specialised issues?
- How can government support community-driven programmes more effectively?



## THE CAPACITY ISSUE

Capacity is a crucial issue that affects the performance of municipalities. It covers not only technical ability but also softer issues, such as the ability to collaborate and build relationships with others (both within and across government, as well as with broader society), and to adapt to changing environments and circumstances. Challenges include positions being filled based on political allegiance (not skills) and the lack of skilled financial officers, especially in smaller municipalities, which may have difficulty attracting skilled people and paying appropriate salaries. Staffing costs tend to favour the ‘top’ (strategic managers), not the ‘middle’ (skilled professionals, the ‘doers’). Poor financial management and a lack of capability result in the overspending of operating budgets, a failure to collect from consumer-debtors (resulting in insufficient cash flow to fund operations) and the underspending of capital grants.

However, the capacity question is contentious, as each municipality faces very different contextual and developmental challenges. Many smaller municipalities have glaring gaps in skills and capacity (especially at middle management level) that need to be acknowledged and tackled. However, while a lack of financial competence (or corruption) may lead to grants and transfers being squandered, this should not be interpreted to mean that local government is well resourced.

fiscal reforms have failed to promote public-private partnerships, as tools to enhance cooperation, especially in light of the dwindling municipal financial reserves. Community engagement takes place in forums established by government (e.g., ward committees), with insufficient attention paid to the organic spaces that are created within communities themselves, hence disempowering the natural development of community and business-led organisations. Municipalities also control the communications function, which is used to promote the political leadership and institution, rather than enabling citizens to participate in policy development and decision-making. If adequately engaged, communities add value to government planning and development, through providing expertise and local knowledge.

## The financial sustainability of municipalities

The South African economy is in structural decline, which has been exacerbated by the global economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. In general, South Africans are becoming poorer, and poverty levels are increasing. Local government’s primary role is to provide basic services, including water, electricity and sanitation, to South African households. The dilemma facing cities is that their populations are growing (especially among lower income groups), but household incomes are stagnating (due to the economic decline). At the same time, costs are escalating due to partially and unfunded mandates, increased expenditure (notably salaries and bulk purchases for water and electricity) and more expensive borrowing (because of the national credit rating downgrades). The result is an increasing demand for services and a decreasing number of households able to pay for them.

## Municipal budgets and fiscal grants

Municipalities rely on a mix of grants and own-revenue sources to fund their constitutionally mandated responsibilities. Views are mixed about whether local government has been provided with sufficient resources or is an under-resourced sphere of government. From National Treasury’s perspective, municipalities have adequate resources and receive generous transfers from national government: local government receives 9.1% of the fiscal budget in direct and indirect grants, but 24% when revenues generated within municipalities are included. The proponents of this school of thought believe that continued financial support “in the face of

local government failure is naïve if not downright immoral”<sup>7</sup> and will lead to a negative downward spiral if the underlying issues are not tackled. In addition, generous grant allocations could be disincentivising municipalities from exploiting their own revenue base and may encourage grant dependency. The other school of thought argues that the increase in grants mirrors the increase in inflation, and that provincial governments have attracted many intergovernmental fiscal grants. The centralisation of intergovernmental fiscal relations and the siloed, top-down approach to planning mean that municipalities do not have a say in how the national budget is allocated. Furthermore, fiscal grants are mostly linked to capital projects (and may be withdrawn if problems arise in the projects), whereas local government’s needs lie with operating budgets. Grants intended for service delivery are often underspent or used to fund recurrent expenditure needs, rather than the basic needs of communities.

### Collection of rates and taxes

The current model, where municipalities depend on the collection of rates and taxes, is increasingly unsustainable. When people cannot pay and the municipality fails to control its costs, the result is chronic financial unviability. Municipalities are not allowed to collect rates and taxes across the board because some communities are simply unable to pay. This means that mass service delivery is funded by big business and a specific proportion of income earners. In South Africa, five municipalities collect 80% of collected taxes and, within those municipalities, 70% of the income comes from 35–50% (and in some cases a smaller percentage) of the population.<sup>8</sup> This paying percentage is becoming smaller as the tariffs charged by municipalities for services are becoming unaffordable for many people. In some municipalities, local communities are contracting directly with service providers, such as Eskom (e.g., Harrismith), or taking over services (e.g., Parys and the Northern Cape where the court has ruled in favour of the local community), all of which have the potential to shift accountability and may lead to rates boycotts.



### KEY QUESTIONS

- Should municipalities consider a new funding model for local government? What would this look like?
- Which mechanisms need to be put in place to improve financial management within municipalities?

7 Hattingh, J. 2020. Input at Celebrating 25 Years of Local Government Virtual Conference, South Africa, 25–26 November 2020

8 Fowler T. 2020. Input at the “Celebrating 25 Years of Local Government” Virtual Conference, South Africa, 25–26 November 2020



## KEY QUESTIONS

- What is needed to ensure continuity in service delivery and the maintenance of infrastructure during and after leadership changes, especially in an era of tenuous coalition governments?
- Is a broader developmental (all-of-society) approach to SCM possible, to ensure that communities benefit as both suppliers and beneficiaries of local government services?
- What can be done to shift the focus of municipalities from compliance to outcomes and enable a more flexible and innovative approach to service provision?

## Service delivery and infrastructure

Over the past 20 years, municipalities have struggled to provide the services and infrastructure required to address apartheid inequalities and rapid urbanisation. The result has been uneven service delivery, difficulties in maintaining and developing the infrastructure, and supply chain management (SCM) challenges.

### Continuity and maintenance of infrastructure

The backbone of service delivery is infrastructure, which needs to be developed and maintained, as it has a finite lifespan. Therefore, investing in maintaining and replacing infrastructure should be prioritised in municipal long-term development and financial plans. Such investments reduce infrastructure breakdowns, prevent system collapses and avoid a ‘patchwork’ approach to infrastructure upgrades, while providing services to business and households and supporting economic development.<sup>9</sup> However, the tendency is for cities to shift priorities to the next term of office, with no proper handover between administrations, resulting in a lack of continuity. In addition, issues are tackled on a ward basis, whereas infrastructure for service delivery is a bulk, interconnected system that crosses ward boundaries.

### Supply chain management

The weakest link in service delivery is SCM, which is the “link between drawing up plans and realising those plans in real substantive outcomes for citizens”.<sup>10</sup> The current service delivery model largely involves contracting private suppliers through public procurement contracting. SCM is decentralised at both operational and regulatory levels (in accordance with the legislation<sup>11</sup>), with operational powers given to the administration and regulatory powers given to Council. This interaction is unique to local government and has resulted in a strained relationship between councils and administrations. Other challenges include a lack of capacity, with thinly staffed SCM units and a shortage of project managers, and a focus on compliance (‘clean audits’) rather than on outcomes. Officials have become more risk averse and cautious, more concerned with irregular expenditure than with unspent funds; and in awarding contracts, price is prioritised over developmental outcomes. As a result, the focus on delivering actual services is lost, and SCM spend is not used effectively to enhance local economies. Cities have not found a way

9 <https://www.local2030.org/library/324/Financial-Management-in-a-Local-Government-Association.pdf>

10 Input from G Quinot at Celebrating 25 Years of Local Government Virtual Conference, South Africa, 25–26 November 2020

11 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) No. 1 of 1999 and MFMA No. 56 of 2003

to integrate procurement from and within local communities, to enable them to be both suppliers and beneficiaries of local government SCM. This is a systemic failure and partly explains why communities are obstructing projects because they do not experience the economic benefit of that spend.<sup>12</sup>

## The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

In March 2020, with the unexpected arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns, municipalities were thrust into uncharted territory: an unavoidable reliance on technology and a resurgence in an active civil society. The urgency of the situation led to municipalities introducing more flexible and innovative ways of reaching communities, such as using digital communication apps that allowed citizens to comment on IDP processes.<sup>13</sup> The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), which describes the technologies that are changing the way in which the world functions, presents both opportunities and challenges for local government. Cities have the opportunity to use “innovation, combined with digital technologies to improve governance, service delivery and societal inclusion”.<sup>14</sup> However, the increasing reliance on technology risks deepening inequalities within society (also known as the ‘the digital divide’) unless public investment in technological innovation serves all communities. It will affect how municipal services are provided and will require municipalities to develop new skills and ways of doing and thinking.

### Resurgence of civil society

The COVID-19 pandemic saw people unite and communities come together to assist each other. It resulted in partnerships being formed among different communities and different organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), businesses and community members. Numerous collective community networks formed organically, and their innovative, rapid and locally based responses and relationships demonstrated that civil society can not only have a massive positive impact but also complement the central role of local government. The challenge for local government is to capitalise through supporting (not stifling through bureaucratic control) the resurgence of civil society organisations, drawing them in as partners in an ‘all-of-society’ approach to development.

<sup>12</sup> Input from G Quinot at Celebrating 25 Years of Local Government Virtual Conference, South Africa, 25–26 November 2020

<sup>13</sup> Mail and Guardian. ‘Local government in crisis: how it can be fixed: Effective citizen participation ahead of the 2021 Local Government Elections’ Webinar 19 November 2020

<sup>14</sup> [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Smart\\_Cities\\_Papers\\_Volume\\_1\\_Final-Draft.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Smart_Cities_Papers_Volume_1_Final-Draft.pdf), page 5.



## KEY QUESTIONS

- How can technology be harnessed to support participatory citizenship, social inclusion and the all-of-society approach?
- Is it possible to improve integration and coordination across departments and across spheres of government using the new technologies available?
- How can local government support and encourage the emergence of civil society organisations and networks that are locally relevant and effective?



## WHERE DO WE GO TO FROM HERE?

---

Cities are experiencing their greatest turbulence in the democratic era, with shifting dynamics in the formation of councils and ongoing urbanisation challenges, including population pressure, poverty, and the effects of energy and water scarcity. The following recommendations are offered to cities, as a basis for a new political outlook for local government, to enable cities to survive and thrive in the next phase of democratic local government.

### Adopt a local cooperative model of governance

Over the past five years, the governance reality of coalitions (which are temporary in nature) has demonstrated instability, a lack of decision-making and a visible decline in service delivery across South African municipalities. There appears to be no universal acceptance or common understanding and articulation of the challenges facing cities among political parties. Inevitably, the consequences of coalitions will be that municipal performance continues to take a back seat. To address this, local government should adopt a cooperative model of governance, which draws on the cooperative business models practised in communities. Unlike coalitions, cooperation focuses on strengthening relationships among leadership and expects everyone to work together to achieve a common purpose. People working cooperatively empower and hold each other accountable for the power granted, while practising, protecting, promoting and perpetuating healthy democratic practices.

A cooperative governance instrument would both improve local government's performance (in terms of administration, service delivery and responsiveness to community needs) and encourage citizen participation in urban decision-making. To be effective, such collaborations would require negotiations that appreciate the political complexities, and leadership groups that share a common interest in addressing the thorny challenges facing cities. The first step would be to develop a convincing plan and a clearly articulated narrative that defines the problem and is broadly accepted. Simply put, the problem is not local government in and of itself, but complex systemic challenges, which require a cooperative governance structure to resolve them.

### Implement a differentiated approach to solving problems

Any long-lasting solution must recognise that municipalities are not identical but face similar problems of varying magnitudes. 'One-size-fits-all' and generic solutions will not address the deep-rooted and systemic problems facing cities. What is needed is a differentiated approach to solving local government challenges. Unfortunately, the current system still largely relies on a 'one-size-fits-all' approach, despite urgent calls for differentiation. The policy framework simply does not go far enough to allow for differentiation among the large metros, secondary (or intermediate) cities and rural municipalities. Even within these categories, the significant differences in economies, capacity, and social and spatial environments need to be recognised and accommodated.

A differentiated approach must be adopted to support municipalities that are unable to sustain themselves. A differentiated approach needs to consider the following:

- Cities are the drivers of the economy and must be at the heart of South Africa's growth strategy. Practically, this means that cities must be allocated and assigned a range of specific powers and functions that enable them to drive growth.
- All functions related to the built environment (including human settlements, public transport and related functions) should be devolved to metros and non-metro municipalities that demonstrate capacity. Combining resources across municipalities would give effect to the notion of regional governance. For example, the City of Cape Town, the Cape Winelands District Municipality and the Overberg District Municipality could pool resources to leverage economies of scale in dealing with issues such as housing.
- A two-tier system (city-states) should be considered in certain areas of the country, where state and municipal functions could be combined under a single authority. The most obvious example of this is in Gauteng.

## Amplify the 'voice' of local government

Although the Constitution defines local government as an equal and autonomous sphere in the government system, in practice local government's authority is vastly diminished. To strengthen the 'voice' of local government, municipalities must be involved in both planning and allocating budgets in all issues that affect the local environment. Municipalities must be given adequate representation in all national and provincial strategy sessions and party conferences, as well as specific planning and budgeting sessions. For example, municipalities must be involved in developing and budgeting for the post-COVID-19 economic recovery plan.

Through strong advocacy, local government has a substantial role to play in reshaping the future of our cities and, most importantly, responding to challenges as they emerge. To amplify the voice of local government will also require decluttering the local government operational space and streamlining policy and legislation meant to support local government. Furthermore, cities need to recognise that citizens are their greatest resource by adopting a more holistic approach to problem-solving, which puts people at the centre, fosters discussion, and enables policymakers, individual cities and their citizens to choose the best way forward.

## Rethink the architecture and design of the local government system

South Africa is a land of many paradoxes that include shining lights and bleak darkness. As cities face (and will continue to face) emergencies, strong and resilient administrations need to be developed and insulated. This means separating the legislative and executive functions in municipalities, which will require rethinking the architectural design of the local government system as set out in legislation and policy.

It is proposed that the mayoral system be enhanced to allow for the establishment of a cabinet that functions in a similar way to the executive authority of national government. This would allow for the establishment of several committees that would include representation from opposition parties. Furthermore, while the cadre system is inevitable in political appointments, it cannot play a role in administrative appointments, and so it is crucial to flag the difference between political and executive appointments.

## Implement an all-of-society and whole-of-government approach

The Constitution entrenches a bottom-up, participatory approach to governance that focuses on community-driven development. However, the reality is that delivery has come overwhelmingly from the top. One of local government's failures is the over-politicisation of the local space, at the expense of progress. There has been very little meaningful engagement with the private sector and a great deal of mistrust of businesses at the local level. Very few municipalities have made progress in involving businesses in planning and decision-making to improve their local areas.

What is needed is both a whole-of-government approach and an all-of-society approach, involving the various spheres and entities of government and all parties who have a stake in the local environment in order to support the developmental outcomes of local government. The starting point is for municipalities to build trust with these stakeholders, which include the private sector, civil society, faith-based organisations and thinktanks. Municipalities need to acknowledge that the private sector could enhance and complement the performance of government, and that the business sector needs to be actively encouraged to become involved in local initiatives. Government officials also need to be capacitated to respond in a more organic and flexible way to the business community and to engage meaningfully in public participation processes and communication. Applying both approaches would provide a much-needed balance that encourages an inclusive participatory approach to planning and governance, and to strategies and programmes that are driven by communities based on their localised, developmental needs.



### THE LAST WORD

---

Cities that are taking bold steps and learning lessons are also the cities that are 'failing forward'. Those cities that adopt new ways of thinking will see the dawn before many others do. The future of cities may not be set in stone nor be easy to predict, but the choices made now will shape the lives of generations to come. South African cities have the potential to be the reference point for cities across the globe in identifying, experimenting with and applying solutions to the future challenges that cities will face.

This chapter has highlighted the journey travelled by cities over the past 25 years, identified potential pitfalls and defined broad principles that cities could use to chart a way forward, through the turbulence that lies ahead. The hope is that it inspires the move to an alternative political agenda for local government.



# LIST OF FIGURES

---

|                                       |    |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b> Timeline (1994–2020) | 8  |
| <b>Figure 2:</b> SoCRV theme          | 13 |

## SECTION 1. Insights Into City Performance and Trends

|   |    |
|---|----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b> Common Data Framework for Cities   | 18 |
| <b>Figure 2:</b> Population growth (2011–2019)  | 21 |
| <b>Figure 3:</b> Increase/decrease in households living in informal dwellings (2015–2018)                       | 21 |
| <b>Figure 4:</b> Change in percentage of city population with adequate access to food (2015–2018)               | 21 |
| <b>Figure 5:</b> Increase/decrease in unemployment rate (2016–2020)   | 21 |
| <b>Figure 6:</b> Change in access to basic services between 2015 and 2018                                       | 21 |
| <b>Figure 7:</b> Households experiencing environmental problems (2019)  | 21 |
| <b>Figure 8:</b> Increase/decrease in households spending $\geq 10\%$ of income on public transport (2015–2018) | 21 |

## SECTION 2. Collaboration and Partnership: Working Towards Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Cities

### CHAPTER 1. Governing South African Cities

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b> SACN's thematic logic | 68 |
|--|----|

### CHAPTER 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b> Local government is designed to function as a partnership    | 100 |
| <b>Figure 2:</b> How inequality replicates, despite increases in productivity | 101 |
| <b>Figure 3:</b> Economic actors in cities                                    | 102 |
| <b>Figure 4:</b> Layout of Bridge City  | 115 |

## CHAPTER 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition

|                   |   |     |
|-------------------|---|-----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b>  | Timeline of national policies, frameworks and key climate-related incidents (2016–2021) | 149 |
| <b>Figure 2:</b>  | Quadruple helix   | 154 |
| <b>Figure 3:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the UEN  | 155 |
| <b>Figure 4:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the Water Resilient Cities                                 | 156 |
| <b>Figure 5:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the City Waster Managers' Forum                            | 156 |
| <b>Figure 6:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the EDP  | 158 |
| <b>Figure 7:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the GRCO   | 158 |
| <b>Figure 8:</b>  | All-of-society indicator for the ECSECC   | 159 |
| <b>Figure 9:</b>  | City of Ekurhuleni proposed three-phase future  | 161 |
| <b>Figure 10:</b> | Strategies and policies developed since 2012 with which the GDS should align            | 161 |

## CHAPTER 5. Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game

|                  |                       |     |
|------------------|-----------------------|-----|
| <b>Figure 1:</b> | The rules of the game | 178 |
|------------------|-----------------------|-----|

# LIST OF TABLES

---

## SECTION 2. Collaboration and Partnership: Working Towards Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Cities

### CHAPTER 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion

|                 |   |     |
|-----------------|---|-----|
| <b>Table 1:</b> | Unemployment rate (2015–2021)                                   | 107 |
| <b>Table 2:</b> | Economic development cooperative structures                     | 113 |
| <b>Table 3:</b> | Community involvement in the Bridge City Shopping Centre (2012) | 116 |

### CHAPTER 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition

|                 |   |     |
|-----------------|---|-----|
| <b>Table 1:</b> | Strategies used by the nine cities  | 151 |
| <b>Table 2:</b> | Structures or mechanisms to embed sustainability practices across the nine cities | 152 |

# REFERENCES

## SECTION 2. Collaboration and Partnership: Working Towards Transformed, Inclusive and Sustainable Cities

### CHAPTER 1. Governing South African Cities

- Anciano F and Piper L. 2019. *Democracy Disconnected: Participation and Governance in a City of the South*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Atkinson D. 2007. Taking to the streets: Has developmental local government failed in South Africa? In Buhlungu S, Daniel J, Southall R & Lutchman J (eds.). *State of the Nation: South Africa 2007*. Pretoria: HSRC Press, pp. 53–77.
- AUC (African Union Commission). 2015. *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*. Addis Ababa: AUC.
- Barber BR. 2013. *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Barichievy K, Piper L and Parker B. 2005. Assessing participatory governance in local government: A case-study of two South African cities, *Politeia* 24(3): 370–393.
- Benit-Gbaffou C. 2008. Are practices of local participation sidelining the institutional participatory channels? Reflections from Johannesburg, *Transformation* 66/7: 1–33.
- Benit-Gbaffou, C, Dubresson A, Fourchard L, Ginisty K, Jaglin S, Olukoju A, Owuor A and Vivet J. 2013. Exploring the role of party politics in the governance of African Cities. In Bekker S and Fouchard L (eds.). *Governing Cities in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp 17–42.
- Booyesen S. 2009. Public participation in democratic South Africa: From popular mobilisation to structured co-optation and protest, *Politeia* 28: 1–27.
- Brenner N. 2004. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bulkeley H, Luque-Ayala A, McFarlane C and MacLeod G. 2018. Enhancing urban autonomy, towards a new political project for cities, *Urban Studies* 55(4): 702–719.
- Cameron R. 2003. Politics-administration interface: The case of the City of Cape Town, *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 69(1): 51–66.
- Cameron R. 2005. Metropolitan restructuring (and more restructuring) in South Africa, *Public Administration and Development* 25(4): 329–339.
- Cameron R. 2014. Vertical decentralisation and urban service delivery in South Africa: Does politics matter? *Development Policy Review* 32(S1): S81–S100.
- Christmas A and De Visser J. 2009. Bridging the gap between theory and practice: Reviewing the functions and powers of local government in South Africa, *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* (2009)2: 107–119.
- Chueca EG. 2016. Human rights in the city and the right to the city: Two different paradigms confronting urbanisation, in Oomen B, Davis MF and Grigolo M. 2016. *Global Urban Justice: The Rise of Human Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 103–120.
- COGTA (Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs). 2016. *Integrated Urban Development Framework: A New Deal for South African Cities and Towns*. Pretoria: COGTA.
- Curtis S. 2016. Cities and global governance: State failure or a new global order? *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44(3): 455–477.
- DeFilippis F. 1999. Alternatives to the “new urban politics”. Finding locality and autonomy in local economic development, *Political Geography* 18: 973–990.
- De Lille P and Kesson C. 2017. *View from City Hall: Reflections on Governing Cape Town*. Johannesburg/Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.
- De Visser JW. 2005. *Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa*. Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia.
- De Visser J. 2009. Developmental local government in South Africa: Institutional fault lines, *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* (2009)2: 7–25.
- De Visser J. 2010. The political-administrative interface in South African municipalities: Assessing the quality of local democracies, *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance* (2010): 86–101.
- De Visser J. 2019. City regions in pursuit of SDG 11: Institutionalising multilevel cooperation in Gauteng, South Africa. In Aust H and Du Plessis A (eds.). *The Globalisation of Urban Governance: Legal Perspectives on SDG 11*. New York/London: Routledge, pp 186–207.
- De Visser J and November J. 2017. Overseeing the overseers: Assessing compliance with municipal intervention rules in South Africa, *Hague Journal on Rule of Law* 9: 109–133.

- Du Plessis A. 2010. "Local environmental governance" and the role of local government in realising section 24 of the South African Constitution, *Stellenbosch Law Review* 21(2): 265–297.
- Du Plessis A. 2017. The readiness of South African law and policy for the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goal 11, *Law, Democracy & Development* 21: 239–262.
- Du Plessis A. 2018. The judiciary's role in shaping urban space in South Africa as per the sustainable development goals, *South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy* 24(1): 5–43.
- Fombad CM. 2018. Constitutional entrenchment of decentralization in Africa: An overview of trends and tendencies, *Journal of African Law* 62(2): 175–199.
- Foster K. 2019. South Africa's tools for urban public participation, *Urban Governance Paper Series* 1: 37–47. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Frug GE. 1999. *City Making: Building Communities Without Building Walls*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fuo O. 2019. Funding and good financial governance as imperatives for cities' pursuit of SDG 11. In Aust H and Du Plessis A (eds.). *The Globalisation of Urban Governance: Legal Perspectives on SDG11*. New York/London: Routledge, pp 87–107.
- Gervais-Lambony P. 2015. Meetings in Vosloorus (Ekurhuleni): Democratic public spaces or spaces for grievances? In Benit-Gabffou C (ed.). *Popular Politics in South African Cities: Unpacking Community Participation*. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 196–213.
- Grigolo M. 2017. Local governments and human rights: Some critical reflections, *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* 49(1): 67–98.
- Gumede W, Everatt D, Karuri-Sebina G, Moleketi T and Willis A. 2020. Integrated, all-of-society, democratic emergency governance. Discussion paper prepared for the State of Cities Project.
- Harber J. 2019. Building capacity for the governance of space: The case of Johannesburg's BRT. *Urban Governance Paper Series* 1: 60–69. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Houghton J. 2011. Negotiating the global and the local: Evaluating development through public-private partnerships in Durban, South Africa, *Urban Forum* 22(1): 75–93.
- Kola N and Jordan L. 2019. Making participation meaningful, *Urban Governance Paper Series* 1: 26–36. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Kraai S, Holthauzen N and Malan L. 2017. Oversight mechanisms in local government: A case of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa, *African Journal of Public Affairs* 9(1): 59–72.
- Kruger P, Moyo K; Mudau P; Pieterse M and Spies A. 2021. Republic of South Africa: Response to Covid-19. In King J and Ferraz O (eds.). *Oxford Compendium of National Legal Responses to Covid-19*. Oxford University Press. Available through [oxcon.ouplaw.com](https://oxcon.ouplaw.com)
- Ledger T and Rampedi M. 2019. Mind the Gap: Section 139 Interventions in Theory and Practice. Johannesburg: PARI.
- Lemanski C. 2007. Global cities in the South: Deepening social and spatial polarisation in Cape Town, *Cities* 24(6): 448–461.
- Lobel O. 2004. The renew deal: The fall of regulation and the rise of governance in contemporary legal thought, *Minnesota Law Review* 89(2): 342–470.
- Madlalate R. 2017. (In)equality at the intersection of race and space in Johannesburg, *South African Journal on Human Rights* 33(3): 472–495.
- Masango CL. 2019. Power dynamics in municipal governance: Insights from the City of Johannesburg. *Urban Governance Paper Series* 1: 70–83. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Mazzucato M, Qobo M and Kattel, R. 2021. Building state capacities and dynamic capabilities to drive social and economic development: The case of South Africa. *UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose Working Paper Series* (IIPP WP 2021/09). Available at: <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/wp2021-09>
- Millstein M. 2010. Limits to democracy: The politics of urban governance transformations in Cape Town, *ICLD Working Paper* No 2.
- MirafTAB F. 2007. Governing post-apartheid spatiality: Implementing city improvement districts in Cape Town, *Antipode* 39(4): 602–626.
- Murray MJ. 2011. *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham/London: Duke University Press.
- Napier CJ. 2018. Political oversight committees and the separation of powers in the local sphere of government: The case of the City of Tshwane, *Journal of Public Administration* 53(2): 169–185.
- Newman P and Verpraet G. 1999. The impacts of partnership on urban governance: Conclusions from recent European Research, *Regional Studies* 33(5): 487–491.
- Olver C. 2019. *A House Divided: The Feud that Drove Cape Town to the Brink*. Johannesburg/Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.
- Oomen B. 2016. Introduction: The promise and challenges of human rights cities. In Oomen B, Davis MF and Grigolo M. *Global Urban Justice: The Rise of Human Rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–19.

- Oomen B and van der Berg E. 2014. Human rights cities: Urban actors as pragmatic idealistic human rights users, *Human Rights & International Legal Discourse* 8(2): 160–185.
- Palmer I, Moodley N and Parnell S. 2017. *Building a Capable State: Service Delivery in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. London: Zed Books.
- Picciotto S. 2011. International transformations of the capitalist state, *Antipode* 43(1): 87–107.
- Pierre J. 1999. Models of urban governance: The institutional dimension of urban politics, *Urban Affairs Review* 34(3): 372–396.
- Pieterse M. 2014. Development, the right to the city and the legal and constitutional responsibilities of local government in South Africa, *South African Law Journal* 131(1): 149–177.
- Pieterse M. 2017. *Rights-based Litigation, Urban Governance and Social Justice in South Africa: The Right to Joburg*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Pieterse M. 2018. Socio-economic rights adjudication and democratic urban governance: Reassessing the “second wave” jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, 51(1): 12–34.
- Pieterse M. 2019a. Urban autonomy in South African intergovernmental relations jurisprudence, *Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law* 13(2): 119–146.
- Pieterse M. 2019b. Components of rights-based service delivery, *Urban Governance Paper Series* 1: 6–17. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Pieterse M. 2019c. A year of living dangerously? Urban assertiveness, cooperative governance and the first year of three coalition-led metropolitan municipalities in South Africa, *Politikon* 46(1): 51–70.
- Pieterse M. 2020a. Devolution, urban autonomy and local governance in the cities of the SADC, *African Journal of International and Comparative Law* 28(4): 612–635.
- Pieterse M. 2020b. Out of the shadows: Towards a line between party and state in South African local government, *South African Journal on Human Rights* 36(2-3): 131–153.
- Pieterse M. 2021. Anatomy of a crisis: Structural factors contributing to the collapse of urban municipal governance in Emfuleni, South Africa, *Urban Forum* 32(1): 1–15.
- Piper L. 2015. From party-state to party-society in South Africa: SANCO and the informal politics of community representation in Imizamo Yethu, Cape Town. In Benit-Gbaffou C (ed.). *Popular Politics in South African Cities: Unpacking Community Participation*. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp 21–41.
- Piper L and Deacon R. 2009. Too dependent to participate: Ward committees and local democratisation in South Africa, *Local Government Studies* 35(4): 415–433.
- Porras IM. 2009. The city and international law: In pursuit of sustainable development, *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 36(3): 537–602.
- Ray B. 2016. *Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation and Democracy in South Africa's Second Wave*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Resnick D. 2014. Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: The role of politics and policies, *Development Policy Review* 32(S1): 3–17.
- SACN (South African Cities Network). 2016. State of South African Cities Report. Johannesburg, SACN.
- SACN. 2020. State of City Finances Report. Johannesburg, SACN.
- Sassen S. 2012. *Cities in a World Economy* (4<sup>th</sup> edition). London: Sage.
- Savage D. 2007. Key themes and trends in municipal finance in South Africa. In Van Donk M et al. (eds.). *Consolidating Local Development: Lessons from the South African Experience*. Cape Town: UCT Press, pp 285–316.
- Schragger R. 2016. *City Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sinwell L. 2015. Social movements, mobilisation and political parties: A case study of the Landless People's Movement: South Africa. In Benit-Gbaffou C (ed.). *Popular Politics in South African Cities: Unpacking Community Participation*. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp 70–92.
- South Africa. 1998. White Paper on Local Government. Department of Constitutional Development. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa.
- Steytler N. 2008. The strangulation of local government, *Journal of South African Law*, (2008)3: 518–535.
- Steytler N and De Visser J. 2008. Local government, in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds.). *Constitutional Law of South Africa* Cape Town: Juta & Co. (2ed OS), chapter 22.
- Thornhill C. 2008a. The transformed local government system: Some lessons, *Journal of Public Administration*, 43(3): 492–511.
- Thornhill C. 2008b. The executive mayor/municipal manager interface. *Journal of Public Administration*, 43(4): 725–735.
- Turok I. 2013. Transforming South Africa's divided cities: Can devolution help? *International Planning Studies* 18(2): 168–187.

- Turok I. 2014. The resilience of South African cities a decade after local democracy, *Environment and Planning A* 46: 749–769.
- UCLG (United Cities and Local Government). 2018. Towards the Localization of the SDGs. Barcelona: UCLG.
- UN (United Nations). 1966: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. New York: UN.
- UN. 2015a. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. General Assembly Resolution 70/1. New York: UN.
- UN. 2015b. Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference for Financing for Development. New York: UN.
- UN-Habitat. 2017. New Urban Agenda, A/RES/71/256. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-Habitat.
- Valencia SC, Simon D, Croese S, Nordqvist J, Oloko M, Sharma T, Taylor Buck N and Versace I. 2019. Adapting the Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda to the city level: Initial reflections from a comparative research project, *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development* 11(1): 4–23.
- Van der Berg A. 2017. South Africa's integrated urban development framework and sustainable development goal 11: Policy mismatch or success? *Obiter* 38(3): 557–573.
- Van der Berg A. 2019. The pursuit of SDG 11 through the lens of integrated development planning, in Aust H and Du Plessis A (eds.). *The Globalisation of Urban Governance: Legal Perspectives on SDG 11*. New York/London: Routledge, pp. 208–226.
- Van Wyk J. 2012. Planning in all its (dis)guises: Spheres of government, functional areas and autonomy. *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal* 15(5): 288–318.
- Wilson S. 2011. Planning for inclusion in South Africa: The State's duty to prevent homelessness and the potential of "meaningful engagement", *Urban Forum* 22(3): 265–252.
- Woodridge D. 2007. Political systems and capacity issues. In Van Donk M et al. (eds.). *Consolidating Local Development: Lessons from the South African Experience*. Cape Town: UCT Press, pp. 465–486.

## CHAPTER 2. Productive Cities: Governance and Economic Inclusion

- Amusa H, Wabiri N and Fadiran D. 2019. Agglomeration and productivity in South Africa: Evidence from firm-level data, WIDER Working Paper 2019: 93.
- Bradlow BH. 2021. Weapons of the strong: Elite resistance and the neo-Apartheid city, *City & Community*, Vol. 20(3): 191–211. Available online: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1535684121994522?journalCode=ctyy>
- CAHF (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance) and CSP (City Support Programme). 2020. *South Africa Housing Report*. Available online: <https://housingfinanceafrica.org/app/uploads/2021/03/Citymark-National-Property-Market-Report-3-March-2021-FINAL.pdf>
- Cawe A. 2021. The Economy on your Doorstep: The political economy that explains why the South African economy "misfires", and what we can do about it. Bryanston: Tracey McDonald Publishers.
- Charman A, Petersen L and Govender T. 2020. *Township Economy – People, Spaces and Practices*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Charman A. 2021. *Time to Reset our Thinking on Planning for Township Economic Development*. Township Economic Development Project Opinion Piece # 2. Available online: <https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/DocumentsConferencesWorkshops/TED%20Opinion%20Piece%20No%202.pdf>
- COGTA (Department of Cooperative Governance). 2016. Integrated Urban Development Framework. Pretoria: COGTA.
- Criado-Perez C. 2019. *Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men*. Abrams: New York.
- CSP (City Support Programme). 2021. City Spatialised Economic Data – Metro Level Reports. Available online: <https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/pages/newsitem.aspx?itemID=19>
- EDP (Economic Development Partnership) and HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council). 2019. *Strengthening Township Economies*. Available online: [https://www.ukesa.info/download/u7Kj6DRcliJNtFdBvVGQPnEaHrAk8fmq/STRENGTHENING-TOWNSHIP-ECONOMIES\\_2019.pdf](https://www.ukesa.info/download/u7Kj6DRcliJNtFdBvVGQPnEaHrAk8fmq/STRENGTHENING-TOWNSHIP-ECONOMIES_2019.pdf)
- Ellis P. 2021. City Transformation through neighbourhood redevelopment. Presented at CSP TED Symposium. Available online: <https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/metro-ted-symposium?itemID=13>
- eThekweni Municipality, 2020. eThekweni Incentive Policy 2020–2021. Available online: [http://www.durban.gov.za/City\\_Services/Economic\\_Development/Documents/EconomicDevelopmentIncentivePolicy2020\\_2021ApprovedFinal.pdf](http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/Economic_Development/Documents/EconomicDevelopmentIncentivePolicy2020_2021ApprovedFinal.pdf)

- FCDO (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office). 2006. Eliminating world poverty: Making governance work for the poor. *White Paper no. 3*. London: FCDO.
- Figueroa J, Jun B, Glaeser EL and Hidalgo C. 2018. The role of industry, occupation and location-specific knowledge in the survival of new firms. *Working Paper 24868*. Available online: [https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/role\\_of\\_industry\\_occ\\_locspec\\_knowl\\_nberwp.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/role_of_industry_occ_locspec_knowl_nberwp.pdf)
- Fourie J. 2021. *Our Long Walk to Economic Freedom: Lessons from 100 000 years of human history*. Tafelberg: Cape Town.
- GPG (Gauteng Provincial Government). 2021. Industrial Parks Portfolio Management Emerging Policy Framework with Potential Implications for Ekandustria. Available online: [https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/DocumentsConferencesWorkshops/GPG%20MEGA-%20Industrial%20estates%20policy%20framework\\_v2.pdf](https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/DocumentsConferencesWorkshops/GPG%20MEGA-%20Industrial%20estates%20policy%20framework_v2.pdf)
- Grant R, Carmedy P, Murphey J. 2019. *South Africa's Green Transition? The Case of Atlantis Greentech Special Economic Zone*. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Available online: <https://ic-sd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/padraig-carmody.pdf>
- Haferburg C and Huchzermeyer M. 2017. Redlining or renewal? The space-based construction of decay and its contestation through a local agency in Brixton, Johannesburg. In Kirkness, P and TijéDra, A. (eds.). *Negative Neighbourhood Reputation and Place Attachment: The Production and Contestation of Territorial Stigma*, pp. 60–80. London: Routledge. Available online: <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/25468/Redlining%20or%20renewal.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Hausmann R. 2015. Redistribution versus inclusion? Project Syndicate. Available online: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/income-inequality-opportunity-costs-by-ricardo-hausmann-2015-01?barrier=accesspay>
- Isandla Institute. 2021. Backyarding: Understanding backyard rental markets better: A synthesis of research findings in eight neighbourhoods in Cape Town 2021. Available online: [https://isandla.org.za/en/resources/item/download/184\\_64b5f78ed1427ab82eafec8618c7bd12](https://isandla.org.za/en/resources/item/download/184_64b5f78ed1427ab82eafec8618c7bd12)
- Kamara R. 2021. Accountability in the context of cooperative governance and local economic development (LED) in South African local government. *MegaTrendReview*, Vol. 18: 1. Available online: [https://megatrend.edu.rs/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Megatrend\\_revija\\_Vol\\_18\\_No\\_1\\_2021-WEB.pdf#page=31](https://megatrend.edu.rs/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Megatrend_revija_Vol_18_No_1_2021-WEB.pdf#page=31)
- LGSETA (Local Government Sector Education and Training Association). 2020. *Assessment of the viability and potential of township economies for municipalities*. Available online: [https://cdn.lgseta.co.za/resources/research\\_and\\_reports/2019%20%E2%80%93%202020%20RESEARCH%20PROJECTS/RESEARCH%20REPORT%20-%20TOWNSHIP%20ECONOMY.pdf](https://cdn.lgseta.co.za/resources/research_and_reports/2019%20%E2%80%93%202020%20RESEARCH%20PROJECTS/RESEARCH%20REPORT%20-%20TOWNSHIP%20ECONOMY.pdf)
- Matjomane M and Koma O. 2020. Infrastructure and services are central to growing the informal sector. *SACN Urban Economies Papers Series*. <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Urban-Economies-Papers.pdf>
- National Treasury. 2019. *Economic Transformation, Inclusive Growth, and Competitiveness: Towards an economic strategy for South Africa*. Pretoria: National Treasury, Economic Policy. Available online: [http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm\\_media/press/2019/Towards%20an%20Economic%20Strategy%20for%20SA.pdf](http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2019/Towards%20an%20Economic%20Strategy%20for%20SA.pdf)
- Nomathemba NC. 2012. *Community Development through the Bridge City project in the INK Area*. A thesis submitted to the University of KwaZulu-Natal in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the School of Built Environment and Development Studies. Available online: [https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/9882/Ngongoma\\_Clara\\_Nomathemba\\_2012.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10413/9882/Ngongoma_Clara_Nomathemba_2012.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)
- NPC (National Planning Commission). 2012. *National Development Plan. Our Future – make it work*. Pretoria: NPC.
- Pillay P and Govender M. 2020. Integrating the informal sector into the local economy. *SACN Urban Economies Papers Series*. Available online: <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Urban-Economies-Papers.pdf>
- SACN (South African Cities Network). 2016. *State of Cities Report*. Available online: <http://www.socr.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SoCR16-Main-Report-online.pdf>
- SACN. 2018. *City Development Strategy Guideline*. Available online: <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CDS-Guideline-Report-Released-2018.pdf>
- SACN. 2020. *State of City Finances report*. Available online: <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SOCF-2020-Report.pdf>
- SACN. 2021. *The State of the Expanded Public Works Programme in South African Cities 2019–2021*. Available online: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/EPWP\\_AR\\_pages\\_2808\\_WEB.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/EPWP_AR_pages_2808_WEB.pdf)
- SALGA (South African Local Government Association) and SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa). 2018. *Towards Recommendations on the Regulation of Informal Trade at Local Government Level*. Available online: <https://www.salga.org.za/Documents/Knowledge%20Hub/Publications/Research%20Projects%20and%20Results/SERI-SALGA%20Recommendations%20on%20the%20Regulation%20of%20Informal%20Trade.pdf>
- Scheba A and Turok I. 2020. Informal rental housing in the South: dynamic but neglected. *Environment and Urbanization*, 32(1): 109–132. Available online: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956247819895958>
- Spaull et al. 2021. *National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM)*. Various reports. <https://cramsurvey.org/reports/>
- Stafford C. 2005. *Apartheid Atlantis: a planned city in a racist society*. Stanford University, History Department, unpublished Honors thesis.

- Stats SA (Statistics South Africa). 2019. *General Household Survey*. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182019.pdf>
- Stats SA. 2021. *Quarterly Labour Force Survey*. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2021.pdf>
- Takunda S. 2016. Evaluating the impact of social grants and the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) on poverty reduction in South Africa. Thesis. Available online: <http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/5271>
- Turok I and Charman A. 2021. *Building Township Economies: From Top-Down Planning to Enabling Development*. Township Economic Development Project Opinion Piece # 4. Available online: <https://csp.treasury.gov.za/csp/DocumentsConferencesWorkshops/TED%20Opinion%20Piece%20No.4.pdf>
- Visagie J and Turok I. 2020. *The Economic Landscape of South African Cities: Diversity across space, sector and skills*. In: Urban Economies Papers. Available online: <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Urban-Economies-Papers.pdf>

### CHAPTER 3. Inclusive Cities: Transversal Cooperation for Inclusion and Wellbeing

- Basdeo M. 2012. The impact and dilemma of unfunded mandates confronting local government in South Africa: A comparative analysis. *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, 51 (September).
- Bjala Foundation. 2016. Community-Driven Design, Jeppe Park: An Analysis of History, Use, Stakeholders; and of the Community's Vision for Jeppe Park. Johannesburg: Bjala Foundation.
- Coetzee T. 2010. Cooperative governance and good governance: Reality or myth? *Journal for Contemporary History*, 35(2): 84-107.
- COGTA (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs). 2016. Integrated Urban Development Framework. Pretoria: COGTA.
- CoJ (City of Johannesburg) and JDA (Johannesburg Development Agency). 2016. Inner City Eastern Gateway: Urban Development Framework. Johannesburg: CoJ and JDA.
- Deloitte. 2021. Women @ Work Report: A Global Outlook. Available at: <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-women-at-work-global-outlook-report.pdf>
- Desmond C, Timol F, Groenewald C and Sausi K. 2016. Towards the development of a contextualised homelessness policy: A Durban case study. *HSRC Policy Brief 01 – Homelessness*, November 2017.
- DHS (Department of Human Settlements). 2018. Localising the New Urban Agenda. South Africa Discussion Document. Pretoria: DHS.
- eThekwini PRC (Parks, Recreation & Culture). [n.d.]. Restructure of Congella Park by integrating homeless people.
- GCRO (Gauteng City Region Observatory). 2021. Quality of Life Survey 2020/21. Johannesburg: GCRO.
- GIZ-VCP and VPUU NPC (eds.). 2020. Violence Prevention Case Studies. Available online at [www.saferspaces.org.za](http://www.saferspaces.org.za) and [www.vpuu.org.za](http://www.vpuu.org.za)
- ISOCARP. 2021. International Symposium on Inclusive Cities, 28–30 June 2021.
- Leibbrandt M, Woolard I, Finn A and Argent J. 2010. Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty Since the Fall of Apartheid. OECD, Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46457107\\_Trends\\_in\\_South\\_African\\_Income\\_Distribution\\_and\\_Poverty\\_Since\\_the\\_Fall\\_of\\_Apartheid](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46457107_Trends_in_South_African_Income_Distribution_and_Poverty_Since_the_Fall_of_Apartheid)
- Nel E and Binns T. 2003. Putting 'developmental local government' into practice: the experience of South Africa's towns and cities. *Urban Forum*, 14: 165–184.
- Nwosu C and Ndinda C. 2018. Female Household Headship and Poverty in South Africa: An Employment-based analysis. ERSA (Economic Research Southern Africa) Working Paper 761.
- Nzimande NP and Fabula S. 2020. Socially sustainable urban renewal in emerging economies: A comparison of Magdolna Quarter, Budapest, Hungary and Albert Park, Durban, South Africa. *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin*, 69(4): 383–400.
- Rampersad J. [n.d.]. Revitalising Congella Park through the inclusion of homeless people. [https://www.ierm.org.za/Congella\\_Park\\_Learning\\_Exchange\\_by\\_Jeniffer\\_Rampersad.pdf](https://www.ierm.org.za/Congella_Park_Learning_Exchange_by_Jeniffer_Rampersad.pdf)
- Right2Protest Project. 2017. The State of Protest in South Africa Report, Right2Protest Project (Wits University), 2017 available at [https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/cals/documents/r2p/Right-to-protest\\_masterset\\_web.pdf](https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/cals/documents/r2p/Right-to-protest_masterset_web.pdf) (accessed May 2021).
- SACN (South African Cities Network). 2015. Assessing Local Government Capacity for Spatial Transformation in South African cities. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2016. The State of Cities Report 2016. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2017. The State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report 2017. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2019. The State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report 2018/19. Johannesburg: SACN.



- SACN. 2020a. The State of Crime and Safety in South African Cities Report 2020. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2020b. Urban Safety Brief on Public Space. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. [forthcoming] SACN-IUDF Youth and City Space: Phase III Report. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN–SACPLAN. 2019. Young Planners Essay Competition I. Johannesburg: SACN. Available online: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/designed-draft-sacn\\_young-planners-digital\\_publication-2018.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/designed-draft-sacn_young-planners-digital_publication-2018.pdf)
- Seepie Z and Goba N. [forthcoming]. A geographical perspective on gendered violence in Khayelitsha. *The Spatial Determinants of Wellbeing II Paper Series*. Johannesburg: SACN.
- Sen A. 2000. A decade of human development. *Journal of Human Development*, 1: 17–23.
- Stats SA (Statistics South Africa). 2020. Women-Headed Households. Pretoria: Stats SA.
- Stats SA. 2021. Youth Unemployment. Pretoria: Stats SA.
- The Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture. 2019. Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture. Available at: [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis\\_document/201907/panelreportlandreform\\_0.pdf](https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_0.pdf)
- UN-Habitat. 2017. Policy paper 1: The right to the city and cities for all. Presented at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, New York. Available at: [www.habitat3.org](http://www.habitat3.org)
- WHO (World Health Organization). 1997. WHOQOL Measuring Quality of Life. Geneva: WHO. Available at: [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/63482/WHO\\_MSA\\_MNH\\_PSF\\_97.4.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/63482/WHO_MSA_MNH_PSF_97.4.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

## CHAPTER 4. Sustainable Cities: Cooperative Governance of the Just Urban Transition

- Baker L and Sovacool BK. 2017. The political economy of technological capabilities and global production networks in South Africa's wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) industries. *Political Geography*, 60: 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.03.003.
- C40 CFF (Cities Finance Facility). 2018. Transforming cities and finance to address climate change: The example of the C40 Cities Finance Facility. Available online: <https://cff-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/storage/files/eFdIR9tEi3ALnudfzN58GJxqCc8jEJTYnqyQ0TGs.pdf>
- C40 CFF. 2019. Transformative riverine management projects in Durban: Background and structuring. Available online: <https://cff-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/storage/files/s1Js6cQi Tg7m4x393utegmODIxW05oVuGniwjneS.pdf>
- City of Ekurhuleni. 2016. Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for the term 2016/17 to 2020/21. Ekurhuleni: City of Ekurhuleni.
- COGTA (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs). 2016. Integrated Urban Development Framework. Pretoria: COGTA.
- COGTA. 2019. EK/52 Profile and Analysis District Development Model: City of Ekurhuleni. Available online: [https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Take2\\_DistrictProfile\\_EKURHULENI-2.pdf](https://www.cogta.gov.za/ddm/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Take2_DistrictProfile_EKURHULENI-2.pdf)
- DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs). 2015. National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. Pretoria: DEA.
- DEA. 2019. National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. Pretoria: DEA.
- DEA and SANBI (South African National Biodiversity Institute). 2016. Strategic Framework and Overarching Implementation Plan for Ecosystems-based Adaptation in South Africa: 2016–2021. Pretoria: DEA.
- Eberhard R. 2015. Briefing Paper 1: Understanding electricity demand patterns in SA cities. Available online: [https://www.cityenergy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/resource\\_440.pdf](https://www.cityenergy.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/resource_440.pdf)
- Engelbrecht F, Le Roux A, Arnold K and Malherbe J. 2019. Green Book. Detailed projections of future climate change over South Africa. Pretoria: CSIR. Available online: <https://pta-gis-2-eb1.csir.co.za/portal/apps/GBCascade/index.html?appid=b161b2f892194ed5938374fe2192e537>
- Enqvist JP and Ziervogel G. 2019. Water governance and justice in Cape Town: An overview. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water*, 6(4): e1354.
- Goodbrand SA. 2019. Ecosystem-based adaptation of urban hydrology to climate change in three South African cities. A dissertation submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Science Degree in the School of Animal, Plants and Environmental Sciences.
- Gumucio T, Hansen J, Huyer S and Van Huysen T. 2020. Gender-responsive rural climate services: a review of the literature. *Climate and Development*, 12(3): 241–254.
- Hobbie SE and Grimm NB. 2020. Nature-based approaches to managing climate change impacts in cities. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 375(1794): 20190124.

- ICLEI-CBC (Cities Biodiversity Centre). 2016. Biodiversity and Municipal Planning – Local Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan Guidelines.
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2018. Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte V, Zhai P, Pörtner H-O, Roberts D, Skea J, Shukla PR, Pirani A, Moufouma-Okia W, Péan C, Pidcock R, Connors S, Matthews JBR, Chen Y, Zhou X, Gomis MI, Lonnoy E, Maycock T, Tignor M and Waterfield T (eds.)]
- IRP (International Resource Panel). 2018. *The Weight of Cities: Resource Requirements of Future Urbanization*. [Swilling M, Hajer M, Baynes T, Bergesen J, Labbé F, Musango JK, Ramaswami A, Robinson B, Salat S, Suh S, Currie P, Fang A, Hanson A, Kruit K, Reiner M, Smit S and Tabory S.] A Report by the International Resource Panel. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Jack CD, Jones R, Burgin L and Daron J. 2020. Climate risk narratives: An iterative reflective process for co-producing and integrating climate knowledge. *Climate Risk Management*, 375(1794): 20190124.
- Keeler BL, Hamel P, McPhearson T, Hamann MH, Donahue ML, Prado KA, Arkema KK, Bratman GN, Brauman KA, Finlay JC and Guerry AD. 2019. Social-ecological and technological factors moderate the value of urban nature. *Nature Sustainability*, 2: 29–38.
- Koop SHA and van Leeuwen CJ. 2017. The challenges of water, waste and climate change in cities. *Environment, Development and Sustainability*, 19: 385–418.
- Martel P and Sutherland C. 2019. Governing river rehabilitation for climate adaptation and water security in Durban, South Africa. In Cobbinah PB and Addaney M (eds.). *The Geography of Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Africa*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 355–387.
- Matikinca P, Ziervogel G and Enqvist JP. 2020. Drought response impacts on household water use practices in Cape Town, South Africa. *Water Policy*, 22: 483–500.
- Mazzucato M, Qobo M and Kattel R. 2021. Building state capacities and dynamic capabilities to drive social and economic development: The case of South Africa. UCL IIPP Working Paper 2021/09. Available online: <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/wp2021-09>
- McPhearson T, Andersson E, Elmqvist T and Frantzeskaki N. 2015. Resilience of and through urban ecosystem services. *Ecosystem Services*, 12: 152–156.
- Moretto A, Lion A, Macchion L, Caniato F, Danese P and Vinelli A. 2018. Designing a roadmap towards a sustainable supply chain: A focus on the fashion industry. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 193: 169–184.
- Nagendra H, Bai X, Brondizio ES and Lwasa S. 2018. The urban south and the predicament of global sustainability. *Nature Sustainability*, 1: 341–349.
- Petrie B, Wolpe P, Reddy Y, Adriázola P, Gerhard M, Landesman T, Strauch L and Marie A. 2018: Multi-level Climate Governance in South Africa. Catalysing finance for local climate action. Berlin/Cape Town: OneWorld, Sustainable Energy Africa, adelphi.
- Preiser R, Swilling M, Nnoli-Edozien N and Ramphele M. 2020. Towards new narratives of hope for fostering transformative African futures. African Chapter of the Club of Rome.
- Revi A, Sattethwaite D, Aragon-Durand F, Corfee-Morlot J, Kiunsi R, Pelling M, Roberts D, Solecki W, Gajjar SP and Sverdlík A. 2014: Towards transformative adaptation in cities: the IPCC's Fifth Assessment. *Environment and Urbanisation*, 26(1): 11–28.
- Roberts D, Boon R, Diederichs N, Douwes E, Govender N, McInnes A, Mclean A, O'Donoghue S and Spires M. 2012. Exploring ecosystem-based adaptation in Durban, South Africa: “learning-by-doing” at the local government coal face. *Environment and Urbanization*, 24(1): 167–195.
- SACN (South African Cities Network). 2016. State of Cities Report 2016. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2020a. Investigating the Efficacy and Impact of Sustainability Indicators in South African Cities. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2020b. A Comparative Analysis of Sustainability Practices in South African Cities. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SANBI. 2014. Biodiversity mainstreaming toolbox for land-use planning and development - Summarised toolbox for senior managers. Compiled by ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability and SANBI Grasslands Programme. Pretoria. Available online: [http://biodiversityadvisor.sanbi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Biodiversity-Mainstreaming-Toolbox\\_Senior-Managers-Summary.pdf](http://biodiversityadvisor.sanbi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Biodiversity-Mainstreaming-Toolbox_Senior-Managers-Summary.pdf)
- SEA (Sustainable Energy Africa). 2020. State of Energy in South African Cities 2020. Cape Town: SEA.
- Serdeczny O, Adams S, Baarsch F, Coumou D, Robinson A, Hare B, Schaeffer M, Perrette M and Reinhardt J. 2017. Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social repercussions. *Regional Environmental Change*, 17: 1–16.
- Simpson NP, Shearing CD and Dupont B. 2020. Gated adaptation during the Cape Town drought: mentalities, transitions and pathways to partial nodes of water security. *Society & Natural Resources*, 33: 1041–1049.

- Sitas N, Selomane O, Hamann M and Gajjar SP. 2021. Towards equitable urban resilience in the global South within a context of planning and management. In: Shackleton CM, Cilliers SS, Davoren E and du Toit MJ. (eds.). *Urban Ecology in the Global South*. Cities and Nature Series. Springer, Cham. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67650-6\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67650-6_13)
- Smit W. 2018. Urban governance in Africa: An overview. *International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement*, 10(2): 55–77. Available online: <http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2637>
- SUP (Summary for Urban Policy Makers). 2018. Summary for Urban Policy Makers: What the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC Means for Cities. [de Coninck H, Klaus I, Revi A, Schultz S and Solecki W (eds.)]. Available online: [https://iis.co.in/knowledge-gateway/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Summary-for-Policy-Makers\\_online\\_citation.pdf](https://iis.co.in/knowledge-gateway/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Summary-for-Policy-Makers_online_citation.pdf)
- Swilling M. 2020. *The Age of Sustainability: Just Transitions in a Complex World*. New York & London: Routledge.
- UN (United Nations). 2013. A new global partnership: eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development. New York: United Nations. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/8932013-05%20-%20HLP%20Report%20-%20A%20New%20Global%20Partnership.pdf>
- UN-Habitat. 2016. New Urban Agenda, Habitat III Quito 17-20 October 2016. Accessed on 15 October 2017, <http://habitat3.org/wp-content/uploads/NUA-English.pdf>
- Wolfram M, Borgström S and Farrelly M. 2019. Urban transformative capacity: From concept to practice. *Ambio*, 48: 1–12.
- Zerbo A, Delgado RC, González PA. 2020. Vulnerability and everyday health risks of urban informal settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Global Health Journal*, 4: 46–50. doi:10.1016/j.glohj.2020.04.003
- Ziervogel G. 2019. Unpacking the Cape Town Drought: Lessons learned. Report for the Cities Support Programme, undertaken by the African Centre for Cities. Cape Town.
- Ziervogel G, Enqvist J, Metelerkamp L and van Breda J. 2021. Supporting transformative climate adaptation: community-level capacity building and knowledge cocreation in South Africa. *Climate Policy*, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2020.1863180

## CHAPTER 5. Spatially Trapped: Transforming the Rules of the Game

- Ammons DN and Roenigk DJ. 2015. Performance management in local government: Is practice influenced by doctrine? *Public Performance & Management Review*, 38: 514–541.
- Andrews M, Pritchett L and Woolcock M. 2017. *Building State Capability*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Ansel C and Trondel J. 2018. Governing turbulence: An organizational-institutional agenda, *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, 1(1): 43–57.
- Béni-Gbaffou C. 2018. Unpacking state practices in city-making, in conversations with Ananya Roy, *The Journal of Development Studies*, 54(12): 2139–2148, DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2018.1460469.
- CLC (Community Law Centre). 2008. *The Strangulation of Local Government*. Cape Town: University of the Western Cape.
- COGTA (Department of Cooperative Affairs). 2016. *Integrated Urban Development Framework*. Pretoria: COGTA.
- De Visser J. 2010. The political-administrative interface in South African municipalities assessing the quality of local democracies, *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*, Special issue March.
- De Visser J. 2018. Five suggestions to fix local government. In GGLN (Good Governance Learning Network). *Developmental Local Government: Dream Deferred?* Cape Town: GGLN. pp.10–14.
- DHS and DPME (Department of Human Settlements and Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation). [n.d.]. *Design and Implementation Evaluation of the Integrated Residential Development Programme: Study Report*. Available online: <http://www.dhs.gov.za/sites/default/files/u19/Design%20and%20Implementation%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Integrated%20Residential%20Development%20Programme.pdf> (accessed 14 May 2020).
- Habitat for Humanity. 2019. *The Impact of Social Facilitation in Building Sustainable and Integrated Human Settlements: Evidence from a comparative analysis of Pelican Park and Ruo Emoh communities on the Cape Flats*. Available online: <https://habitat.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HFSA-Impact-of-Social-Facilitation-in-Pelican-Park.pdf> (accessed 14 May 2020).
- Hendler Y and Fieuw W. 2018. *Exploring Partnerships with Local Government: A people's led approach to informal settlement upgrading*. Cape Town: CORC.
- Kroll A. 2015. Drivers of performance information use: Systematic literature review and directions for future research, *Public Performance & Management Review*, 38: 459–486.

- Levy C. 2015. Expanding the 'room for manoeuvre': Community-led finance in Mumbai, India. In Lemanski C and Marx C. *The City in Urban Poverty*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp 158–182.
- Molopi E and Ebrahim T. 2017. Spatial justice: Accountability through collaboration and confrontation. In GGLN (Good Governance Learning Network). *Navigating Accountability and Collaboration in Local Governance*. Cape Town: GGLN.
- Masiya T, Davids Y and Mazenda A. 2019. Effective public participation in municipal service delivery: The case of Nyanga township, *Administratio Publica*, 27(3): 27–47.
- Moonsaamy S. 2018. Presentation made at The Making of Modern African Cities, SAPI Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 14–18 July 2018.
- National Treasury. 2017. BEPP Core Guidance. Pretoria: National Treasury, CSP. Available online: [https://csp.treasury.gov.za/Resource%20\\_Centre/Conferences/Documents/BEPP%20Guidelines%20CSP2/BEPP%20Core%20Guidance%20v5.5.pdf](https://csp.treasury.gov.za/Resource%20_Centre/Conferences/Documents/BEPP%20Guidelines%20CSP2/BEPP%20Core%20Guidance%20v5.5.pdf) (accessed 1 April 2020).
- National Treasury. 2018. Strategic Planning Led Budgeting [DRAFT]: An Input into the Planning Reform Seminar (May). Pretoria: National Treasury, CSP.
- North D. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511808678.
- Pieterse E and Owens K. 2018. Johannesburg: Confronting spatial inequality, World Resources Report Case Study. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
- Palmer I, Moodley N and Parnell S. 2017. *Building a Capable State: Service delivery in post-apartheid South Africa*. London: Zed Books.
- SACN (South African Cities Network). 2016. State of Cities Report IV. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2017a. Urban Land Paper Series Vol 2: A transit-oriented development lens. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2018a. Urban Land Dialogue Series: "Knowledge constructed in dialogue". Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2018c. BEITT Meeting Report: Focusing on the political-administrative interface. Johannesburg: SACN. Available at: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report\\_Joburg-Oct-18.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report_Joburg-Oct-18.pdf)
- SACN. 2018d. BEITT Meeting Report: Sophiatown. Johannesburg: SACN. Available at: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report\\_Sophiatown-May-2018.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report_Sophiatown-May-2018.pdf)
- SACN. 2019a. Cities Political-Administrative Interface in the Built Environment. Johannesburg: SACN. Available at: <https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/BEITT-Political-Administrative-Interface-Research-Report.pdf>
- SACN. 2019b. BEITT Meeting Report: How institutions shape behaviour. Johannesburg: SACN. SACN. 2019c. BEITT Meeting Report: Skills and capacity for spatial transformation. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2020a. Built Environment Integration Practices. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2020b. BEITT Meeting Report: Understanding good community engagement practice. Johannesburg: SACN. Available at: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report\\_NMB-Feb-2020.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report_NMB-Feb-2020.pdf)
- SACN. 2020c. Virtual BEITT Meeting Report: Shifting practice in a time of crisis. Johannesburg: SACN. Available at: [https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report\\_Virtual-Meeting-21April-2020.pdf](https://www.sacities.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BEITT-Meeting-Report_Virtual-Meeting-21April-2020.pdf)
- SACN. 2020d. Integrated Development Plan Guidelines Review Support: Practice Note. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2021a. The Rules of the Game: A practitioner-centric review of the municipal performance management system in five South African cities. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SACN. 2021b. Municipal Legislative Alignment and Enablement Analysis Report. Johannesburg: SACN.
- SALRC (South African Law Reform Commission). 2019. Review of regulatory, compliance and reporting burdens imposed on local government by legislation, Issue Paper 37. Pretoria: SALRC.
- Senge P. 1990. *The Fifth Discipline*. New York: Random House.
- South Africa. 2005. The Intergovernmental Relations Act (No. 13 of 2005). Pretoria: Government Printers.
- Talking Transformation. 2020. "The Road to Ficksburg" The B(uilt) E(nvironment) I(ntegration) T(ask) T(eam) journey. [Podcast]. 19 March 2020. Available at: <https://anchor.fm/talking-transformation-po/episodes/Episode-21-The-Road-to-Ficksburg-The-Built-Environment-Integration-Task-Team-journey---reflections-on-governance-and-transformation-in-democratic-South-Africa-ebh161>
- Williams J. 2000. Urban transformation. *Cities* Vol. 17(3): 167–183.

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

---

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <b>4IR</b>   | Fourth Industrial Revolution  |
| <b>AbM</b>   | Abahlali baseMjondolo   |
| <b>AFD</b>   | French Development Agency   |
| <b>AFUS</b>  | African Forum for Urban Safety  |
| <b>AIDS</b>  | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome                                   |
| <b>ANC</b>   | African National Congress   |
| <b>ARPP</b>  | Aller River Pilot Project   |
| <b>ASEZ</b>  | Atlantic Special Economic Zone  |
| <b>ATO</b>   | African Traders Organisation  |
| <b>AUC</b>   | African Union Commission  |
| <b>BCCM</b>  | Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality                                |
| <b>BEITT</b> | Built Environment Integration Task Team                               |
| <b>BEPP</b>  | Built Environment Performance Plan                                    |
| <b>BNG</b>   | Breaking New Ground   |
| <b>BRICS</b> | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa                         |
| <b>BRT</b>   | Bus Rapid Transit   |
| <b>C40</b>   | C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group                                   |
| <b>CAHF</b>  | Centre for Affordable Housing Finance                                 |
| <b>CAP</b>   | Climate Action Plan   |
| <b>CbA</b>   | Community-based Adaptation  |
| <b>CBO</b>   | Community-Based Organisations   |
| <b>CDFC</b>  | Common Data Framework for Cities                                      |
| <b>CFF</b>   | Cities Finance Facility   |
| <b>CHC</b>   | Community Health Care Centre  |
| <b>CHEC</b>  | Cape Higher Education Consortium                                      |
| <b>CID</b>   | City Improvement District   |
| <b>CITI</b>  | Cape Innovation and Technology Institute                              |
| <b>COGTA</b> | National Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs |
| <b>CoJ</b>   | City of Johannesburg  |
| <b>COSUP</b> | Community Oriented Substance Use Programme                            |
| <b>CRAM</b>  | Coronavirus Rapid Mobile survey                                       |
| <b>CSIR</b>  | Council for Scientific Innovation and Research                        |
| <b>CSO</b>   | Civil Society Organisation  |
| <b>CSP</b>   | Cities Support Programme  |
| <b>CSU</b>   | City Sustainability Unit  |
| <b>CTIN</b>  | Civic Tech Innovation Network   |
| <b>DA</b>    | Democratic Alliance   |
| <b>DAG</b>   | Development Action Group  |

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| <b>DBSA</b>    | Development Bank of South Africa  |
| <b>DDM</b>     | District Development Model  |
| <b>DEA</b>     | Department of Environmental Affairs   |
| <b>DHC</b>     | District Health Council   |
| <b>DHET</b>    | Department of Higher Education and Training   |
| <b>DHS</b>     | Department of Human Settlements   |
| <b>DMA</b>     | Disaster Management Act   |
| <b>DPLG</b>    | Department of Provincial and Local Government   |
| <b>DPSA</b>    | Department of Public Service and Administration   |
| <b>DRDLR</b>   | Department of Rural Development and Land Reform   |
| <b>DSW</b>     | Durban Solid Waste  |
| <b>EbA</b>     | Ecosystem-based Adaptation  |
| <b>e-BAMS</b>  | Electronic Building plans Application Management System   |
| <b>ECD</b>     | Early Childhood Development   |
| <b>ECDC</b>    | Eastern Cape Development Corporation  |
| <b>ECSECC</b>  | Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council  |
| <b>EDJV</b>    | Effingham Development Joint Venture   |
| <b>EDP</b>     | Economic Development Partnership  |
| <b>EFF</b>     | Economic Freedom Fighters   |
| <b>EISD</b>    | Environmental and Infrastructure Services Department  |
| <b>e-LAMS</b>  | Electronic Land Application Management System   |
| <b>ELIDZ</b>   | East London Industrial Development Zone   |
| <b>e-MAMS</b>  | Electronic Municipal Application Management System  |
| <b>EPWP</b>    | Expanded Public Works Programme   |
| <b>Eskom</b>   | Electricity Supply Commission   |
| <b>FCDO</b>    | Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office  |
| <b>FRACTAL</b> | Future Resilience for African Cities and Land   |
| <b>GAPP</b>    | Government and Public Policy  |
| <b>GCIF</b>    | Global City Indicator Facility  |
| <b>GCR</b>     | Gauteng City-Region   |
| <b>GCRO</b>    | Gauteng City-Region Observatory   |
| <b>GDP</b>     | Gross Domestic Product  |
| <b>GDS</b>     | Growth Development Strategy   |
| <b>GEAR</b>    | Growth, Employment and Redistribution   |
| <b>GGDA</b>    | Gauteng Growth and Development Agency   |
| <b>GGT2030</b> | Growing Gauteng Together 2030   |
| <b>GIZ</b>     | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation) |
| <b>GPG</b>     | Gauteng Provincial Government   |
| <b>GVA</b>     | Gross Value Added   |
| <b>HDA</b>     | Housing Development Agency  |
| <b>HIV</b>     | Human Immunodeficiency Virus  |
| <b>HSRC</b>    | Human Sciences Research Council   |
| <b>IBPSA</b>   | International Budget Partnership South Africa   |

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| <b>ICDG</b>      | Integrated City Development Grant                   |
| <b>ICLEI</b>     | International Local Government for Sustainability   |
| <b>IDP</b>       | Integrated Development Plan                         |
| <b>IIP</b>       | Integrated Infrastructure Plan                      |
| <b>ILASA</b>     | Institute for Landscape Design for South Africa     |
| <b>INK</b>       | Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu                        |
| <b>IPP</b>       | Independent Power Producer                          |
| <b>IRP</b>       | International Resource Panel                        |
| <b>ISO</b>       | International Organization for Standardization      |
| <b>ISOCARP</b>   | International Society of City and Regional Planners |
| <b>IT</b>        | Information Technology                              |
| <b>IUDF</b>      | Integrated Urban Development Framework              |
| <b>JCPZ</b>      | Johannesburg City Parks and Zoo                     |
| <b>JDA</b>       | Johannesburg Development Agency                     |
| <b>JICA</b>      | Japan International Cooperation Agency              |
| <b>JMPD</b>      | Johannesburg Metro Police Department                |
| <b>JSB</b>       | Joint Services Board                                |
| <b>KZN</b>       | KwaZulu-Natal                                       |
| <b>KZNPPC</b>    | KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Planning Commission        |
| <b>LAB</b>       | Local Action for Biodiversity                       |
| <b>LBSAP</b>     | Local Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan         |
| <b>LED</b>       | Local Economic Development                          |
| <b>LGNF</b>      | Local Government Negotiating Forum                  |
| <b>LGTA</b>      | Local Government Transition Act                     |
| <b>LGTAS</b>     | Local Government Turnaround Strategy                |
| <b>M&amp;E</b>   | Monitoring and Evaluation                           |
| <b>MBDA</b>      | Mandela Bay Development Agency                      |
| <b>MCPP</b>      | Municipal Climate Protection Programme              |
| <b>MDB</b>       | Municipal Demarcation Board                         |
| <b>MDTT</b>      | Multi-Disciplinary Task Team                        |
| <b>MEC</b>       | Member of the Executive Council                     |
| <b>Metro</b>     | Metropolitan Municipality                           |
| <b>MFMA</b>      | Municipal Finance Management Act                    |
| <b>MIG</b>       | Municipal Infrastructure Grant                      |
| <b>MILE</b>      | Municipal Institute of Learning                     |
| <b>MinMEC</b>    | Meeting between a Minister and nine provincial MECs |
| <b>MISA</b>      | Municipal Infrastructure Support Agency             |
| <b>MMC</b>       | Member of the Mayoral Committee                     |
| <b>MTREF</b>     | Medium Term Revenue and Expenditure Framework       |
| <b>MTSF</b>      | Medium Term Strategic Framework                     |
| <b>MuniMoney</b> | National Treasury municipal finance database        |
| <b>NatuReS</b>   | Natural Resources Stewardship Programme             |
| <b>NBSAP</b>     | National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans   |

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| <b>NCCAS</b>  | National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy         |
| <b>NDHS</b>   | National Department of Human Settlements            |
| <b>NDP</b>    | National Development Plan                           |
| <b>NGO</b>    | Non-Governmental Organisation                       |
| <b>NMBM</b>   | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality                     |
| <b>NMBMM</b>  | Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality        |
| <b>NPO</b>    | Non-Profit Organisation                             |
| <b>NT</b>     | National Treasury                                   |
| <b>NUA</b>    | New Urban Agenda                                    |
| <b>PAC</b>    | Pan Africanist Congress of Azania                   |
| <b>PAIA</b>   | Promotion of Access to Information Act              |
| <b>PEP</b>    | Public Employment Programme                         |
| <b>PFMA</b>   | Public Finance Management Act                       |
| <b>PPE</b>    | Personal Protective Equipment                       |
| <b>PPP</b>    | Public-Private Partnership                          |
| <b>PRASA</b>  | Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa               |
| <b>PSC</b>    | Project Steering Committee                          |
| <b>PV</b>     | Photovoltaic  |
| <b>RDP</b>    | Reconstruction and Development Programme            |
| <b>RSC</b>    | Regional Service Council                            |
| <b>SACCD</b>  | South African Council on City Data                  |
| <b>SACN</b>   | South African Cities Network                        |
| <b>SALGA</b>  | South African Local Government Association          |
| <b>SALRC</b>  | South African Law Reform Commission                 |
| <b>SAMWU</b>  | South African Municipal Workers' Union              |
| <b>SANBI</b>  | South African National Biodiversity Institute       |
| <b>SANCO</b>  | South African National Civic Organisation           |
| <b>SAPS</b>   | South African Police Service                        |
| <b>SARS</b>   | South African Revenue Service                       |
| <b>SASDIA</b> | South African Shack Dwellers International Alliance |
| <b>SCM</b>    | Supply Chain Management                             |
| <b>SCODA</b>  | South African Open Data Almanac                     |
| <b>SDBIP</b>  | Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan     |
| <b>SDF</b>    | Spatial Development Framework                       |
| <b>SDG(s)</b> | Sustainable Development Goal(s)                     |
| <b>SEA</b>    | Sustainable Energy Africa                           |
| <b>SERI</b>   | Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa     |
| <b>SETA</b>   | Sector Education and Training Authority             |
| <b>SEZ</b>    | Special Economic Zone                               |
| <b>SHRA</b>   | Social Housing Regulatory Authority                 |
| <b>SIP</b>    | Strategic Infrastructure Plan                       |
| <b>SJC</b>    | Social Justice Coalition                            |
| <b>SLF</b>    | Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation                  |



|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| <b>SMME</b>       | Small Medium And Micro Enterprises  |
| <b>SMS</b>        | Short Message Service   |
| <b>SoCR</b>       | State of Cities Report  |
| <b>SoE</b>        | State of Environment  |
| <b>SPCDF</b>      | Slovo Park Community Development Forum  |
| <b>SPLUMA</b>     | Spatial Planning and Land-Use Management Act                                      |
| <b>SPV</b>        | Special Purpose Vehicles  |
| <b>Stats SA</b>   | Statistics South Africa   |
| <b>StepSA</b>     | Spatial Temporal Evidence for Planning in South Africa                            |
| <b>SUP</b>        | Summary for Urban Policymakers  |
| <b>TB</b>         | Tuberculosis  |
| <b>TEC</b>        | Transitional Executive Council  |
| <b>TMR</b>        | Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation                             |
| <b>TOD</b>        | Transit-Oriented Development  |
| <b>TRMP</b>       | Transformative Riverine Management System   |
| <b>UBF</b>        | Umbilo Business Forum   |
| <b>UCGL</b>       | United Cities and Local Governments   |
| <b>UCT</b>        | University of Cape Town   |
| <b>UDZ</b>        | Urban Development Zone  |
| <b>UEN</b>        | Urban Energy Network  |
| <b>UISP</b>       | Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme                                       |
| <b>UKFCDO</b>     | United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office                       |
| <b>UN</b>         | United Nations  |
| <b>UN-Habitat</b> | United Nations Human Settlements Programme  |
| <b>USAID</b>      | United States Agency for International Development                                |
| <b>USRG</b>       | Urban Safety Reference Group  |
| <b>VPUU</b>       | Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading                                       |
| <b>WASH-FIN</b>   | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Finance   |
| <b>WCCD</b>       | World Council for City Data   |
| <b>WCEDP</b>      | Western Cape Economic Development Partnership                                     |
| <b>WCG</b>        | Western Cape Government   |
| <b>Wesgro</b>     | Tourism, trade and investment promotion agency for Cape Town and the Western Cape |
| <b>WRI</b>        | World Resources Institute   |
| <b>WSDP</b>       | Water Services Development Plan   |

# PHOTO CREDITS


---

|     |   |     |   |
|-----|---|-----|---|
| 16  | @shawn_9_3  | 206 | SACN Archive  |
| 20  | @shawn_9_3  | 207 | SACN Archive  |
| 36  | Durban Tourism  | 208 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality   |
| 40  | City of Johannesburg Communications Department                            | 212 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality   |
| 44  | Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality  | 216 | City of Johannesburg  |
| 48  | @bayandajele3   | 217 | @thewaldi   |
| 49  | @chrisseptember4  | 219 | City of Johannesburg Communications Department                          |
| 50  | @natesvw11  | 220 | SACN Archive  |
| 51  | @bayandajele1   | 224 | City of Ekurhuleni  |
| 52  | @Grahamdrobz  | 226 | City of Ekurhuleni  |
| 60  | Group Communications & Marketing City of Tshwane                          | 227 | City of Ekurhuleni  |
| 68  | Durban Tourism  | 228 | Durban Tourism  |
| 74  | @Javasphotos1   | 229 | @jethrosnydersphotography   |
| 87  | Group Communications & Marketing City of Tshwane                          | 230 | Durban Tourism  |
| 97  | Ciske Smit – Our Future Cities  | 232 | @goku_explores  |
| 105 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality   | 236 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality   |
| 128 | @natesvw  | 238 | @crazyinja88  |
| 135 | eThekweni PRC   | 239 | @mlungisibusakwe1   |
| 136 | Toffa2021   | 240 | André Oosthuizen  |
| 139 | Durban Tourism  | 242 | André Oosthuizen  |
| 146 | Faheemah – Barefoot Facilitator   | 243 | André Oosthuizen  |
| 168 | @HigherGroundAfrica   | 244 | Top pic – @tysonfree<br>Bottom pic – Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality |
| 171 | @thewaldi   | 248 | Both pics @natesvw  |
| 181 | SACN Archive  | 250 | @natesvw  |
| 182 | SACN Archive  | 251 | @natesvw  |
| 198 | Top pic – @embellishment3<br>Bottom pic – Bellhaven Harm Reduction Centre | 252 | Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality   |
| 198 | @embellishment3   | 253 | Graeme Williams   |
| 200 | SACN Archive  |     |   |





ISBN 978-0-620-98277-1



9 780620 982771 >

 South African  
**CitiesNetwork**

Tel: + 27 11 407 6471 • Fax: + 27 11 403 5230

P.O. Box 32160 • Braamfontein 2017

[www.sacities.net](http://www.sacities.net)